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Less attention has been paid to the information receivers in disaster communication, 
particularly the way disaster information is considered to be trustworthy by the affected 
community and how it can increase collective participation in disaster communication, both 
at research and practice levels. Meanwhile, a lack of trust will prevent the transformation of 
information into usable knowledge for an effective disaster response because people are 
unlikely to pay attention and act on information provided by someone with whom they have a 
lack of trust. Thus, this study aims at gaining an in-depth understanding of community-based 
disaster communication by conducting a qualitative case study of Jalin Merapi (Jaringan 
Informasi Lingkar Merapi - Merapi Circle Information Networks) in the 2010 Mt. Merapi 
eruption with 35 in-depth interviews and 2 focus groups in Mt. Merapi surroundings. Data 
analysis was conducted with constructivist grounded theory in order to construct a theoretical 
understanding of how disaster communication is regarded as trustworthy and able to 
encourage collective participation. by the affected community, and the combined usage of 
traditional media and new media in disaster communication.  
This thesis explains that the perception of the affected community of trustworthy and 
effective official communication is strongly related to the government‘s promptness in 
sharing complete and accessible official disaster information, and willingness to engage the 
affected community and their local knowledge. Thus, this thesis argues that the affected 
community is worth to be engaged in disaster communication for their culturally-embedded 
communication and tie strength of the social network, which can encourage trust and 
collective participation. In order to effectively facilitate community participation, disaster 
communication needs to engage multiple media, both the advanced internet-based and 
traditional media, based on the local communication behaviours. Moreover, this thesis details 
important roles of the affected community as reliable sources, couriers, and on-the-ground 
verifiers of local information about the needs of survivors and the affected areas during a 
disaster response. Finally, this thesis acknowledges the challenges of disaster communication 
with a bottom-up communication approach by involving local communities, based on their 
knowledge and vulnerabilities in responding to a disaster. Also, this thesis has a number of 
important implications for the future practice of disaster communication, especially in 
facilitating effective and trustworthy disaster information for the affected community.  
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Introduction: The information chaos in the 2010 Merapi eruption 
 
Located in Indonesia, Mt. Merapi is one of the most active and hazardous volcanoes in the 
world (Mei et al., 2011, Surono et al., 2012, Troll et al., 2015); it erupts approximately every 
4-6 years with varying intensity and magnitude (Surono et al., 2012). From 26 October to 30 
November 2010, Mt. Merapi erupted continuously and ejected 130 million cubic metres of 
volcanic material (Sumarti et al., 2014). The 2010 eruption affected 1,335,885 residents 
living in four different districts in the areas surrounding Mt. Merapi, where more than 350 
people died, 400,000 were displaced, and there were losses of US$ 300 million (Mei et al., 
2011, Surono et al., 2012, Brown et al., 2015). Vulcanologists claimed that the 2010 eruption 
showed an unusual pattern of eruption (Brown et al., 2015), and was the mountain‘s most 
explosive eruption for more than 100 years (Mei et al., 2011, Surono et al., 2012, Sumarti et 
al., 2014). Being aware of the hazard of the volcano, the local communities living on the 
slopes of Mt. Merapi have been developing their indigenous knowledge of Mt. Merapi and 
participating in various workshops on disaster management to build their disaster capacities 
(Birowo, 2010). Despite an adequate level of community preparedness, the authorized 
contingency plans were not able to cope with the unexpectedly overwhelming scale of the 
2010 eruption (Mei et al., 2011). Consequently, the local governments were not able to 
provide enough information for the affected community to be able to respond to the eruption 
effectively. Moreover, one of the national television stations reported misleading information 
that led to more chaos and casualties. The absence of essential information in the disaster 
communication made the disaster response more chaotic, increased distrust in the authorities, 
and created a demand for alternative trustworthy information sources besides the authorities 
and the mass media. 
In any kind of disaster response, there is an increased demand for information from both 
affected and unaffected communities (Doan et al., 2012, Gao et al., 2011, Schellong, 2007, 
Spence et al., 2009, Tanner et al., 2009). People seek out and rely on trustworthy and 
accurate information to mitigate a hazard‘s uncertainty (Ferrante, 2010, Uslaner, 1999, 
Widén-Wulff et al., 2008). In order to fulfill a demand for trustworthy information, an 
affected community often turns to mass media, local government, or other community 
members as the dominant information sources in disaster response (Johnson, 2007). Yet, the 
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unpredictable nature of natural hazards may prevent the authorities from providing effective 
disaster communication. Similarly to the 2010 Merapi eruption, other extreme natural 
disasters (for example, the 1997 Red Valley flood (Hindman and Coyle, 1999), the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011), and the 2005 Hurricane 
Katrina (Moody, 2013)) have showed that relying on the local government as the sole 
information source may be insufficient because of the possibility the authorities are 
overwhelmed with demands. Moreover, as also happened in the 2010 Merapi eruption, the 
mainstream mass media tend to take sides with particular parties for their own economic 
interest or exaggerate their information to promote their program ratings (Dougall et al., 
2008, Gutteling and Dijkstra, 2012).  
Thus, there is a strong risk that mass media and local government may lose their credibility as 
trustworthy and reliable information sources in a disaster response, as happened in the 2010 
Merapi eruption. In this condition, community members turn to each other in seeking 
information they need to respond to a disaster effectively. However, the trustworthiness and 
the reliability of community-based disaster communication are still regarded as controversial 
both by researchers and emergency managers. Therefore, in order to gain an in-depth 
understanding about community-based information networks, this thesis is a case study of the 
role of Jalin Merapi (Jaringan Informasi Lingkar Merapi – Information Network of Merapi 
circle) during the 2010 Merapi eruption in Indonesia. Jalin Merapi is a trusted community-
based network built on local person-to-person relationships and community participation, 
which could provide rapid and trustworthy information (BBC, 2012, IFRC, 2015). As this 
thesis will show, the Jalin Merapi network was considered trustworthy by the affected 
community; it was able to facilitate community participation in disaster communication, and 
it drove collective action in helping the victims, especially with volunteer help and direct 
distribution of aid.  
This introductory chapter describes the focus on trustworthy and participatory community-
based disaster communication. Starting with an explanation of the series of continuous 
eruptions of Mt. Merapi in 2010, this chapter outlines the specific context of disaster 
response that led to the usage of the Jalin Merapi network at that time. The chapter also 
provides the general background of the study regarding the vulnerability of Indonesia to 
various natural hazards, the vulcanology of Mt. Merapi, and the socio-cultural context of the 
local communities living in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi. After identifying several 
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research gaps in disaster communication, the chapter outlines the questions of this research in 
order to address the identified gaps and ends with an overview of the thesis. 
 
1.1. The 2010 Merapi eruption 
On 20 September 2010, increasing seismic activity (increasing ground inflation, earthquakes, 
increasing temperature, and gas release) led to the status of Mt. Merapi being elevated from 
―Normal‖ (Level I) to ―Waspada‖ (Level II/ Advisory) indicating the possibility of a small to 
moderate eruption. On 21 October 2010, the status was increased to ―Siaga‖ (Level III/ 
Watch) indicating the increased likelihood of an eruption. On 25 October 2010, Mt. Merapi‘s 
status was increased once again to “Awas” (Level IV/ Alert) indicating a high possibility of a 
large eruption. Consequently, the Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi (Center 
for Vulcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation - CVGHM) declared a safety zone 
outside a radius of 10 kilometres from the Mt. Merapi summit. Further, the local government 
instructed the at-risk community living within a radius of 10 kilometres from the Mt. Merapi 
summit to evacuate (Mei et al., 2013, Mei et al., 2011, Sumarti et al., 2014, Surono et al., 
2012). 
As in previous eruptions, most of the local communities living in the at-risk areas were 
reluctant to evacuate because the mountain‘s spiritual gatekeeper Mbah Maridjan refused to 
leave at that time. The action of Mbah Maridjan was presumably based on the cultural belief 
that obliges the sacred elders, including the gatekeeper, to stay during an eruption in order to 
pray and ask the spirit to move the lava back to its original places in the river streams and 
cliffs (Triyoga, 1991). Unfortunately, some community members emulated his action and 
believed that the supernatural power of Mbah Maridjan would protect them from Mt. 
Merapi‘s hazards (Lavigne et al., 2008, Donovan, 2010, Donovan et al., 2012, Troll et al., 
2015), regardless of the official instruction to evacuate. Others refused to evacuate for 
another reason, as explained by a community member below: 
We didn‘t know that Mt. Merapi could erupt so enormously. Never been 
that way before. When we were being told to evacuate, we thought that 
there was no way Mt. Merapi erupted in the way they [the local 
government] imagined […] We thought, ―ah, ra popo” [ah, it will be fine] 
[…] The local governments also didn‘t expect that the eruption would be so 
enormous, I think (Setiawan, personal interview, 5 June 2014).       
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Prior to the 2010 eruption, the local community had been repeatedly unresponsive, or even 
resistant, to the official instruction to evacuate. Part of the reason for this reluctance to heed 
the official warnings was likely to have been caused by the local volcanic mythology related 
to the traditional beliefs of the precursors of an eruption, the local socio-economic 
vulnerability of the local community including the reluctance to abandon livestock and 
livelihood, and the undermined trust in the official disaster response (Donovan, 2010, 
Donovan et al., 2012, Dove, 2008, Lavigne et al., 2008, Schlehe, 1996, Triyoga, 1991, Troll 
et al., 2015). The particular socio-cultural behaviour of the villagers on Mt. Merapi will be 
described in detail in the next subsection. 
Only 35 hours after Mt. Merapi‘s status was increased to the highest level, it erupted 
explosively at 05:02 pm (local time) on 26 October 2010. The eruption produced a 12 km 
high ash plume, visible flame, bursts of volcanic material, and 8 km pyroclastic hot air flows 
from the southern part of Mt. Merapi (Sumarti et al., 2014, Surono et al., 2012). The first 
eruption forced the affected community to evacuate to the temporary Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDP) camps (Tempat Pengungsian Sementara). According to the National Disaster 
Management Agency (Badan Penganggulangan Bencana Nasional – BNPB), the first 
eruption resulted in 22,599 registered evacuees and 40 casualties, with the dead including 
spiritual gatekeeper Mbah Maridjan and those who remained behind with him (Donovan et 
al., 2012, Mei et al., 2013, Surono et al., 2012).  
The Merapi volcano erupted explosively between 26 and 29 October 2010. On 30 October 
2010, the volcanic activities increased as the volcanic ash reached 30 kilometres from the 
Merapi vent and 22-minute pyroclastic flows travelled to the southern parts of Mt. Merapi 
(Mei et al., 2011). At that time, the number of registered evacuees increased to 55,048 (Mei 
et al., 2013). However, the authorities officially declared their prediction that the volcanic 
activities of Mt. Merapi would decrease following the lava release (The Jakarta Post, 30 
October 2010), which was later proven to be inaccurate as Mt. Merapi continued erupting. 
The mainstream mass media, particularly television, did not seem to be a reliable information 
source in reporting the increasing volcanic activities during the eruption. A national 
television channel inaccurately reported that the pyroclastic flows would reach areas within 
thirty kilometres from the Merapi summit. In fact, it was the volcanic ash that spread up to 
thirty kilometres away. A volunteer from the Jalin Merapi network explained that the 
inaccuracy apparently was caused by the lack of technical knowledge of the reporter to 
distinguish between the terminology of hot pyroclastic flows and volcanic ash (Sundary, 
14 
 
personal interview, 21 April 2014). As a result, the inaccurate report led to chaos and the loss 
of several lives in traffic incidents when people fled in panic. Consequently, some people 
rose up in protest and rejection of this information source; they picketed the particular 
national television channel and requested its reporters leave the surroundings of the Merapi 
volcano. 
TV One‘s news was exaggerated and DREADFUL!!! The reporter 
broadcasted that a hot pyroclastic flow was coming. It was just volcanic ash. 
There were lots of traffic accidents because people were panicking. Some 
died […] We, as Merapi refugees, committed to BOYCOTT AND REPEL 
THE TV ONE‘S REPORTERS!!! WE DO NOT NEED THEM!!!!! 
(Prenanto, 2010). 
On 3 November 2010, a new eruption of Mt. Merapi was three times larger than the first one. 
It sent up five-kilometre clouds of ash and gas continuously for more than an hour. After the 
explosion, volcanic tremors continued intensely and 38 pyroclastic flows occurred 
continuously reaching areas 12 kilometres away from the Merapi summit. Consequently, the 
CVGHM vulcanology centre extended the exclusion zones to 15 kilometres replacing the 
initial restriction of 10 kilometres, and recommended 32 villages in the Hazard Zone III 
(Kawasan Rawan Bencana - KRB) to evacuate (Mei et al., 2013; CBS News, 2010; Reuters, 
2010a). The extension forced the local government to move the evacuees from the 10 
kilometres-away-IDP-camps set up earlier. There were 76,031 registered evacuees  and no 
casualties on that particular date (Mei et al., 2011, Surono et al., 2012). 
On 4 November 2010, again, Mt. Merapi erupted continuously for 24 hours on  a scale five 
times bigger than the 3 November eruption. At midnight, the eruption generated a 17 km 
altitude ash column and pyroclastic flows travelled 16 kilometres (15 km radial distance from 
the summit) to the western part of Mt. Merapi. On 5 November 2010, the authorities 
extended the exclusion zone into the areas within a radius of 20 kilometres from the summit 
in the southwestern and southern parts of Mt. Merapi. The flows claimed the lives of 367 
people who had not evacuated or re-evacuated at that time (Surono et al., 2012). After the 
extension of the exclusion zone up to 20 kilometres from the summit, a massive exodus of 
evacuees moved down the Merapi slopes early on the morning of 6 November.  
Unfortunately, the official instruction did not include a detailed list of which villages were 
included within the radius of 20 kilometres (Mei et al., 2013). The absence of information, 
consequently, created confusion among the Merapi people about whether they had to 
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evacuate or not. Moreover, there were many complaints about a lack of information about the 
destinations for re-evacuation because there were not enough IDP camps beyond the point of 
the 20 km exclusion areas. In addition to not being able to provide information about where 
to evacuate, the local government also could not provide information about how to re-
evacuate for all the affected communities and the vehicles prepared by the local governments 
were not sufficient to accommodate all evacuees. Consequently, Wijoyono from Jalin 
Merapi, declared that most of the affected community re-evacuated randomly in panic, as 
they did not know where to go. He specifically stated:  
In the second big eruption, nobody knew where to re-evacuate […] Some 
IDP camps managed by the government had been directed to particular 
areas […] but, in general, they only followed their instincts […] They 
followed the crowds to get away from Merapi […] [They] just ran no matter 
where (personal interview, 17 March 2014).  
Sharing his experience of the 2010 eruption, Mujianto, a volunteer from MMC FM, stated 
that the people from his village had to move eleven times in one night because there was no 
clear authorised instruction about the destinations for re-evacuation. He specifically stated: 
It was chaotic. We moved eleven times in one night because of inaccurate 
information […] At that time, there were not any officials on standby […] 
The local government didn‘t point out the evacuation points. They let us 
evacuate wherever we wanted to […] There were not any official IDP 
camps […] We were scattered for our own lives […] including the 
community leaders. A family was separated […] lost the other family 
members […] The 2010 eruption was our first experience of evacuating. 
Selo used to be less affected by a Mt. Merapi eruption compared to the 
western areas (personal interview, 26 April 2014). 
At that time, the local authorities appeared to be overwhelmed because of the extensively 
affected areas and the large number of IDPs. Similarly to the community members, the 
authorities also experienced a chaotic disaster response and this was described by Yatin, a 
head of a village, and Kushartati, an officer of the Regional Disaster Management Agency 
(BPBD), as below: 
At that time, our efforts to seek and communicate with our residents were 
chaotic. We couldn‘t communicate with our own residents […] We could 




The scale of the eruptions was unpredictable. Actually, we had been 
informed that the eruption was going to be big, but we didn‘t know how big 
it was going to be (Kushartati, focus group, 19 June 2014). 
There were at least 600 IDP camps scattered in several districts of Central Java province and 
Yogyakarta province (Mei et al., 2011) and many of them were unofficial. An officer of the 
Magelang government stated that the government agencies had to focus on the permanent IDP 
camps and could not cover the unofficial and temporary ones; they were not able to record the 
refugees who were outside the official IDP camps. As a result, the local authorities lost track 
of the number of evacuees and faced difficulties in distributing assistance (Mei et al., 2013). 
Similarly, Iman, a district officer told his story: 
 [A] head of a village lost his villagers. A husband didn‘t know where his 
wife was evacuated to […] Everything was uncoordinated […] Some had 
too much aid, some had a lack [of aid]. When they needed rice, they got 
eggs […] It really happened in the Notoyudan sub-district (focus group, 19 
July 2014). 
Many evacuees experienced unprepared IDP camps with inadequate facilities, lack of food 
and clean water, and sanitation issues (Lie, 2012). According to an interviewed community 
member, this situation was worsened because of a lack of knowledge about emergency 
preparedness bags on the part of the evacuees; they tended to evacuate without bringing 
anything and totally relied on logistic aid from outsiders. He explained: 
Where should we have gone? How? […] We just ran! […] We didn‘t know 
the evacuation routes…We re-evacuated three times on foot […] Until now, 
we didn‘t know where the IDP camps were […] We just knew that the 
[downwards sloping] roads were the evacuation routes […] We just knew 
that we had to run and reach it [the nearest IDP camp]. After we reached it, 
that was it! […] Nobody took care of us […] The IDP camps were not ready 
yet […] We were only accommodated without any further management […] 
It happened several times […] We did not bring anything with us when we 
evacuated […] The most important thing is information. Whom should we 
ask what we need? What should we do as evacuees? We didn‘t know whom 
to ask (Setiyoko, personal interview, 8 July 2014). 
Responding to the overwhelmed local authorities, the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, declared that the 2010 Merapi eruption was a national disaster. Therefore, he 
designated the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) to manage the disaster 
response. Referring to the Regulation of the Head of BNPB Number 14 (2010), the BNPB 
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took responsibility for the regional disaster management by establishing Pos Komando 
Tanggap Darurat (Emergency Operation Center - EOC) in Yogyakarta city located 
approximately 30 km away from Mt. Merapi.  
On 6 November, the eruption became less intensive, although Mt. Merapi‘s status still 
remained at the Alert level with occurrences of pyroclastic flows and lava (Sumarti et al., 
2014, Surono et al., 2012). Starting from 13 November 2010, the exclusion zone was 
gradually reduced for the four affected districts (Mei et al., 2011) and on 3 December 2010, 
the status of Mt. Merapi was decreased to the Alert stage (Level III) (Sumarti et al., 2014, 
Surono et al., 2012), and the eruptive activities subsided. Although Mt. Merapi stopped 
erupting, the volcanic hazards did not stop. By February 2011, the 150 million cubic metres 
of volcanic mudflow had turned into 282 massive lahars and destroyed 215 houses, damaged 
463 houses, took away 12 bridges and 20 sabo-dams
1
, and flooded some major roads (Lie, 
2012, Surono et al., 2012). 
 
In the 2010 Merapi eruption, the absence of adequate official information and inaccurate 
news reporting led to distrust in the mass media and the local governments. The distrust 
simultaneously encouraged a critical demand for alternative information sources from the 
Merapi communities, particularly from their internal social networks. In responding to the 
demand, the broadcasters of five community radio stations located on the slopes of Mt. 
Merapi decided to use their pre-existing community-based network called the Jalin Merapi 
network for acquiring and sharing trustworthy information about the survivors in all affected 
districts in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi. The community radio stations were Lintas 
Merapi FM in Klaten district, K FM in Magelang district, Merapi Merbabu Community 
(MMC) FM in Boyolali district, Gema Merapi FM in Sleman district, and Lahara FM in 
Magelang district. This thesis shows how the Jalin Merapi network was used to counter any 
misleading news from the national television, foster the process of official information 
sharing in order to reach villagers in remote critical areas, and share specific local 
information about the affected community during the 2010 Merapi eruption. The Jalin Merapi 
network was able to trigger and facilitate community participation to help the affected 
                                                          
1
 The structures of Sabo-dams have been performing the functions of damming the rivers prone to lahar and 
decelerating the discharge of lahars in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi since 1970s (Lavigne et al., 2000).  
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community as a response to the overwhelmed local governments, as reported by Reuters 
(2010b): 
Jalin Merapi has helped with shelters that are unable to receive 
government aid […] the government had established communication 
systems for volunteers and soldiers but it could not cover all of the 700 
refugee centres scattered around the foot of Mount Merapi […] When the 
community announced they needed help to provide meals for 30,000 
people, the meal was ready in four hours.  
Additionally, the Jalin Merapi network was able ‗to answer a classic question of disaster 
response; how to connect individuals providing support to individuals who need it‘ 
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies - IFRC, 2015, p. 190). 
More importantly, the Jalin Merapi network was regarded as a comprehensive example of 
how a local community can take an important role in disaster response (OCHA, 2013), 
particularly when the mass media and the local government were unable to effectively 
function as information sources. How the Jalin Merapi achieved its success during the 2010 
Merapi eruption is discussed in detail throughout this thesis. This thesis specifically 
investigates the conditions for the level of trust it gained and how that trust led to the 
collective participation of the eruption-affected Merapi residents in generating effective 
community-based disaster communication. In other words, this thesis offers valuable lessons 
from the Jalin Merapi network for future disaster response.  
 
1.2. Background of this study 
This thesis is a case study of the Jalin Merapi Network and how it was used to fulfill the 
affected community‘s demand for trustworthy information coming from their own 
surroundings and facilitate community-based disaster communication during the 2010 Merapi 
eruption. In this section, to provide a brief understanding of the case study, I will describe the 
vulnerability of Indonesia to natural hazards, particularly volcanic hazards, and I will further 
describe Mt. Merapi in detail. According to The International Association of Vulcanology 
and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior (National Geographic, 2008) and Surono et al. (2012), 
Mt. Merapi is worth studying because of its history of frequently destructive eruptions and 
the proximity of its hazards to a dense human population (National Geographic, 2008, Surono 
et al., 2012). Therefore, in this subsection, the description of Mt. Merapi will focus on two 
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different aspects: its vulcanology, and the socio-cultural context of the local community 
living on its slopes.  
1.2.1. Indonesia and natural hazards 
Comprising more than 17,000 islands and 254.5 million people on highly unstable tectonic 
plates (World Bank, 2014), Indonesia is considered to be one of the countries most 
vulnerable to disaster, with the highest risk of and constant threat of natural hazards in the 
world (see Figure 1), including volcanoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, and landslides 
(Dougall et al., 2008, IFRC, 2015). Between 1900 and 2015, Indonesia experienced 464 
natural disasters with 241,548 casualties, losses of more than US$ 29 billion and 29,677,381 
residents have been affected (EM-DAT, 2016).  
 
Figure 1. Natural disaster risks of Indonesia (UN OCHA, 2011). 
Regarding the risk of volcanic eruptions, the Indonesian archipelago is geographically 
located in the western part of the Pacific Ring of Fire, the ‗hemisphere-girdling string of 
volcanic mountains‘ where the world‘s active volcanoes are concentrated (D‘Arcy Wood, 
2014, p. 8; Siagian, 2014; Tupper at al., 2004). The volcanic belt of Indonesia consists of 129 
active volcanoes in areas of 7,000 kilometres in total length and an average of 200 kilometres 
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in width (Triyoga, 1991) and the number of active volcanoes in Indonesia represents 13 per 
cent of active volcanoes in the whole world (PVMBG, 2014). Consequently, Indonesia is the 
riskiest country for volcanic hazards, because 66 per cent of the global volcanic threat lies in 
Indonesia; while the second-riskiest volcanic country, the Philippines, has only 10.6 per cent 
of global volcanic hazards (Brown et al., 2015). In addition to a large number of active 
volcanoes, there is a dense population living on the lower slopes of the volcanoes (Brown et 
al., 2015). Specifically, 60 percent of the Indonesian population is centred on 16 active 
volcanoes, including Mt. Merapi (Voight et al., 2000b). As a result, a volcano eruption often 
results in loss of life and property (Suryo and Clarke, 1985). 
Indonesia has experienced numerous massive volcanic eruptions, including the super-
eruption type that occurs approximately every 130,000 years. In fact, three (out of five) of the 
most explosive volcanic eruptions on earth occurred in Indonesia, namely the eruptions of 
Mt. Toba, Mt. Tambora, and Mt. Krakatoa; the other two were the eruptions of Mt. Taupo in 
New Zealand and Mt. Katmai in Alaska (Winchester, 2003). The super-eruption of Mount 
Toba occured in Toba, Sumatra approximately 75,000 years ago. This eruption formed a 
volcanic crater 80 km long and 30 km wide and its 3,000 cubic kilometres of volcanic ash 
may have caused major climatic change for a decade or more (Brown et al., 2015). In more 
recent history, numerous volcanic eruptions in Indonesia have caused over 130,000 casualties 
since 1800 (Thouret et al., 2000, Voight et al., 2000), including the two largest eruptions in 
modern history. The 7 magnitude eruption of Tambora in 1815 is referred to as ‗the eruption 
that changed the world‘, as it threw ‗human communities worldwide into chaos‘ (D‘Arcy 
Wood, 2014, p. 8), caused 60,000 casualties, and affected global climate and crop growing 
conditions for three years. The 1883 Krakatoa eruption, referred to as the loudest sound ever 
recorded in human history, produced over 80 km of pyroclastic flows, the volcanic dust of 
which changed the appearance of the world‘s sky and claimed 36,417 casualties (Butt, 2014, 
Suryo and Clarke, 1985, Brown et al., 2015, Winchester, 2003).  
1.2.2. The Mt. Merapi eruptions 
The present Mt. Merapi has existed for 2000 years and has erupted frequently ever since 
(Badan Geologi, 2014)
2
. The frequent eruptions of Mt. Merapi have been characterised by a 
                                                          
2 The geological history of Mt. Merapi is classified into four periods: (1) the period of Pra-Merapi (Pre-Merapi) 
between 700,000 and 60,000 years ago; (2) the period of Merapi Tua (Old Merapi)  between 60,000 and 8,000 
years ago; (3) the period of Merapi Muda (Young Merapi) between 8,000 and 2,000 years ago; and (4) the 
period of Merapi Baru (New Merapi) between 2000 years ago to present (Badan Geologi, 2014). 
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fluctuating intensity and magnitude, and showed a change of eruptive pattern between the 
19
th
 and the 20
th
-century eruptions. In the 19
th
 century, Mt. Merapi had one or more intense 
eruptions every 44 – 79 years, but in the 20th century, it has erupted less intensively every 4 
– 6 years (Surono et al., 2012; Suryo & Clarke, 1985). It erupts gently (Volcanic Explosivity 
Index - VEI 1) every 2 – 7 years, explosively (VEI 2) every 8-15 years, catastrophically (VEI 
3) every 26-54 years, and cataclysmically (VEI 4) every 150 – 500 years (Badan Geologi, 
2014; Schlehe, 1996; Sumarti et al., 2014; Thouret et al., 2000). In the last 2000 years, there 
have been at least 93 major eruptions (Troll et al., 2015). These occurred in 1675 with 
approximately 3000 casualties, in 1872 with 200 casualties, in 1930 with 1369 casualties, in 
1954 with 64 casualties, in 1976 with 28 casualties, in 1994 with 64 casualties, in 2006 with 
2 casualties, and in 2010 with more than 350 casualties (Triyoga, 1991, Troll et al., 2015). In 
an eruption, Mt. Merapi releases lava, causes earthquakes and a collapsed lava dome, 
followed by a type of pyroclastic flows (wedhus gembel in the Javanese language) consisting 
of rotating clouds of 200-300
 o
C gases that move at a speed of 200-300 km/h, lahars
3
, forest 
fires, landslides and disease epidemics (Triyoga, 1991, Dove, 2008, Surono et al., 2012).  
1.2.3. The Javanese community’s response to an eruption of Mt. Merapi 
Mt. Merapi is located on Java Island (Suryo & Clarke, 1985; Troll et al., 2015), the most 
densely populated island in Indonesia with 56.9 percent of the total population (Indonesian 
Statistics Center, 2016) and only 7% of the total land (Troll et al., 2015). The population 
density on Java Island is 1,109 people per km2; meanwhile, the average population for the 
whole country is only 132 people per km2 (Indonesian Statistics Center, 2016). Specifically, 
there are more than 1.1 million people living on the slopes of Mt. Merapi with a population 
density up to 500 people per km2 (Troll et al., 2015). This large number of people does not 
only live on the flanks of Mt. Merapi, but as close as five kilometres from the summit (Troll 
et al., 2015) which is over 2900 m (Suryo and Clarke, 1985, Triyoga, 1991, Troll et al., 
2015).  
 
                                                          
3 Lahars is an Indonesian word for fast-moving volcanic mudflows consisting of volcanic debris and water 





Figure 2. Villages within a radius of 5 km, 10 km, 15 km, and 20 km from the summit of Mt. Merapi 
(BNPB, 2010). 
 
In addition to the dense population, Mt. Merapi is also well known for the Javanese culture of 
the villagers who live on its slopes, which strongly influences their behaviours in responding 
to an eruption
4
 (Lavigne et al., 2008, Schlehe, 1996, Schlehe, 2008, Donovan, 2010, 
Donovan et al., 2012, Dove, 2008, Troll et al., 2015). The Merapi volcano is located in the 
middle of the Java island of Indonesia and is considered to be the ‗heart‘ of the Javanese 
cultural environment (Lie, 2012, p. 5). Mt. Merapi‘s Javanese residents embrace Javanese 
culture in their daily lives; they speak the Javanese language, practise Javanese traditions and 
have close kinship structures (BPPTKG, 2014).  
For the last 2000 years, the local communities have experienced cycles of the eruptive 
intensity of Mt. Merapi, which have affected their daily life and influenced their cultural 
development (Troll et al., 2015). Thus, based on the patterns of the repetitive eruption, the 
villagers living on the Mt. Merapi slope have developed and inherited an indigenous culture 
of hazard
5
 as well as cultural and psychological relationships with the Merapi volcano to deal 
with and perceive the risk of volcanic hazards (Donovan, 2010, Sudrajat, 2014, Donovan et 
al., 2012, Troll et al., 2015, Dove, 2008, Brown et al., 2015). Accordingly, the culture of 
hazard acts as a creative coping mechanism by domesticating hazards for the community‘s 
                                                          
4
 Indonesia is regarded as one of the countries with ‗an intense cultural relationship with volcanoes and hazards‘ 
(Donovan, 2010, p. 118). Some of its active volcanoes (e.g. Mt. Merapi, Mt. Sumbing, Mt. Sindoro, Mt. Dieng, 
Mt. Sibayak, Mt. Sinabung) have been closely associated with cultural hazard knowledge owned by the local 
communities living on their slopes (Lavigne et al., 2008).  
5
 A culture of hazards often occurs in places where an at-risk community has repetitively experienced a constant 
disaster caused by natural hazards, and the disaster caused significant casualties and material damage for many 
generations (Bankoff, 2004, p. 111; Wenger & Weller, 1973, p. 9).  
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benefits on a day-to-day basis (Bankoff, 2004; Bankoff et al., 2015; Birowo, 2010; Donovan 
et al., 2012; Dove, 2008; Moore, 1964). 
In the culture of hazards, Mt. Merapi has been personified as the respected ‗Mbah‘
6
 Merapi 
and a sacred kingdom for powerful baureksa spirits, which is closely related to the human 
world and other mystical kingdoms (Triyoga, 1991, Donovan, 2010, Dove, 2008, Troll et al., 
2015). The natural processes of an eruption of Mt. Merapi have been personified as the spirit 
of the Merapi people. An eruption is often regarded as a celebration or a ceremony held in the 
spirits‘ kingdom (Schlehe, 1996). The volcanic materials (lahars, ash, and gas cloud) erupted 
are regarded as the waste from the renovation or cleaning of the Merapi kingdom (Triyoga, 
1991, Dove, 2008); the sounds of strong wind and rain, and loud rumblings of thunder are the 
sound of a party held in the Merapi kingdom or the sound of a group of spirits visiting, or 
from the kingdom of the South Sea (Triyoga, 1991). The Merapi people have a high sense of 
perceived safety because of their ancestors‘ graves and the little mountains surrounding their 
villages (including the Mt. Bibi Merapi – the Aunt of Mt. Merapi). They believe that the 
spirits of their ancestors will help and protect them from the hazards of Mt. Merapi (Triyoga, 
1991, Troll et al., 2015). They also believe that Mt. Merapi would not be brave enough to 
overstep its aunt and destroy their villages (Triyoga, 1991). In other words, everything in the 
Mt. Merapi ecosystem is considered to have life and soul.  
Each district surrounding Merapi has its local wisdom regarding the livelihood and myths of 
Merapi. For example, in the southern part of the Merapi volcano, the local communities in 
the Sleman district annually alleviate the Merapi spirit through an offering ceremony called 
Labuhan (Triyoga, 1991). The Labuhan ceremony is usually performed by the spiritual 
gatekeeper and aims at praying for prosperity, and the safety of the King and the citizens of 
Yogyakarta from Mt. Merapi hazards (BPPTKG, 2014; Donovan, 2010; Donovan et al., 
2012; Lie, 2012; Schlehe, 1996; Troll et al., 2015). In the ceremony, the gatekeeper sacrifices 
foods, flowers, and incense to the spirit of Mt. Merapi respectfully (Triyoga, 1991) in order to 
maintain peace and a good relationship with the Mt. Merapi spirit, and persuade them to 
change the possibility of a future eruption (Troll et al., 2015). In the northern part of the 
Merapi volcano, the Selo communities also have a similar cultural ceremony called Sesaji 
Alam (natural offerings) to the Merapi volcano. The ceremony is aimed at expressing 
                                                          
6
 ―Mbah‖ is an appellation for elders in the Javanese language. 
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gratitude for the fertile soil and praying for the security of their livelihoods from Merapi 
hazards. 
In addition to the cultural myth of the Merapi kindom and the cultural ceremony, the 
existence of a spiritual gatekeeper of Mt. Merapi has been an inseparable part of the culture 
of hazard owned by the local communities living in the Mt. Merapi surroundings.  For 
example, many people in the Sleman district believe that the spiritual gatekeeper
7
 of Mt. 
Merapi knows everything about it and can lead them in critical times (Combine, 2007, 
Triyoga, 1991), because of his ability to communicate with Mbah Merapi and its spiritual 
army (Triyoga, 1991). Thus, some community members living on Mt. Merapi‘s slopes tend to 
trust the gatekeeper rather than the local governments in matters to do with Mt. Merapi, 
particularly regarding evacuation decisions (Donovan, 2010, Troll et al., 2015). The 
gatekeeper also has the authority in deciding whether someone may climb Mt. Merapi or not, 
and acts as a skipper in a missing-person rescue (Triyoga, 1991). Moreover, apart from the 
formal leadership, the gatekeeper is an honoured cultural leader at the community level. 
Many people come to him for his blessings, his advice on a wedding date or for a name for a 
new-born baby, etc.  
As the result of the cultural geo-mythologies, the local communities living on the slopes of 
Mt. Merapi have been well-known as risk-taking societies when it comes to an eruption of 
Mt. Merapi. The cultural belief in the supernatural has become the community‘s framework 
for familiarizing, adapting, and domesticating volcanic hazards in everyday practices (Dove, 
2008), and providing a ‗sense of subjective security‘ in facing uncertainty during an eruption 
(Triyoga, 1991; Troll et al., 2015, p. 161). Moreover, unlike the outsiders who perceive Mt. 
Merapi‘s eruption as a hazardous event that should be feared, the local communities regard 
the hazards of Mt. Merapi as not destructive, but blessed catalysts for the economic benefit of 
their lives (Triyoga, 1991, Troll et al., 2015, Dove, 2008, Donovan et al., 2012, Lavigne et 
al., 2008). The local communities believe that they are part of the Mt. Merapi macrosystem. 
Thus, they have to act respectfully and behave in harmony with their peers, Mt. Merapi, and 
the spirit of the Merapi kingdom. By doing so, they believe that they help the Merapi 
kingdom to balance the cosmos and they will achieve fertility, safety, and a prosperous life in 
return (Triyoga, 1991).  
                                                          
7
 The spiritual gatekeeper (juru kunci) of Mt. Merapi is designated by the Sultan (the King of Ngayogyakarta 
Kingdom) who is also the Governor of the Province of Yogyakarta.  
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In addition to the influences of the cultural beliefs, the worry about daily livelihoods and 
livestock are the other socio-culture aspects of the Merapi people that increase their 
reluctance to evacuate during an eruption (Donovan, 2010). Specifically, livestock is regarded 
as an indispensable part of their livelihood, the main sources of income and part of their 
families
8
 (Bachtiar, 2014). Similarly to the previous Merapi eruptions, most community 
members hesitated to evacuate because they did not want to leave their livestock as they 
might starve or be stolen in the 2010 Merapi eruption. If they did decide to evacuate, there 
was a high level of stress among the refugees because they were worried about their livestock. 
This is clearly described by one of the volunteers from the Jalin Merapi network: 
The communities were reluctant to evacuate…they worried about their 
livestock. If they evacuated, who would feed their livestock? This is related 
to their cultural behaviour. For the Merapi people, the livestock are their 
livelihood…When Merapi erupted, they had to evacuate and leave their 
livestock. They were extremely anxious (Dewi, personal interview, 26 
March 2014). 
In the 2010 Merapi eruption, similarly to the previous eruptions, it was challenging to keep 
the evacuees from returning home every time Mt. Merapi showed slightly decreasing volcanic 
activity. The volcanic hazards were still threatening despite the decrease in activity showed by 
Mt. Merapi at times. Many of the evacuees insisted on coming home or doing a part-time 
evacuation (returning to their homes during the day and staying at the IDP camps at night) to 
take care of their livestock (Lavigne et al., 2008, Donovan, 2010, Troll et al., 2015). To 
prevent people from doing so, the national government guaranteed to give five to ten million 
Indonesia Rupiah (approximately $523 to $1047 NZD) for each head of the cattle owned by 
the Merapi people (Kompas, 2010). Yet, the offer would only partly meet the concerns of the 
affected community, as the livestock was more than just financial assets for them. 
 
1.3. Research gaps in the existing research on disaster communication 
Taking the strong influences of the socio-cultural factors into account, the disaster 
communication in responding to the Merapi eruption must be understood as a complex 
communication process. Disaster communication is more than a function of informational 
messages. It can not be easily defined as communicating information about physical and 
                                                          
8
 The behavior of returning home from evacuation to take care of livestock and crops also occurs in other 
countries, such as the Philippines, Ecuador, and Tonga (Brown et al., 2015).  
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economic safety. Instead, how disaster information is shared and understood in different 
ways by different audiences, and how different audiences perceive and address hazards 
differently cannot be separated out in disaster communication. Thus, in order to understand 
this, it is important to involve community‘s perspective in disaster communication. 
Reinforcing the importance of the community‘s roles at the global level, the United Nations 
has released the Sendai Framework calling for special attention to community engagement 
and community participation in and a people-centred approach to an effective disaster 
management, developed in the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in 
Sendai, Japan. The people-centered approach is sometimes focused on as a matter of 
communication, as described below: 
To invest in, develop, maintain and strengthen people-centered multi-
hazard, multisectoral forecasting and early warning systems, disaster risk 
and emergency communications mechanisms, social technologies and 
hazard-monitoring telecommunications systems; develop such systems 
through a participatory process; tailor them to the needs of users, including 
social and cultural requirements, in particular gender; promote the 
application of simple and low-cost early warning equipment and facilities; 
and broaden release channels for natural disaster early warning information 
(United Nations, 2015, p. 21).  
Similarly, in the World Disaster Report 2015, the International Federation of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Society (IFRC) also emphasised the focus on communication with and 
participation of local actors as the key criteria for efficient and accountable humanitarian 
responses, because: 
Their effectiveness goes beyond their proximity. They are also effective 
because of the perspective they bring. Because they are present in 
communities before a crisis hits, they see it not as an event in and of itself, 
but as something that is linked to the past, to unaddressed risks, 
vulnerabilities and inequalities (IFRC, 2015, p. 8).  
The concept of local is contextual, that is, depending on an individual‘s point of view. For 
example, from the international perspective, the locals can be conceptualized as those, 
including the community and the government, at the national level; from the national 
perspective, the locals can be conceptualized as those at the regional level. In this thesis, the 
locals are defined as the members of an affected community who personally experience a 
natural hazard.  
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Global awareness of community roles in disaster communication has been implemented 
recently in a growing number of ‗local volunteer tech communities‘; these have been 
activated in the 2012 Hurricane Sandy and the 2015 Nepal earthquake, where user-generated 
information was collected from local community networks and satellite imagery by utilizing 
social media, OpenStreetMap, or the Ushahidi platform (IFRC, 2015, p. 184-186). While the 
local volunteer tech communities have shown great success in working with local 
communities using novel communication technologies, those efforts have focused on 
collecting the insiders‘ information for the use of the outsiders in order to help the affected 
community effectively. However, they still overlook the affected community‘s own need for 
trustworthy disaster information. It is important to fulfil this particular need as the affected 
community suffers most from a disaster. 
Similarly to the way the local volunteer tech communities have overlooked the needs of 
affected communities themselves for trustworthy disaster information in recent disasters, I 
identify a lack of attention in the current studies to the perspective of the affected community 
as the information receivers in disaster communication. This is particularly the case in regard 
to how disaster communication is regarded as trustworthy by the affected community, and the 
community‘s offline characteristics than can facilitate collective participation. Most studies 
of disaster communication have failed to recognize the way information receivers, in 
particular the affected community, regard trustworthiness based on their perspectives of 
historical, ethnic, and cultural values on how they understand a hazard (Steelman et al., 2015, 
Reinhardt, 2015, Ferrante, 2010, de Certau, 1998, cited in Kitley, 2001, Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). Instead, disaster response including disaster communication 
generally focuses on the efforts to rescue the victims, minimize the damage and provide the 
physical essentials, as acknowledged by Bankoff (2004, p. 110): 
There is still a tendency to underestimate the extent to which disasters are 
also perceptual phenomena, occurrences that take place and shape in 
people's minds. The focus on people's physical, social, economic and 
political vulnerabilities and their comparable capacities or coping practices 
obscure just how much these are likewise cerebral events that influence 
behavior.  
Moreover, studies of disaster communication often focus on designing messages and 
selecting media to ensure the intended disaster information is well-received by the affected 
community (Reynolds and Seeger, 2005, Steelman and McCaffrey, 2013, Witte and Allen, 
2000). Yet, focusing on message design and media usage does not always guarantee trust 
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encouragement (Steelman et al., 2015). In other words, even if an information source/channel 
becomes the most used means of disaster communication, it may not necessarily be regarded 
as equally useful or trustworthy by its audiences, and vice-versa. 
Moreover, numerous scholars have shifted their focus on participatory disaster 
communication to internet-based media, particularly social media, as the new means to 
promote community participation in disaster response. The shifting focus is understandable 
as online communication technologies can enable timely, unfiltered, and interactive 
backchannel disaster communication by expanding new forms of peer-to-peer information-
seeking and information-providing behaviour (Doan et al., 2012, Dufty, 2012, Gao et al., 
2011, Lindsay, 2011, Palen, 2008, Taylor et al., 2012, BBC, 2012, Nugroho, 2011, OCHA, 
2013, Potts et al., 2011, Fearn-Banks, 2011). However, engaging social media does not 
automatically provide trustworthy and accurate disaster communication, even though it may 
simplify the participation mechanism for community members. Online participatory disaster 
communication may be compromised by a combination of overloaded information, myriad 
information sources, and a lack of aggregation and validation mechanisms (Gao et al., 2011, 
Austin et al., 2012, Crowe, 2012, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). Consequently, in 
order to be considered for official response efforts, social media creates other demands for 
continual organizing, monitoring of credibility, and additional verification mechanisms to 
establish reliable disaster communication for publicly-concerned decision making (Palen et 
al., 2010, Palen and Liu, 2007, IFRC, 2015). These demands reinforce the importance of 
understanding what the local audience, the affected community in this case, regards as  the 
trustworthiness of disaster communication. 
The recent focus on the usage of online media for community participation seems to overlook 
the other traditional means of communication, which still exist and are still used by local 
communities. This thesis addresses this gap in the research regarding media usage in 
community-based disaster communication. The practices of disaster communication seem to 
assume that, in order to have a better response, a community simply needs to own and 
advance the novelty of current communication technologies. However, using novel 
communication technology does not always guarantee the trustworthiness of disaster 
communication. Communication technologies are simply the tools that can expand the 
existing capacity of a community to ‗respond, communicate, and organise collectively‘ in 
order to fulfil their local needs (IFRC, 2015, pp. 186, 201). This means that pre-existing 
communication technologies are still useful for facilitating a successful disaster 
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communication. The IFRC (2015, pp. 194-195) identified that technology usage in a disaster 
communication is more likely to be successful when ‗the volunteers are familiar with the 
technology‘ and the technology ‗directly supports an existing activity‘. However, how a 
disaster-affected community participates in disaster communication through a combination of 
traditional (‗leave-behind‘) media and new media is still under-explored.  
Moreover, disaster management practice, including disaster communication, has been very 
much dominated by the Western scientific paradigm (IFRC, 2015). The approach may 
generate useful lessons for those countries with a high level of scientific awareness, but it is 
by no means clear that it will be equally applicable to developing countries with varying 
levels of scientific awareness and culturally affected communication behaviours that are often 
unaligned with the ‗assumption of avoidance-loss so much favoured by Western social 
science‘ (Bankoff et al., 2015, p. 9). The community perspective in developing countries, 
particularly, has been less explored and less documented in existing studies of disaster 
communication; meanwhile, the levels of vulnerability and risk of many developing countries 
often ‗greatly exceed their capacity to respond to disaster‘ (Nottage et al., 2014, United 
Nations, 2015, p. 24).  
In summary, the thesis addresses three gaps in existing research on disaster communication: 
how disaster communication is regarded as trustworthy by the affected community, the 
community‘s offline characteristics that can encourage collective participation, and the 
combination usage of traditional media and new media in disaster communication. The thesis 
focuses on trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication in 
disaster response by specifically investigating the case study of the Jalin Merapi network 
during the 2010 Merapi eruption in Indonesia. In responding to the debate on whether 
community-based disaster communication is trustworthy, the objective of this research is to 
investigate the roles of an affected community in encouraging trustworthiness and collective 
participation based on their knowledge, experiences, and vulnerabilities. This thesis has not 
necessarily sought evidence to support verified or accurate community-based disaster 
communication, but rather investigates the social capital of the affected community that can 
establish perceived trust and community participation in community-based disaster 
communication. Further, this thesis also expands the focus on community-based disaster 
communication to examine how an affected community participates in providing, verifying, 
and sharing disaster information in a trustworthy community network based on their own 
knowledge, experiences and vulnerabilities. 
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Therefore, it is argued that disaster management needs to start moving from a supply-driven 
approach based on the priorities of outsiders to a demand-driven approach based on the 
priorities of the affected community. Placing the efforts of disaster response on the existing 
capacity and participation of the targeted community is an effective way to ensure 
effectiveness and simultaneously reduce community vulnerability (IFRC, 2015, Troll et al., 
2015). Hence, disaster communication needs to build and frame a new perspective on citizen-
based activities, which arise out of peer-to-peer communication in a disaster context, that 
serve important tactical, community capacity building and emotional functions (Palen and 
Liu, 2007, Sutton et al., 2008, Crowe, 2011, Bankoff et al., 2015). Again, community-based 
disaster communication enables the affected community to promote local voices and serve 
local interests by participating in information sharing.  
 
1.4. Research questions 
As the thesis focuses on trustworthiness and participatory community-based disaster 
communication in a disaster response, it is expected to answer the following research 
questions: 
RQ1. What do the members of the affected community regard as trustworthy and 
community-engaging official disaster communication in responding to the Mt. Merapi 
eruption? 
RQ2. How can community-based disaster communication be regarded as trustworthy and 
facilitate community participation in disaster response? 
RQ2.1. How can a culture-embedded communication encourage trust and collective 
participation in community-based disaster communication? 
RQ2.2. How can the tie strength of local networks encourage trust and collective 
participation in community-based disaster communication?  
RQ3. How does the affected community participate in community-based disaster 
communication through media multiplexity? 
Based on the research questions, the arguments are expected to be able to turn the gap 
between a community-based informal approach and an organisational formal approach in 
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disaster management into an integrated information network that can fulfil the information 
needs of affected communities as the first responders. Again, since the area of trustworthy 
and participatory community-based disaster communication in developing countries is still 
under-explored, the thesis is expected to enrich the literature of disaster communication and 
disaster management. 
 
1.5. Thesis outline 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. This chapter has described the event of the 2010 
Merapi eruption, the Jalin Merapi community-based network, and the socio-cultural context 
of the local communities living in the area around Mt. Merapi surrounding as the background 
of the thesis. It identified the significant need for trustworthy community-based disaster 
communication during a disaster response, especially when both the mass media and the local 
government lose their credibility as trustworthy and reliable information sources for local 
communities. This chapter also notes the gaps in existing research on disaster communication 
regarding trustworthy and participatory disaster communication from the perspective of the 
affected community. By selecting the case study of the Jalin Merapi network, the thesis 
addresses these gaps by investigating what is regarded as trustworthy in the Jalin Merapi 
network by the affected community and how this community participated in the network 
during the 2010 Merapi eruption. As this chapter identifies, the objective of the thesis is to 
investigate the social capital of an affected community in encouraging trustworthiness and 
facilitating collective participation in community-based disaster communication. 
Chapter Two reviews the multi-disciplinary literature of disaster management, disaster 
communication, community capacity, and community radio stations that is used as a 
theoretical framework in this thesis. The research gaps identified in Chapter One are also 
discussed further in the chapter. Specifically, Chapter Two reviews the theoretical 
relationships between institutional logic in official disaster management, and trust and 
effectiveness; between culture and trust; between the tie strength of the social network, trust, 
and information sharing; between media multiplexity and community participation; and 
between community radio stations and community participation in natural disasters. A multi-
disciplinary theoretical framework is used to develop an understanding of trustworthy and 




Chapter Three establishes the methodological framework adopted in the study in order to 
construct an integrated and comprehensive theoretical understanding of trustworthy and 
participatory community-based disaster communication. It explains the constructivist and 
interpretative paradigms as the epistemological and ontological foundations of this study, 
which also become the grounding logic for the selection of the qualitative methodology in 
this study. The chapter also details the selections of constructivist grounded theory  and the 
qualitative case study of the Jalin Merapi network in the 2010 Merapi eruption adopted in this 
study. The discussion is followed by descriptions of the theoretical sampling used in 
determining the research participants, and the research methods of in-depth interviews and 
focus groups used to gather data in this study. Further, the chapter outlines the ethical 
procedures followed to gain access to the research participants, protect the rights of the 
research participants, and meet the Indonesian administrative requirements for conducting 
this study. The chapter ends with an explanation of the methodological steps of the data 
analysis in the grounded theory applied in constructing a theoretical framework describing 
the patterns and relationships between the concepts of trustworthy and participatory 
community-based disaster communication in the study.  
Chapter Four acknowledges the absence of the perspective of an affected community 
regarding what the community members regard as trustworthy and community-engaging 
official disaster communication in practice. The chapter analytically addresses the first 
research questions by identifying that the local community‘s distrust of official disaster 
communication is based in a perception that official information is delayed and inaccessible, 
that officials and communities have different perceptions of risk, and official information 
channels have no scope for community engagement. The chapter explains the reciprocal lack 
of trust in the relationship between the authorities and the local community living in the area 
surrounding Mt. Merapi, which is strongly influenced by the communication behaviours of 
each party. Further, the chapter contrasts the community‘s perception of official disaster 
communication with the local governments‘ perception that community-based disaster 
communication is untrustworthy, based on their institutional and scientific logic and their 
perception that the affected community has an elevated perception of risk. This is followed 
by a discussion of community engagement that can be a bridge for the reciprocal trust 
between the authorities and the affected community.  
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As a response to the officials‘ lack of trust in community-generated disaster information 
detailed in Chapter Four, Chapter Five explains the way community-based disaster 
communication can be trustworthy and participatory, which addresses the second research 
question of this study. The chapter sets out the role of community radio stations as facilitators 
of trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication. The chapter 
discusses the social capital embedded in the involvement of the volunteers in the community 
radio stations. Being representative of the social capital owned by the Merapi people, the 
volunteers successfully encouraged trust and collective participation in the Jalin Merapi 
network during the 2010 Merapi eruption. In particular, the chapter details the way culture-
embedded disaster communication can encourage trust. It also details the positive role of the 
tie strength embedded in the personal social network owned by the community radio 
volunteers as members of the affected community, information sharing, and trust in disaster 
communication. The chapter will further discuss how the internal participatory mechanisms 
of the community radio system encourage a sense of community among their surrounding 
community members and lead to collective participation in Jalin Merapi. 
During the 2010 eruption, the Jalin Merapi network was recognised for the way it encouraged 
participation by the affected community, which enabled it to share disaster information from 
the affected community to the people outside the affected areas and vice-versa. Thus, Chapter 
Six addresses the third research question of this study by explaining the way the affected 
community participated in providing and sharing local information through the media 
multiplexity of Jalin Merapi. The chapter explores the integrated platform of media 
multiplexity used by the Jalin Merapi network, with the participation of the affected 
community, for providing and sharing information. In particular, the chapter details the use of 
media that are already commonly used in existing local disaster communication around Mt. 
Merapi, in order to make it easier for local people to participate in community-based disaster 
communication through the Jalin Merapi network. The chapter also details the engagement of 
the existing local social network of the affected community for facilitating information 
provided by isolated affected community members and extending the exposure of 
information sharing within the affected community.   
Still addressing the third research question, Chapter Seven specifically explains the process 
of community participation in verifying disaster information. It details Jalin Merapi‘s 
community-based verification mechanisms for ensuring the validity of the information 
provided by the affected community, by engaging voluntary participation of the other 
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affected community members, including the community radio volunteers, to verify the 
information on the ground. The chapter also details the way Jalin Merapi attempted to keep 
up with the fast-pace of information changes during the disaster response by publishing 
information about the needs of the evacuees without prior verification and verifying the 
information about the actual eruption before being published. However, community-based 
verification mechanisms were strongly rejected by the local governments, which heavily 
relied on an institutional logic of accountability. To give a clear explanation of the rejection, 
the chapter contrasts the community-based verification mechanisms with the official 
verification mechanisms in disaster communication. Further, focusing on the affected 
community as the most disadvantaged party in disaster response, this chapter discusses the 
compatibility of Jalin Merapi‘s community-based verification mechanisms with individuals‘ 
perspectives on verified and trustworthy disaster communication. Finally, Chapter Eight 
summarises the key arguments discussed in the previous chapters with reference to the 
research questions. The chapter also identifies the theoretical and practical contributions of 
the thesis, and provides suggestions for future study in order to gain a broader understanding 


















A central part of the 2010 Merapi eruption was the failure of the authorities to communicate 
effectively with the affected community. In order to understand this problem, it is not enough 
to understand what information was right or wrong, but what made the disaster 
communication inadequate. A key element in that is trust. The availability of trust can 
facilitate rapid decision-making during critical times and establish effective collective 
efficacy (Murayama et al., 2013, Reinhardt, 2015, Waugh and Sylves, 2002). Specifically, 
trust affects the overall quality of the communication process by increasing the efficiency of 
information seeking, and the resulting community participation based on information shared 
(Granovetter, 1973, Jaeger et al., 2007, Johnson, 2007, Tang et al., 2012, Uslaner, 2002). 
Aiming at achieving the positive effect of trust, some scholars emphasise the information 
source as a significant determinant of encouraging trust in disaster communication (Covello 
et al., 2001, Sandman, 1993, Fisher, 2013, Jaeger et al., 2007). They specifically identify that 
people are unlikely to pay attention and act on information provided by someone in whom 
they have a lack of trust, no matter how crucial the information is. Information from that 
source will be regarded as less trustworthy, less useful and thus ineffective, preventing the 
transformation of the information provided into usable knowledge. In other words, 
identifying the information sources that are considered to be trustworthy could be more 
important than identifying a specific medium for whether the information is considered 
trustworthy by the affected community. If a particular information source is regarded as 
trustworthy, it would be consistently regarded as trustworthy no matter what medium the 
information is being shared through. Conversely, if an information source is regarded as 
untrustworthy, its information would not suddenly be regarded as trustworthy when it is 
shared through a particular medium. Therefore, this chapter focuses on how a specific 
information source can encourage trust in disaster communication, particularly for the 
authorities and an affected community.  
Not only in this chapter, trust is such an important term throughout this thesis. The definition 
of trust here is closely related to confidence in the reliability of a person or a system, and an 
emotional feeling of ‗ontological security‘ (Giddens, 1990, p. 92). In defining the 
terminology of trust, I adopt the definition of Giddens. He defines trust as: 
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[C]onfidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of 
outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or 
love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles (technical 
knowledge) (1990, p. 34). 
The review of multi-disciplinary literature in the chapter is focused on the relationship 
between officials and the public in disaster communication, trustworthy and participatory 
community-based disaster communication, and community radio stations. In particular, I will 
begin the chapter by reviewing the literature of official disaster communication, particularly 
in regard to its institutional logic and its association with trustworthiness and effectiveness. 
Then, I will review the literature related to how a community‘s social capital (as the offline 
driving factors) can encourage trust and facilitate collective participation in community-based 
disaster communication without depending on a particular medium. Particular attention will 
be paid to the significance of the culture-embedded disaster communication and tie strength 
of the local social network. Further, I will review the literature on community participation 
and media multiplexity. As the study focuses on the community radio stations as the local 
actors of trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication, I will 
review the literature on the cultural characteristics of radio broadcasting and participatory 
mechanisms of radio management accordingly.   
It is important to emphasise that this chapter aims at using the literature to define the object 
of study and the relevant issues, but not to pre-theorise it. The literature review is useful for 
identifying how trust and community participation are usually maintained and the role they 
usually play. Further, the literature review aims at informing the analytical process to 
understand trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication, not 
necessarily to drive the construction of the understanding. The understanding of trustworthy 
and participatory community-based disaster communication is particularly built on a 
collaborative understanding between the research participants and myself as the researcher by 
adopting the constructivist grounded theory. The research methodology of constructivist 
grounded theoretical methodology will be discussed in the next chapter thoroughly.  
   
2.1. Trust and official disaster communication 
As a formal institution, the behaviours of a government agency, including disaster 
communication, are often solely based on institutional logics of the way an agency identifies, 
values, and sets itself as an organisation (Lammers, 2011, Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
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According to Friedland and Alford (1991) and Lowrey (2009, p. 48), institutional logics have 
been centralised on the symbolic and unquestioned power of organisational structure, habits, 
and norms in decision-making, and the ‗fruitfulness of loose coupling‘. Further, they describe 
that the logics have constituted how an organisation is supposed to perform its practices in 
connection with other institutions and which resources are available to elaborate. The logics 
also have simultaneously constrained institutional practices technically and materially.  
The practice of official disaster communication based on the institutional logic often creates a 
great gap between the authorities and the public, and has been contested frequently by the 
affected community who demand ‗creative responses‘ (Bankoff et al., 2015, p. 6). According 
to Lowrey (2009, p. 45), organisational practices, including official disaster communication, 
aim to:  
[S]eek public legitimacy through conformity with wider cultural ―accounts‖ 
of how an organisation or field is supposed to behave and which accord with 
the needs of other social, political, and economic institutions. 
The aim may become independent from organisations‘ functionalities and frequently buffer 
organisations from ‗the demands of external realities‘. Similarly, Bankoff et al. (2015, p. 14) 
identify that: 
Many DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction) organisations or policies are 
sometimes divorced from the reality…DRR staff and institutions are often 
aware of the gaps between their own goals and those of the people they are 
claiming to help. But they are often not willing to accept that this is a 
problem, or find it difficult to challenge the institutions‘ remit to take it into 
account. 
The authorities treat their formal structure of official disaster communication as a legitimacy 
that must be taken for granted by the public. As a result, they often overlook people‘s rights 
of inspection and control over their techniques and outputs of official disaster communication 
(Lowrey, 2009, Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In other words, the affected community‘s 
perception of the effectiveness and trustworthiness of official disaster communication is often 
neglected by the authorities in determining the success of official disaster communication. 
The authorities have solely evaluated their practice of official disaster communication based 
on institutional logic and not based on whether the practice has been able to fulfill the 
demands of the affected community during a disaster response. The lack of acknowledgement 
of the perspective of an affected community leads the first question of this study regarding 
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what the community members regard as trustworthy and participatory official disaster 
communication in practice. The community perspective needs to be addressed in order to 
identify the historical gap between the authorities and the affected community, and make the 
community feel more engaged in official disaster communication. More importantly, trust 
between local communities and authorities is particularly essential for a successful official 
disaster communication (Tang et al., 2012, Widén-Wulff et al., 2008).  
Yet, some scholars have identified a lack of trust in official disaster communication (Lavigne 
et al., 2008, Slovic, 1987, Slovic, 1993, Sandman, 1993, Chatfield et al., 2014). This has been 
mainly encouraged by a lack of an interactive exchange of information, a lack of community 
engagement using a collaborative mechanism in official disaster communication, and the 
bureaucratic hindrances in government systems of disaster management (Chatfield et al., 
2014, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Jaeger et al., 2007, Samadhi, 2014). Firstly, 
many government institutions still use a one-way and top-down approach in conducting their 
official disaster communication. Yet, despite being the conventional basis for official disaster 
communication, the unidirectional top-down model of information dissemination has 
increasingly failed to fulfil the growing demand for interactive communication (Palen, 2008, 
Reynolds and Seeger, 2005, Jaeger et al., 2007, Steelman et al., 2015). As a result, there has 
been a scarcity of refugee-originated official information because refugees have faced 
difficulty in communicating ‗what they consider significant‘ to the authorities (Sandman, 
1993, p. 586). OCHA (2013, p. 25) even identified that lack of two-way communication is a 
‗common and glaring deficiency‘ and ‗a persistent problem that has been observed in many 
natural disasters‘.  
Nonetheless, the unidirectional top-down communication model does not necessarily 
guarantee accessibility to official disaster information by the affected community. Some 
official disaster information remains quarantined and disaster affected communities often 
have difficulty in accessing the information; survivors become frustrated due to a lack of 
relevant information (Kanayama, 2012). Particularly in Indonesia, Tanesia (2007) evaluates 
that the official disaster communication is mostly dedicated to delivering official 
information9 to general audiences through mass media; there has been no sustainable 
information framework that is specifically dedicated to delivering official information to the 
vulnerable people in disaster zones. Meanwhile, in addition to the reliance on established 
                                                          
9
 The terminology of ‗official information‘ here is referring to the disaster-related information that is officially 
released by the authorities.  
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expertise, Giddens (1990) identifies that trust (and lack of trust) in an abstract system, such as 
official disaster communication, is also influenced by individuals‘ experiences of receiving 
updated information through various communication media from the authorities. 
Secondly, the lack of interactivity in official disaster communication shows a lack of priority 
on the critical value of the feedback of information receivers, including the affected 
community. The governments often see community members simply as targets to be reached 
rather than as citizens to be consulted and involved on a continuing basis (Bakir and Barlow, 
2007, Palen, 2008). Consequently, authorities have rarely engaged the affected community in 
a collaborative mechanism in official disaster communication. For example, in 2014, IFRC 
and UNDP identified that only 13 out of 31 studied countries had a government policy that 
regulated local civilian participation in disasters. Yet, the existence of policies for community 
participation does not guarantee a smooth implementation because there may be a lack of 
clear procedures, or the policies may not embrace all aspects of a civil society such as 
indigenous practices (IFRC, 2015). Subsequently, the lack of interactivity and the lack of 
community engagement are most likely to make official disaster communication less useful 
and trustworthy (Steelman et al., 2015, Tang et al., 2012). In a similar fashion, Giddens 
(1990) agrees that simply connecting lay public and experts is not enough to encourage trust 
between them; they need to be regularly bound up with each other to establish friendship to 
be taken for trustworthiness. 
Thirdly, in regard to the bureaucratic hindrances in government systems, Chertoff (2005), 
Samadhi (2014), and Murayama et al. (2013) identify that different administrative levels of 
government often result in a culture of bureaucratic silos and sectoral ego. Specifically, in 
Indonesia, both the Indonesian central government and the regional governments share very 
similar authorities and responsibilities in disaster management (Butt, 2014). This 
jurisdictional overlap can lead to an institutional paralysis because policies over the same 
issue may differ. Furthermore, bureaucratic silos, sectoral egos, and jurisdictional 
overlapping often result in unnecessarily layered and repetitive coordination, and an inability 
to connect multiple emergency plans. The authorities may face difficulties in producing rapid 
decision-making, regardless of the need for a timely response. Samadhi (2014, p. 178) has 
identified that the ‗core strategic threat‘ to the trustworthiness of the Indonesian official 
disaster management is the public‘s perception of internal corruption in government agencies 
(Donovan et al., 2012).  
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Effective dissemination of official disaster information can be a vital form of assistance for 
affected communities to reduce uncertainty and panic, and be a reference for effective aid 
based on the affected communities‘ real needs (BBC, 2012, WHO, 2001). However, the lack 
of interactivity, the lack of community engagement, and the bureaucratic hindrances of 
official disaster communication can create a communication gap between a community and 
the authorities, which prevents the effectiveness of information exchange accordingly. As a 
solution to the gap, Donovan (2010), Fraser and Estrada (2001), Lavigne et al. (2008), 
Moody (2013), Murayama et al. (2013), Sandman (1993), and United Nations (2015) suggest 
that the authorities need to engage the voices of the disaster-affected community members in 
their policies. Particularly in official disaster communication conducted by the authorities 
who are mostly the outsiders, Bankoff et al. (2015) affirm that it is important to engage local 
actors to reduce the likelihood of failure in disaster communication.  
Engaging citizen-centric disaster communication can provide immediate benefits both for the 
authorities and the affected community. On the side of the authorities, they can have a better 
understanding of what is happening at the grassroots level, so they can effectively respond to 
the real needs of the affected community in a way that the community accepts and complies 
with. On the other side, the affected community can ‗understand government risk perception 
more clearly, so that they can take appropriate actions‘ in responding to a disaster (Chatfield 
et al., 2014, 160), and provide support to the authorities based on their knowledge, 
experiences, and resources (United Nations, 2015). More importantly, community 
participation can generate a sense of accountability for disaster response efforts, including 
those performed by all levels of government (Chatfield et al., 2014, Jaeger et al., 2007, 
Samadhi, 2014, Sandman, 1993, IFRC, 2015), which may further lead to trustworthiness 
(Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011; Steelman et al., 2015; Tang et al., 2012).  
 
2.2. Trust and community-based disaster communication 
Particularly in community-based disaster communication, disaster information emerges from 
individual resources; thus, trust is highly demanded by the information receivers when the 
personal information is raised into a collective attention (Widén-Wulff et al., 2008). 
Referring to Giddens (1990), again, trust between community members is different from trust 
in the authorities that relies on an expertise system. Giddens specifically describes that trust 
between individuals relies on the personal relationships between them: 
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There is that established between individuals who are well known to each 
other and who, on the basis long-term acquaintance, have substantiated the 
credentials which render each reliable in the eyes of other. Trustworthiness 
in respect of the disembedding mechanisms is different, although reliability 
is still central and credentials are certainly involved (p. 83). 
Yet, the trustworthiness and the reliability of community-generated disaster communication 
are still contentious. Austin et al. (2012), Gao et al. (2011), and Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative (2011) argue that community-generated information draws attention to the absence 
of a mechanism to aggregate and validate the information. Supported by the practicality of 
communication technologies, it is becoming easier to spread false or manipulated information 
for individuals (IFRC, 2015). On the other hand, Uslaner (1999) and Veszteg et al. (2015) 
argue that cooperative behaviours and mutual trust in interpersonal relationships increase in a 
disaster response, as individuals are more likely to expect reciprocity from a person than from 
an entity such as the government. The trustworthiness of community-based information and 
the cooperative actions of a community rely heavily on and simultaneously result from the 
social capital embedded in the social relationships and active interaction among individuals 
(Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Jaeger et al., 2007, Putnam, 2000, Tang et al., 2012). 
Similarly, Alder and Kwon (2001), and Fukuyama (1995) agree that social capital is an 
investment for trust establishment, and a level of trust may represent the level of social 
capital embedded within a social network.  
Specifically, Cohen et al. (2007) and Steelman et al. (2015) identify that community-based 
information is trustworthy because community members can take into account local concerns 
when providing locally-relevant information. Moreover, Palen et al. (2007), Putnam (1995), 
Rojas et al. (2011), and Stephenson (2005) add that the features of a community‘s social 
networks, both formal and informal, have a positive association with effectiveness, trust 
establishment, voluntary participation and collaboration among group members in a 
collective action. Following studies that support the trustworthiness of community-based 
information, this section will further elaborate on the literature of culture-embedded 
communication, as an attempt to provide locally-relevant information (as a cognitive 
dimension of social capital)10, and its association with trust encouragement and community 
participation. Also, the literature of tie strength, as one of the features of the social network 
                                                          
10
 Hazleton and Kennan (2000), Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), Tang et al. (2012), and Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) 
classify shared knowledge as a cognitive dimension of social capital, and a pattern of a social network as a 
structural dimension of social capital. 
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(as a structural dimension of social capital) of the affected community, will be considered 
along with its association with trust encouragement and community participation. Again, the 
literature of social capital, culture-embedded communication, and tie strength is used to 
identify the existing relationships between each of them and trust. Yet, the understanding of 
the relationships in this thesis is not merely based on pre-theorising the literature, but is 
driven beyond the limits of existing theories without abandoning those theories.  
2.2.1. Culture, trustworthiness, and collective participation  
In many cases of natural disasters, traditional cultural beliefs have been proven to have 
significant impacts, both positive and negative, on the vulnerability and disaster behaviours 
of an affected community (Troll et al., 2015). The indigenous culture of a community that has 
repeatedly experienced disaster events, can be useful in providing effective disaster 
mitigation, effective disaster response, and strengthening community resilience based on 
what are culturally acceptable and past experiences (Bankoff et al., 2015, Chandra et al., 
2006, Donovan, 2010, Donovan et al., 2012, Ghodse and Galea, 2006, Troll et al., 2015). On 
the other hand, traditional cultural beliefs often become the reason for an at-risk community‘s 
reluctance to heed official warnings; hence, traditional cultural beliefs often increase a 
community‘s vulnerability (Butt, 2014, Lavigne et al., 2008, Schlehe, 1996); this was also an 
issue for some Merapi residents during the 2010 Merapi eruption (see Chapter One).  
Emphasising the positive influences of culture, engagement of the collective cultural values 
of a community can strongly reduce public outrage in disaster and encourage trust. Giddens 
(1990, p. 105) explains that the positive influences are closely related with the way 
culturally-related traditions can provide ontological security:  
Ritual often has a compulsive aspect to it, but it is also deeply comforting, 
for it infuses a given set of practices with a sacramental quality. Tradition, 
in sum, contributes in basic fashion to ontological security in so far as it 
sustains trust in the continuity of past, present, and future, and connects such 
trust to routinized social practices.  
The building of trust, which is based on the cultural and economic concerns embedded in 
daily behavior towards hazards, is significantly required to ensure community acceptance and 
facilitate collective participation (Guion et al., 2007, Romo‐Murphy et al., 2011, Veszteg et 
al., 2015, Sandman, 1993, Servaes, 1999, Uslaner, 1999, Widén-Wulff et al., 2008, IFRC, 
2015, Troll et al., 2015). Specifically in disaster communication, traditional cultural 
knowledge can be a useful source in designing information for early warning, because the 
knowledge represents years of local wisdom about potential threats in a specific region and 
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skills owned by a specific community in the past (United Nations, 2015, Troll et al., 2015). 
Moreover, using examples from cases in Ethiopia, Haiti, Pakistan, and the Philippines, the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (2015) argues that 
culturally sensitive information, which is connected with the existing local values/belief of 
hazards, is more valued and prioritized by, and appealing and memorable for the community, 
because it can fulfil the specific needs of a community. 
Regardless of the positive association between cultural values, trust, and collective 
participation, Fronz (2012)11 and Hewitt (1983) find that socio-cultural factors have not been 
thoroughly discussed in most crisis communication theories. Similarly, there have been very 
limited studies that discuss the direct association of the socio-cultural values of an audience 
with disaster communication (for example the study of Murayama et al., 2013). Scholars of 
disaster communication have been increasingly paying attention to science communication in 
order to increase public scientific understanding; however less attention has been paid to the 
underlying social factors causing community vulnerability, which can be useful for designing 
effective disaster communication (Shannon et al., 2014). Not limited to the research level, 
disaster managers tend to disregard the socio-cultural factors in their disaster risk strategies in 
practice (Donovan, 2010).  
Although some studies (for example the study of Samadhi, 2014) have started raising the 
importance of a deep understanding of the local context in disaster recovery, the same 
understanding does not seem to be equally applied in the phase of disaster response. 
Meanwhile, culture has become one of the determinants of risk perception and evacuation 
behaviours during a disaster response. In general, risk perception is a function of hazard and 
outrage, as hazard is a multiplication of magnitude (how bad it is when it happens) and 
probability (how likely is it to happen), and outrage is an individual‘s subjective feeling about 
a hazard (Sandman, 1993, Hollingshead et al., 2007, Nottage et al., 2014). Particularly in a 
volcanic eruption, individual perceptions of risk and individual evacuation behaviour are 
often independent of the knowledge of actual hazards, but more closely associated with 
socioeconomic factors (e.g. accessibility to daily resources) and socio-cultural factors (e.g. 
                                                          
11
 Fronz (2012) specifically analyzed ten crisis communication theories and models: Image Restoration 
Strategies (Benoit, 1995), Crisis Communication Framework (Coombs, 2007), Situational Crisis 
Communication Model (Coombs and Holladay, 2002), Crisis Communication Strategies (Cornelisseen, 2008), 
Crisis Communication Best Practice Guidelines (Fearn-Banks, 2001), Rhetorical Area Micro Model (Frandsen 
and Johansen, 2010), Issue Management Model (Health and Nelson, 1986), Basis Elements of Crisis Response 
(Nikolaev, 2010), Anticipatory Model of Crisis Management (Olanivan and Williams, 2001), and Crisis 
Communication Model (Oliver, 2004). 
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cultural beliefs, social values, religious beliefs, community traditions, and attachment to 
place) instead (Lavigne et al., 2008, Donovan, 2010, Gaillard, 2008, Mei et al., 2013). In 
other words, risk is a social construction of perception of how a hazard will affect people 
(Gaillard and Dibben, 2008), featuring emotional perceptions, cultural beliefs, livelihood 
activities, and a connection with a particular hazard location (Bankoff et al., 2015). 
Additionally, public outrage is also influenced by the authorities‘ behaviours, the authorities-
community interactions, and shared control over risks (Sandman et al., 1993).  
As local culture influences the risk perception of an at-risk community significantly, it often 
leads to a different level of risk perception from outsiders who do not share the same culture. 
Subsequently, the discrepancy of risk perception frequently creates a gap in priorities 
between an at-risk community (as the insider) and the local government (as the outsiders) 
(Bankoff et al., 2015, Sandman et al., 1993), as has happened in the area around Mt. Merapi 
(Donovan, 2010; Donovan et al., 2012; Dove, 2008; Lavigne et al., 2008; Schlehe, 1996). 
Unlike the affected community, various organisations involved in disaster risk reduction 
adopt frameworks of scientific and institutional understanding, and assume that their 
understanding of significance is also adopted by the affected or at-risk community (Bankoff, 
2004). In other words, the authorities often perceive risk solely based on the scientifically 
actual hazards and adopt the strategy of not dealing with the public‘s real perception of 
hazards (Lavigne et al., 2008, Sandman, 1993, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Bird et 
al., 2009, Mazur, 1981, Mazur, 1990, Jaeger et al., 2007).  
Yet, Shannon et al. (2014, p. 641) and Yearley (2005) describe the relationship between 
scientific rationality and the public‘s rationality through ‗a simple deficit model‘. Differently 
from the scientific approach that is frequently used by the authorities in disaster management, 
community members are more willing to practise community-generated knowledge based on 
cultural rationality (Dougall et al., 2008, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Sandman, 
1993, Aw, 1992, Donovan, 2010, Donovan et al., 2012). This can be exemplified by the fact 
that some people consciously decide to live in risky areas and some people want to go back to 
their homes after they have been struck by a hazard where the hazard(s) may reoccur; those 
decisions are often questioned by the rationality of  the scientific approach (Cannon, 2008, 
Oliver-Smith, 1986). In practice, community members often put a higher value on their 
perceived seriousness of a risk rather the actual hazard itself in their decision-making in a 
disaster response.   
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If the authorities respond to the discrepancy in risk perception by simply relying on expert-
based perception and ignoring indigenous knowledge, it would be elevated into conflict, 
tension, and misunderstanding between the authorities and the community (Sandman et al., 
1993, Mercer et al., 2010, Shannon et al., 2014, Wynne, 1996). Moreover, disconnecting an 
affected community from their culture (as part of community behaviors and beliefs) may  risk 
losing acceptance from the community and social capital owned by the community, and 
weakening the community‘s capacity to cope with a disaster (Bankoff et al., 2015, Cannon, 
2008, Dove, 2008). 
Therefore, lack of attention to socio-cultural values in disaster communication leads to the 
second question of this study regarding how culture can be involved in disaster 
communication in order to encourage trust and community participation in a disaster 
response. Again, engaging people‘s culture closely can provide an understanding of how 
people perceive risk in responding to a disaster (Mitchell, 1995, Smith, 2001, Donovan et al., 
2012, Bankoff et al., 2015). Those need to be addressed in understanding the appropriate 
efforts of disaster communication in disaster-prone areas that are very much affected by the 
local culture, such as the Merapi volcano in Indonesia, as the case study of this research. The 
global call to design disaster management into the local context and the culture of the 
affected area has also been raised by the IFRC (2015) at the Disaster Response Dialogue in 
Manila in 2014 and the United Nations (2015) at the Third UN World Conference in Japan in 
2015. 
2.2.2. The roles of the tie strength of social networks in a communication process. 
In a disaster response, people eventually rely on their social networks to validate, interpret 
information and to collectively decide their behaviours (Bunce et al., 2012, Hindman and 
Coyle, 1999). Diverse scholars have presented that the tie strength of social networks can be 
associated with information sharing, trust encouragement, and participation. However, how 
tie strength can be specifically associated with trustworthy and participatory disaster 
communication has been under-explored. This gap was also acknowledged by Jaeger et al. 
(2007) who identified that the role of existing local social networks is often less recognised as 
a supportive factor of trustworthy disaster communication during a disaster response. Some 
studies have found that  involving existing local networks, which consist of local people, may 
provide recognition of local perspectives in identifying local problems, historical analysis and 
ultimately solutions in situ (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Moody, 2013). 
Particularly in disaster response, social networks can provide one-to-one personal 
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interactions, which are highly beneficial for confirmatory purposes to reduce uncertainty, and 
help decision-making for evacuation (Steelman et al., 2015, Burkhart, 1991, Lindell and 
Perry, 1987).  
Scholars of social networks mostly identify the strength of network ties as strong ties (for 
example, the study of Widen-Wulff et al., 2008) and weak ties (for example, the study of 
Granovetter, 1973). Strong ties are characterized by well-established friendships or close 
relationships; they are most likely to occur between homogenous community members with 
spatial proximity where they frequently communicate face-to-face and interact with one 
another (Gemeinschaft) (Bouchillon, 2014, Fisher, 2013, Haythornthwaite, 2005, Uslaner, 
1999, Veszteg et al., 2015). Meanwhile, weak ties are extensive social relationships between 
acquaintances, casual contacts, or community members with shared interests (Gesellschaft) 
(Granovetter, 1973, Fisher, 2013, Haythornthwaite, 2005, Widén-Wulff et al., 2008). Tie 
strength, both strong and weak, has been thoroughly examined by scholars. However, due to 
the lack of direct connection between tie strength and disaster communication in previous 
studies, the role of tie strength in this subsection will be discussed within the general themes 
of trustworthy and participatory communication: information sharing, trust, and participation. 
These themes shape the direct connection between the roles of tie strength and individual 
communication efforts in finding trustworthy disaster information, accordingly.    
2.2.2.1. Tie strength and information sharing 
During a disaster response, access to the beneficial resources of others through a social 
network can ‗improve coping capacities‘, ‗minimize negative psychological impacts‘, and 
‗reduce vulnerability‘ (Troll et al., 2015, p. 162). In order to be able to gain a valuable 
information and communication process, an individual must be in contact with others through 
network ties (Johnson, 2007, Portes, 1998, Rojas et al., 2011). Numerous scholars have 
agreed that strong ties and weak ties have distinctly important roles in information sharing. 
Particularly, strongly-tied individuals are effective in facilitating internal information 
diffusion for collective purposes, because they can decrease cost and transmit information 
more quickly than weak ties (Opsahl et al., 2010, Putnam, 1993, Putnam, 2000, Uslaner, 
1999). In comparison, weakly-tied individuals are less likely to be able to internally diffuse 
complex knowledge in a particular group (Hansen, 1999). They are more effective for 
information sharing aimed at reaching a large number of people across different networks, by 
acting as shorter bridges to reduce network distance and provide access to a range of new 
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contacts or new resources from the other social networks (Fisher, 2013, Lin, 2001, Widén-
Wulff et al., 2008, Granovetter, 1973, Valente and Fujimoto, 2010, Hansen, 1999).  
A communication process undertaken with the purpose of obtaining new information is more 
likely to be achieved through weak ties, which can provide new information from those who 
are beyond an individual‘s close network (Johnson, 2007, Granovetter, 1973, Borgatti and 
Halgin, 2011, Haythornthwaite, 2005). Pelling et al. (2008) and Valente and Fujimoto (2010) 
explain that an ability to generate novelty is facilitated by a loose structure of weak ties and a 
lack of ego between weakly tied individuals. This may make an individual more willing to 
share information with their indirect contacts, and move freely between different clusters in 
order to access various information sources.  
In contrast, collective blindness to new information, information bias, and information 
redundancy are more likely to happen in a community with strong ties (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998, Hall, 2003, Borgatti and Halgin, 2011, Widén-Wulff et al., 2008, Tutić and 
Wiese, 2015). These are because the bonding capital embedded in strong ties may grow 
excessively and lead to an egocentric, introverted, and hierarchical network (Fisher, 2013, 
Granovetter, 1973). Excessive bonding capital is described as ‗amoral familism‘ by Widén-
Wulff et al. (2008, p. 351-352). In practice, the community members are discouraged from 
interacting with those outside their close network, because they are perceived as ‗evils‘. 
Additionally, an information gatekeeper is most likely to be present in order to strategically 
control information exchange with outsiders, and limit access to internal information 
resources for the outsiders. In other words, a community with strong ties has strong local 
cohesion but weak global cohesion (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). 
2.2.2.2. Tie strength and trust  
According to Fisher (2013), the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2011), Haythornthwaite 
(2005), Murayama et al. (2013), and Putnam (1993, 2000, cited in Widén-Wulff et al. (2008), 
individuals with strong ties are considered to embody a large amount of social capital and a 
high level of trust, which bind them together as a social cement. Moreover, strong ties can 
encourage a mechanical solidarity as a ‗coping capital‘ (Putnam, 2000; Widén-Wulff et al., 
2008, p. 351), which is significant for an affected community in disaster response.  
In contrast to the indisputable trust embedded in strong ties, the trust embedded in weak ties 
has been arguable. Granovetter (1973), Fisher (2013), and Haythornthwaite (2005) have 
argued that weak ties can encourage trust by providing bridging social capital, which is able 
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to act as a social leverage; further, weak ties can facilitate collective action and solidarity 
mobilization. On the other hand, Bouchillon (2014) and Widén-Wulff et al. (2008) have 
critiqued that the generated trust is thin or practically absent, because weak ties are embodied 
in an unstable and fleeting network. Hence, individuals require information literacy to master 
the information shared through weak ties, as the information cannot be automatically 
regarded as trustworthy.  
2.2.2.3. Tie strength and collective participation 
In regard to collective participation, it seems that there has been no single agreement on the 
direct impacts of both strong ties and weak ties. According to Putnam (1993), Rojas et al. 
(2011) and Uslaner (1999), a dense network of strong ties will decrease self-interest and 
encourage individuals to collaboratively participate in a collective action. As the strongly-tied 
individuals share a sense of belonging, they are more willing to work together and exchange 
resources in order to achieve their collective goals. However, this argument is strongly 
debated by Widén-Wulff et al. (2008) who argue that strongly-tied individuals often act 
hierarchically (top-down approach), owing to the well-established structure of strong ties, and 
this is most likely to prevent collaboration. 
Correspondingly, Putnam (1993, 2000, cited in Fisher (2013) and Granovetter (1973, p. 
1373) claim that the bridging capital provided by weak ties can generate a social cohesion as 
a ‗sense of community‘. Furthermore, the sense can mobilise organic solidarity and 
encourage individuals to be more willing to participate in a collective action. However, the 
sense of community is more likely to be temporary because of the instrumental and interest-
oriented characteristic of a weak tie; it strongly depends on shared interests and the medium 
used to connect with other community members. If the instrument or the interest is no longer 
available, the sense of community is more likely to collapse, and the members are less likely 
to participate in a collective action (Haythornthwaite, 2005, Miller, 2011). 
 
In summary, diverse studies show the benefits and weaknesses of strong and weak ties 
regarding information diffusion and trust encouragement and they often debate which are the 
most effective ones. Although, Borgatti and Halgin (2011), and Widén-Wulff et al. (2008) 
suggest that strong ties and weak ties may be combined, or a particular tie may become more 
important without necessarily replacing the other, this depends on the context. The debates on 
the effectiveness of strong and weak ties and the lack of attention to the role of tie strength in 
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studies of disaster communication inform the second question in this study: how each type of 
tie strength encourages trust and collective participation in community-based disaster 
communication. This particular question needs to be addressed because acknowledging the 
specific characteristics of social networks, including tie strength, can clarify existing patterns 
of communication behaviours and predict the communication outcomes (Widén-Wulff et al., 
2008, Borgatti and Halgin, 2011, Jaeger et al., 2007). If individuals acknowledge the pattern 
of communication behaviours, they can have the ability to choose a specific local social 
network or its combination that can provide the specific information they require, and avoid 
information overload and exposure to irrelevant information (Jaeger et al., 2007). Therefore, 
it is important to identify how specific tie strength influences disaster communication, in 
order to provide a conducive environment for trustworthy and participatory disaster 
communication.   
 
2.3. Civic participation in community-based disaster communication 
Drawing further on the positive effect of a community‘s social capital on trust establishment, 
a combination of social ties and information exposure can encourage individuals to 
participate in social life (Rojas et al., 2011). Hence, this particular section discusses the third 
question of this study concerning how the affected community participates in disaster 
communication through media multiplexity. This question needs to be addressed because the 
knowledge of how community members participate in their social network, empowered with 
an appropriate medium, can be used to recognize the effective disaster communication that 
can promote individual capacity in making better life-saving decisions and mobilizing the 
right types of external support (OCHA, 2013, Winkworth et al., 2009, Rojas et al., 2011). At 
the community level, the knowledge can promote resident-to-resident assistance and foster 
coordinated emergency responses throughout a community (Jaeger et al., 2007).   
Specifically, the terminology of community participation in this study refers to the studies of 
Palen (2008) and Palen et al. (2010). They classified community participation in disaster 
communication into three particular actions: providing useful information, verifying received 
information, and sharing information to and from multiple sources. However, it seems that 
there have been very limited studies that actually engage the affected community in the three 
actions altogether. Previous studies of disaster communication often tend to frame the 
affected community as a passive and vulnerable party without any further significant roles 
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than providing information about their needs. This tendency seems to be increasingly 
popular, as numerous studies (for example, the study of Jaeger et al., 2007) have discussed 
community participation in disaster communication narrowly in relation to information 
provided by the affected community and information sharing to general audiences.  
2.3.1. Information providing, sharing, and verification 
Participation in disaster communication is often closely related to the demand for information 
during a disaster. In disaster response, BBC (2012), Bunce et al. (2012), Kanayama (2012), 
Reynolds & Seeger (2005), Seeger et al. (2003), Spence et al. (2006), and Spence et al. 
(2009) identify that people mostly provide or share information about warnings, evacuation 
notifications, the scope of damage, governmental responses, rescue and relief efforts, 
messages regarding self-efficacy, and how to get basic necessities and healthcare. In practice, 
community members often provide and share information that is regarded as reliable through 
a cross-channel cluster of media in order to leverage their collective capacities (BBC, 2012, 
Palen, 2008, Reagan, 1996). The cross-channel cluster of media will be discussed as media 
multiplexity in the subsequent subsection. 
In information sharing, Fronz (2012) identifies that only four theories (out of ten theories he 
analysed) emphasise defining a target audience in crisis communication. He specifically 
identifies that the theories of Coombs and Holladay (2002), Fearn-Banks (2001), Heath & 
Nelson (1986), and Nikolaev (2010) emphasise the unique local knowledge and vulnerability 
of different communities in defining a specific target audience of a crisis communication. On 
the other hand, the theories of Image Restoration Strategies (Benoit, 1995), Crisis 
Communication Framework (Coombs, 2007), Crisis Communication Strategies 
(Cornelisseen, 2008), Rhetorical Area Micro Model (Frandsen and Johansen, 2010), 
Anticipatory Model of Crisis Management (Olanivan and Williams, 2001), and Crisis 
Communication Model (Oliver, 2004) argue that defining a specific target audience is not 
required in crisis communication. 
Unlike the capacities of an affected community in providing and sharing disaster information, 
the potential role of an affected community in verifying information remains under-explored 
in disaster communication, both in academic studies and in practice. The efforts of 
information verification in disaster response still heavily rely on hierarchical formal 
procedures to collect and analyse disaster information, and media analysis to scan inaccurate 
information (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Dougall et al., 2008). Disaster-
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information sharing, nevertheless, is ‗growing more complex at a faster rate than current tools 
and human resources can handle‘ (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 18). As a result, 
there is an increasing gap between the community expectation for a rapid response to their 
information and the real analysing time for decision making over the community-originated 
disaster information (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). Thus, owing to constantly-
changing uncertainties, rapid information verification still appears to be the biggest challenge 
in disaster response (Dougall et al., 2008). 
In responding to the limitations of communication technology and the hierarchical formal 
procedures on rapid information verification, the members of the affected community can 
play an important role in fostering the process of information verification, because the 
affected community also has ‗ideas about what accountability means‘ (IFRC, 2015, p. 189). 
However, it is important not to simply conclude that the community members are the 
indisputable verifiers in evaluating the accuracy of disaster information, because the affected 
community may have self-selection bias and possibly exaggerate information in an extremely 
stressful situation (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). Therefore, this study investigates 
how community-based disaster communication can be regarded as trustworthy, because of 
community participation in providing, verifying, and sharing information; the trustworthiness 
can further encourage rapid decision-making for a disaster response. 
2.3.2. Media multiplexity in disaster communication 
During a disaster, choosing the right medium to exchange information can be particularly 
difficult, because many tools of communication (particularly phone and internet-based 
media) are likely to be either damaged or overwhelmed with incoming and outgoing 
information (IFRC, 2015, Kodrich and Laituri, 2005). Additionally, referring to Uses and 
Gratification theory (Rubin, 1994), an individual uses a certain medium to match his 
communicative purpose, literacy, age, perception, need, cultural preference, and to adapt to 
the societal system (Ruggiero, 2000, Whiting and Williams, 2013, So, 2012, Hollingshead et 
al., 2007). Thus, an individual tends to rely on the most convenient media in which they have 
the most personal interest and trust and are most familiar with, and which have been well-
established in the existing information workflows (Austin et al., 2012, Dutta-Bergman, 2004, 
Dutta‐Bergman, 2006, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Steelman et al., 2015, 
Haythornthwaite, 2005). Moreover, it is important to acknowledge the individuals‘ patterns 
and preferences of media usage because people use media not only as a communication tool, 
but also as ‗a social tool‘ rooted in ‗cultural and social mores‘ (IFRC, 2015, p. 201). 
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However, the practice of disaster communication has not responded appropriately to the 
unique pattern of media usage of individuals, as people tend to simply assume that everyone 
uses the same communication technologies in the same way (IFRC, 2015). Similarly, Fronz 
(2012) finds that only four out of the ten theories of crisis communication he analysed 
support that communication channels need to be differentiated based on target audience and 
crisis type. Specifically, he identifies that Fearn-Banks (2001), Frandsen & Johansen (2010), 
Health & Nelson (1986), and Oliver (2004) suggest that communication channels should be 
differentiated and selected carefully, based on the target audience and the crisis type. On the 
other hand, the others claim that communication channels do not need to be differentiated in 
crisis communication.  
The most common response to possibly varied media usage has been in the form of engaging 
multiple communication technologies in disaster communication (Jaeger et al., 2007). The 
use of multiple communication channels has been widely recognised as media collaboration 
in various studies of disaster communication. Yet, the term of media multiplexity has been 
little used in studies of disaster communication, and has been more widely discussed in 
regard to social networks (Haythornthwaite, 2005). Although both media collaboration and 
media multiplexity involve multiple technologies, they are different from each other. Media 
collaboration refers to a particular platform that includes collaboration between multiple 
means of communication; whereas media multiplexity refers to the simultaneous usage of 
multiple means of communication (Haythornthwaite, 2005, Koku et al., 2001). In particular, 
this study attempts to engage media multiplexity into community-based disaster 
communication. 
In the concept of media multiplexity, the number of communication channels is related to the 
strength of the network ties of the community. The individuals with stronger network ties 
incorporate a larger number of channels in their social relationships, in comparison to the 
individuals with weak network ties (Haythornthwaite, 2005, Igarashi et al., 2005). 
Specifically, Mizco et al. (2011, p. 21) explains that:   
Overall, consistent with multiplexity, friendship characteristics (i.e., tie 
strength) were related to different motives for using CMC [computer-
mediated communication]; the fact that different aspects of the relationship 
were related to different motives suggests that strong ties may be more 
variable than weak ones. 
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Individuals often use communication channels to communicate with their weakly-tied 
acquaintances only for the ‗purposes of escaping some other activity‘ (p. 18). In comparison, 
strongly-tied individuals have the purpose of informational exchange and diverse emotional 
purposes when they are communicating with each other. They aim at fulfilling the purposes 
of ‗support‘ (e.g. ‗To let this person know I careabout him/her‘), ‗escape‘ (e.g. ‘To get away 
from what I am doing‘), ‗distance‘ (e.g. ‗To keep some distance in our relationship‘), 
‗pleasure‘ (e.g. ‗Because it‘s stimulating‘), and ‗compliance‘ (e.g. ‗Because I want this 
person to do something for me‘) (p. 17). These diverse communicative purposes mean that 
individuals use numerous communication channels in different ways.  
Owing to the close relationship between media usage and social network, a change in tie 
strength (e.g. friendship or individual closeness) may affect media usage within a social 
relationship. Conversely, a channel change (a removal or an addition) will affect the tie 
strength and the information access (Haythornthwaite, 2005, Miczo et al., 2011). In 
particular, a channel change is more likely to disrupt existing weak ties, whereas strongly-tied 
individuals will be less affected by it. If a medium is removed, strongly-tied individuals will 
find a way to compensate for their loss. Likewise, they are more willing to adopt a new 
unfamiliar medium if they find it useful for maintaining ties (Haythornthwaite, 2005, Valente 
and Fujimoto, 2010), although they may resist the additional medium if they find it does not 
suit them (Yates et al., 1999). In comparison, if a new medium12 is introduced into existing 
media multiplexity, it can create new latent ties of a social network, which is labelled the 
latent tie theory (Haythornthwaite, 2005). The latent ties can technically connect individuals 
who previously were disconnected socially, or forge new connections that formerly did not 
exist. If the new technical connections are being maintained with social interventions, the 
generated latent ties can be transformed into weak ties. Furthermore, a combination of new 
public medium and person-to-person medium will be more likely to strengthen and transform 
the weak ties into stronger ties, accordingly (Haythornthwaite, 2005).  Yet, this has not been 




                                                          
12
 Haythornthwaite (2005) emphasizes that the new medium has to be a public one, and its introduction has to 
be done by an outsider party. 
54 
 
2.4. Community radio stations as a community-based act of participation 
My preliminary study of Jalin Merapi from its website and mass media makes it clear  that a 
study of trust and community participation in the disaster communication during the 2010 
Merapi eruption requires consideration of community radio stations. The important role of 
community radio stations in disaster management has been widely recognised by various 
scholars. Primarily, a community radio station can be a key source of detailed, real-time, and 
trustworthy locally-relevant information, which is often unavailable in other media. A 
community radio station is rated more positively in providing coverage of ‗what the victims 
really wanted to know‘ (Hindman & Coyle, 1999, p. 13). In addition to its informational role, 
a community radio station also can provide an important sense of community solidarity and 
emotional support (Joyce, 2015, Perez-Lugo, 2004). 
Unlike most commercial radio stations that have a weak definition of disaster responsibility 
as a temporary role of information sharing in a disaster response (Birowo, 2009, Fraser and 
Estrada, 2001, Moody, 2013, Spence et al., 2009), community radio stations have a greater 
sense of continuous disaster responsibilities in all stages of disaster (Barlow, 1988, Fraser and 
Estrada, 2001, Moody, 2013, Romo‐Murphy et al., 2011, Spence et al., 2009). In the stage of 
disaster preparedness, community radio stations have a significant role in increasing the level 
of local disaster preparedness by regularly broadcasting disaster knowledge, such as how to 
prepare an emergency bag, how to recognize reliable information sources of warning, how to 
minimize injury, and how to assist others (Romo‐Murphy et al., 2011, Tanesia, 2007). In the 
stage of disaster response, community radio stations can provide timely and continuous news 
coverage by broadcasting a combination of live call-ins of eyewitness reports from listeners, 
field reports from news staff, and statements from public officials (Birowo, 2009, Hindman 
and Coyle, 1999, Kanayama, 2012, Moody, 2013, Sellnow et al., 2002, Tanesia, 2007). 
Specifically, a community radio station can provide a locally-based early warning regarding a 
certain affected area; surveillance of updated conditions; information about missing family 
members; and information about the movement of local relief efforts. Additionally, 
community radio stations frequently organise disaster volunteer groups, which gather and 
report information about situations right after a disaster, and distribute aid (Kanayama, 2012, 
Bachtiar, 2014). Finally, a community radio station can be a medium for community 
reconstruction in a disaster recovery stage, by providing support and comfort in the trauma 
healing process, and monitoring aid distributions. In fact, it is also true that all media can do 
what community radio stations do in disaster stages. Yet, what makes community radio 
55 
 
stations different from other media is their strong potential to be continuous, local, and able 
to mobilise social network ties for trust in disaster communication.  
Specifically, some scholars attribute a radio station‘s strengths in disaster communication to 
its ability to sustain critical information during a disaster, due to the portability and the 
electrical grid independence of a radio receiver, and its broad availability as a household 
device (Ewart and Dekker, 2013, Moody, 2013, Reynolds and Seeger, 2005). However, I 
presumed that the strengths of a community radio station do not depend solely on the 
resilience of radio broadcasts during a disaster or its characteristics as mass media. Hindman 
and Coyle (1999) describe that the disaster communication provided by a community radio 
station is indistinguishable from interpersonal communication between the broadcasters and 
the listeners. Following Hindman and Coyle, I presumed that the strengths of a community 
radio station also lie in the interpersonal relationships between the broadcasters and the 
community members they serve. The ability of a community radio station to provide 
trustworthy local information is also likely to result from the localised characteristics of its 
community-based communication system, particularly cultural community identities and the 
sense of community ownership. These are more likely to manifest the social capital of the 
community a radio station serves, so that the community members may feel closer to the 
community radio station during a disaster response (Hindman and Coyle, 1999). Therefore, in 
this section, I draw out the connections between the literature on community radio stations 
and literature on community social capital, particularly the culture-embedded communication 
and the social network previously discussed, in regard to their associations with trustworthy 
and participatory community-based disaster communication.  
2.4.1. Culture-embedded broadcasts of community radio stations. 
This subsection will further discuss the culture-embedded broadcasts of community radio 
stations. Previous studies show that the consistency of local cultural engagement in 
community radio stations‘ broadcast is able to strengthen local identities and increase a 
community‘s enthusiasm for participating in community radio stations‘ broadcast (Carpentier 
et al., 2007, Jankowski, 2002, Kanayama, 2012, Lindsay, 1997, Sen, 2003). Thus, the culture-
embedded broadcast of community radio stations can support the relationship between 
culture-embedded disaster communication and trust establishment at the community level.  
A close attachment to local culture often differentiates a community radio station from other 
mass media. The cultural identity in the broadcast of a community radio station often has the 
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biggest impact on its listeners; most listeners often expect to listen to cultural entertainment 
(e.g. traditional music, story-telling, poetry, customs, and traditions) when they decide to 
listen to a community radio station (Berque, 1992, Valenzuela, 1992). Moreover, the cultural 
programs are often regarded as a ‗collective cultural expression‘ rather just a form of 
entertainment (Fraser & Estrada, 2001, p. 16). A community radio station often acts as a 
personalised communication link with a very high listenership by emphasising cultural 
identities and responding to the specific needs of its target audiences (Day, 2009, Moody, 
2013, Valenzuela, 1992, Foy et al., 1992, Mohr, 1992). Specifically, Fraser & Estrada (2001, 
p. 5) argue that: 
Community radio works in the cultural context of the community it 
serves; it deals with local issues in the local language or languages; it is 
relevant to local problems and concerns; and its aim is to help the 
community to develop socially, culturally, and economically.  
Despite wide-ranging discussions of community radio stations by various scholars, the 
culture-embedded broadcasting of a community radio station has not been thoroughly studied 
in regard to its relationship with community-based disaster communication. So far, the 
culture-embedded broadcast has only been associated with attempts by community radio 
stations to be a part of and strengthen communal cultural identity (Mohr, 1992, Day, 2009, 
Jurriëns, 2003). In fact, Tanesia (2007, p. 75) found that some community radio stations 
deliberately broadcast cultural entertainment, such as Pantun (traditional poetry), Nazam 
(Aceh folktales), and Javanese songs to comfort the refugees in some natural disasters in 
Indonesia. However, how the culture-embedded broadcast may influence the trustworthiness 
of community disaster communication has been less explored.  
2.4.2. The broadcasters of community radio stations as local actors. 
Humanitarian organisations, which mostly comprise outsiders, often face difficulties in 
establishing trust and identifying trusted networks within the affected community (Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Murayama et al., 2013). This is particularly so because trust 
establishment is a long-term process that includes a history with a specific audience. It is not 
easily attained by outsiders who arrive into a disaster-affected neighbourhood shortly after a 
disaster has occurred. Again, Bankoff et al. (2015) add that outsiders cannot easily 
comprehend the everyday culture at the community level.  
In responding to this difficulty, Antonovsky (1987), Dougall et al. (2008), Ferrante (2010), 
IFRC (2015), and Widén-Wulff et al. (2008) suggest that the outsiders should engage the 
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local people. In addition to proximity familiarity with the affected area, local people can 
identify useful local knowledge of information behaviours to foster the process of local 
rapport, accelerate the process of trust establishment, and encourage local cooperation, which 
outsiders usually struggle with. For example, they can identify the local informal information 
sources, the internal rules in their information environment, how group identity affects their 
knowledge sharing, and the social construction of knowledge, such as how their groups 
gather, analyse, process, store, use, and re-use information. Moreover, local actors can ‗draw 
on pre-existing contacts with people of influence‘ (Austin et al., 2012; Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative, 2011; Shannon et al., 2014, p. 639).  
The broadcasters of community radio stations are part of the affected community, living 
among their listeners in the affected area. In practice, they share the same reality faced by the 
victims, understand the local perspectives and are able to identify the local problems and 
voice the victims‘ interests accurately (Birowo, 2009, Birowo, 2010, Day, 2009, Fraser and 
Estrada, 2001, Moody, 2013). Without this knowledge, outsiders might ‗incorrectly‘ choose 
the information sources with inappropriate network ties (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011, p. 1169), 
and this certainly results in ineffective disaster communication. Furthermore, engaging 
community radio broadcasters, who are part of the local community, may significantly 
reinforce trust building within the affected community. 
2.4.3. Participatory mechanisms of community radio stations. 
This section focuses on the participatory mechanisms of community radio stations. This 
selection is made particularly by considering studies showing the historically fundamental 
roles of community radio stations in encouraging and enabling community participation, as a 
response to the difficulties in finding local identity, communicating, and participating in 
decision-making at the grassroots level (Foy et al., 1992, Day, 2009, Carpentier et al., 2007, 
Dagron, 2007, Hollander et al., 2008, Berque, 1992, Chateau-Degat, 1992, Rennie, 2006). 
Specifically, Hochheimer (2002, p. 319) describes community radio stations as community-
based participatory media that can support localised issues, as below: 
[C]ommunity-based participatory media…provide substantial hope that 
people can best make decisions affecting their own futures if provided with 
the contexts within which to establish media for themselves to address their 
own problems as they construct them. 
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In disaster communication, Hindman and Coyle (1999), and Kanayama (2012) identify that 
a community radio station can provide an active means for community participation in 
exchanging information and responding to other community members. 
The studies of Day (2009), Jurriëns (2003), and Sen (2003) describe that a radio broadcast 
can provide a degree of interactive participation for its listeners through a range of forums of 
discussion or talkback. In a profound way, a community radio station does not limit its 
encouragement of participation to its on-air broadcast. It expands its mechanisms of 
voluntary participation by establishing an equal relationship, a continuous dialogue, and 
horizontal communication with its listeners (Birowo, 2006, Jurriëns, 2003, Moody, 2013). 
Additionally, a community radio station grants its listeners active roles in programme 
production, radio management, and radio ownership (Carpentier et al., 2007, Day, 2009, Foy 
et al., 1992, Fraser and Estrada, 2001, Hindman and Coyle, 1999, Hochheimer, 2002, Moody, 
2013, Valenzuela, 1992). In other words, a community radio station is owned and managed 
by the community members themselves; the programmes are produced and broadcast by the 
listeners in a participatory way.  
Moreover, a community radio station also has structural characteristics that are beneficial in 
stimulating the participation of its listeners. They are: (1) its localized management by local 
people, who understand the local realities and cultural identity; (2) its limited coverage, 
which simplifies broadcasting issues based on the listeners‘ specific needs; (3) its 
independent status, which allows it to freely accommodate local interests and needs; (4) its 
accessibility, due to the geographic proximity of the radio station (5) its networks of potential 
local correspondents, which make its broadcast more reliable (Abdurrahman, 2013, Berque, 
1992, Birowo, 2006, Fraser and Estrada, 2001, Valenzuela, 1992). In addition to those 
characteristics, the culture-embedded broadcast of a community radio station can also 
simplify the requirements of participation. Community members are able to simply 
participate in an authentic manner based on their own traditions, customs, and cultures by 
using their own languages accordingly (Jankowski, 2002). Furthermore, the available 
participatory mechanisms can eventually develop a communal perception and encourage 
individuals to participate in a collective action in social life (Flint and Luloff, 2007, Fraser 
and Estrada, 2001, Jurriëns, 2003, Waxman, 1973, cited in Moody, 2013). Servaes (1999, p. 
260) even labels a community radio station as ‗an act of participation‘ of a community.  
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However, community radio stations have not been regarded as a mature support/ instrument 
for disaster communication in Indonesia, regardless of being recognised for their long 
history. Tanesia (2007) found that the Indonesian community radio stations had facilitated an 
inadequate participation in disaster communication prior to the 2010 Merapi eruption. The 
community radio stations simply broadcasted the text messages provided by the affected 
community, without necessarily engaging them into further roles, such as information 
verification. They frequently simply quoted the information that was published by mass 
media, meanwhile, their news content might be incorrect and too general to be quoted. Thus, 
the literature on the participatory broadcasting of a community radio station may not be able 
to provide a comprehensive description of the practice of community participation at the 
community level in a disaster communication environment.  
Therefore, this study does not narrowly investigate the relationship between the culture-
embedded and participatory broadcast of community radio station, and trustworthy and 
participatory community-based disaster communication. This acknowledges the fact that the 
broadcasters of community radio stations are actually the members of the affected 
community. Thus, there is a big possibility that they may not be able to broadcast right after a 
disaster occurs, and may have to struggle to physically rebuild or get a new studio to be back 
‗on-air‘ (Joyce, 2015, pp. 63, 65). If their roles in disaster communication rely on their on-air 
broadcast, they certainly become ineffective when they are off-air. Additionally, a 
community radio station may differ from other community radio stations in the culturally-
embedded broadcasts they play (Day, 2009). Moreover, the strong ties of the broadcasters 
may or may not lead to reinforcement of community ideology rather than generating new 
knowledge. If this study only focuses on a specific cultural program of a particular 
community radio station, the arguments are less likely to be able to be applied generally in 
other cases of community-based disaster communication.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This study is attempting to build a theoretical framework for understanding trustworthy and 
participatory community-based disaster communication. Specifically, a theoretical 
framework of the relationships between the social capital (the culturally-embedded 
communication and the tie strength of a social network, to be precise) owned by the affected 
community, trust encouragement, and community participation in disaster communication. In 
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the case study of this research, the culturally-embedded communication and the tie strength 
being studied are embedded in the characteristics of community radio stations, whose 
volunteers are the main providers of the community-based disaster communication of the 
Jalin Merapi network, as the representatives or extensions of the social capital owned by the 



























This chapter sets up the methodological framework adopted in this research in order to 
construct an integrated and comprehensive theoretical understanding of trustworthy and 
participatory community-based disaster communication. The chapter starts with an 
explanation of the constructivist epistemology and the interpretivist ontology of this research. 
The epistemological and ontological positions have become the grounding logic for the 
selection of the qualitative methodology in this research. Further, the explanation is followed 
by the rationale for adopting the constructivist grounded theory of Charmaz (2003, 2006) and 
the case study of Yin (2009) in this research. The chapter progresses to discuss the research 
design and data collection utilizing the methods of in-depth interview and focus group. It also 
describes the gaining of access to research participants, the practices of conducting in-depth 
interviews and focus groups, and how research obstacles were overcome. Subsequently, the 
methodological processes of grounded theory used for analyzing data, which are coding, 
constant comparative analysis, and memo writing, are explained thoroughly. The data 
analysis is aimed at elaborating the conceptual connections between the data categories of 
social capital of the affected community, trust, and community participation into a theoretical 
understanding of trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication. 
Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the ethical requirements met in order to protect 
the research participants. 
 
3.1. Constructivist and interpretivist paradigms 
This study aims at constructing a holistic understanding of trustworthiness and participation 
in community-based disaster communication, by significantly referring to the heterogeneous 
subjective interpretations of research participants (Creswell, 2009, Patton, 2002). 
Importantly, I have acknowledged that their individual interpretations are closely associated 
with the relationship between the affected community and their everyday socio-cultural 
context (Guba and Lincoln, 1982), and their previous experiences of disaster communication 
regarding the Mt. Merapi eruption (Creswell, 2009, Patton, 2002). The perspective has 
underlain my position in the epistemological and ontological paradigms, which strongly 
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constitute knowledge and the theoretical perspectives of research methodology accordingly 
(Crotty, 1998). 
Epistemologically, I have positioned myself in the constructivist paradigm, understanding 
social knowledge as not discovered but constructed within the transactional, close, and direct 
interaction between researcher and research participant (Crotty, 1998, Guba and Lincoln, 
1994, Ponterotto, 2005, Patton, 2002, Polit and Beck, 2010). Aligned with the 
epistemological position of a constructivist, I have endorsed an ontological position of an 
interpretivist/relativist. I have perceived social realities as human products of knowledge, 
which are contextually and subjectively interpreted by an individual based on his/her 
historical experiences, culture, education, and age in their natural daily settings (Charmaz, 
2006, Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Guba and Lincoln, 1989, Levers, 2013, Lincoln and Guba, 
2003, Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). The interpretivist paradigm informs symbolic 
interactionism, which includes researchers‘ attempts to understand how research participants 
construct their interpretations of realities and, further, to understand the participants‘ actions 
upon their interpretations (Charmaz, 2006). Thus, I did not focus on a single perspective of 
either the research participants or myself, because a common theoretical understanding is less 
likely to be constructed in a single interpretation of a single reality; the understanding of the 
same reality may be personalized differently or similarly among individuals (Levers, 2013, 
Crotty, 1998). Therefore, based on my epistemological and ontological perspective, I define 
the knowledge of trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication 
generated in this study as a collaborative understanding between the participants, in regard to 
their interpretations of their lived experiences of disaster communication, and me as the 
researcher, in regard to my understanding of the interpretation of the research participants.  
Epistemological and ontological positions are the foundations that distinguish the two most 
dominant approaches, which are the qualitative and the quantitative methodologies, in 
academic research (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In particular, my perspectives of constructivist 
epistemology and interpretivist ontology strongly determined the selection of the qualitative 
design for this research (Crotty, 1998, Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Specifically, this study was 
conducted using the grounded theory methodology for not aiming at verifying pre-existing 
theory (Bunce et al., 2012, Glaser, 1998, Birks and Mills, 2011, Goulding, 2002, Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, Charmaz, 2006, Miller and Salkind, 2002, Moustakas, 1994, Strauss, 1987, 
Glaser, 1978). As there are some paradigms of grounded theory that have distinguished 
methodological strategies and methods for data analysis (Bryant and Charmaz, 2010, Levers, 
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2013, Mills et al., 2008), the epistemological position of researcher also influenced the 
selection of the particular paradigm of grounded theory used in this study. 
 
3.2. Constructivist grounded theory 
Epistemologically adhering to the constructivist paradigm, this research specifically has 
adopted the constructivist grounded theory of Charmaz that rests heavily on the interpretative 
paradigm and symbolic interactionism in producing a theory. With regard to her approach, 
Charmaz (2006, p. 10) describes it as follows: 
I assume that neither data nor theories are discovered. Rather, we are part of 
the world we study and the data we collect. We construct our grounded 
theories through our past and present involvement and interaction with 
people, perspective, and research practice. My approach explicitly assumes 
that any theoretical rendering offers an interpretive portrayal of the studied 
world, not an exact picture of it. 
Being built upon the principles of symbolic interactionism, constructivist grounded theory 
emphasizes that constructing a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon studied entails 
acknowledging how the values, beliefs, feeling, and ideologies of an individual influence 
their interpretation of meaning and actions in a specific situation and is not solely gathering 
facts of the external world (Charmaz, 2006, Goulding, 2002, Miller and Salkind, 2002). In 
other words, the emergent conceptual theory in constructivist grounded theory results from 
the interpretations of the researcher and research participants of ‗meanings and actions‘ 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 131; Levers, 2013). Therefore, the generated theoretical framework of 
this thesis is constructed based on my interpretative understanding of the stories of the 
research participants, and the shared experiences and the relationship between the research 
participants and me during data collection (Charmaz, 2006, Mills et al., 2006, Hayes and 
Oppenheim, 1997).  
This study does not solely follow either the approach of Glaser or the approach of Strauss or 
their collaborative approach; despite grounded theory being originally developed by Barney 
Glaser and Anselm Strauss in their book The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967). 
Regardless of Glaser‘s (1978, 1992, 1998) initial critique of the objectivist epistemology, his 
theory of discovery resembles the quantitative methods with his ‗dispassionate empiricism‘ 
and rigorously ‗codified methods‘ of comparative work (Charmaz, 2006, p. 127; Levers, 
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2013, p. 1). Thus, the strong tendencies of Glaser towards the positivist ontology and 
objectivist epistemology are not suitable for this study, which applied a qualitative research 
design. Correspondingly, although Strauss has started to acknowledge the interpretivist view 
in constructing theory and has placed more emphasis on listening to the research participants 
in order to verify the emergent conceptual relationships (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), his 
approach still inclines towards a positivist perspective of explanation (Charmaz, 2006). Thus, 
the pragmatism approach of Strauss (1987) is also regarded as unsuitable for this study. 
In addition to the epistemological ground, some practical benefits have motivated the 
selection of the methodology of grounded theory in this study. Grounded theory provides a 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon being studied directly from the specific 
context of inquiry, its time, place, culture, and situation (Charmaz, 2006, Glaser, 1978, Stern 
and Porr, 2011). As the data of this study are grounded inductively in the natural context of 
the social phenomenon being studied, complete and in-depth explanations of data are able to 
emerge with contextual significance (Guba and Lincoln, 1982, Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Therefore, by adopting grounded theory, I have been able to construct an integrated 
theoretical formulation that gives a comprehensive understanding of how the affected 
communities living in the Mt. Merapi surroundings responded to the 2010 Merapi eruption 
by developing a localized and trustworthy community-based disaster communication process.  
Additionally, grounded theory is practical when the existing explanations/theories are 
inadequate to capture the complexity of the phenomenon being studied (Miller and Salkind, 
2002, Salkind, 2010). As discussed in the literature review in Chapter Two, there has been a 
lack of attention in previous studies to the perspective of the affected community in disaster 
communication; particularly, how disaster communication is regarded as trustworthy by the 
affected community, and how it can increase collective participation. Hence, through 
constructivist grounded theory the interactions between the research participants and I can 
construct the framework/theory required to interpret the complexity of the concept of 
trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication. Finally, the 
flexibility of grounded theory is appropriate in responding to the practical issues surrounding 
the qualitative research. According to Charmaz (2006) and Glaser (1998), grounded theory 
offers flexibility to a researcher in collecting data, generating conceptual categories, and 
analyzing data, although it still has a structured and rigorous approach. This flexibility is 
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particularly beneficial in providing a ‗tolerance for feeling out of control‘ in a qualitative 
study such as this one (Glaser, 1998, p. 11).  
 
3.3. The case study: The Jalin Merapi network in the 2010 Merapi eruption  
The design of a case study is also able to provide a comprehensive understanding of a social 
phenomenon or a bounded entity (or entities) within its real social and cultural context 
(Putney, 2010, Yin, 2009). Hence, a case study is particularly suitable for a study that 
specifically focuses on the disaster communication process within the affected community in 
its natural context. In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of community-based 
disaster communication, I selected a case study of a community-based information network 
called Jalin Merapi (Jaringan Informasi Lingkar Merapi – Information Network of Merapi 
Circle). The Jalin Merapi network was used by the affected communities living on the Mt. 
Merapi slopes in an attempt to provide community-based disaster communication during the 
Mt. Merapi eruption, which happened from September – November 2010 in the Provinces of 
the Special Region of Yogyakarta and Central Java, Indonesia. This particular case study has 
been chosen as an example that resembles the theoretical sampling of trustworthy and 
participatory community-based disaster communication (Charmaz, 2006). Additionally, I 
selected the Jalin Merapi network because it demonstrates the circumstances and conditions 
of the way local communities can take an important role in formal disaster management 
(OCHA, 2013, BBC, 2012). Moreover, the case study of the Jalin Merapi network was 
selected for a general understanding of trustworthy and participatory community-based 
disaster communication, which may be instrumental in informing the policies of disaster 
management. 
Yet, a single-case study is often considered to be less generalizable and less robust than 
multiple-case studies (Putney, 2010, Yin, 2009). Therefore, this study does not limit its unit 
analysis to a particular social unit of the Merapi community in a particular district. The 
Merapi people and the relevant authorities are constrained by four different administrative 
districts. Thus, focusing on one particular district in Mt. Merapi may not be sufficient to 
represent the other districts in the Mt. Merapi surroundings and the heterogeneity of social 
elements of disaster communication within the affected community. For the purpose of wider 
relevance of the study‘s findings, the data collection of the study was conducted in four 
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different districts in the Mt. Merapi surroundings  to look holistically at the Jalin Merapi 
network.  
Moreover, this study was designed with embedded units of analysis in order to explore 
disaster communication both at the government level and the affected community level. As 
the embedded analysis units, research participants were the officials of the district 
governments and the segmented parts of the Merapi community. Therefore, I assumed that 
the embedded units of analysis and the multiple locations were more likely to provide a 
broader understanding by representing heterogeneous views about trustworthy and 
participatory community-based disaster communication. Again, comparing the responses of 
various research participants across different groups is useful for validation purposes, as 
‗people are not neutral or mistake-free reporters of their own experience‘ (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2002, p. 172). Additionally, according to Charmaz (2006), grounded theory, as used in this 
study can result in empirical generalization, by inductively connecting the contextualized 
concepts of the case study to the larger social structure.  
 
3.4. Theoretical Sampling 
Prior to the data collection of the study, Charmaz (2006, p. 100) suggests defining initial 
sampling by establishing ‗sampling criteria for people, cases, situations, and/or settings‘ as 
the starting point. Within the context of a grounded theory study, recruiting research 
participants is conducted through theoretical sampling for theoretical purposes, as theoretical 
sampling aims at finding the most suitable data to elaborate and refine the emerging 
conceptual categories (Charmaz, 2003, Charmaz, 2006, Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
From the theoretical perspective, the study is designed to investigate both formal disaster 
management at the government level, and communication capital of the affected community 
that can facilitate trustworthy community-based disaster communication in a disaster 
response. Therefore, I have outlined some parameters in defining the research participants to 
ensure their theoretical suitability for the purposes of the study. The first parameter is the 
theoretical relevance of the recommended interview, which means that they can contribute a 
substantive insight into the theory being generated because they had experienced or were the 
representatives of the phenomenon being studied (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002, Miller and 
Salkind, 2002, Salkind, 2010). As the research is also concerned with the nature of social 
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media usage during the 2010 Merapi eruption, convenience sampling was employed to ensure 
that participants were aware of social media, had experienced social media, and had access to 
an internet connection (including through a mobile phone).  
Moreover, the other parameter of selecting the research participants was also related to their 
geographic locations. The case study‘s focus on the Mt. Merapi eruption automatically 
determined the locations of the research participants. The Merapi volcano is administratively 
located in four districts: Sleman (administratively under the province of Yogyakarta Special 
Region) and Klaten, Magelang, and Boyolali (administratively under the province of Central 
Java) in Indonesia. Thus, the research participants were specifically local members who were 
living in those particular areas. Based on the parameters, the research participants of the 
study were categorized into two distinct groups: the local community members who 
participated in the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 Merapi eruption, and the officials of 
local governments who were responsible for the official disaster management. The group of 
local community members initially consisted of the representatives of Jalin Merapi 
volunteers, the representatives of community radio volunteers, and the representatives of the 
Combine Resources Institute (Combine). 
3.4.1. Gaining access to the research participants  
Following the process of defining the research participants, gaining access to participants was 
another fundamental prerequisite for undertaking the study, as it may influence the reliability 
and validity of the data that a researcher subsequently obtains (Burgess, 1984, Bogdan and 
Biklen, 2007). Prior to the data collection, I was physically located in New Zealand. Thus, 
the only possible means of finding relevant materials about the Jalin Merapi network and 
making contact with Indonesia was through the internet-based media. I found that the website 
of the Jalin Merapi network (www.merapi.combine.or.id) was a subdomain of the website of 
Combine Resources Institution (Combine), a Non Goverment Organisation in Yogyakarta 
city located 30 kilometres away from Mt. Merapi. Thus, I assumed that Combine might be a 
suitable and credible representative to help me gain access to the Jalin Merapi network. Using 
this approach, the initial contact was made with Combine through email to briefly outline the 
study. Further, in December 2013, I conducted a preliminary meeting with a manager who 
worked at Combine where I initially confirmed the close relationship between Combine and 
the Jalin Merapi network; Combine has been working together with some community radio 
stations in the Mt. Merapi area in establishing the Jalin Merapi network since 2006. I further 
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requested from the manager information on how to gain access to the potential participants 
who were involved and actively participated in the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 
Merapi eruption. Subsequently, he identified some broadcasters of community radio stations 
who might be suitable for the study and recommended me to contact them. After contacting 
the first broadcaster, the selection of the subsequent interviewees continued with snowball 
sampling.  
3.4.2. Snowball Sampling 
In determining the research participants, I utilized non-probability sampling, particularly 
snowball sampling. The research participants, who were initially interviewed, were asked to 
recommend a subsequent potential research participant (Bryman and Bell, 2007). All former 
interviewees deliberately recommended someone they knew who might suit the research 
context. Based on the recommendation, I afterwards made preliminary phone contact with the 
potential interviewee in order to explain my research and ask for their willingness to be 
interviewed. I emphasized that they could refuse to be interviewed if they were not 
comfortable with my research. I also addressed any questions they asked in regard to the 
study. In practice, I faced one objection from a potential research participant. Thus, the 
personal information gained from the referrer was not used in this study.  
As soon as the obtained data were likely to be able to define preliminary concepts, I 
conducted early data analysis simultaneously with the theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2006). 
As data analysis is conducted simultaneously with data collection, the result of the generated 
data analysis determines ‗what group or subgroup does one turn to next in data collection‘ in 
such a progressive direction (Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 47). Specifically, by 
conducting memo writing and constant comparison in data analysis, I could identify the 
incomplete categories and the gaps evident in the early categories and their associated 
properties while conducting theoretical sampling. As a result, I might identify additional data 
needed, which were not covered previously, and how to gather the additional data in order to 
fill in the identified gap or to illuminate a category (Bryant and Charmaz, 2010, Charmaz, 
2006, Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Hansen, 2009).  
In practice, my early analysis revealed that the emerging categories of the trustworthiness and 
effectiveness of the Jalin Merapi network did not fully account for the empirical experiences 
of the affected community. I identified that the initial groups of community members (the 
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Jalin Merapi volunteers, the community radio volunteers, and Combine) provided a 
somewhat similar tone about the trustworthiness and effectiveness of the Jalin Merapi 
network. Yet, I needed to gain another perspective to contrast the data already collected. 
Thus, I decided to add a group of  Jalin Merapi audience members, who were the community 
members living on the surrounding Merapi slopes and had passive experiences with the Jalin 
Merapi network in the 2010 Merapi eruption. To distinguish this group from the Jalin Merapi 
volunteers, they did not actively participate in the Jalin Merapi network to provide or verify 
the information, but kept themselves updated with its information. They might use the 
information from the Jalin Merapi network for their personal reference or their personal 
consideration when giving donations. 
The perspectives of the Jalin Merapi audiences, which might confirm or be opposed by the 
other groups, could be an effective way of avoiding an easy conclusion from the study. In 
other words, the group of the Jalin Merapi audiences can define more specific forms of 
variation in how community members (between those who actively participated in the Jalin 
Merapi network and those who passively acted as the Jalin Merapi audiences) perceive the 
effectiveness and the trustworthiness of the Jalin Merapi network. In addition to the 
substantive contribution, adding the new group of the Jalin Merapi audience members 
required ‗further clearance with institutional committees‘ (Charmaz, 2006, p. 111). Thus, I 
submitted a request for an amendment for the addition of the group of the Jalin Merapi 
network to the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury and it was 
approved.  
Unlike the other groups of community members where an interviewee was more likely to 
recommend someone in the same group of participants (although it is not always the case), 
the snowball sampling for the Jalin Merapi audience group was based on the 
recommendations of the other groups of participants, such as the volunteers of community 
radio stations or the volunteers of the Jalin Merapi network. As part of the local community, 
the community radio volunteers knew the individuals in their own community who were 
interested in getting information from the Jalin Merapi network. The audience members 
might ask them for any updated information from the Jalin Merapi network or for further 
information that was previously mentioned on it. Meanwhile, the volunteers of the Jalin 
Merapi network suggested those individuals who contacted them for detailed information 
about refugees in order to give donations after the 2010 Merapi eruption. 
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The flexibility of theoretical sampling does not only apply to the decision on the possibility 
of an additional group, but also in regard to the number of participants in each group. The 
number of research participants cannot initially be definable, because the decision does not 
necessarily aim at reaching a particular number that statistically represents the population of 
the Mt. Merapi surrounding area. Instead, the theoretical sampling reflects the emerging 
categories and their properties (Charmaz, 2006). Hence, I kept recruiting the research 
participants as long as the data obtained still contributed to the emergence of a new category 
in the simultaneous data analysis. I discontinued the theoretical sampling once the 
simultaneous data analysis had reached the point of theoretical saturation (Charmaz, 2006, 
Corbin and Strauss, 2008). For data collection, I conducted 35 in-depth interviews and two 
focus groups attended by 14 participants, as described in the diagram below. 
  
Figure 3. The classifications and numbers of the research participants. 
 
3.5. Data Collection 
In gathering data, I utilized multiple research methods, which were the in-depth interview and 
the focus group interview. Yin (2009) and Marshall and Rossman (2011) support the use of 
multiple research methods in order to construct validity. Similarly, Glaser (1998) agrees that 
gathering data from rigorous research methods is consistent with the systematic generation of 
theory in grounded theory. In particular, in responding to Charmaz‘s (2006) suggestion of 
deeply considering the research problem in choosing the research methods, the methods of 
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in revealing the participants‘ experiences, feelings, and perspectives of trustworthy disaster 
communication in their life context (Charmaz, 2006, Lindlof and Taylor, 2002, Miller and 
Salkind, 2002, Seidman, 2013, Donovan, 2010). 
Again, I could not utilize real-time methods such as observation because of the time 
constraints of the case study. Thus, interviews were more suitable for inquiring about past 
events and recalling the participants‘ memories of the Merapi eruption that occurred five 
years before (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). Moreover, the interview method is also able to result 
in a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the social phenomenon by providing 
proximity (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), as well as flexibility and inherent control for an 
incisive data analysis that fits the strategies of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). In addition 
to the suitability of research methods, the research design was also partly influenced by the 
financial resources available for this research which was partly funded by New Zealand Aid 
and self-funding. How the financial resources influenced the research methods will be 
described in detail in the next sub-sections.  
For the case study of the Mt. Merapi eruption that happened from September – November 
2010, the data collection was initially scheduled for February 2014. The time frame of 
different months was selected purposely in order not to cause a reliving of the traumatic 
experiences of the research participants. However, the conduct of the data collection had to 
be postponed twice. The first delay was caused by the eruption of the Kelud volcano, which 
is located approximately 300 kilometres away from the Merapi volcano. The thick ash from 
the Kelud eruption affected the community members, who were the potential research 
participants. Thus, I postponed my data collection and waited until the communities had 
recovered from the thick ash. However, when the Merapi people were fully recovered, I still 
could not conduct the data collection process because of the increasing activity of the Merapi 
volcano. At that time, the status of the Merapi volcano was officially raised to Alert 
(Waspada). It caused high tension within the local communities, who were mostly 
traumatized as a result of the 2010 Merapi eruption, and they had to be prepared for 
evacuation. Out of respect for the communities‘ situation, I, again, postponed the data 
collection. Fortunately, the status of Merapi was lowered a few weeks later, so the data 
collection could be performed in April 2014. Despite the delay, the situation was actually in 
my interest as the research participants were more eager to discuss their experiences of the 
Merapi eruption and I had a chance for personal observation of information sharing regarding 
the status of Mt. Merapi.  
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3.5.1. Semi-structured in-depth interview  
By adopting the constructivist grounded theory, I aimed to construct a dialectic understanding 
and interpretation of trustworthy community-based disaster communication as a result of the 
researcher-participant interaction. In order to achieve the ultimate objective, Lindlof and 
Taylor (2002) and Tripp (1983) emphasize partnership, equal power and mutually shared 
perspectives between the participants and the researcher. Therefore, the semi-structured in-
depth interview was selected as a suitable method in order to establish the intended equal 
relationship between the interviewees and me (Goulding, 2002), and to facilitate an 
unconstrained discussion where the interviewees could respond to inquiries without any pre-
arranged boundaries  (Burgess, 1984, Charmaz, 2006).  
In practice, the main focus of the interviews was to understand the subjective experiences, 
views, and actions of the participants, according to their own perspectives without any 
guidance from the interviewer (Charmaz, 2006). Hence, I developed a non-directive 
interview guide consisting of some open-ended questions. The interview guide was useful in 
helping me concentrate on the participants‘ words, rather than splitting my concentration to 
conjecture the next appropriate question (Charmaz, 2006). Unlike the tight control of a 
researcher in the structured interview, the semi-structured interview offers flexibility that can 
be serendipitous to identify any formerly unanticipated topic outside the list of predetermined 
questions (Charmaz, 2006, Burgess, 1984, Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). The loose template of 
interview questions allowed me to ask additional questions or alter them in various ways (e.g. 
rephrase or break them up into several detailed questions) (Charmaz, 2006, Lindlof and 
Taylor, 2002). Moreover, the flexibility is particularly significant in adapting to the social 
dynamic of interviewing and the possibly different interview contexts from one participant to 
another. 
Differently from general qualitative interviewing, grounded theory interviewing might alter 
as the study progresses (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, Charmaz, 2006). After some initial 
interviews, I started analyzing the initial data and identified any potential changes in the 
interview questions as a result of the initial findings. Specifically, the questions of the initial 
interviews were related to a range of issues and aimed at gaining a broad understanding of 
trustworthy and participatory disaster communication. Later, I proceeded with subsequent 
interviews with more specific questions than the earlier ones. As the data collection 
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progressed and  conceptual categories emerged, I repeated the same pattern until I reached 
theoretical saturation. 
In total, 35 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted (see Appendix A for the 
interview schedule) to identify a range of issues related to how the Jalin Merapi network 
facilitated the trustworthiness and the participation of the local community members in 
community-based disaster communication, the flow of information providing and sharing, the 
mechanisms of information verification, the volunteering mechanism, and the engagement of 
community radio stations. The interviewees were categorized into five groups with the aim of 
addressing different themes of the interview questions for each category of participant. 
Specifically, the groups consisted of: 
1. Five representatives of the Combine Resources Institution (Combine) staff members, as 
the non-government organization that facilitated the establishment of the Jalin Merapi 
network. This group was interviewed regarding the establishment of the Jalin Merapi 
network, the involvement of community radio stations in the Jalin Merapi network, and 
the government support in community-based disaster communication (see Appendix A for 
the list of questions). 
2. Nine representatives of five community radio stations that were closely involved in the 
Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 Merapi eruption. They are a representative of Lintas 
Merapi FM, a representative of MMC (Merapi Merbabu Community) FM, four 
representatives of K FM, a representative of Lahara FM, and two representatives of Gema 
Merapi FM. This group was interviewed regarding the perceived disaster responsibility 
owned by the community radio stations, the cultural and participatory approaches in radio 
broadcast and disaster communication, the involvement of the community radio stations in 
the Jalin Merapi network, and the roles of the community radio stations in encouraging 
and facilitating community participation in the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 
Merapi eruption (see Appendix A for the list of questions). 
3. Eight representatives of volunteers who actively participated in the Jalin Merapi network 
during the 2010 Merapi eruption. This group was interviewed regarding their voluntary 
participation in the Jalin Merapi network, the media selection of the Jalin Merapi network, 
the trustworthiness and effectiveness of the Jalin Merapi network, and the processes of the 
community participation in information provision, sharing, and verification that were 
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mediated by the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 Merapi eruption (see Appendix A 
for the list of questions). 
4. Eleven representatives of the Jalin Merapi audiences. This group was interviewed 
regarding the perceived trustworthiness of the Jalin Merapi network and the effectiveness 
of the Jalin Merapi network‘s media selection related to its compatibility with the 
community‘s media preference (see Appendix A for the list of questions). 
5. Two officials of the Indonesian National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB). This 
group was interviewed regarding Indonesian policies of formal disaster management, 
coordination and information flow between BNPB and the regional agencies, the 
responsibilities of BNPB for information disseminating, and community engagement in 
official disaster communication. 
Unlike the other officials who were invited into the focus groups, the representatives of 
the BNPB were interviewed separately in Jakarta (the capital city of Indonesia) because of 
a lack of research resources. They were both located in Jakarta, which is approximately 
550 kilometres away from the location of the focus groups, so it would have required 
additional funding to invite them to the focus groups in Sleman or Magelang. As 
previously discussed, the research participants of the study were categorized into two main 
groups based on the theoretical perspective: the local community members and the 
authorities. Although the representatives of BNPB were interviewed separately, their data 
was analyzed in the same category as the other authorities in the focus groups, regarding 
formal disaster management at national and regional levels. 
 
3.5.1.1. Interview process and protocol 
The quality of generated data and the interviewee‘s cooperation in a face-to-face interview 
are significantly influenced by the established relationship between the interviewer and the 
interviewee (Charmaz, 2006, Hesse-Biber, 2007). Hence, Bogdan and Biklen (2007), 
Creswell (2009), Lindlof and Taylor (2002), and Oakley (1981, cited in Ribbens (1989) 
suggest initially establishing non-hierarchical interactions in order to encourage trust, early 
rapport, reciprocity, and initiate the relationships between the interviewee and the 
interviewer. In comparison to the other research methods, the in-depth interview requires ‗a 
more reciprocal style of interaction‘ (Ribbens, 1989, p. 580). Specifically, Charmaz (2006, p. 
110) emphasizes that: 
Reciprocities are important and listening and being there are among them. 
Some researchers may command access on the basis of their authority and 
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the prestige of their projects. Many other researchers cannot. Instead, we 
gain access through the trust that emerges through establishing on-going 
relationships and reciprocities. Ignoring such reciprocities not only weakens 
your chances of obtaining telling data but, moreover, dehumanizes your 
research participants – and yourself. 
The non-hierarchical interactions and the reciprocity are particularly significant in responding 
to the possibility of unbalanced power between interviewer and interviewee. If the issue of 
unbalanced power is not addressed appropriately, it may interfere with the willingness of 
participants to be engaged and to provide a subjective understanding of the phenomenon 
studied (Charmaz, 2006, Hesse-Biber, 2007, Ribbens, 1989, Oakley, 1981). 
In practice, Burgess (1984), Charmaz (2006), Lindlof and Taylor (2002), and Persaud (2010) 
emphasize that an interviewer needs to have the social skills to encourage trust in the initial 
relationship with the interviewee and be more sensitive to the interview‘s context. 
Particularly in a cross-cultural interview, Charmaz (2006), and Lindlof and Taylor (2002)  
emphasize that the interviewer should take account of the participants‘ local culture. 
Adapting myself (as the interviewer) to the interviewees‘ cultural context was one of my 
concerns because the interviewees and I did not share the same culture, regardless of the fact 
that we are Indonesian. The research participants‘ culture is Javanese unlike mine. Thus, I 
attempted to learn about Javanese culture in general and make the participants feel 
comfortable by using a friendly approach in a familiar environment.  
I also dressed appropriately according to the anticipated dress code of the participants during 
the interviews. For example, I dressed very casually for the interviews with the community 
members, and in formal attire for the interviews with the officials. In addition to my attempts 
to be culturally sensitive, all interviews and focus groups were conducted in Bahasa 
Indonesia. I also sometimes used the Javanese language during the interviews. In Indonesia, 
people who are not close usually do not call each other by name, but by appellation. Thus, I 
called my participants by the appellation of Mas (brother), Mbak (sister), Bapak (Sir) and Ibu 
(Mam). The culturally-sensitive behavior and appearance resulted in a situation of equality in 
an interview, and furthermore were effective in building rapport between the the participants 
and me (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002).  
Prior to each interview, I introduced myself, explaining who I was and my personal reasons 
for conducting the study, and engaged in ‗ice-breaker‘ small talk with them. The small talk 
and the self-disclosures were attempts to encourage trust, build an early rapport and 
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discourage the participant‘s feeling of being treated solely as a data-providing object. As a 
result, the participants seemed to feel comfortable talking about themselves. Afterwards, I 
handed in the information sheet to the interviewee (see Appendix A), while verbally 
explaining the study purposes, the reason the participants had been contacted, and how the 
interviews would be conducted. The information sheet outlined the purposes of the research, 
the average length of time of an interview, the general theme of questions, the voluntary 
participation, the optional confidentiality, the future publication of the research, and my 
doctoral supervisor‘s contact for any possible inquiries in future, along with the approval of 
the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee.  
While the participant was reading the information sheet, I once again offered them the 
opportunity to ask any questions or address any concerns regarding the research. The 
information provided in the information sheet and the repeated explanations of the research 
scope were aimed at ensuring the clarity of the research purposes for the interviewee (Patton, 
2002) . This process is more likely to elicit cooperation from the participants so they provide 
accurate and relevant information voluntarily (Persaud, 2010, Ribbens, 1989). Besides, a 
clear statement of the research purpose should encourage rapport between the researcher and 
the participants (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). Further, I verbally emphasized that there were no 
right and wrong responses, as the participants‘ views were the most important. When 
interviewees are assured that they will not face ‗denial, contradiction, competition, or other 
harassment‘ from the interviewer, they will not feel intimidated and will speak more freely 
(Benney & Hughes, 1970, pp. 194-195). Again, I urged the participants to bring up questions 
or issues relevant to the topics that I might not know to ask.      
After they had finished reading the information sheet, again, I confirmed their agreement in 
participating. When they stated their agreement, I requested them to sign the consent form 
(see Appendix C) and fill in a form to obtain their demographic information. The consent 
form basically outlined similar information as on the information sheet, confirming their 
agreement to participate voluntarily, their knowledge of data storage and my contact details, 
their request to remain confidential or not, and their right to withdraw from participating at 
any time. Owing to the available option of confidentiality, I provided two different consent 
forms. For those who chose to remain confidential, their identities would remain unpublished. 
Yet, none of the interviewees wanted to remain confidential. Thus, their identities would be 
revealed in any publication of the research. The identity of interviewees made public was 
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taken from the information provided in the demographic form, not the information that was 
initially provided by the referees as a third party.  
I asked the participants‘ permission to record the interviews, and none of them expressed any 
objection to being recorded. To record the interviews, I took field notes and recorded the 
interviews using a digital audio recorder. The use of the recorder was to ‗capture the 
interview more or less exactly as it was spoken‘ (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 187). Besides, it 
could free me up to be fully engaged in the interview without having to worry about losing 
the exact statement of the interviewees (Charmaz, 2006). In total, the duration of the audio 
recording of the 35 interviews was 31 hours and 19 minutes; this indicates that the average 
time of the interviews was approximately 53 minutes.  
All interviews were maintained in a conversational tone, as I took a less directive and 
dominating role in asking questions (Charmaz, 2006, Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). I also 
encouraged the interviewees‘ interests by emphasizing the scope of the research at the 
community level. My arguments were most likely to be useful for community empowerment 
in performing trustworthy disaster communication. Consequently, the sense of equality and 
alignment somewhat eliminated the asymmetrical power roles of the interviewer and 
interviewee, and encouraged the sense of community stakeholder for the interviewees‘ 
interest (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). More importantly, I kept reminding myself not to further 
probe for answers to those questions that might be sensitive to the participants‘ vulnerabilities 
and potentially recall their traumatic experiences of the 2010 Merapi eruption, as suggested 
by Charmaz (2006) regarding an interview with people who have experienced a crisis.  
3.5.1.2. Locations of interviews 
The in-depth interviews were carried out at five affected sub-districts in the areas surrounding 
the Merapi volcano. These were the Selo sub-district in the Boyolali district, the Dukun sub-
district in the Magelang district, the Salam sub-district in the Magelang district, the 
Kemalang sub-district in the Klaten district, and the Cangkringan sub-district in the Sleman 
district. The selection of these particular sub-districts was based on the locations of the 
community radio stations involved in the Jalin Merapi network. However, in determining the 
venues and the schedules of interviews, I always asked the interviewees during the initial 
phone contact, as I did not know their preferences. The main consideration in asking the 
interviewees was to ensure their convenience and privacy (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). In 
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practice, the interviews were conducted in the interviewees‘ residences, public spaces or their 
offices (including a radio station) in the research locations.  
 
3.5.2. Focus group interviews 
In conjunction with the in-depth interviews, data was also gathered in two focus group 
interviews. Unlike the in-depth interviews that mainly focused on disaster communication at 
the community level, the focus groups aimed at exploring the official disaster communication 
at the government level. Specifically, the open-ended questions of the focus groups were 
related to the official information flow of disaster communication between the involved 
government agencies and from the government agencies to the public, the content of the 
official disaster communication, the official database of disaster information, media usage in 
official disaster management, the accuracy and trustworthiness of community-based 
information from the government perspective, and community engagement in the existing 
formal disaster communication (see Appendix B for the list of questions). The main objective 
of conducting the focus groups was to identify any gaps between the institutional approach 
and the community‘s perspective (gained from the in-depth interviews) of trustworthy and 
participatory disaster communication.  
There were some considerations in selecting focus groups as one of the data collection 
methods in the study. The first consideration was the ability of a focus group to produce 
cumulative data on the various views of participants, which results from the dynamic 
interaction between the participants through dialogue (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002, Kaehne and 
O'Connell, 2010, Cambridge and McCarthy, 2001, Barr et al., 2003). This particular ability is 
effective in understanding how the participants feel or think about the research subject 
(Morgan, 1998) and mirrors the paradigm of social constructionism adopted in this study. 
However, the emergent consensus view does not necessarily neglect individual opinions. 
Instead, the individuals‘ experiences, beliefs, and understanding jointly elaborate the 
consensus view, as described by Smithson (2008, p. 368) below: 
It enables research participants to discuss and develop ideas collectively, 
and articulate their ideas in their own terms, bringing forward their own 
priorities and perspectives.  
In practice, a focus group is considered to be effective in gaining a cumulative perspective 
from the various government agencies involved in Indonesian formal disaster management. 
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Owing to the different authorities of the government agencies, consensus data is less likely to 
be accessible if they were interviewed separately. Moreover, interviewing more than one 
person at the same time is significantly beneficial for research time and resources savings 
(Smithson, 2008). 
Additionally, the focus group can be considered as a relatively egalitarian method because it 
inevitably reduces the researcher‘s control over the interaction. Owing to the lack of 
intervention by the researcher, a focus group is likely to provide peer solidarity and validation 
as a non-threatening environment for discussion (Cambridge and McCarthy, 2001, Krueger 
and Casey, 2000, Wilkinson, 2004). Thus, this ability is very useful for people who may be 
uncomfortable with individual interviews, but happy to talk with their peers. However, as 
also raised by Smithson (2008), I realized that individual hesitation in speaking 
straightforwardly in front of their superior and the possibility of offending another institution 
were inevitable during the focus groups. As an attempt to mitigate the risk, the moderator of 
the focus groups verbally emphasised the freedom of speech, as the participants were free to 
share their opinions without having to worry about being criticized. Thus, all participants 
were asked to respect everybody‘s opinions. 
In practice, two focus group interviews were held in the districts of Sleman and Magelang. 
Although some scholars argue that the ideal design of focus groups is achieving the point of 
theoretical saturation, which occurs somewhere between three and twelve focus groups, I 
decided to limit my focus groups to two groups owing to the lack of supporting research 
resources. Unlike the individual in-depth interview, organizing a focus group requires more 
financial support with regard to travel expenses, remuneration, and refreshment (Smithson, 
2008). I could not conduct only one focus group, which would stand as a representative of the 
perspectives of authorities in the Mt. Merapi surrounding area, because of the possibly 
different policies of disaster management among the four districts. As the four districts in the 
surroundings of Mt. Merapi are administratively under two different provinces, two focus 
groups were conducted with a similar type of participants so the research could identify 
trends of perception by performing cross-group comparability (Smithson, 2008).   
The district governments of Sleman and Magelang were selected purposely as the 
representatives of all district governments in the Mt. Merapi area, because those particular 
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districts had large numbers of casualties and refugees compared to other districts
13
 during the 
2010 Merapi eruption. The Sleman district was selected to represent formal disaster 
management in the Province of the Special Region of Yogyakarta; meanwhile, the Magelang 
district was selected to represent the formal disaster management in the Province of Central 
Java. I did not conduct focus group interviews in the districts of Klaten and Boyolali because 
they were more likely to have a similar mechanism of disaster management to the Magelang 
district as the three of them are administratively under the Province of Central Java.  
Although the locations and the district governments of the focus groups were selected 
purposely, the selection of the invited agencies was conducted with snowball sampling based 
on the recommendation of the Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD). According to 
the Indonesian Law no. 24, the BPBD is the leading agency in formal disaster management at 
the district level. Therefore, I assumed that BPBD could provide a reliable recommendation 
on which regional agencies were involved in the formal disaster responses in the Mt. Merapi 
eruption. Prior to the focus groups, I visited the Sleman Disaster Management Agency and 
the Magelang Disaster Management Agency to ask for their recommendations on the 
appropriate agencies for the focus groups for this study. Following the regulation of the 
provinces as their higher level of governance, the Sleman district and the Magelang district 
have different policies on disaster management which led to the difference in involved 
agencies in responding to the Merapi eruption in each district. Consequently, I invited the 
different regional agencies to the focus group interviews in each district.  
Regardless of the different agencies involved, the policies of disaster management of both 
district governments involve numerous agencies in their formal disaster responses. Again, 
owing to the limited research resources, I decided not to accommodate all involved agencies 
and limited the number of the invited agencies for each district government. In practice, 
obtaining the appropriate number of focus group participants can be challenging (Smithson, 
2008), as various scholars present diverse arguments about the appropriate range of the 
number of participants. Without stating a specific number of participants, Brannen et al. 
(2002, cited in Smithson (2008) argue that having a small group can provide a sufficient 
space for active participation from each participant and for a detailed discussion. Similarly, 
having a big group is more likely to make the participants remain silent, because of the 
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possibly personal fear of speaking or embarrassment about talking about personal concerns in 
a big group (Smithson, 2008, Lindlof and Taylor, 2002, Barrett and Kirk, 2000) . 
Therefore, I decided on the number of the invited agencies based on the suggestions of 
Lindlof and Taylor (2002, p. 182) and Smithson (2008). They restrict the number of focus 
group participants to between six and twelve; a focus group with fewer than six participants 
would lead to ‗a less diverse range (and more rapid exhaustion) of useful comments‘. Based 
on the recommendation of the Sleman Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) and the 
Magelang Disaster Management Agency (BPBD), eight agencies were invited to participate 
in each focus group. In responding to the recommended number, I assumed that eight 
participants (one representative official for each agency) would be the appropriate number of 
participants for each focus group, as it would not be too ―crowded‖ but sufficient to explore 
diverse responses from the engaged officials.  
Following the recommendations of the BPBDs, 16 invitation letters (see Appendix B for a 
representative sample of the letters) were sent to the intended government agencies in Sleman 
and Magelang (see Table 1). Each letter was addressed to each Head of the agencies to ask 
for his/her willingness to be a participant or, instead, to appoint an official as the 
representative of the agency. The letters also outlined the scope and the purposes of the study, 
and the planned location and time of the focus groups. Similarly to the snowball sampling in 
the in-depth interviews, the representative officials, who were the participants of the focus 
groups, were designated by the Heads of the invited agencies.  
The Focus Group of the Sleman District 
Government 
The Focus Group of the Magelang District 
Government 
1. The Sleman Disaster Management Agency. 
2. The Sleman Demographic and Civil 
Registration Agency. 
3. The Geological Disaster Technology 
Research and Development Agency. 
4. The Sleman Code and Telecommunication 
Sub-division. 
5. The Head of the Cangkringan sub-district, 
as the most-affected sub-district in the 
2010 Merapi eruption in the Sleman 
district.  
6. The Kepuharjo village government, as the 
closest village to the Merapi peak in the 
Cangkringan sub-district. 
7. The Sleman Transportation, 
1. The Magelang Disaster Management 
Agency.  
2. The Magelang Social, Labour, and 
Transmigration Agency.  
3. The Magelang Health Agency. 
4. The Magelang Regional Planning and 
Development Agency. 
5. The Magelang Public Works, Energy, 
and Mineral Resources Agency. 
6. The Dukun sub-district government, as 
the most-affected sub-district in the 
2010 Merapi eruption in the Magelang 
district. 
7. The Head of the Ngargomulyo village, 
as the closest village to the Merapi peak 
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Communication and Information Agency 
8. The Center for the Serayu-Opak River 
Region  
in the Dukun sub-district. 
8. The Magelang Communication and 
Information Agency 
Table 1. The invited government agencies in the districts of Sleman and Magelang 
In practice, the focus group of the Sleman district governments was conducted on 19 June 
2014, and that of the Magelang district governments was conducted on 19 July 2014. Seven 
appointed officials attended each focus group. In the Sleman focus group, the invited official 
of the Center for the Serayu-Opak River Region and the invited official of the Sleman 
Transportation, Communication and Information Agency which is responsible for official 
information sharing and coordination in the Sleman district did not show up. Similarly, the 
invited official of the Magelang Communication and Information Agency, which is 
responsible for official information sharing and coordination in the Magelang district, did not 
show up either.  
3.5.2.1. Focus group process and protocol  
Both focus groups were led by a moderator whom I personally selected based on her 
professional experiences. The decision to have a moderator was made based on consideration 
of their important role in encouraging participants to speak out and promoting a good group 
dynamic (Smithson, 2008, Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). Ideally, a moderator can bridge the 
potential gap in individual perspective, which may occur due to the heterogeneity of the 
participants (Morgan, 1998). Without a moderator, I was concerned I might be overwhelmed 
in maintaining my focus on the content of discussion, while simultaneously trying to 
maintain the group dynamic and observing the non-verbal communication of each 
participant. Therefore, sharing responsibility with the moderator was extremely useful for me 
in order to maintain my substantial focus. In practice, the moderator fully facilitated the 
interactions within the focus groups, and I was among the participants, but did not take part 
in the group interactions.    
In contrast to the loose-template of the in-depth interviews, the focus groups followed a more 
structured protocol to build rapport because of the possibly heterogeneous perceptions of the 
participants (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002) . In practice, the focus groups started with a welcome 
and self-introduction of the moderator and me as the researcher. As in the interviews, the 
introduction was followed by an explanation of the research scope and distribution of the 
information sheets. While the participants were reading the information sheet, the moderator 
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verbally underlined the optional confidentiality and the voluntary participation. Later, she 
pointed out the audio recorder and the video recorder while explaining consideration of their 
usage. Finally, she offered the participants the opportunity to ask any questions or address 
any concerns regarding the study. All questions were answered subsequently. After all 
participants had completed their consent form, the moderator started the semi-structured 
discussion guided by a list of open-ended questions. Both focus groups lasted approximately 
two hours, with lunch at the end; the length of time was still in the ideal range of interview 
length (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002, Smithson, 2008). 
3.5.2.2. Physical environment of the focus group interviews. 
Unlike the interviews‘ venues that were recommended by the interviewees, I determined the 
locations of the focus groups to ensure that the places had a relaxed-friendly ambience, so the 
participants could feel comfortable in expressing their opinions. Following the suggestion of 
Lindlof and Taylor (2002, p. 182) for a ‗neutral‘ location to accommodate the diversity of the 
participants, the focus groups were not held in a particular office of the participants. Instead, 
they were held in conference rooms of restaurants close to the participants‘ offices, so it 
could be convenient for them. I chose private and closed rooms with quiet ambience, so the 
participants could be distraction-free and their information remain confidential. Both rooms 
of the focus groups were large enough to fit everyone in, and had some comfortable chairs 
arranged in a rectangular shape. The moderator sat at the side of the table and I sat on the 
other side. I positioned myself on that particular side because the position gave me a wide 
view of the non-verbal communication of all participants. The ability to have an unimpeded 
observation of the participants is important because it may reveal any concealed data 
(Charmaz, 2006). Moreover, the layout provided an effective environment for a non-
bureaucratic discussion. 
A digital audio recorder was placed in the middle of the table, and a video recorder was set 
up next to me (see Figure 4). The reason for using an audio recorder in the focus groups was 
similar to those in the in-depth interviews. The audio recorder was useful to pick up some 
details of the participants‘ statements that I might have missed in my field notes. However, it 
might not be so helpful when several people talked at the same time and it would be difficult 
to identify the overlapping voices. Therefore, I added a video recorder to help me identify 
voices and to capture simultaneous non-verbal communication from different participants 










Figure 4. The layout of the focus group interviews. 
3.5.3. Transcribing 
The length of the audio recordings of the interviews and the focus groups was approximately 
35 hours in total. Therefore, I hired a transcriber to help me with the transcribing workload. 
The transcriber was responsible for transcribing the audio recordings in Bahasa Indonesia and 
sending me the initial transcripts. Further, I read the initial transcripts while listening to the 
recording, so I could identify and add anything that had been missed by the transcriber. 
Moreover, I made notes of the non-verbal signals recorded on the tape, such as a cough, a 
laugh, a sigh, a pause, a silence, an outside noise, a telephone ring, or any interruption. The 
non-verbal signals might implicitly support or contradict what the participants stated, or 
indicate something about what the participants might have meant. Thus, acknowledging the 
signals can significantly strengthen my interpretation of the possibly real meaning of the 
interviewees‘ statements or actions (Charmaz, 2006, Lindlof and Taylor, 2002). Furthermore, 
I translated the transcripts into English because both the interviews and the focus groups were 
conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. Consequently, the processes of transcribing and translation 
were time-consuming and resulted in 693 pages of typed transcripts.  
 
3.6. Data Analysis 
Charmaz (2006) outlines that the grounded theory methodology stipulates analysis through 
coding, constant comparative analysis, and memo writing in order to identify tentative 
categories, define gaps, and delineate relationships between categories. In a grounded theory 
study, data analysis is conducted simultaneously with data collection in a zigzag process; it is 












becoming codes, codes becoming suggestive categories, finding a possible gap, gathering 
more data, analyzing more data, and so forth (Charmaz, 2006, Hansen, 2009, Salkind, 2010, 
Miller and Salkind, 2002, Egan, 2002).  
In general, I started my data analysis by systematically coding the empirical key themes and 
developing them into conceptual categories. Later, I identified the patterns of, and the 
relationships between the developed conceptual categories, to generate a theoretical 
framework. Each analytical stage of the data analysis involved constant comparative analysis 
to name the category and compare the emerging category against another, and memo writing 
to define relationships between the data categories, specify their properties, and identify any 
possible gaps in order for a theory to emerge (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Glaser, 1978, 
Charmaz, 2006, Hansen, 2009, Miller and Salkind, 2002, Miles and Huberman, 1994). The 
result of the data analysis is a theoretical framework describing the positive relationship 
between the social capital embedded in the local culture, the tie strength of the local social 
network of an affected community, trust, and community participation in community-based 
disaster communication. The framework also details community participation in providing, 
verifying, and sharing locally-relevant disaster information through media multiplexity.  
3.6.1. Data coding 
According to Glaser (1992), coding is a process of data conceptualization by constant 
comparison of data to enable categories to emerge. Specifically, in constructivist grounded 
theory, Charmaz (2006) defines coding as a researcher‘s attempt to interpret the implicit 
meaning of the participants‘ empirical views and actions, and describe the interpretation with 
his/her own language and perspective. Thus, coding is constructed from the researcher‘s 
perspective and is useful for ‗sorting, synthesizing, integrating, and organizing a large 
amount of data‘ (Charmaz, 2006, p. 46).  
In regard to the procedural stages of coding, all grounded theory scholars seem to agree that 
the coding process starts with open/ initial coding and ends with focused/selective coding. 
However, scholars seem to be divided when it comes to axial coding. Hansen (2009), Polit 
and Beck (2010), Miller and Salkind (2002), Strauss (1987), and Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
define axial coding as the processes of defining a core category, connecting it to the other 
categories, and specifying the properties of a category. Thus, they argue that grounded 
theorists need to conduct axial coding in between the open/initial coding and the 
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selective/focused coding. Furthermore, Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 125) conclude that the 
important roles of axial coding lie in providing answers to the questions of ‗when, where, 
why, who, how, and with what consequences‘, and integrating the segmented data, which is 
previously fractured in the initial coding, into a coherent framework.  
On the other hand, Charmaz (2006), Glaser (1978) and Urquhart (2007) argue that the axial 
coding of Strauss actually overlaps with an analytical part of focused/selective coding. 
Contradicting the role of axial coding in reuniting the fragmented data, Glaser (1978) 
specifically argues that the theoretical coding will eventually compile the fragmented data 
back together; so axial coding is not necessary. He further argues that the coding is an 
attempt to force data to fit the emerging theory, rather than allowing a conceptual category to 
emerge organically from the data (Levers, 2013). Moreover, Charmaz (2006) claims that 
axial coding is impractical and can limit researchers‘ interpretation of their empirical 
findings, because it encourages a pre-set framework for the data.  
Owing to the adoption of the constructivist grounded theory of Charmaz, the coding process 
in this study is mainly divided into two stages, which are the open/initial coding and the 
selective/focused coding. I did not necessarily eliminate the process of the axial coding; 
albeit, I take sides with Charmaz, Glaser and Urquhart regarding Strauss‘s definition of axial 
coding in developing the conceptual categories, and identifying the properties of a category 
and the relationships between categories as parts of the focused/selective coding. Besides, 
regarding the distinguished process of coding, Strauss (1987) and Glaser (2001) acknowledge 
that as long as the researcher maintains his/her main focus of the study, the sequential steps 
of coding can be altered in many ways based on the unique details of the study.  
3.6.1.1. Open/ Initial Coding 
The data analysis of this study started with open coding by exploring, identifying, and 
revealing the theoretical opportunities emerging from the data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
Glaser, 1992). Open coding is also referred to as initial coding by Charmaz (2006). In 
practice, my initial coding was fully conducted on the transcripts of the interview and focus 
group recordings. This was can provide a deeper level of understanding of the studied 
phenomenon in comparison to coding from and across field notes (Charmaz, 2006). Since 
each group of research participants had different questions in their interviews, my coding 
system follows a single-layered design based on the groups of research participants: the 
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volunteers of the community radio stations and the Jalin Merapi network, the Jalin Merapi 
audiences, the Combine, and the authorities.  
As suggested by Seidman (2013), I started my initial coding by separately interpreting the 
transcripts of each category of research participant. Specifically, I segmented the data into 
themes by making a judgement of what was significant in the transcripts. After identifying 
themes in my data, I coded the themes by attributing descriptive and concise labels of process 
or action
14
 (Charmaz, 2006, Hansen, 2009, Glaser, 1978, Miles and Huberman, 1994). In 
total, I generated 133 codes  from the transcripts of the interviews and the focus groups (see 
Table 2). Following the suggestions of Charmaz (2006), Glaser (1978), and Seidman (2013), 
the emergent codes remain short and tentatively open to any changes for the theoretical 
development.  
                                                          
14
 Charmaz (2006) specifically suggests using gerunds for coding, because they can help the researcher to see 
sequences and make conceptual connections. Consequently, they can foster the theory construction.  
 Codes 
The Jalin Merapi 
audiences (21 
codes) 
voluntary, trustworthiness, reliable information source, general response level, 
response level of the community, response level of local government, media 
preference, mobile phone, mass media, traditional media, radio 
communication, internet and social media, community radio station, verifying 
information, information accuracy, sharing and providing information, 
cultural considerations, information flow, information demands, information 
accessibility, effectiveness, continuity. 
Volunteers of 
community radio 
stations (28 codes) 
characteristics of community radio stations, programs of community radio 
stations, audiences  of community radio stations, responsibilities of 
community radio stations in a disaster, involvement in community-based 
information, mediator of information providing and sharing, responsibilities  
of community radio stations in community-based information, community-
based information mechanisms, information demands,  sharing and providing 
information, media selection, mobile phone, two way radio, weaknesses of 
two way radio, social media, mass media, traditional media, type of 
information,  verifying information, reliable information source, information 
accuracy, coordination with and between the local government and the 
communities, coordination between the government and the community radio 
stations, coordination with the government within the community-based 
information, social networks of the broadcasters, disaster response level of the 
community, information accessibility, obstacles  of community radio stations 





the general social aspects of the community, information accessibility, 
response level of the community, development of a community-based 
information network, challenges, establishment process, purposes, involved 
parties, supportive infrastructure, trustworthiness of community-based 
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Table 2. The initial coding of the five groups of research participants. 
By conducting the initial coding, I simultaneously organized and summarized various aspects 
of data, and described the detailed patterns within the data  (Charmaz, 2006, Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). The emergent codes subsequently suggested the development of early 
analytical concepts/categories and their properties/subcategories, and the patterns of 
relationships between the conceptual categories in the focused/selective coding (Charmaz, 
2006, Hansen, 2009, Miller and Salkind, 2002, Stern and Porr, 2011).  
3.6.1.2. Focused/selective coding 
After the open/initial coding, data analysis continues with the focused/selective coding, in 
which the researcher incisively organizes and clusters the emergent codes into categories 
(Birks and Mills, 2011, Charmaz, 2003, Charmaz, 2006, Hansen, 2009). Because this study 
has multiple units of analysis, I analyzed the specific pattern of categories in each group of 
information networks, formal disaster management, coordination with the 
government in the community-based information network, information 
accuracy, information demands, providing information by the communities, 
sharing information, type of information, verifying information, local 
communities' acceptance, local communication behaviours, media usage, 
website, audio streaming, community radio station, Google docs as bank data, 
two way radio, SMS gateway, social media, Twitter, Facebook, mechanisms 
of voluntary participation. 
Authorities (19 
codes) 
community-based information, two way radio usage in the community, 
community radio station usage in the community, internet-based media usage 
in the community, mobile phone usage in the community, traditional media 
usage in the community, coordination between government agencies, 
coordination between local government and communities, data management, 
information flow in formal disaster management, verifying information, 
media usage in formal disaster management, mobile phone usage in 
government, two way radio usage in government, traditional media usage in 
government, internet-based media usage in government, disaster response 
level, SOP and regulation, type of information. 
Volunteers of  the 
Jalin Merapi 
network  (34 codes) 
response level, voluntary participation, reason for participation, participation 
requirements, form of participation, field post volunteers,  main post 
volunteers, any location volunteers, cultural considerations, coordination 
between volunteers, challenges of participation, aid donations,  verifying 
information,  sharing and providing information, types of information, media 
usage, SMS, mass media, website, Twitter, Google Docs, Facebook, two way 
radio, information source, information demand, information accessibility, 
information accuracy, community-based information network, mechanism of 
information flow, trustworthiness, practicality of a disaster response, 
effectiveness, involvement of a community radio station, coordination with 
local government.   
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participants before summarizing the patterns into a generalized pattern (Hansen, 2009). In 
each group of participants, I conducted a constant comparative analysis by repetitively 
comparing and contrasting the emergent codes against one another, based on their thematic 
similarities and differences (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, cited in Charmaz, 2006, Stern and Porr, 
2011). Simultaneously, I conducted memo writing to develop ideas about how the random 
codes could be related to one another (Neuman, 1997, Glaser, 1978), and how they could  
account for the properties that can analytically define a category (Charmaz, 2006). As a 
result, some initial codes could be inductively raised as categories, which have a higher level 
of abstractness compared to the initial codes (Creswell, 2009). Subsequently, the initial codes 
with a similar theme were grouped under a higher level of category/concept (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
In the initial process of the focused/selective coding, I classified the 21 initial codes of the 
group of the Jalin Merapi audiences into four categories and 17 sub-categories/ properties, as 









































Figure 5. The focused/selective coding of the 




I classified the 28 initial codes of the group of the volunteers of community radio stations 
into five categories and 19 sub-categories/properties, as shown in the diagram below. 
 

































































I classified the 31 initial codes of the group of the Combine Resources Institution into five 
categories and 20 sub-categories/properties, as shown in the diagram below. 
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I classified the 19 initial codes of the group of the authorities into four categories and 14 sub-
categories/properties, as shown in the diagram below. 
 

























































I classified the 34 codes of the group of the volunteers of the Jalin Merapi network into four 
categories and 21 sub-categories/properties, as shown in the diagram below. 
 
Figure 9. The focused/selective coding of the group of volunteers of the Jalin Merapi network. 
 
After identifying the emergent conceptual categories in each group of participants, I 
conducted a cross-unit comparative analysis between the emergent categories of the five 
groups of the research participants to ‗find what patterns are consistent and under what 



















































simultaneously conducting memo writing, I manually compared the emergent categories with 
the other categories to sharpen their distinctions, identify superiority, and interpret how they 
relate to one another (see Figure 10). By doing so, any possible gap in the emergent 
categories is more likely to be identified (Charmaz, 2006). Subsequently, the categories that 
significantly represented the most meaningful data were analytically treated as the major 
conceptual categories/concepts in the on-going theory development (Charmaz, 2006, Glaser, 




Figure 10. The focused/selective coding of the five group of research participants. 
 
The process of categorizing the emergent codes with constant comparative analysis and 
memo writing continued to run until I reached the point of theoretical saturation. Although 
there is no consensus parameter to identify when the point of theoretical saturation is truly 
achieved (Holton, 2007), I adopted the definitions of Charmaz (2006), Glaser (2001), and 
Hansen (2009) that describe theoretical saturation as the emergence of a valid and reliable 
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categories; there is no new theoretical insight or a new emergent property. In practice, it was 
the point when I began to obtain similar findings to those already found from different 
participants (Marshall and Rossman, 2011, Morse, 1995). In other words, the theoretical 
saturation also can be observed with the repetitive subsequent conceptual categories which 
emerged from the different groups of research participants (Suddaby, 2006, Bowen, 2008). 
Consequently, the theoretical saturation also indicates the termination of theoretical sampling 
in the on-going data collection (Hansen, 2009). 
As the final process of focused/selective coding, I hypothetically connected the emergent 
categories to the major category(ies) and elaborated the relationships of categories as an 
integrated conceptual pattern (Birks and Mills, 2011, Glaser, 1978) (see Figure 11). 
Specifically, Charmaz (2006, p. 63) outlines that researchers need to:   
[C]larify the general context and specific conditions in which a particular 
phenomenon is evident, specify the conditions under which it changes and to 
outline its consequences, learn its temporal and structural orderings and 
discover participants‘ strategies for dealing with them.  
In connecting the conceptual categories to the major/core category(ies), Glaser (1978) offers 
the Six C as the coding families: causes, contexts, contingencies, consequences, covariances 
and conditions. In a similar fashion, (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and Miller and Salkind 
(2002) offer four types of relationships between categories: (1) conditions, as the categories 
that establish the core category(ies); (2) actions/interactions/strategies, as the categories that 
represent the participants‘ routine actions or strategies in responding to the core 
category(ies); (3) intervening and contextual categories, as the categories that influence the 
categories of actions or strategies; and (4) consequences, as the categories that result from the 
categories of actions or strategies. Although these coding families can suggest the 
relationships between the conceptual categories, I, as suggested by Charmaz (2006), did not 
necessarily accept the coding families as a strict guidance to define all connections between 
the emergent categories in my data. As this study focuses on a complex social phenomenon, 
the suggested coding families may overlap or not cover all possible connections between the 
conceptual categories. 
 
Finally, I compared and integrated my memos to develop a theoretical insight into how the 
conceptual connections between categories in my data can be elaborated into an interpretative 
theoretical understanding of trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster 
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communication, and how the emergent framework is relevant to closing gaps in the existing 
studies (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, Hansen, 2009, Strauss, 1987, Miller and Salkind, 2002, 
Charmaz, 2006, Glaser, 1978). This was when I began to frame my conceptual analysis into a 
theoretical statement (Charmaz, 2006). In practice, the emergent conceptual categories of my 
data were contextualized and triangulated within the existing literature on disaster 
management, disaster communication and social capital to corroborate the significance of 
trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication in disaster response 
























Figure 12. The theoretical understanding of trustworthy and 
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3.7. Ethical Considerations 
In addition to the responsibility for presenting rigorous research findings, a researcher is 
obligated to protect the basic human rights of the participants and not to cause harm to them 
(Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, Miles and Huberman, 1994, Persaud, 2010). In particular, Patton 
(2002) underlines that the method of in-depth interview faces more ethical challenges than 
other research methods, because it ‗opens what is inside people‘ so it is more likely to be 
intrusive and encourage ‗greater reactivity‘. Therefore, I acknowledged some ethical 
challenges in the study, particularly regarding confidentiality, data storage, and any required 
research permits.  
As previously discussed, all participants were offered optional confidentiality. Regardless of 
the effectiveness in gaining an agreement from the potential participants, I acknowledged that 
the snowball sampling I used may be in contradiction to my ethical obligation to protect the 
identities of my research participants. As snowball sampling requires an interviewee to 
recommend another interviewee, it means that the identity of the potential interviewee had 
been revealed even before I gained his consent to participate. Similarly, as I mentioned the 
referee to the potential interviewee in my initial contacts, it means that they obviously were 
aware that the referees had participated in my research. Although the snowball sampling is 
unlikely to respect the privacy of research participants, the consents of 48 participants to be 
neither anonymous nor confidential made the contradiction less problematic; thus, they would 
be identified publicly in this study. Only one participant of a focus group raised her concern 
about being anonymous and suggested she might be identified by her agency. This I 
addressed by reassuring her that her identity would be protected and not made public. 
However, despite the attempt to protect the confidentiality of the focus group participants, I 
still cannot fully guarantee that other participants would not discuss her identity afterwards 
(Smithson, 2008). More importantly, all participants were treated respectfully and 
professionally, no matter what their decisions of confidentiality.   
Regarding the data storage, all data were securely stored on a password-protected computer 
in a locked office in the Department of Media and Communication, University of Canterbury. 
The raw data of audio recordings were previously accessible to the transcriber. In order to 
protect the confidentiality of the research participant, the transcriber had signed a 
confidentiality agreement confirming that the audio files would be deleted after transcribing, 
as well as the transcript files, and that the personal information from the confidential 
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participants remains strictly confidential. Starting from the process of data analysis, 
henceforth, the data have been accessible only to my doctoral supervisors. The raw data will 
be destroyed after 10 years.  
As an assurance of the ethical rights of research participants and my ethical integrity, 
approval from the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury had been 
granted prior to data collection. Moreover, I gained the required research permits from the 
Indonesian governments for the data collection of Indonesia. Because the research was 
located in two different provinces, I initially had to gain a research permit from the 
Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs, as the authority holder for domestic research permits at 
the central government level (see Appendix D). Afterward, I delivered the research permit as 
a recommendation to the provincial government of Central Java and the provincial 
government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta. Each provincial government issued a 
research permit for me (see Appendix D). Because the research focuses on the disaster 
communication at the community level and at the district level, the research permit of the 
provincial government of Central Java was delivered further as a recommendation to the 
district government of Klaten, Boyolali, and Magelang. Likewise, the research permit of the 
provincial government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta was delivered further as a 
recommendation to the district government of Sleman. Finally, I started conducting the study 
after the four district governments of Sleman, Klaten, Boyolali, and Magelang granted 
research permits for me (see Appendix D).  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
The study has been conducted based on constructivist and interpretative paradigms as the 
grounding logic for the selection of the qualitative methodology in this study. Specifically, I 
utilized a qualitative case study of the Jalin Merapi network in the 2010 Merapi eruption in 
order to gain an in-depth understanding of trustworthy and participatory community-based 
disaster communication. Additionally, I adopted constructivist grounded theory methodology 
by emphasizing that the construction of a theoretical understanding of the studied 
phenomenon does not solely refer to the interpretation of the research participants, but also 










Figure 13. The research methodology 
 
In gathering data, I conducted 35 in-depth semi-structured interviews and two focus groups to 
gather data from the local community living on the Mt. Merapi slopes and the local 
governments. Further, adopting the grounded theory methodology, I analyzed the data by 
conducting coding, constant comparative analysis, and memo writing in order to construct a 
theoretical framework that describes patterns and relationships between concepts of 


























Perceived trustworthiness and effectiveness of official disaster management  
 
Experiencing the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami became the critical point defining the 
inadequacy of formal Indonesian disaster management. Consequently, Indonesia updated its 
disaster management law in 2007 and released a series of regulations accordingly. As a result, 
according to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Indonesia 
has ‗one of the most comprehensive legal frameworks for disaster management and response 
in the world‘ (2015, p. 80). However, the legal comprehensiveness does not necessarily 
guarantee an absolutely successful disaster response in practice. Unlike the robust legal 
frameworks, formal disaster communication seems not to be prioritized as an important factor 
determining the effectiveness of a formal disaster response by the authorities in Indonesia. 
Therefore, taking the case study of the 2010 Merapi eruption, as one of the national disasters 
in Indonesia, this chapter emphasizes the importance of trustworthy formal disaster 
communication in facilitating an effective disaster response.  
The formal disaster management of Mt. Merapi is a suitable case study to closely investigate 
the interaction between an at-risk community and authorities, particularly regarding 
trustworthy formal disaster communication. The tension between the local communities 
living on the slopes of Mt. Merapi and the local government has been recognized by 
numerous scholars (for example, Donovan et al, 2012; Dove, 2008; Lavigne et al., 2008; 
Schlehe, 1996; Triyoga, 1991; and Troll et al., 2015). Donovan et al. (2012) and Troll et al. 
(2015) explicitly identify the tension as a form of undermining trust in the local governments 
in the Mt. Merapi surroundings, which has led to the communities‘ reluctance to follow 
evacuation instructions and the government‘s program of disaster management.  
The lack of trust in local government by those living in the Mt. Merapi surroundings existed 
long before the 2010 eruption. In 1977, Triyoga (1991) identified the tendency for 
undermined trust; he found that only 4% of the surveyed Merapi people trusted the 
government when an eruption occured. As previously mentioned in the introduction, the local 
community has been repeatedly unresponsive, or even resistant, to the official evacuation 
orders because of the incompatibility between the government approach in determining when 
the at-risk community has to evacuate and local cultural beliefs and economic vulnerability. 
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However, lack of trust in the local government has not only been influenced by the cultural 
beliefs of the local community, but also by the negative experiences with the local 
government prior to the 2010 eruption. Specifically, Donovan et al. (2012), Triyoga (1991), 
and Troll et al. (2015) identify that trust in local government was also undermined by the 
community‘s former experience when the local government in 1968 resettled 115 families 
permanently from their homes and made money by selling their land. As a result, in the 1978 
eruption, the affected community refused to be resettled by the local government, which 
responded by abandoning the community; the authorities issued the policy of simply ‗erasing‘ 
the village from the official government maps, as the easy solution to the community‘s 
refusal (Dove, 2008, p. 333). Again, in the 1994 eruption, the affected community refused to 
be resettled by the local government because they questioned the government‘s motives 
(Schlehe, 1996). The negative disaster experiences may have led to negative evaluation and 
lower trust in the authorities (Nicholls and Picou, 2013, Reinhardt, 2015), and, further, to 
individuals‘ disengagement from the official system (Giddens, 1990). 
In a similar fashion, the interviewed community members, including the community radio 
volunteers, constantly described a low level of perceived effectiveness and generalized trust 
in local governments regarding formal disaster response, because of their misfortunes in the 
past Mt. Merapi eruptions. Specifically, they have regarded the formal efforts of the local 
governments to reduce the Mt. Merapi risk as inappropriate and not beneficial for the local 
community. Unfortunately, the tension between the authorities and the local communities 
frequently led to casualties because the government could not force the community members 
to evacuate when an eruption occurred. As an interviewed community member explained: 
‗Although the local government is responsible for facilitating evacuation process, the 
decision to evacuate totally depends on the communities themselves completely‘ (Setiawan, 
personal interview, 5 June 2014). As a result, the mismatch of evacuation decisions between 
the affected community and the authorities became the main determining factor for the high 
death toll in the 2010 eruption (Mei et al., 2013). 
In addition to the long-existing lack of trust in the authorities, the contingency disaster 
response plan was considered inadequate in responding to the extreme 2010 eruption. 
Specifically, the contingency plans used to respond to past Mt. Merapi eruptions, including 
the 2010 eruption, had been criticised for being developed based only on the patterns of past 
smaller eruptions, and not covering the possibility of a major explosive eruption (Thouret et 
al., 2000, Lavigne et al., 2008, Mei et al., 2013, Donovan, 2010). During the 2010 Merapi 
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eruption, the local governments appeared to be overwhelmed because of the extensively 
affected areas and the large number of evacuees. For example, Mei et al. (2013) evaluated 
that, based on the contingency plans used that time, IDP camps were only prepared to 
accommodate people living in Kawasan Rawan Bencana (KRB) III (Hazard Zone III)
15
; 
meanwhile, the volcanic hazards impacted the communities within the Hazard Zone II and 
Hazard Zone I. When the affected communities were instructed to re-evacuate for the third 
time to areas more than 20 kilometres away, there were no IDP camps prepared beyond a 
radius of 20 kilometres from the summit. Subsequently, chaos and confusion because of an 
absence of official information about how and where to re-evacuate, were inevitable.  
In this chapter, I present other factors that have been less acknowledged as determining 
factors of the effectiveness and trustworthiness of official disaster communication, 
particularly the reasons for the resistance of the local community to the official disaster 
communication in the Mt. Merapi surroundings. Specifically, I will discuss the perspectives 
of the affected community and the authorities regarding the effectiveness and trustworthiness 
of official disaster communication, and the involvement of the community in official disaster 
communication. Prior to further discussion of the perspectives of the community and the 
authorities on the official disaster communication, I will discuss the official disaster 
communication of the Mt. Merapi eruption in order to provide a general understanding of the 
case. To maintain contemporary validity, my discussion does not solely refer to the formal 
information flows conducted by the local governments during the 2010 eruption, but also 






                                                          
15
 In the authorized plans and the hazard map, Mt. Merapi is divided into three hazard zones. From the least to 
the most dangerous, these are: Hazard Zone I (KRB I), which is the furthest area from the Mt. Merapi summit, 
and potentially affected by mass flows (lahar flood) and/or air fall material (volcanic ash fall and ejected rock 
fragments (glowing)); Hazard Zone II (KRB II), which is potentially affected by mass flows (pyroclastic flows, 
lava flows, and lahar flood) and/or ejected material (thick dry volcanic ash fall, volcanic bombs, and other 
ejected rocks); and Hazard Zone III (KRB III), which is the closest area to the Mt. Merapi summit, and 
potentially affected by pyroclastic flows, lava flows, rock falls, and ejected rock fragments (glowing) (Dove, 
2008; Hadisantono et al., 2002; Sayudi et al., 2010). 
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4.1. The processes of official disaster communication in Mt. Merapi eruptions 
The government agencies and the processes of official disaster communication for Mt. 
Merapi eruptions are regulated in the Indonesian Act Number 24 (2007). The Act defines that 
Indonesian disaster management encompasses the formal efforts of disaster-related policy 
development, disaster mitigation (pre-disaster), disaster response, and disaster rehabilitation 
(post-disaster). It also designates Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National 
Disaster Management Agency – BNPB) as having the responsibility for providing guidelines 
and directives on disaster management at the national level, which was established by the 
central government
16
 (article 10, clause 2), and Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah 
(Regional Disaster Management Agencies – BPBDs) as the coordinators for local disaster 
management at provincial and city/district levels (articles 18 and 22)
17
. 
As the official authorities of disaster management, both the BNPB and the BPBDs cooperate 
with certain government agencies in responding to a disaster, depending on the type of 
natural hazard. Regarding a volcano eruption, the Disaster Management Agencies collaborate 
with the government agencies responsible for the formal vulcanology management. At the 
central government level, the formal responsibility for vulcanology lies with the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Indonesia (Kementerian Energi dan 
Sumber Daya Mineral - ESDM), specifically with one of its units called Badan Geology 
(Geological Agency). The Geological Agency is responsible for general geological research, 
including geological resources, vulcanology, and environmental geology. One of its units, 
which is responsible for vulcanology and geological disasters is called Pusat Vulkanologi dan 
Mitigasi Bencana Geologi (Center for Vulcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation - 
CVGHM). Further, the CVGHM is responsible for assessing and monitoring all volcanic 
activities in Indonesia; the specific unit that is responsible for the vulcanology mitigation 
process, particularly Mt. Merapi, is Balai Penyelidikan dan Pengembangan Teknologi 
Kebencanaan Geologi (Center for Investigation and Technology Development of Geological 
Disasters – BPPTKG). The BPPTKG is the government research institution that is mainly 
responsible for providing scientific recommendations regarding Mt. Merapi, particularly 
regarding its status level, to the local governments. In summary, official disaster 
communication about the Mt. Merapi eruption involves all the government agencies 
                                                          
16
 BNPB is headed by a ministerial-level official who directly reports to the President. 
17
 Indonesia has five levels of administrative government: national, provinces, districts, sub-districts and 
villages, consecutively. A village consists of several hamlets. 
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responsible for disaster management, vulcanology, and regional governance both at the 
regional and the national levels.  
The concept of official disaster communication in this thesis is related to the government 
regulation, policies and administrative procedures associated with the communication process 
performed by the levels of government in responding to a Mt. Merapi eruption. The existing 
official disaster communication process about Mt. Merapi eruptions was developed based on 
the CVGHM‘s official flows of volcanic activities (see Figure 14), which is applied to any 
volcanic eruption in Indonesia; so the information flows are closely related to a dissemination 
of early warnings. The early warnings of Mt. Merapi eruptions are basically classified into 
four levels of Mt. Merapi‘s activities. From the lowest to the highest, these are: Normal 
(Level 1) when Mt. Merapi is in a normal state of activity; Advisory (Level 2/Waspada) 
when visual observation and seismic data record an increasing volcanic activity; Watch 
(Level 3/Siaga) when the increasing activity shows a continuous trend that is likely to lead to 
an eruption; hence, people must be prepared for evacuation; and Warning (Level 4/Awas) 
when an ash/vapor eruption starts and may lead to a larger and more hazardous eruption; 


































Figure 14. The planned official information flow of volcano activities (CVGHM, 2014a)  
In practice, the research participants in both focus groups explained that the official 
information flow starts from the monitoring system of the BPPTKG vulcanology research 
unit‘s five Vulcanology Observation Posts (the observation posts of Kaliurang, Babadan, 
Ngepos, Jrakah, and Selo) located 5-10 kilometres away from the Mt. Merapi summit. The 
initial data is transmitted further to the BPPTKG‘s main office to be analyzed. The 
BPPTKG‘s analysis report has to be officially reported to the CVGHM vulcanology centre 
before being delivered further to the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and 
local governments that consist of Heads of Provinces, and Heads of Districts. Furthermore, 
Heads of Districts deliver the information to the Regional Disaster Management Agencies 
(BPBDs) and Heads of Sub-districts. Heads of Sub-districts deliver the information to Heads 
of Villages and Heads of Villages deliver the information to Heads of Hamlets. Finally, 
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Heads of Hamlets deliver the information to community members by means of face-to-face 
meetings, two-way radio, and SMS.  
The official information about the level of volcanic activities of Mt. Merapi and the official 
evacuation instruction is treated differently by the authorities. Iman, a district officer, 
explained that the official information about Mt. Merapi‘s increased activities to Level 2 and 
Level 3 can be declared officially by the BPPTKG vulcanology research unit; the official 
information about Mt. Merapi‘s increased activities to Level 4 has to be declared officially by 
the CVGHM vulcanology centre (focus group, 19 July 2014). Hence, information flow about 
increased status from Level 3 to Level 4 is treated with a longer process. The official 
information about the level of Mt. Merapi‘s activity is disseminated further to the community 
members by the local governments accordingly. Unlike the official information about the 
level of volcanic activity that becomes the responsibility of the vulcanology agencies, the 
official instruction to evacuate is declared by the district governments based on the 
recommendation of the vulcanology agencies. The same process is also applied to siren 
activation as a tool of an early warning system for evacuation. Sirens are positioned in 
villages and have to be manually activated by an appointed official, based on the Head of the 
District‘s instruction.  
Referring to the explanations above, the information flows about early warnings of Mt. 
Merapi are more bureaucratic and more complex in practice (see Figure 15), compared to the 
planned information flows in Figure 14. However, I identified that the official information 
flow does not strictly adhere to the information flows shown in Figure 15 as the focus-group 
participants also mentioned some ―shortcuts‖ in information sharing in their official disaster 
communication. For example, the BPPTKG volcano research unit can deliver its information 
about an increased status from Level 1 to Level 3 directly to Heads of Districts and BPBDs. 
Afterward, the information flow from the Heads of Districts to the community members is 
the same as the previous flow that I have discussed above. In exceptional cases, Heads of 
Sub-districts can directly deliver the warning to community members, based on a 
recommendation of BPBD regional disaster agencies. Likewise, in addition to coordination 
with Heads of Sub-districts, the BPBDs can directly coordinate with the Heads of Villages in 
Hazard Zone III; subsequently, the Heads of Sub-districts forward the warning to the other 
Heads of Villages in Hazard Zones II and I. Moreover, the BPPTKG volcano research unit 
can directly inform the community members through sirens in a particularly urgent situation.  
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When it comes to a formal measurement of a policy/program‘s effectiveness, there seems to 
be an absence of an official evaluation of the practice of official disaster communication for 
Mt. Merapi eruptions. Similarly to Lowrey (2009, p. 48) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), there 
is a tendency for ‗loose coupling‘ when the government agencies regard their policies as 
powerful myths and practise their regulations ceremonially regardless of their actual 
effectiveness. I argue that the information flows of official disaster communication 
potentially have problems with regard to information redundancy and an absence of feedback 
loops. Although Austin et al. (2012) and Dougall et al. (2008) outline that redundancy in 
transmitting the same key messages is effective in encouraging audiences to be more 
responsive to disaster information, the redundancy is most likely to lead to confusion when 
involved individuals do not understand clearly the role of each involved agency. In a similar 
fashion, Butt (2014, pp. 194-195) and Samadhi (2014, p. 179) found that Indonesian disaster 
management has been challenged by ‗institutional complexities‘ because of the 
‗regionalization‘ of disaster policies and authorities between the Indonesian central 
government and regional governments. The jurisdictional overlap often results in 
unnecessarily layered and repetitive coordination and an inability to connect multiple 
emergency plans. Further, the jurisdictional overlap can lead to an institutional paralysis, 
when the policies over the same issue are inconsistent and not linked to one another (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977).  
Consequently, information redundancy due to repetitive coordination may ensure acceptance 
of official disaster information by the intended agencies, but the authorities may face 
difficulties in producing rapid decision-making, despite the need for a timely response. The 
lack of ability for prompt decision-making may be addressed by inserting feedback loops 
from information receiver to information sender, which function as the embodiment of 
official responses to the disaster information/instruction accepted formerly. For example, a 
Head of a Sub-district Government will receive the same information about the alert status of 
Mt. Merapi from a Head of a District Government and a Regional Disaster Management 
Agency; the information of the Regional Disaster Management agency sent to the Head of a 
Sub-district was actually the same information that was simultaneously sent by the Head of a 
District to the Regional Disaster Management agency and the Head of a Sub-district (see 
figure 15). A direct feedback loop from the Head of a Sub-district to the Head of a District 
may be useful for preventing repetitive coordination with the Regional Disaster Management 
Agency on the same disaster information. At the same time, it is important to emphasise that 
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feedback loops do not necessarily obviate any possible coordination between the Head of a 
Sub-district and the Regional Disaster Management agency on different disaster information. 
Without the unnecessary repetitive coordination on the information redundancy, the 
government agencies may be able to share and make their decisions promptly.  
Moreover, when it comes to official disaster communication about Mt. Merapi eruptions, the 
focus group participants mostly discussed the dissemination of early warnings of Mt. 
Merapi‘s status, as if that is the only type of disaster information required by the affected 
community. In contrast to the authorities‘ tendency to assume that the affected community 
only required information about the status of Mt. Merapi, an interviewed community member 
stated that the information on Mt. Merapi‘s status was mostly not required after the eruption, 
because the evacuees could simply gain the information from the closest governmental posts 
to their IDP camps and television (Gunawan, personal interview, 8 July 2014). From the 
perspective of an affected community, the interviewed community members specifically 
identified the types of information they needed right after the first eruption and when they 
were evacuating in 2010. These were: the most up to date status and condition of Mt. Merapi; 
casualties; refugees‘ condition; affected/vulnerable areas; the possibility of further eruptions 
as the consideration for whether it was necessary to evacuate or not, where to evacuate and 
how to evacuate; damage; evacuation routes; locations of IDP camps; emergency bags; 
transportation means and fuel for evacuation; demands for food, clothes, and blankets; aid 
distribution; refugees‘ needs; missing persons; physical and psychological recovery; demands 
for food ingredients, clothes, blankets, and activities; condition of livelihood; farms and 
livestock; time when they can feed their livestock; time when they can go home for their 
daily activities; lahars and their levels; traffic updates and road blockages; logistic aid, and 
demand for food ingredients and water pumps. The numerous types of information demand 
mirror the findings of other scholars who also identified that the highest community need for 
information concerns warnings, risk messages, evacuation notifications, scope of the damage, 
governmental responses, rescue and relief efforts, messages regarding self-efficacy, how to 
get basic necessities and healthcare (BBC, 2012, Bunce et al., 2012, Reynolds and Seeger, 
2005, Seeger et al., 2003, Spence et al., 2007, Spence et al., 2009). Yet, this list shows that 
the affected community‘s demand for disaster information in a disaster response is not only 
limited to early warnings. Thus, the authorities‘ tendency to solely focus on the information 
about the status of Mt. Merapi‘s activity was inadequate on its own to fulfill the information 
demands of the affected community during the 2010 eruption.  
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Not just inadequate for the community‘s need, official disaster communication that focused 
only on early warning was also inadequate for an effective formal response to the 2010 
Merapi eruption, as was clearly stated by this district officer: 
When the [first] eruption happened on the 26 October [2010], everything 
was unpredictable [...] there was no communication at all [...] some 
secretaries of Heads of Sub-districts had accidents when they delivered 
some [official] documents from their offices to the field posts by motorbikes 
[...] in the middle of heavy ashfall [...] we couldn‘t use cars because of lots 
of collapsed trees [...] We were confused about how to gather data on who 
were responsible for each village [...] how many evacuees there were [...] It 
was difficult because they were not registered before [...] It [data gathering] 
was manual. Everything was manual (Sofian, focus group, 19 July 2014). 
Similarly to the community‘s need for various disaster information, the authorities in the 
focus groups identified the types of disaster information they require for an effective formal 
disaster response. They are information about assembly points (both for community members 
and livestock), evacuation routes, locations of IDP camps, fluctuating data on refugees and 
logistics, missing persons, reports of distributed aid, temporary shelters for livestock, updates 
on weather, and riverbank conditions. However, the officials seemed to be unaware that the 
affected communities also require different types of information, in addition to early 
warnings, in order to be able to respond to an eruption of Mt. Merapi effectively. 
Consequently, the various types of information seemed to be shared in a limited way among 
the government agencies themselves, regardless of the fact that the affected community also 
needs the information. Hence, in designing a message in official disaster communication, the 
authorities should not solely focus on the dissemination of early warnings, but they also need 
to acknowledge the other types of information demands from the affected community in 
order to be able to effectively fulfil the demands. 
In summary, I argue that the government agencies seem to focus on practising the formal 
structure of information flows ceremonially to send out their disaster information, rather than 
evaluating whether the community can actually access and understand the official 
information. This shows that the existing official disaster communication has been performed 
based on institutional logic, which often confines government agencies‘ formal structures and 
behaviors into two key goals: the ends which their behaviors aim to achieve and the 
appropriate means to achieve the ends (Douglas, 1986, Friedland and Alford, 1991, Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). However, the institutional logic is frequently inefficient (Meyer and 
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Rowan, 1977). Meanwhile, the community considers efficiency as one of the most important 
factors for trusting official disaster communication. In the next section, I will discuss how the 
affected community perceives the efficiency and trustworthiness of official disaster 
communication in responding to any eruption of Mt. Merapi, particularly based on the 
experiences of the research participants in the 2010 Merapi eruption.  
 
4.2. The official disaster communication from the perspective of the affected community 
In this section, I focus on the perspective of the affected community, who mostly rely on their 
perception of trust to follow the advice of authorities (Montgomery et al., 2008). Unlike 
Steelman et al. (2015) who argue that the affected community is most likely to rely on the 
authorities and consider them credible, useful, or trustworthy information sources, in this case 
study I argue the contrary. I argue that the research participants regard the existing official 
disaster communication process as untrustworthy and inefficient. Specifically, the 
unidirectional, top-down and bureaucratic approach seems to reduce trust in the official 
disaster communication regarding the Mt. Merapi eruption, and there is a communication gap 
due to the inaccessibility and delay of official disaster information. 
4.2.1. A lack of trust in official disaster communication 
I argue that the the community‘s lack of trust is based in perceptions of government secrecy 
and a lack of commitment by the authorities. Firstly, the slow process of sharing official 
information is considered to be a secretive effort by the local government to conceal disaster 
information. Adji (personal interview, 22 July 2014), Pujiantoro, and Setiyoko believed that 
the official information is not always fully disclosed to the community members. 
Specifically, they stated: 
[I]nformation from the local government is not shared entirely to the 
community members (Pujiantoro, personal interview, 5 June 2014). 
The status of Mt. Merapi was increased in April. I went to the observatory 
post to ask directly […] the Head of the Village didn‘t share the information 
about the [increased] status […] We had to seek the information ourselves 
(Setiyoko, personal interview, 8 July 2014). 
As a result, the slow and long process of official disaster communication is most likely to 
embody poor trust and irresolution. This was clearly stated by an interviewed community 
member, as below:  
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 [I]t [the process of formal disaster communication] is long and 
unclear…not convincing […] slow […] we do not know whether it is true or 
not (Supadi, personal interview, 22 July 2014). 
Additionally, some research participants believed that the local governments frequently share 
false information with outsiders, which does not represent realities. This was clearly stated by 
a former Combine staff member: 
[I]nformation about Merapi for outsiders frequently cites the version from 
the government and does not represent the real conditions. For example, in 
[the] 2006 [eruption], the government declared that they had prepared all 
transportation needed for evacuation, however, people said that it was 
inaccurate (because) they had  to prepare trucks and buy fuel on their own 
(Nasir, personal interview, 17 March 2014). 
 
Unlike the interviewed community members who perceived the slow process of official 
disaster communication in negative ways, the authorities understood the slow process as a 
form of discretion to maintain reliability and public confidence in the government agencies. 
In addition to the bureaucracy of information flows, both Sleman and Magelang officers 
explained that they often had to wait to release information, particularly regarding the 
increased status of Mt. Merapi, to prevent panic among the Merapi people. In particular, 
Nurwiyono, a Head of a Sub-district in Sleman, and Yatin, a Head of a Village in Magelang, 
stated: 
For example, when the status [of Mt. Merapi] was increased to Advisory 
[level 2] […] We didn‘t immediately share it [the information] although we 
already knew it […] I got a call in the afternoon […] We waited for an 
official announcement from BPPTKG […] It was officially announced at 
11:50 pm [by BPPTKG]. Then, we shared it with the community members 
(Nurwiyono, focus group, 19 June 2014). 
Sometimes we have to consolidate disaster information in a whisper. For 
example, we didn‘t release our official information immediately when the 
status of Mt. Merapi was raised [by the BPPTKG] recently […] we 
consolidated the information first […] We couldn‘t share all our information 
to the community members. They were traumatized, they were panicking 
(Yatin, focus group, 19 July 2014).  
However, the community may regard the waiting period as the period of time required by the 
local government to conceal or manipulate disaster information secretly. Subsequently, when 
115 
 
the community members regard the authorities as secretive, they are most likely to distrust 
their official disaster communication.     
Secondly, the interviewed community members (including the community radio volunteers) 
also perceived that the slow official disaster communication process implies a lack of local 
governments‘ commitment to the community in prioritizing community safety. In particular, 
one of the community radio volunteers stated: 
We never directly cite information from the local government. It does not 
mean that we do not trust them at all. Sometimes, the information that we 
need is not similar to their need…they do not take action if there has not 
been any impact yet […] They wait until it reaches a dangerous level 
(Santosa, personal interview, 21 March 2014).   
I argue that this finding is related to the discrepancy in risk perception between the local 
government and the Merapi people. Similarly to several scholars who have identified an 
incompatibility between the public‘s risk perception and the authorities‘ regulatory attention 
(Dougall et al., 2008, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Nottage et al., 2014, Sandman, 
1993, Sandman et al., 1993, Lammers, 2011), most of the interviewed community members 
emphasized the incompatibility between their local wisdom and the official approach, 
particularly in regard to evacuation instructions. Not only the local community, but also the 
interviewed officials acknowledged the incompatibility between the local wisdom of the 
community and the official approach, as expressed by Yatin, a Head of a Village, below: 
At the village level, we cannot be as strict as at district level. At the district 
level, everything is regulated by regional regulations […] At our level 
[village level], the local content is stronger […] That‘s the difference […] 
The district level is systematized and not flexible […] If the district 
[government] decides something […] it has to be based on scientific studies. 
[Meanwhile], the villagers act based on their nature, then their feelings 
(focus group, 19 July 2014). 
Again, my argument that the local government and the Merapi people have a discrepancy in 
risk perception mirrors previous studies on Mt. Merapi (Lavigne et al., 2008, Lie, 2012, 
Schlehe, 1996, Donovan, 2010, Donovan et al., 2012, Dove, 2008, Troll et al., 2015, Triyoga, 
1991), showing that the incompatibility of risk perception between the local governments and 
the local communities has been observed for a very long time. Yet, this incompatibility is still 




The focus of local governments on scientific knowledge and economic-political national 
interests, aimed at developing appropriate knowledge of Mt. Merapi, has encouraged the 
tension between the Merapi people and the local governments. In disaster management, the 
local government applies a scientific and institutional approach by overly focusing on hazard-
related factors. For example in relation to the official decision on the level of Mt. Merapi‘s 
status, the local governments have been solely relying on the scientific analysis of the 
BPPTKG vulcanology research unit and neglecting local knowledge, ‗which is remarkable, 
given the ancient and rich tradition on Java of folk observation of volcanic activity‘ (Dove, 
2008, p. 334). Specifically, BPPTKG monitors the volcanic activities of Mt. Merapi through 
geophysical monitoring on seismic events, deformation, and magnetics; geochemical 
monitoring on the petrochemistry of eruptive products, and gases emission; visual monitoring 
of the lateral and vertical distance reached by lethal and non-lethal ejecta, crater development 
and build up of potential lahar material; and remote sensing monitoring of satellite imagery 
(Suryo and Clarke, 1985, Triyoga, 1991, Surono et al., 2012, Brown et al., 2015). The 
rationality of the government‘s scientific approach is influenced by the nature of institutional 
logic (Douglas, 1986, Lammers, 2011, Meyer and Rowan, 1977), which assumes that a 
rational formal structure is the most effective way to coordinate within and control a complex 
environment. As a result, local governments often attempt to replace the traditional approach 
with their bureucratic approach (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
On the other hand, the community members are more likely to practise community-generated 
knowledge based on cultural rationality, which is often opposed to the scientific facts of the 
actual hazards. Similarly to the previous studies on Mt. Merapi (Butt, 2014, Donovan, 2010, 
Donovan et al., 2012, Lavigne et al., 2008, Lie, 2012), I argue that the traditional cultural 
beliefs have produced a lack of fear, a false perception of volcanic risks, and repeated 
reluctance to heed the official warnings to evacuate. According to Setiyoko, a community 
member, some community members have low hazard awareness and refused to comply with 
the official evacuation instructions because of their local knowledge of volcanic mythology, 
traditional precursors, and risk perception. He specifically stated:  
At the individual level, the villagers rarely ask the BPPTKG [the 
vulcanology research unit] or the BPBD [the regional disaster management 
agency] […] They have their unique beliefs of Mt. Merapi […] they have 
their own opinions. If Mt. Merapi erupts, it will be this…they observe the 
―signs‖ […] because they have been living in the Mt. Merapi environment 
117 
 
[…] The elders know the ―signs‖ showing that Mt. Merapi is about to 
―work‖ (personal interview, 8 July 2014). 
Another community member, Wulandari agreed: 
At that time (the 2010 eruption), we were not nervous […] Because the 
elders taught us the doctrine that ―it‘s fine, the mountain is all right‖ […] I 
was sleeping with my son […] The volcanic ash got into my house […] 
There was not fear. It was normal for me (personal interview, 7 July 2014).   
The local communities living on the Mt. Merapi slopes, especially the elders, believe that 
they have inherited the knowledge of understanding the natural signs to predict Mt. Merapi‘s 
activities. They assume that earthquakes, lightning, and strange behavior of wild animals 
must precede an eruption. They believe that the animals are sent by the Mbah Merapi to warn 
the local community about an upcoming eruption. The beliefs of traditional precursors may 
be an accumulation of the concrete memories and direct personal experiences of the affected 
community in past eruptions (Cashman and Giordano, 2008, Cronin and Cashman, 2008, 
Donovan, 2010, Fischer, 2000, Troll et al., 2015). 
Some local community members also believe that the spirit of their ancestors will inform 
them when Mt. Merapi will erupt and how to escape from its hazards; the spirit will appear in 
someone‘s dream or directly come to the sacred elders, including the gatekeeper of Mt. 
Merapi (Triyoga, 1991). A community member, Setiyoko explained that if any of the 
traditional precursors did not happen, the at-risk communities were less likely to evacuate 
because they assumed that Mt. Merapi would not erupt soon (personal interview, 8 July 
2014). Again, a volunteer of MMC FM, Mujiono stated that the local people in Boyolali 
believe that an eruption of Mt. Merapi would not affect them, because their settlements are 
located on the ―back side‖ of the volcano (personal interview, 26 April 2014). This finding 
mirrors Donovan et al.‘s (2012, pp. 315-316) finding identifying that the personification of 
Mt. Merapi as a human leads the presumption that Mt. Merapi will only erupt in or ―vomit‖ 
from its mouth, the western parts of the mountain. An eruption is also often personified as a 
periodic defecation from Mt. Merapi‘s ‗body‘, so it will not impact the surface of its body, 
the villages on the slopes of Mt. Merapi (Triyoga, 1991). Thus, the local communities living 
in the eastern part of Mt. Merapi slope are less likely to evacuate than those in the western 
part. 
Moreover, Mt. Merapi has become a beneficial asset in supporting local livelihoods by 
providing the local communities with fertile soil for traditional agriculture, volcanic material 
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for mining, and beauty for local tourism (Troll et al., 2015, Lie, 2012, Triyoga, 1991). In fact, 
Lavigne et al. (2008) found that the income of the farmers living on the slopes of Mt. Merapi 
was three times higher than that of lowland farmers. Consequently, the Merapi people are 
often unlikely to give up the day-to-day benefits of their livelihoods for the less frequent and 
presumably predictable hazards (Triyoga, 1991, Dove, 2008). They ‗discount‘ the actual risk 
they are facing (Bankoff et al., 2015, pp. 8-9) and more people decide to live further up for a 
better living (Troll et al., 2015) 
Yet, the interviewed community members argued that the local governments have not been 
able to understand how the local communities apply their cultural knowledge to adapt to the 
Mt. Merapi ecosystem. Nonetheless, the local governments do not totally ignore the cultural 
behaviors of the local community in Mt. Merapi‘s surroundings. Similarly to Triyoga (1991), 
I identified that the authorities at the village level have been collaborating with the cultural 
gatekeeper in organizing the Labuhan ceremony. As stated by a Head of a District, the 
authorities usually provide administrative support in organizing the villagers and securing the 
ceremony (Nurwiyono, focus group, 19 June 2014). Another district officer, Aisyah agreed 
that the local governments have acknowledged the local wisdom of the local communities in 
the surroundings of Mt. Merapi, which has facilitated the communities‘ resilience. She 
specifically stated:   
Mt. Merapi never stops [erupting]. It has its own cycle […] The 
communities have been living in harmony with nature. So, they are 
adapting. The Merapi people have already got used to living with Mt. 
Merapi‘s eruptions. They know it with their own ―language‖ […] I think 
that the Merapi people have built their unique wisdom to adapt to the 
Merapi‘s characteristics […] They are relatively more prepared and 
mentally ready for an eruption. Therefore, in a recovery phase, they can be 
resilient quickly because it is part of their life (Focus group, 19 June 2014). 
Yet, the acknowledgement has not been equally applied in official disaster communication. 
Consequently, the local communities may not be easily influenced by the authorized 
scientific warnings and have been resistant to the government policies of disaster mitigation 
and response, such as evacuation and resettlement. Likewise, three officers, Kushartati, 
Nurwiyono, and Wibowo confirmed that the community members used to enjoy the views of 




As a result of the discrepancy in risk perception, the Merapi people may perceive less risk 
from Merapi hazards; meanwhile, the government may perceive more risk, or vice versa 
(Dove, 2008). In disaster communication, when community members consider the local 
government  understates or overstates the risk, the government loses its informational 
credibility (Sandman, 1993). Consequently, the official information, which may be regarded 
as valuable by the authorities, may not be equally perceived to be useful or trustworthy by the 
affected community (Steelman et al., 2015). In this case study, communities believe that the 
local government is not committed to their safety when agencies share information that is 
important for the authorities rather than for the affected community.  
 
In summary, there is a pattern that the community‘s perceptions of secrecy and lack of public 
commitment due to different risk perception lead to distrust in the accuracy or usefulness of 
information provided by the government. Moreover, with reference to the community‘s 
former experiences of the abuse of government authority over their land (Dove, 2008, 
Donovan et al., 2012, Triyoga, 1991, Troll et al., 2015), the perception is most likely to lead 
to an assumption that local governments secretly take personal advantage in their 
responsibilities to the public; consequently, this may increase the level of distrust (Donovan 
et al., 2012, Samadhi, 2014) and the community‘s reluctance to comply with the official 
disaster information. Unless there in a change in the relationships of authorities to community 
members, the lack of trust will result in a lack of confidence in the government‘s actions 
including in the official disaster communication (Fisher, 2013, Reinhardt, 2015, Samadhi, 
2014, Sandman et al., 1993) and ‗persistent existential anxiety‘ (Giddens, 1990, p. 100), 
regardless of the public‘s actual need for information. 
In contrast to the undermining of trust in official disaster communication, five (out of eleven) 
interviewed community members expressed their remaining high expectation of local 
governments, particularly the officials at the village level, for being the front lines of formal 
disaster communication. They further argued that the authorities are fundamentally the ones 
responsible for formal disaster management and have the appropriate disaster-related 
technologies; hence, the authorities have the most accurate disaster information. According to 
Meyer and Rowan (1977), the logic of confidence is useful as a public assumption that 
officials are performing their roles in good faith for the public interest, regardless of the lack 
of official validation of the official disaster communication‘s efficiency. On the other hand, 
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the opponents mainly argued that limited access to the government‘s official channels is still 
the main problem that needs to be solved, regardless of the level of trust in the local 
government. Moreover, the bureaucratic system of formal disaster management will most 
likely be a ―domino effect‖; if the upper level of local government is not well-prepared, it can 
be certain that the lower level is unprepared as well.  
Regardless of the discrepancy among the interviewed community members, a formal disaster 
communication process that is accessible and perceived to be trustworthy in many ways is 
significantly required. Establishing trustworthy official disaster communication is a complex 
practice that requires a holistic approach embracing various aspects of realities, as the 
‗outsiders‘ priorities are often not the same as those they aim to help‘ (Bankoff et al., 2015, p. 
11). As discussed previously, the formal bureaucratic structure of official disaster 
communication is most likely to ‗buffer activity from efficiency criteria and produce 
ineffectiveness‘ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 360). Therefore, in addition to being able to 
overcome the bureaucratic challenges of layered levels of local government and disaster 
management agency, official disaster communication should be able to adapt to the external 
environment by bridging different kinds of knowledge owned by the community and the 
authorities. This was specifically suggested by a community member, Wulandari: ‗the local 
government should focus on the community by combining scientific findings and the local 
wisdom of the Merapi‘ (personal interview, 7 July 2014). 
Together with Bankoff et al. (2015), the Sendai Framework of United Nations (2015), Troll 
et al. (2015), and Triyoga (1991), the argument that the risk perception of the local 
communities has been strongly influenced by their cultural beliefs suggests the importance of 
integrating local socio-cultural knowledge in the policy assessment of vulnerability and risk. 
In other words, official disaster communication needs to integrate the socio-cultural 
knowledge of how the community members experienced the past eruptions of Mt. Merapi and 
perceive the existence of Mt. Merapi into the scientific risk assessment applied by the 
authorities. The engagement of socio-cultural knowledge is important because the knowledge 
represents how a community perceives its vulnerability and the risks it is facing. Also, the 
knowledge is most likely to influence how each individual interprets the received disaster 
information, including early warnings, and an individual may pay more attention to a 
particular alert. By understanding how an affected community perceives their vulnerabilities 
and interprets disaster information, the government can measure the existing community 
capacity in disaster response and assess an appropriate approach to communicating with the 
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community. Further, bridging the distinct knowledge between an affected community and the 
authorities may gradually encourage community acceptance (Bankoff et al., 2015) and the 
trustworthiness and effectiveness of official disaster information, and lead to appropriate 
community responses. Particularly, trust in government acts as a bond, which provides 
community confidence in a formal disaster response and gives the authorities the support to 
make decisions required to establish an effective disaster response (Samadhi, 2014, 
Reinhardt, 2015).  
4.2.2. Inaccessible and one-way official disaster communication 
In the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Sendai, Japan, the United 
Nations (2015) emphasized the importance of freely available and accessible disaster 
information. Studying 32 countries, the IFRC (2015, p. 82) identified that an absence of ‗the 
necessary resources‘ (e.g. information) may have a negative effect on disaster management. 
However, in contrast to the top-down approach of the official disaster communication, I 
argue that the official flows of disaster information do not necessarily guarantee accessibility 
and timely reception of disaster information by the affected community. Adji, a community 
member said, ‗[B]efore the Jalin Merapi network existed, we did not know how to get 
information from the local government‘ (personal interview, 22 July 2014). Consequently, 
another community member explained that the community members were only able to 
passively wait for information from the Heads of Villages or Heads of Hamlets (Supadi, 
personal interview, 22 July 2014), or, according to a volunteer of Gema Merapi FM, wait for 
the other villagers living in the higher parts of the Mt. Merapi slopes to evacuate as a sign for 
their evacuation decisions (Widiyantoro, personal interview, 11 March 2014). Another 
community member, Purnomo (personal interview, 8 July 2014) agreed: 
There is not an official channel […] We ask the others, ―nggonmu piye?‖ 
[what does happen in your place?] […] We connect to the other community 
members at the other hamlets. 
Dewi, a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network, told me of her similar experience of the 
inaccessibility of information for disaster-affected survivors in the 2006 Yogyakarta 
earthquake
18
. She stated:  
                                                          
18
 The 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake was 5.9 on the Richter scale, and resulted in 5,716 casualties and 
approximately US$3.1 billion economic loss (Kusumasari & Alam, 2012). 
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I experienced the chaos because of the Tsunami rumor in 2006 [Bantul 
earthquake]. At that time, the activity of the Merapi volcano also increased 
[…] The only information I knew that it [the earthquake] was the effect of 
an enormous Merapi eruption […] I just knew the truth when my family 
called and told me that we had experienced a big earthquake, not an eruption 
of Merapi. We [the affected communities] didn‘t know […] the outsiders 
knew more instead (personal interview, 26 March 2014). 
 
Both the national and regional governments tend to perceive disaster communication as only 
the function of an organizational spokesperson, who disseminates information to general 
audiences through mass media. It seems that there has not been any channel to deliver local 
information in a timely manner directly to the affected community members, in order to 
fulfill their needs for specific types of official and locally-based information from the 
authorities. At the national government level, Panjaitan, a BNPB officer who worked at the 
media centre of the Emergency Operation Center (Pos Komando Tanggap Darurat - EOC) 
during the 2010 Merapi eruption, described that the media centre played a role as a liaison of 
disaster communication between the National Disaster Management Agency, donors, mass 
media, and community members (personal interview, 25 September 2014). However, only 
restricted community members were allowed to access information from the media centre and 
he explained:  
It did not necessarily mean that the community was not our priority, but 
it was dominated by the information for the President and journalists […] 
Some community members came to the media center, but it [the number] 
was limited. They only could access certain things […] Our information 
was not dedicated directly to the affected community […] There was not 
such a thing as the community‘s right to information […] I think a 
system on how to effectively disseminate the government‘s abundant 
information to community members is significantly required […] in such 
a way that doesn‘t cause panic [in the community].  
 
Similarly, at the local government level, Suhadi (a staff member of the village government, 
confirmed that the procedural flow of official disaster information often did not reach down 
to hamlet level; it only reached Heads of Villages before and during the 2010 eruption,. 
Consequently, the at-risk community, whose members live in hamlets, could not quickly 
access official disaster information. In a workshop of UNDP held in Yogyakarta, Subandrio 




Accurate early warning is not the only determinant of an effective disaster 
response. But, the key factor is how the early warning can be received 
quickly and responded to appropriately by the community. So far, we 
haven‘t had a solid information system for a disaster response. 
Consequently, people rely too much on the mass media […] Like what 
happened in the phreatic eruption on the 18 November [2013] […] In our 
consideration, it was unnecessary to raise the status of Mt. Merapi […] but, 
there was another source who stated that the status of Mt. Merapi should 
have been raised. The mass media ―played‖ around this controversy. It made 
people confused […] We can prevent this with a solid information system 
for disaster response, which can be a guidance for the communities living in 
the Mt. Merapi surroundings. 
With reference to the institutional logic of conformity (Lowrey, 2009, Meyer and Rowan, 
1977), the institutional tendency to generalize about the audiences of official disaster 
communication is often inappropriate to the unique conditions of a disaster response and 
makes it difficult to respond to individual needs. This also makes it difficult for the affected 
community to seek official information, and also to communicate their needs to the 
authorities. The argument that the affected community faces difficulty in directly accessing 
the official disaster information mirrors the study by Tanesia (2007) which also identified the 
absence of a sustainable information framework that is specifically dedicated to delivering 
official information to the vulnerable people in disaster zones. Conversely, it is also hard for 
the authorities to know what is reliable and what people require. Meanwhile, in order to 
generate effectiveness, an effort of a disaster response needs to be specifically based on the 
needs of different categories of the affected community (IFRC, 2015, United Nations, 2015). 
In addition to making information inaccessible, the government bureaucracy also makes 
official information flow slowly. Indonesian bureaucracy in disaster management has been 
recognized as an obstacle to responding to a disaster quickly and effectively in previous 
studies (Dougall et al., 2008, Mei et al., 2013). In official disaster communication, Haji, a 
volunteer of K FM, also raised the same problem. He described that by the time the official 
disaster information, particularly evacuation warnings, reached the community members at 
the hamlet level, it was often too late or they were received by the community members 
shortly before an eruption occurred (personal interview, 21 March 2014). Similarly, Supadi, a 
community member, stated, ‗Although the local government has announced its official 
information, not all community members immediately gain the information‘ (personal 
interview, 22 July 2014). Again, Combine (2007) and Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi 
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FM (personal interview, 6 May 2014), took the Merapi eruption that happened on 22 
November 1994 as an example of a delayed official disaster communication. At that time, the 
presence of flaming lava and the movement of pyroclastic flows were reported at 7:30 am, 
but the community members received the official warning at around 10 am. This delayed 
warning meant there were approximately 66 casualties. In summary, Sukiman, a volunteer of 
Lintas Merapi FM, described: 
The government would be trusted more if they they were less 
bureaucratic in information sharing. It could be directly delivered to the 
Head of the Village and the community members […] so it can cut down 
the gap between the government and local communities (personal 
interview, 6 May 2014). 
 
Therefore, the argument that official disaster communication has been inaccesible and 
delayed strongly stresses the need for a direct mechanism to deliver official information to 
the affected community in a timely manner. This is supported by a Head of a Village, Yatin 
who strongly stated:  
Information is significantly required because the Merapi people are 
traumatized […] The district authorities are located in the low lying areas 
of Mt. Merapi, meanwhile, the communities [who live in the elevated 
areas] can feel any slight activity of Merapi. So, the district authorities 
have to recognize the need! (focus group, 19 July 2014). 
Likewise, Choliq, a BPPTKG officer, agreed: 
In the 2010 eruption, BPPTKG‘s monitoring system and hazard warning 
were working well […] However, in fact, there were many victims […] 
The official procedures of information mechanisms and early warning 
systems in the government structure were running well, but the process 
of sending the information to the community failed […] The official 
mechanism of information dissemination was a long bureaucratic process 
to reach the communities. That was one of the reasons there were so 
many victims in the 2010 eruption […] A mechanism of rapid 
information sharing, hence, is significantly required (personal interview, 
5 March 2014). 
 
As a result, a culture of rapid information sharing  and the usage of accessible communication 
technology are required to promote real time access and dissemination of reliable data; these 
needs also have been acknowledged by Samadhi (2014, p. 175), Jaeger et al. (2007), and 
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United Nations in its Sendai Framework (2015). They not only make disaster information 
from both the authorities and the affected community more accessible, the real time access to 
reliable data can eliminate the gap between the affected community and the local government 
in disaster communication, so the affected community can effectively decide their responses. 
4.2.3. Information silos that lead to confusion 
In addition to accessible disaster information, a direct information channel, and interactive 
disaster communication, I also argue a need for an integrated data bank that can act as the 
only official information source in disaster communication. When it comes to early warning, 
the formal information flow seems to be well-distributed from the vulcanology agencies to 
the local government agencies. Most of the disaster-related information that can assist the 
formal effort, however, seems to be scattered among various government agencies. For 
example, in the Sleman government, Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Sosial (the Agency of Labor 
and Social) has the data on logistic needs; Dinas Pekerjaan Umum (the Agency of Public 
Works) has the data on infrastructure conditions; Dinas Kesehatan (the Agency of Health) 
has the data on community health conditions; the Head of Hamlets has the data on 
demography, village assets, villagers‘ assets, livestock, and community disaster savings.  
I argue that the scattered official disaster information represents information silos, which are 
created by the cluster design and sectoral bureaucracy adopted by the local governments. In 
practice, each cluster tends to distinctly manage its information because of the different goals 
of the diverse government agencies. Consequently, the scattered silos of official disaster-
related information are most likely to create another challenge to the establishing of timely 
responses in formal disaster communication; the information silos show rather limited 
information sharing at critical decision-making points during disasters. The argument that the 
local governments have managed their information in silos is similar to the studies of Butt 
(2014), Chertoff (2005), Dougall et al. (2008), Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2011), 
Murayama et al. (2013), Samadhi (2014) and Sandman (1993). 
At the community level, the information silos require the knowledge to classify which 
information belongs to which agency. Unfortunately, not all community members can 
identify the responsibilities and official information of each government agency, which may 
lead to a misunderstanding about intergovernmental functions (Schneider, 2008). 
Supportively, Gimar, a community member, agreed,„not all community members can identify 
which information belongs to which agency‘ (personal interview, 8 July 2014). He further 
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explained that the villagers tend to ask any closest government officer whom they know from 
their personal networks (most likely a Head of the Hamlet or a Head of the Village or an 
officer of BPPTKG). If that person does not have required information, they would have to 
follow another bureaucratic process to gain the information from the government agency that 
owns the information.  
Furthermore, this particular issue of information silos is not only a problem for the affected 
community, but also the lower level of the government. For example, in two separate focus 
groups, both the Head of a Sub-district in Sleman and the Head of a Village in Magelang 
requested a particular radio frequency for their official coordination with their district 
officials. Both the requests were met by the district officials with the same explanation that 
the district governments have provided a particular frequency for official coordination in 
disaster response (mostly used by BPBD regional disaster management agencies). The lower-
level officials apparently did not recognize the official radio frequency of the BPBD regional 
disaster management agencies that had already been used for official coordination. This 
rather shows a lack of official information sharing among the officials themselves. As a 
result, disaster-related information is unlikely to be exchanged between government agencies, 
and between government agencies and those from outside their official network, and 
elaborated for the benefit of the overall system. Furthermore, as Lammers (2011) describes 
an institutional message as a connecter between different institutional levels, the 
identification of information silos shows that coordination among different government 
agencies involved in the disaster response may not be possible. 
Interviewees from both the local government organisations and the community members 
suggested that the official disaster communication requires a mechanism to integrate all 
disaster information into an accessible and reliable data bank, in order to simplify disaster 
information seeking and reduce the siloing of information. Yatin, a village head, expounded 
on the absence of official guidance from a contact person, specifically, about who are the best 
people to be contacted regarding particular information. He further explained: 
Information has to come from one source […] a reliable one […] it can 
be the BPBD or whoever […] to ensure the reliability and accessibility of 
information […] Reliability and timely update matter the most! (focus 





Also, a community member stated: 
There are too many information sources who state different information. 
It could create confusion because people do not know which one is 
reliable […] A ‖one source‖ communication flow can reduce the 
possibility of panic within the communities (Setiyoko, personal 
interview, 8 July 2014). 
In a similar way, Dougall et al. (2008, p. 88) and Samadhi (2014) suggested that 
centralization of information is fundamental as ‗the gateway for a flood of constantly 
changing information‘ and a comprehensive contact point can facilitate the collaboration 
among government agencies. It plays a proactive role in ensuring information quality by 
identifying valuable and reliable messages and disseminating important information rapidly 
(Tang et al., 2012).  
Establishing and maintaining centralization requires bureaucracy in order to control the 
standardization of conformity among involved stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Bureaucracy is often embedded in a top-down and hierarchical structure owned by a formal 
organisation such as a government agency. According to Griffin et al. (1999) and Shannon et 
al. (2014), formal organisations are characterized by a pyramid of hierarchy, logically 
structured job roles, and standardized guidelines of process. Hence, a disaster communication 
process performed with a top-down and bureaucratic approach tends to be well-ordered, 
consistent, and centralized. Yet, similarly to the interviewed community members‘ critiques 
of official disaster communication, the top-bottom approach tends to lack creativity, 
initiative, and speed in responding to uncertainty (Shannon et al., 2014, Griffin et al., 1999). 
Thus, the low trust in the authorities caused by the slow bureaucracy, as discussed previously, 
also needs to be factored in.  
In fact, two years after the 2010 Merapi eruption, the BNPB issued a regulation as a formal 
guidance in establishing Pusat Pengendalian Operasi Penanggulangan Bencana (Center of 
Disaster Management Operation Control – Pusdalop PB); this unit is administratively under 
BNPB or BPBD, and responsible for managing data and disseminating information to the 
authorities and community members through the media. In a disaster response, this unit will 
perform the function of an Emergency Operation Center (EOC) (Regulation of Head of 
BNPB Number 15, 2012). However, when this study was conducted in 2014, two years after 
the regulation‘s declaration, none of the interviewed community members seemed to know 
this particular unit, even in a recent context of formal disaster communication. It may 
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demonstrate an example of the need for socialization regarding new changes within the 
structure of official disaster communication, because the networks of information flow take 
time to develop and become robust within the stakeholders, including the community; 
otherwise, there will be a lack of clarity on who exactly is responsible for official disaster 
communication. Again, it would reinforce the community‘s confusion and misunderstanding 
about government agencies‘ functionalities regarding who is responsible for what type of 
disaster information, as previously discussed.  
Conversely, the weaknesses of a top-down and bureaucratic approach seem to be the 
strengths of a bottom-up approach, which is often adopted by informal organisations. As an 
informal organization consists of personal, loose, and fluid networks of friendships, it can be 
flexibly responsive and innovative in ensuring effective disaster communication. 
Additionally, requests for information and help are most likely to be abundant and prompt in 
the open and loose personal networks (Shannon et al., 2014, Griffin et al., 1999). Similarly, 
based on his research on the 2004 Aceh tsunami in Indonesia, Samadhi (2014, p. 176) 
suggested that Indonesian formal disaster management needs to provide some ‗shortcuts‘ and 
decentralized decision-making. By providing those, each agency can be more responsive to 
the needs of the affected community and maintain its sense of urgency. 
However, regarding the need for centralized disaster communication, a bottom-up approach 
would lead to even more informal networks and multiple overlapping sources. I found that 
the community-generated disaster communication that has been performed by the users of 
two-way radio since the 1990s in the Mt. Merapi surroundings has been increasingly regarded 
as too ―crowded‖ and unreliable. Despite the long-established communication behavior, all 
research participants (both the community members and the officials) described that the large 
number of two-way radio users in the Mt. Merapi surroundings often creates confusion 
because of their overlapping information. In particular, an interviewed community member 
described it as follows: 
Maybe HT [Handy-Talkie/two-way radio] can make information [sharing] 
faster. But like what happened in 2010, HT made people panic. Most 
information [shared through two-way radio] was unclear and made people 
panic more. Where should we go? What should we do? […] So, the degree 
of the community‘s panic was higher […] The users of the HT usually don‘t 
know the real status of Mt. Merapi, but have exaggerated the information 
[…] They don‘t know the advantages of using an HT […] Individuals often 
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buy HT just for showing off. Very annoying! (Setiyoko, personal interview, 
8 July 2014). 
The users of two-way radio often share different information for a single event, as described 
by Widyantoro, a volunteer of Gema Merapi FM, and Julianto, a community member, below: 
The users [of two-way radio] create more panic because of the unclear 
information about where to go and what to do […] They exaggerate 
information […] they did not really understand the benefit of [the 
technology of] two-way radio […] Most of them have one just to feel 
superior and discuss unnecessary issues […] There are so many groups of 
two-way radio users in one hamlet […] The [information] is overlapping 
[…] Sometimes, they [the users] use unfamiliar jargon […] different terms 
for the level of lahars […] One said the flood was 30 cm in height […] 
others said it was knee-height […] They need to uniform their language 
(Widyantoro, personal interview, 11 March 2014). 
There are so many groups of HT users in a hamlet […] maybe an  individual 
is a member of many groups […] they are overlapping […] One group uses 
a certain terminology or sign or whatever […] a uniform term is required, 
particularly regarding the lahars. So, a one metre height [of lahars] is 
dangerous or not. It‘s one example of a uniform term […] They are not 
uniform yet (Julianto, personal interview, 8 July 2014).  
Although the users of two-way radio can effectively facilitate a bottom-up disaster 
communication by promoting community-based information and making disaster information 
more accessible, they seem to create a demand for information validation accordingly. 
Similarly, Austin et al. (2012), Hindman and Coyle (1999), Jaeger et al. (2007) and Johnson 
(2007) agreed that bottom-up communication efforts are often highly uncoordinated, full of a 
range of accurate and inaccurate observations, as well as diverse advice, and lack 
mechanisms for information aggregation and validation. Therefore, the need for a centralized 
disaster communication is unlikely to be fulfilled by a bottom-up approach, because it 
requires continual organizing, monitoring of credibility, an aggregation mechanism, and 
additional verification in order to establish a standardized centralized disaster communication 






4.3. The official disaster communication from the perspective of the authorities 
In contrast to the negative perspectives of the interviewed community members, I identified 
positive confidence among the authorities when we were discussing how they manage their 
practice of official disaster communication in the focus groups. The authorities claimed that 
that they no longer have any problem in their formal disaster communication because of the 
accessibility of their official disaster information, particularly the scientific messages, 
through various media after the 2010 eruption. In particular, Wibowo, an officer of Sleman 
village government, stated: 
I think, at the community level, information is not a problem anymore […] 
If the community members are confused, they can easily browse Google, or 
at least the ESDM‘s [The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the 
Republic of Indonesia] website. For the elders, they can be informed 
because a household, at least, has one two-way radio and one mobile phone. 
So, everything is clear! (focus group, 19 June 2014). 
Similarly, another officer, Kushartati agreed:  
They [the local community] have really understood various channels [of 
information] […] For example, they have Handy-Talky. They monitor the 
signal sound of the seismograph [of BPPTKG]. The seismograph is in the 
science domain. But, the Merapi people have become very familiar with it 
(focus group, 19 June 2014).   
However, despite the confidence of the authorities, Kushartati also emphasized:  
Because I am a government officer, I will tell you good stories for sure […] 
I definitely tell you that we share our official disaster information with 
everyone, to the Head of the Village [the low level of local government] 
[…] Maybe the community members themselves can tell you about what 
they really feel (focus group, 19 June 2014). 
Supporting the studies of Bankoff et al. (2015) and Lowrey (2009) identifying the gap 
between the institutional logic of the official practices and the real demand of the public, this 
study shows that the affected community and the authorities prioritize different aspects in 
determining the success of official disaster communication in a disaster response. Unlike the 
affected community who demand trustworthiness and effectiveness, the local governments 
and the volcano research unit seemed to focus more on improving the scientific knowledge of 
the local communities living in the Mt. Merapi surroundings by disseminating scientific 
disaster information about Mt. Merapi abundantly, and solving the information inaccessibility 
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by using SMS and social media as the most recently popular media in disaster 
communication. How the authorities have managed the accessibility of their disaster 
information and how they have spread their scientific disaster information will be discussed 
thoroughly in the next sub-sections.  
The confidence of the authorities does not seem an appropriate response to the perception of 
the affected community of how official disaster communication should be trustworthy, 
effective, and community engaging. Yet, this has become the main determinant of the 
prolonged gap between the authorities and the affected community in official disaster 
communication. Prior to following the numerous scholars who suggest community 
engagement can bridge the gap (Donovan, 2010, Lavigne et al., 2008, Moody, 2013, 
Murayama et al., 2013, Sandman et al., 1993), I argue that whether the authorities are willing 
to engage the community has been very much influenced by their perception of the 
trustworthiness of community-generated disaster communication. Thus, I will also discuss 
how the officials have perceived the trustworthiness of community-based disaster information 
in the next sub-section. 
4.3.1. Perceived accessibility of official disaster communication 
In an effort to increase the accessibility of official disaster information, the BPPTKG volcano 
research unit developed Sistem Informasi Kebencanaan Antar Desa (Village Disaster 
Information System - SIKAD) in 2012. Unlike the conventional formal information flows, 
the information of BPPTKG does not necessarily go through the local government in 
advance, but goes directly to the community members. In SIKAD, the official information 
about Mt Merapi‘s activities and status change is directly shared with the registered 
individuals, as Simpul Warga (information nodes) who are considered to have public 
outreach. By means of a text message (SMS Gateway), the key individuals will disseminate 
the information further to the rest of the community members, So, they can immediately 
receive information from the BPPTKG, without the long bureaucracy of the local 
governments. Conversely, Merapi people can acquire information about Mt. Merapi through 
the SIKAD‘s number, phone calls, and the officials‘ personal numbers. At the time this study 
was conducted, the BPPTKG volcano research unit had 790 SIKAD users among community 
members in KRB I, II, and III.  
In addition to the SIKAD disaster information system, the BPPTKG volcano research unit 
has been utilizing social media (Twitter and Facebook) since 2012, together with email, and 
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two-way radio. Those media have been utilized for the same purpose, which is to directly 
share their official information with the community members. The BPPTKG sends a weekly 
email that consists of information about Mt. Merapi‘s activities to some community members 
who subscribe to BPPTKG‘s emailed update. Also, BPPTKG broadcasts the signal sound of 
its seismograph through the frequency of BPPTKG‘s communication radio. However, the 
local governments seem to adhere more to their conventional face-to-face meetings in order 
to disseminate their official information to the Merapi people.  
In regard to online disaster communication, the authorities did not utilize social media during 
the 2010 eruption; they mainly focused on their official websites in order to disseminate their 
disaster information. One of the Sleman officers, Kushartati explained: 
We published all of our disaster information online on our website… During 
the emergency response, all official disaster information of BPBD [the 
regional disaster management agency] was uploaded onto the 
slemankab.co.id [the official website of the Sleman district government]. 
The emergency response was around November 2010 to May 2011 […] The 
information about Mt. Merapi‘s current condition, the evacuees‘ needs, the 
evacuation routes, the locations of the IDP camps, donations, including the 
level of rainfall (focus group, 19 June 2014).  
 
At the present time, it is possible that districts are using social media to communicate with 
communities, because there is an increasing tendency for government agencies to set up 
social media accounts rather than establishing or updating their own website (IFRC, 2015). 
However, when I asked about the Facebook accounts of BPBD Sleman and BPBD Magelang 
in my focus groups, none of the officers present could discuss it further because both 
representatives of the Sleman and Magelang Regional Disaster Management Agencies 
(BPBDs) left the focus groups early, and the Agencies of Communication and Informatics of 
Sleman district and Magelang that are responsible for managing all districts‘ official 
information did not show up in the focus groups. 
The official attempts to directly disseminate disaster information through the SIKAD disaster 
information system and social media do not seem to be sufficient to solve the inaccessibility 
of official disaster information. Setiyoko, a community member (personal interview, 8 July 
2014), and Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM (personal interview, 6 May 2014), 
separately stated that some Merapi people still do not know how to access official disaster 
information from the local government. Specifically, Setiyoko stated:  
133 
 
So far, we don‘t know […] the evacuation points, where the IDP camps […] 
We just know that the roads are the evacuation routes […] we don‘t know 
where to run […] just run! That‘s the most important thing […] until now 
[…] I heard that there will be a sister village or whatever. If there is an 
eruption, we will evacuate into the village. The information has not been 
socialized yet […] I know it because I asked my friends who are working at 
the village government […] Otherwise, I know nothing!  
Again, this supports the previous argument that disaster communication solely focusing on 
early warning is inadequate. Additionally, both Setiyoko, a community member (personal 
interview, 8 July 2014), and Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM (personal interview, 
6 May 2014) also stated that most of the community members on the Mt. Merapi slopes are 
not familiar with the official communication channels, such as the SIKAD system and social 
media, that were used by local government. This finding leads to my argument that it is 
important to select the media which the targeted community is familiar with in official 
disaster communication. The argument will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Moreover, the formal attempt to involve social media in existing disaster communication 
does not solve the issue of undermined trust in the local governments. All interviewed 
community radio volunteers expressed their ingrained undermined trust in online official 
disaster communication. They reckoned that local governments, especially those which are 
responsible for disaster management, have a lack of online disaster communication skills 
within their human resources. In practice, local governments have been handling their online 
media in a similar way to their conventional communication processes, which are not 
appropriate to online media. Despite being interactive media that can facilitate bottom-up 
communication, Chatfield et al. (2014) found that the Indonesian governments still adopt 
social media superficially to merely inform the community members in a conventional top-
down and uni-directional manner. A community member, Zakaria also raised the same issue 
as follows: 
Government bureaucracy creates difficulties in working with social media. 
Compared to the social media accounts that are managed by civil society, the 
governments have lower credibility […] The work of civil society is based on 
pure mutual responsibility […] Government uses social media because of the 
bureaucratic demand, not as a social movement. Different motivation will 
lead to differences in content and speed […] The government‘s social media 
accounts can be more suitable for a comparison with other information 
sources […] not for the main reference because of their information delay 
(personal interview, 27 June 2014). 
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Additionally, the government‘s websites often function in a limited way as ‗a collection of 
documents, forms, and positive press about the agency whose site it‘ (Jaeger et al., 2007, p. 
601). Consequently, as stated by an interviewed community member, a local government‘s 
website has not become a better means of accessing official disaster information during a 
disaster response (Ramawanti, personal interview, 24 July 2014). Confirming the lack of 
interactivity in the existing online official disaster communication, Panjaitan, a BNPB officer 
(personal interview, 25 September 2014), stated that the questions asked by the community 
are often responded to slowly or not at all, yet, rapid response is necessary to reduce 
uncertainty in disaster response.  
The asymmetrical communication or the lack of interactivity in the official disaster 
communication seems to be influenced by the institutional logic of bureaucracy. When 
official disaster information is shared from a bureaucratic structure, it will be classified as an 
institutional message (Lammers, 2011), which dissociates the senders from the recipients. So, 
the officials are protected from the responsibility for acting on or responding to the message 
(Lammers, 2011, Watson, 1997). Again, the officials seem to merely adopt social media 
based on their institutional logic of the goal, regarding the ends to which their behaviors aim 
(Douglas, 1986, Friedland and Alford, 1991, Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Presumably, the 
officials may assume that solely disseminating official disaster information through social 
media is the end of their official disaster communication. Information shared through social 
media is more likely to be accessed by the community, compared to other official media, so it 
seems to be considered as fulfilling their aim of delivering their official information to the 
public. Unfortunately, again, the sense of ―fulfilling‖ the aim of official disaster 
communication does not seem to include following up on the public‘s response to the 
information shared previously.  
The local governments are perceived to lack the skill/expertise to adapt the interactive 
characteristics of online media into their official disaster communication. By not engaging in 
interactive dialogue local governments‘ social media use suggests they do not understand the 
critical value of receivers‘ feedback and community engagement. This attitude makes it 
difficult to reduce uncertainty and produce trustworthy disaster information (Steelman et al., 
2015, Tang et al., 2012). The value of interactivity for encouraging trust also applies to more 




4.3.2. Spreading the scientific disaster information 
In this case study, the authorities seem to simply consider that spreading as much as scientific 
information as possible can be the best bridge for the gap between the community members 
and themselves in official disaster communication. This tendency is also recognized by 
Sandman (1993) who observes that technical people often simply respond to the public‘s 
science illiteracy by presenting the technical data more thoroughly. Unfortunately, the official 
attempt to disseminate the scientific information does not seem to be well-accompanied by 
―translation‖ of the scientific information based on the level of science literacy of the targeted 
community.  
Taking the example of the effort of the BPPTKG volcano research unit in sharing its 
seismograph‘s signal, Choliq, a BPPTKG officer, confirmed that the signal often results in 
confusion, as below: 
We use seismograph […] It sounds similar in indicating lahars and 
pyroclastic flows. This problematically creates panic, because communities 
do not understand the meaning of the signal‘s increasing sound. They just 
can interpret that the instrument is showing an activity, but, they don‘t know 
the detail, whether it is a lahar or a volcanic earthquake. Therefore, they still 
need to verify the increasing signal by contacting BPPTKG (personal 
interview, 5 March, 2014). 
Another BPPTKG officer, Pamungkas added that some community members, unfortunately, 
often misinterpret the aspect of open data by publishing ―raw‖ data on Mt. Merapi. They 
access the raw data from the BPPTKG‘s monitoring equipment, interpret the signal based on 
their knowledge and share it on their social media accounts or mass media. In particular, he 
stated: 
They even bought their own detectors and uploaded its raw data onto their 
Facebook accounts […] The community may have their own ―standard‖ 
based on their local knowledge and their visual observation on the Mt. 
Merapi volcano […] It might be scientifically incorrect (focus group, 19 
June 2014).  
Consequently, the community members may spread inaccurate conclusions which lead to 
misconceptions.  
Again, taking the SIKAD disaster information sytem as another example, the BPPTKG 
volcano research unit seems to put the important role on the key individuals, who act as 
136 
 
information nodes between the community members and BPPTKG. I assume that the 
BPPTKG expects the key individuals to have the ability to translate scientific information 
into the local language that can be easily understood by the community. Hence, the 
information nodes can act as bridges for the knowledge gap between BPPTKG and the 
community members. However, leaving the community members alone without official 
guidance for interpreting the scientific information is potentially risky. Unsystematic and too-
technical disaster-scientific information is often too convoluted to be easily understood by the 
lay public (Butt, 2014, Chatfield et al., 2014). Hence, the lay public need to have adequate 
capacity to ‗engage meaningfully‘ with scientific disaster information (HFP, 2007; Shannon 
et al., 2014, p. 636). If the key individuals do not have sufficient understanding to accurately 
interpret the BPPTKG‘s scientific information, it is most likely to lead to confusion and 
misunderstanding. Furthermore, the official disaster communication is most likely to be 
framed as ‗ineffective communication‘, ‗poor trust‘, and ‗low credibility‘ (Reynolds & 
Seeger, 2005, p. 47). 
In addition to the previous argument that the authorities need to bridge traditional knowledge 
and scientific assessment in their official disaster communication, I argue that the authorities 
also need to carefully decide ways of sharing scientific knowledge on an ongoing basis. The 
SIKAD disaster information system of the BPPTKG vulcanology research unit may be 
efficient for generating prompt official disaster communication by cutting through the 
bureaucratic process and directly sending out scientific information to the affected 
communities. However, it does not necessarily provide a timely local understanding of the 
scientific information due to the lack of scientific vulcanology knowledge among the Merapi 
people. Scientific disaster information needs to be translated into a local language so the 
information can be accurately and easily understood by the local community. From the 
perspective of an affected community, moreover, the sole usage of official language (often 
solely based on scientific explanation) may be considered to overly emphasize the 
understanding from the government‘s side, the authority of the government, and the 
exclusivity of government. Subsequently, it can drag the government further away from the 
local community and be most likely to widen the controversy of public-versus-expert risk 
(Sandman et al., 1993). Moreover, Sandman et al. (1993) have identified that providing more 
technical details of scientific information has no significant effect on the public‘s perception 
of risk. Hence, if the effort of disseminating scientific information of Mt. Merapi as much as 
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possible is aimed at convincing the at-risk community to increase their perceived risk and be 
more cooperative in evacuation process, it is unlikely to succeed. 
Therefore, bypassing the slow bureaucratic system by simply disseminating scientific data 
does not automatically bridge the gap between the authorities and the at-risk community in 
official disaster communication. Slower information flows may be presumably more useful in 
designing scientific information as it moves down the chain. Within the existing official 
information flow (see Figure 15), the layered levels of government agencies may have 
important roles in designing the scientific information from the BPPTKG vulcanology 
research unit to be more relevant to the local communities on the slopes of Mt. Merapi. 
Therefore, in addition to the definition of institutional messages as ‗intentional, enduring, 
have a wide reach, and encumber the participants to engage in certain behaviors or take 
actions‘ (Lammers, 2011, p. 174), I emphasize the importance of designing disaster 
information so it can be relevant to people with different local needs in different contexts. 
However, it is also important to identify that  slower information flows may have a negative 
side, as they may require longer times and lead to delayed information flows that can put the 
affected community in danger during a disaster response.    
4.3.3. A lack of trust in community-based disaster information in official disaster 
communication 
Authorities often evaluate community-generated information from their institutional logic, 
which is different from the perspective of the community (Bankoff et al., 2015, Sandman et 
al., 1993). As a result, the local governments demonstrated a lack of trust in community-
based disaster communication, although they acknowledged the value of some of the 
practices around Mt Merapi. In the focus groups, the officials strongly acknowledged the 
strong initiatives and social capital of the Merapi people in disaster management, through 
practices like community-initiated money savings for disaster responses, self-organized 
evacuation, and voluntary collective actions. They also recognized that the community 
members, as first responders, can be the first information sources because they know exactly 
what is happening in their surroundings before the authorities arrive in the affected areas. A 
head of a sub-district, Nurwiyono gave an example: 
Regarding lahars, the users of two-way radio can solve the limitation of 
the authorities. The authorities tend to use CCTV, and take time to reach 
the lahar. Meanwhile, the community can quickly reach the river bank to 
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observe the lahar‘s height level and the scope of damage. They better 
understand the areas and are more valid. They can be sources of 
information […] the community members can inform us from the 
elevated areas; particularly if any accident occurs. So, we can be on 
standby and prepare the appropriate response in low areas (focus group, 
19 June 2014). 
Similarly, Panjaitan, a BNPB officer, agreed that the local community could have been 
engaged as an alternative information source during the 2010 eruption, due to an 
overwhelmed local government. He specifically explained: 
We (the BNPB‘s officials) were not familiar with the Mt. Merapi 
surroundings […] It was more effective to engage volunteers to gather 
information from community members and to deliver official information 
to community members […] the local officials had lots of responsibilities 
[…] they were most likely to miss some things […] Therefore, besides 
being the first responders, we can engage the community to be volunteers 
for themselves […] As far as I know, they always think that they are 
victims. Yes, they are. But, they can do something, right? All they do is 
just sit at the IDP camps. I think that there is a way to make them useful 
to the others during a disaster response […] We can give them two-way 
radios […] ‖You let me know what is happening. Don‘t you just sit and 
do nothing‖. So, they can do something for themselves (personal 
interview, 25 September 2014). 
 
In spite of the acknowledgement of community capacity in providing local information, the 
officers did not seem to regard it as providing reliable and verified information in disaster 
communication. The officials emphasized in focus groups that community-based information 
cannot be automatically considered in a formal response; it has to be verified by the 
authorities in advance. The officers, accordingly, frequently stressed that the government is 
the only official information source; only the official information, issued by the government, 
is allowed to be delivered further to the community members. A BNPB officer, Panjaitan 
stated: 
All community-based information has to be verified, in order to make it 
reliable […] BNPB cannot rely on personal information […] All 
information has to be verified institutionally or, at least, derived from an 
authority […] As a government institution, all responses of BNPB have 
to be accountable […] Local government is the only reliable information 
source (personal interview, 25 September 2014). 
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A Head of a Sub-district, Nurwiyono also stated: 
Is it [community‘s information] reliable? […] The other day, there was 
information about Mt. Merapi releasing lava. But, after we checked its 
source, he said that he got it [the information] from something ―someone 
said‖. He didn‘t see it personally. This is unreliable! (focus group, 19 June 
2014). 
Similarly to the argument of the inability of community members to rapidly conduct 
decentralized communication, the unorganized and unverified nature of their information has 
become the main argument about the difficulty of integrating community-generated disaster 
information into official disaster communication. However, the existing official mechanisms 
are not in themselves able to rapidly collate, analyse, and transform community-based 
information into the knowledge required for decision-making (Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative, 2011, Jaeger et al., 2007).  
Consequently, I argue that community-generated disaster information is only used by the 
authorities as additional data or as a comparison to the other information sources. Drawing on 
his experience using the community-generated information shared in the Jalin Merapi 
network, Susetya a Magelang officer, specifically stated: 
I only used the information [of the Jalin Merapi network] as back-up 
information for our main responsibilities […] It was not considered to be 
a main reference […] We were confident that our data was more updated 
[…] more valid (focus group, 19 June 2014). 
This argument is similar to the studies of Austin et al. (2012), Hindman and Coyle (1999, p. 
18), Jaeger et al. (2007) and Johnson (2007) that community members (including those who 
are mediated by social media) are often treated as ‗secondhand sources of information‘ and 
cannot automatically become official communication sources.  
However, I argue that the degree of distrust in community-based information varies among 
the officers. In comparison to Reinhardt (2015) who found that the affected community 
tended to trust their local governments more than the central government in responding to the 
2005 Hurricane Katrina, my findings suggest the opposite result in this case study. The lower 
levels of government, such as district, sub-district, village, and hamlet officials, seem to have 
more trust in the community members than the district governments. In the focus groups, for 
instance, these officers always referred to the users of two-way radio when they were 
discussing community-based disaster communication. The disaster information provided by 
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the users is more likely to be taken into consideration by the village and sub-district 
governments than the district government, as expressed by Nurwiyono, a head of a sub-
district:  
There are some groups of two-way radio users that are often considered 
to be community-based references for the sub-district and village 
officials. They are SKSB and AMC, as the oldest groups in Cangkringan 
sub-district […] However, they are increasingly too crowded and 
unreliable (focus group, 19 June 2015). 
The argument that the lower government level has a lower degree of distrust in community-
generated disaster information is similar to that in the study of Donovan et al. (2012) where 
the Heads of Hamlets sampled in the Mt. Merapi surroundings actually trusted more in their 
residents, who shared the same cultural beliefs; but they had to obey the official instructions 
of their higher levels of government. Therefore, this argument reflects that the greater trust in 
community-based disaster communication comes from officials who are closer to the 
communities.   
The focus group participants argued that the main reason for their lack of trust in community-
originated disaster information was the excessive risk perception of the community members. 
The officials described that the local communities on the Mt. Merapi slope tended to 
overestimate risk, panic easily, and be likely to share any information they gain without 
verifying it. A Head of a Village, Yatin specifically explained: 
[M]aybe they [the community members] are still traumatized by the 2010 
eruption […] when they [the community members] feel or hear something 
from the Mt. Merapi [summit], they will ask me anxiously. ‗What is 
happening? What should we do?‖ […] The BPPTKG has not officially 
raised Mt. Merapi‘s status, but they have raised their ―status‖ of anxiety 
unofficially (focus group, 19 June 2014). 
After the 2010 Merapi eruption, there was a change of attitude to disaster response within the 
local communities living on the Mt. Merapi slopes. Both the community members and local 
government officials I interviewed confirmed that the Merapi people still tend to ignore the 
instructions for evacuation or, on the contrary, do self-evacuation regardless of official 
instructions. Unlike their former perception of low risk, the local community has become 
overly responsive because of their trauma during the 2010 eruption. They tend to make their 
decision on evacuation based on their interpretations from observing Mt. Merapi and what 
happens in their surroundings. A minor change of visual observation of Mt. Merapi‘s 
141 
 
volcanic activity can easily cause anxiety and independent evacuation accordingly. A Sleman 
officer, Wibowo explained: 
The communities do not want to hear anyone anymore when they worry 
[…] The Head of a Hamlet is only able to remind them not to evacuate in 
panic […] those who feel afraid and traumatized by the 2010 eruption may 
go down, but be careful. Please don‘t run (focus group, 19 June 2014). 
In a separate focus group, Gunawan, a Magelang officer also stated that there is an unofficial 
agreement among the community members that they will evacuate independently at Level 3, 
regardless of the fact that an official instruction for evacuation will be released at Level 4. 
Similarly to the fact that local governments cannot enforce the communities to evacuate, the 
authorities also cannot prevent the communities from self-evacuating (focus group, 19 July 
2014). 
Although the officials argued that the community‘s perception of excessive risk Shas become 
one of the main determining factors of their lack of trust in community capacity to respond 
effectively to an eruption, I argue that the excessive risk perception results from the increased 
distrust in the local government by many community members, which has been caused by 
their perception that local governments are secretive and incapable (as discussed previously). 
More importantly, the community‘s perception of the communication behaviours of the local 
government has stronger effects on their perception of risk and their level of trust in the local 
government, in comparison to the effects of culture. Before the 2010 eruption, the local 
communities living on the slopes of Mt. Merapi have shared a perception of low risk of 
volcanic hazards; their cultural beliefs have been accused of encouraging the low-risk 
perception, which led to distrust in the local government. However, after the 2010 eruption, 
the level of distrust in the local government and the perception of risk of the local community 
have been increasing significantly, regardless of the fact that their cultural beliefs remain the 
same.  
Based on the findings, I argue that the distrust and risk perceptions of the local communities 
on the Mt. Merapi slopes significantly increased when they perceived that disaster 
communication behaviors of the authorities had been inappropriate. Again, the disillusion 
may result from the agencies‘ former attempts to maintain internally rigid conformity by 
isolating the community from their official disaster communication process (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). This argument is supported by Sandman et al. (1993) who found strong 
correlations among agencies‘ perceived trustworthiness, secrecy, and a community‘s 
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perception of risk. Therefore, in addition to the importance of an effective message design 
and channel, the ways the authorities conduct their official disaster communication play 
significantly important roles in encouraging trustworthiness; this argument is supported by 
Giddens (1990, pp. 33-34) who identifies that trust in abstract systems, such as official 
disaster communications, more ‗concerns their proper working rather than their operation as 
such‘. Moreover, the government agencies cannot only disproportionately preserve their 
practices of official disaster communication as legitimate policies that must be taken for 
granted by the community; the authorities also need to convince the community that their 
practices actually work for the affected community. 
 
4.4. Community engagement as a bridge between the different perspectives of 
community and authorities in official disaster communication 
According to Donovan (2010), Fraser and Estrada (2001), Lavigne et al. (2008), Moody 
(2013), Murayama et al. (2013), and Sandman et al. (1993), authorities would be able to 
reduce public unease if they were willing to be responsive and engage community members, 
rather than providing more technical information. In the Sendai Framework, the United 
Nations (2015) also emphasizes enhancing collaboration with local people to disseminate 
disaster information. However, engaging the community is often perceived by government 
agencies as a formal-control sharing, which becomes the most common controversy between 
community and government. Government agencies are often reluctant to acknowledge the de 
facto veto on the community and share their formal control with the community (Sandman, 
1993). Meanwhile, community engagement within a collaborative system can generate a 
sense of accountability for all levels of government (Chatfield et al., 2014, Jaeger et al., 2007, 
Samadhi, 2014, Sandman, 1993), and make official disaster communication more trustworthy 
(Steelman et al., 2015, Tang et al., 2012, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011).   
In contrast to the studies presenting that community engagement leads to trustworthiness, I 
argue that the relationship between community engagement and trustworthiness also works in 
the opposite way. Specifically, the authorities‘ lack of trust in community-generated disaster 
information has led to undermined community engagement in their official disaster 
communication. A community member stressed a lack of community engagement within 
official disaster management, particularly by the district governments (Wulandari, personal 
interview, 7 July 2014). Likewise, Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM stated: 
143 
 
The sub-district and village governments have been supportive in sharing 
information rapidly. They also frequently involve and invite the community 
members for coordination […] At the higher levels of district government, the 
BPBD still think that we are powerless and cannot do anything […] We are 
victims and the first responders. We have acted when the local government 
hasn‘t responded [to an eruption] yet. Why? We realise that if we waited for 
the authorities, we would have died [before they came] […] When people are 
treated as powerless, they will be powerless. Yet, we have our own capacity. 
The government makes us look vulnerable and powerless (personal interview, 
6 May 2014).   
The finding of a lack of community engagement does not only occur in the case of the Mt. 
Merapi eruption, as Chatfield et al. (2014) and Tanesia (2007) also found similar evidence of 
a scarcity of official citizen-originated disaster communication in other areas in Indonesia. 
Moreover, as previously discussed, the lack of community engagement does not only apply to 
the lack of engagement of the local actors, but also to the lack of engagement of the 
community‘s cultural knowledge in disaster management of Mt. Merapi eruption. How the 
culture of local villagers living on Mt. Merapi can be engaged in disaster communication will 
be discussed in the next chapter.  
Unlike the interviewed community members claiming a lack of community engagement, the 
officials in the focus groups claimed the existence of community engagement in their official 
disaster management. For example, the officers of Sleman explained that the government has 
been engaging the community members in the Early Warning System (EWS)
19
. Specifically, 
they appointed two community members, who live near the EWS, to be responsible for 
monitoring it. In the case of an emergency, they may turn on the sirens if they do not start 
automatically. Kushartati, a Sleman officer, added another example: 
We already have good intentions to open communication related to disaster 
management as much as possible […] We have the Sleman Disaster 
Information Network (SDIN) […] www.sdinslemankab.wordpress.com […] 
a website that has been provided for the community […] they can submit 
any disaster information to the website in the form of news […] It was one 
of the real implementations of a communication channel in our disaster 
management. The local communities are the information sources, not us. 
We call it civil journalism as the community members may submit their 
self-written news without it being edited by BPBD (focus group, 19 June 
2014). 
                                                          
19
 EWS utilizes sirens that are stationed in almost all Sleman‘s hamlets.  
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Although the arguments were raised as an example of community engagement by the 
officials, this suggests an incompatibility in perceived engagement between the local 
government and the community members. Similarly to the traditional approach of official 
disaster communication, the official engagement in EWS limitedly treats the role of 
community as a passive party who has to wait for the government‘s unidirectional instruction 
to turn on the sirens. On the other hand, the community members, including the community 
radio volunteers, demanded community involvement by engaging the community‘s social 
capital in such an interactive way, in order to establish an effective and collaborative official 
disaster communication. I also found that the website of SDIN is totally empty; it does not 
have any community-generated content at all. 
Unlike the other officers, an officer of the Sleman district confirmed the lack of community 
engagement in official disaster communication. He strongly argued that the information 
provided by community members through two-way radio does not meet the official standards 
of the operational procedure of radio communication, so it cannot be included in formal 
disaster communication. He specifically stated: 
[T]he language (the codes of radio communication) is regulated by ITU 
[International Telecommunication Union]. The officials use code 8, 
ORARI [Indonesian Amateur Radio Organisation] use code Q […] they 
[the community members] use disorganized language […] their random 
terminologies cannot be considered in our official communication […] to 
be able to get involved, they have to adapt to the official language […] so 
their disaster information can be valid and disseminated further to 
government agencies (Sunyoto, focus group, 19 June 2014). 
Nurwiyono, a head of a sub-district, agreed: 
[A]lthough we [the officials at the village and sub-district level] can 
understand the terminologies of the two-way radio users, we only can 
listen to them […] They still have to comply with the official regulations 
of disaster information in order to be considered in the official disaster 
communication (focus group, 19 June 2015). 
This is supported by the Regulation of the Head of BNPB Number 6 (2013) that regulates 
that the BNPB national disaster management agency and BPBD regional disaster 
management agencies are obligated to use code 11 and the official call-signs in radio 
communication during a disaster response. Therefore, in order to be able to be considered 
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reliable, all kinds of community participation have to be performed based on the official 
guidances (Regulation of Head of BNPB Number 11, 2014, article 15). 
I argue that the lack of community involvement in formal disaster communication is 
reinforced by the difficulty of translating the community‘s daily language into the official 
language of disaster communication. The difference between institutional speech and 
ordinary language has been stressed by Lammers (2011), who describes institutional speech 
as the ‗language in work settings situated in organisations‘. The incompatibility between 
community language and official language is somewhat similar to the previously discussed 
argument of the incompatibility between scientific themes used by the authorities and the 
community‘s scientific literacy. Again, they strengthen the importance of the usage of a 
mutual language that can be understood and accepted by both the authorities and the local 
community. When both the local community and the local government can understand the 
language used in disaster communication, they can exchange their information more 
effectively (Troll et al., 2015). Furthermore, the mutual understanding is most likely to 
encourage community engagement (Shannon et al., 2014, Wilby, 2010) in disaster 
communication and assist the affected community to decide appropriate responses. 
Therefore, I argue that engaging the community, particularly the informal community leaders 
who have genuine concerns about the communities‘ interests and are considered to have 
expertise in local cultural knowledge, can facilitate trustworthy and participatory disaster 
communication. Supportively, two interviewed community members, Pujiantoro (personal 
interview, 5 June 2014) and Zakaria (personal interview, 27 June 2014), stated that 
identifying and engaging appropriate leadership will effectively lead to the community‘s trust 
and participation. Another interviewed community member, Setiyoko added that another 
advantage of community engagement is that it will accelerate the process of information 
sharing between the community members (personal interview, 8 July 2014). 
The argument of the important role of community leaders in disaster communication is 
similar to that in the study of Lavigne et al. (2008, p. 284), identifying that informal 
community leaders play ‗a more important role than the one played by the authorities‘ in 
community decision-making in the Mt. Merapi surroundings. Additionally, disaster 
information delivered by informal leaders would be taken more seriously by the rest of the 
community members (Shannon et al., 2014), because they have been regarded as the local 
experts (Aw, 1992) who can simultaneously provide assurance and a safe feeling for the 
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community members (Triyoga, 1991). The engagement of community leaders is actually 
legally supported by the Regulation of the Head of BNPB Number 11 (2014) which regulates 
that the communities, especially those that are established based on geographical proximity 
(Gemeinschaft), have to be significantly engaged by considering their local traditions and 
independent leaderships. However, although engagement with community leaders as 
‗information brokers‘ can significantly increase the effectiveness of information exchange, 
this remains less prioritized in the official disaster communication (Wenger, 2000; Shannon 
et al., 2014, p. 641). 
In practice, community engagement is not only beneficial for the community members, but 
also for a government agency that is willing to do so. For example, in contrast to the district 
governments, the interviewed community members including the community radio volunteers 
considered that the BPPTKG volcano research unit has been more willing to engage the 
Merapi people by combining their local knowledge with its scientific findings. According to a 
community member, the BPPTKG frequently asks the locals about what they see and hear 
from Mt. Merapi (Adji, personal interview, 22 July 2014). Subsequently, they believed that 
their information would be used to compare with or confirm the BPPTKG‘s scientific 
information emerging from its monitoring equipment, as stated by Sukiman, a volunteer of 
Lintas Merapi FM: 
The good thing about the BPPTKG is they don‘t only rely on the 
technologies. The technologies and the local wisdom in observing the 
volcano […] They are willing to listen to us […] Sometimes, they invite us 
[…] A day before the BPPTKG officially increased the status of Mt. Merapi 
to Waspada [level 2], Choliq [a staff member of the BPPTKG] asked me 
―How‘s the mountain? What did you hear? […] They are scientists, yet, they 
confirm it [the scientific findings] with the local wisdom (personal 
interview, 6 May 2014). 
The particular approach also has been suggested by Kahneman (2011, p. 145) and Shannon et 
al. (2014) who emphasize co-production of disaster knowledge by combining a community‘s 
‗emotion and intuition‘ and local government‘s expertise. Similarly, Panjaitan, a BNPB 
officer agreed: 
There are some ways to get information […] technologies are important […] 
but, there are also the community members. They are the ones who know 
the information about changes within the [affected] community when the 
volcano erupts […] So, actually we can use their information…they are the 
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first responders […] We have to respond to the first responder, but not rely 
on […] meaning that we have to filter it [the information] […] We ask the 
experts whether it is true that the volcano will erupt or not. If the community 
thinks that we have to evacuate because snakes have gone down the 
volcano, we can‘t do that. We have to check what the technologies say 
about it. But, if the community has accurate information, why not? […] We 
have to listen to them […] don‘t ignore them […] involve the community 
(personal interview, 25 September 2014).  
Moreover, an Indonesian Act of Disaster Management (Act Number 24, 2007) also stated 
that the policies of a BPBD regional disaster management agency should be based on region-
specific knowledge and community capacity (Butt, 2014). As a result of the approach by the 
BPPTKG vulcanology research unit, a volunteer of MMC FM stated that there is some 
evidence that the Merapi people are more willing to cooperate with the BPPTKG than with 
the local governments (Mujianto, personal interview, 26 April 2014). As a further result of 
the tendency to corporate, the community engagement can lead to trust (Steelman et al., 2015, 
Tang et al., 2012, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Giddens, 1990), as community 
engagement is one of mechanisms of accountability (Chatfield et al., 2014, Jaeger et al., 
2007, Samadhi, 2014, Sandman, 1993). 
 
4.5. The model of reciprocal trust between the local government and the affected 
community in disaster communication  
More importantly, I argue that trust in disaster communication works in a circular interaction 
between the affected community and the authorities. The government‘s communication 
behaviours affect the community‘s trust; subsequently, the community‘s communication 
behaviours that are influenced by its level of trust adversely affect the authorities‘ trust in the 
community‘s capability. If there is a lack of trust, the distrust is more likely to lead to the 
authorities‘ reluctance to share control and engage the community in disaster communication. 
Again, a lack of community engagement and shared-control will be more likely to increase 










    
 
Figure 16. Circular interactions of trust and communication behaviors between community 
members and authorities. 
 
When the model (Figure 16) is applied in a high trust environment, it is most likely to 
encourage effective disaster communication. However, when the model is applied in a low-
trust environment, perceived uncertainty will increase and the community members will feel 
less safe; they are likely to express anger and consider the authorities‘ behaviours to be less 
appropriate (Sandman et al., 1993). If the official disaster information is not embedded with 
trust, it will most likely be ignored or responded to slowly (Jaeger et al., 2007, Sandman, 
1993) and the uptake of formal information and voluntary co-operation are likely to remain 
minimal (Fisher, 2013).  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The practice of official disaster communication in the Mt. Merapi surroundings seems more 
to focus on message construction and media selection to ensure the intended disaster 
information is well-received by the affected community. Meanwhile, the empirical findings 
show that the behaviours of disaster communication by the authorities seem to have stronger 
influences on the perceived trustworthiness of that communication than the message design 
and the media usage. Hence, addressing the first research question, I argue that the perception 
of the affected community that official communication is trustworthy and effective is strongly 
related to the government‘s promptness in sharing complete official disaster information, and 
willingness to share control by engaging with the at-risk community, to involve the 












a community into the formal structure of official disaster communication enables ‗creativity 
and flexibility to sit within a context of continuity and stability‘ (Griffin et al., 1999; Shannon 
et al., 2014, p. 649).  
In this thesis, I specifically do not take a position on the superiority of either formal disaster 
communication or informal community-based disaster communication, because both of them 
have their unique strengths and weaknesses in fulfilling a community‘s needs for information 
in disaster response. However, the critiques of an institutional top-down approach of official 
disaster communication do not seem to be able to be answered by simply changing the top-
down approach to the informally bottom-up approach (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). It should 
not be assumed that government agencies should neglect their ceremonial formal structure in 
order to promote the efficiency and trustworthiness of disaster communication. Undermining 
the validity of institutional structures would result in the government agencies most likely not 
being able to access their formal resources, formally document their practical efficiency, or 
maintain their stability; more importantly, it would reduce the legitimacy of the agencies 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
Therefore, it is necessary to look closer at the community level to identify what aspects of a 
community‘s social life may be useful in encouraging trust and collective participation in 
disaster communication. As I argue that the trustworthiness between community members 
and local government works in a circular interaction, identifying the trustworthy aspects of 
community communication may be useful to decrease doubt in the government‘s community-
based disaster communication, and, subsequently, increase the degree of trust in the local 
governments and community engagement in formal disaster communication. Referring to the 
arguments and the existing studies, community engagement is most likely to increase the 
community‘s trust in the government. Further, the reciprocal trust both from community 
members and the government may lead to trustworthy and participatory disaster 
communication, which is the key factor to facilitate an effective disaster response (Chatfield 








Trustworthy community-based disaster communication 
 
Community-based disaster communication is often perceived as untrustworthy because of a 
combination of excess information, myriad information sources, and a lack of aggregation 
and validation mechanisms (Gao et al., 2011, Austin et al., 2012, Crowe, 2012, Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). For similar reasons, the arguments in the previous chapter 
show that the authorities‘ excessive reliance on their institutional logic has led to the 
undermining of perceived trust in community-based disaster communication. Consequently, 
the community-generated information is often unlikely to be engaged as a reliable 
information reference in a formal disaster response. In contrast with the authorities‘ 
perceptions of the unreliability and untrustworthiness of community-based disaster 
communication, disaster-affected individuals tend to treat other community members (e.g. 
families, friends and neighbours) as primary sources of information, particularly in the 48 
hours after a disaster strikes (Romo‐Murphy et al., 2011). Differently from the authorities‘ 
focus on the institutional logic (Lammers, 2011, Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977), community members often rely heavily on the social capital embedded in 
their social relationships with other members in appraising the trustworthiness of information 
(Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Jaeger et al., 2007, Putnam, 2000, Tang et al., 2012). 
Yet, the specific forms of social capital that can encourage trustworthiness and community 
engagement in disaster communication are still underexplored in the existing research.  
Focusing on trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication, this 
chapter identifies the social capital of an affected community that can encourage trust and 
collective participation in community-based disaster communication. In particular, social 
capital takes the forms of the engagement of local culture and the tie strength of the local 
social network. In the case of Jalin Merapi (Jaringan Informasi Lingkar Merapi – 
Information Network of Merapi circle), the engagement was particularly performed by the 
volunteers of community radio stations who were part of the affected community. At the 
same time, engaging local culture and involving local actors are the characteristics of 
community radio stations.  
I begin the chapter by explaining the establishment of the Jalin Merapi network by three 
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community radio stations in the Mt Merapi surroundings, followed by a discussion of the role 
of community radio stations as a form of community-based disaster communication. The 
discussion focuses on the characteristics of community radio stations that represent the social 
capital of the Merapi people, who successfully encouraged trust and community participation 
in the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 Merapi eruption. Particular attention will be paid 
to the significance of the culturally-embedded disaster communication and tie strength of the 
local social network. In the discussion on culturally-embedded disaster communication, I will 
discuss the roles of the community radio stations in supporting and reflecting local cultural 
beliefs in their daily broadcasts, and the implementation of culturally-embedded broadcasting 
into the Jalin Merapi network. The local culture discussed is discussed in the context of the 
cultural understanding of Mt. Merapi macrosystem and the relationship between the residents 
and the volcano as discussed previously in Chapter One. In the discussion on the tie strength 
of the social network, I will discuss the roles of the tie strength embedded in the personal 
social network owned by the radio volunteers in information sharing and encouraging 
trustworthiness in the Jalin Merapi network. Further, I will discuss the internal participatory 
mechanisms of the community radio stations that encouraged a sense of community among 
their surrounding community members and led to collective participation in Jalin Merapi, as a 
community-based network, during the 2010 Merapi eruption. I end this chapter with 
explanations of the voluntary mechanism and technology platform used by the Jalin Merapi 
network to facilitate the community participation in its community-based disaster 
communication.  
5.1. Community radio stations: the pioneers of the Jalin Merapi network 
Being shaped by communities‘ prolonged distrust in the official disaster communication as 
identified in the previous chapter, local disaster understanding and preparedness in terms of 
the local communication networks aim to establish a reliable communal mechanism that 
could give them timely, localized, accurate information about Merapi, and simultaneously 
―bridge‖ official information in order to be more accessible for the community members. In 
order to achieve these kinds of aims, Romo‐Murphy et al. (2011) stress that a communication 
mechanism has to be accessible, affordable, and interactive. Since 1998, two-way radio 
communication has dominated the local community-based disaster communication around Mt 
Merapi. However, according to a volunteer of Gema Merapi FM (Ferdana, personal 
interview, 11 March 2014) and a volunteer of Lahara FM (Setyawan, personal interview, 20 
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March 2014), it is increasingly insufficient because of its limited one-to-one transmission and 
the high price of a two-way radio set.  
Responding to the limitations of the two way radio, Paguyuban Sabuk Gunung Merapi 
(Pasak Merapi – The Association of Merapi‘s Volcano Belt)20 introduced three community 
radio stations in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi in early 2000 and strongly contributed to 
the development of the Jalin Merapi network. The establishment of community radio stations 
in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi was based on the practicality and affordability of radio 
equipment, the accessibility of radio broadcasts, and radio‘s capacity to maintain two-way 
communication function. Specifically, Hartanto, a Combine staff member who is also a 
volunteer of Gema Merapi FM, explained that establishing a community radio station is 
relatively affordable because it is portable and can be easily constructed only with 50 Watt 
electric capacity (personal interview, 12 March 2014); this is supported by Fraser and Estrada 
(2001) who agree that a community radio station technically only requires cheap transistor 
receivers and low-powered and cheap transmitters. Additionally, a volunteer of K FM 
described radio as an appropriate medium for the Merapi people, because they have a habit of 
listening to the radio as their daily communication behavior, particularly when they are 
working on farms or in mines. He also described that, as an audio medium, radio is suitable 
for responding to the illiteracy in the area surrounding the Merapi volcano21; a community 
radio station broadcasts audible information and in local languages (Haji, personal interview, 
21 March 2014). Another community radio volunteer, Ferdana, expressed his confidence in 
the accessibility of a radio broadcast because of a high level of mobile phone ownership 
within the local communities; they can simply listen to the radio through the radio feature 
that exists in almost all types of mobile phone, even the cheap ones (personal interview, 11 
March 2014). 
In comparison to two-way radio, Ferdana argued that a radio broadcast is more able to 
maintain a two-way communication function and to simultaneously extend the information 
                                                          
20
 According to Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM (personal interview, 6 May 2014) and Wulandari, a 
community member (personal interview, 7 July 2014), Pasak Merapi is one of the oldest informal community-
based organisation that has accompanied the locals in building their disaster capacities since 1997. It has 
regularly provided various training sessions in disaster management for the community members and assisted 
the villagers in developing their informal contingency plans. Pasak Merapi has at least 1,860 members 
distributed in 62 villages in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi.  
21
 In the process of my data collection, I observed that some of the elders are still illiterate and only understand 
the Javanese language. Unfortunately, I could not find the official count of illiteracy in the specific areas of the 
Merapi volcano. In general, 7.18 percent of the population of the province of thr Special Region of Yogyakarta 
is still illiterate; similarly, 8.73 percent of population of the province of Central Java is illiterate (BPS, 2013). 
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coverage from one point to multi-points. A similar argument was also stated by Supadi, a 
community member:  
The radio is more effective than the HT [two-way radio]. Only certain 
people have HT. If we turn on a radio during an emergency, everyone can 
listen to it. HT connects one individual to another. It takes too long! 
(personal interview, 22 July 2014). 
As a result, according to a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM, Sukiman, the number of 
community radio stations is growing in the area surrounding Mt Merapi (personal interview, 
6 May 2014). There is no official information about their number around Mt. Merapi. 
In this case study, I identify that the community radio stations have a strong social 
responsibility for promoting community capacity in disaster and consider themselves as the 
local actors of disaster management. Similarly, Barlow (1988), Fraser and Estrada (2001), 
Moody (2013), Romo‐Murphy et al. (2011), and Spence et al. (2009) agree that a community 
radio station has a greater sense of community responsibility in disasters, compared to other 
types of radio stations. Specifically in disaster communication, the interviewed community 
radio volunteers emphasized the important role of the community radio stations as transfer 
agencies and reliable sources of disaster knowledge/information within the Merapi 
communities. They regularly insert disaster knowledge about vulcanology and the disaster 
management of Mt. Merapi in the forms of public service announcements, talk shows, and 
the local government‘s disaster programmes. A volunteer of K FM specifically explained: 
We know that Merapi can be a threat, but still we do not want to move 
away. So we need to develop mitigation, warning, and preparedness. In 
normal conditions [of Merapi], we keep updating information about its 
condition and information to build community capacity to adjust to Merapi 
[...] in the forms of Public Service Announcements and Talkshows [...] It is 
part of our responsibility to give educated information [...] In an alert 
situation, we support the information needed. It is compulsory (Asnawi, 
personal interview, 21 March 2014). 
In addition to the informative role, the community radio stations‘ responsibility for disaster 
management has also been implemented in off-air programs. Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas 
Merapi FM, explained that the community radio stations have been actively involved in 
various programmes of disaster management and focused on off-air programs in developing 
community capacity in disaster risk reduction and disaster response by organizing regular 
training for their surrounding communities. He specifically stated,  
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As an organization, we have responsibilities. Not only broadcast, we also 
educate the communities about disaster risk reduction. The broadcast itself 
is number two, the most important thing is the off-air events […] about 
disaster [management] […] So we can be useful for the communities 
(personal interview, 6 May 2014). 
Another community radio volunteer, Mujianto (personal interview, 26 April 2014) added that 
the community radio stations broadcast local and updated information about Mt. Merapi 
based on their personal observations of Merapi visualisation. The community radio 
volunteers regularly climb up to the Merapi peak and river stream for direct observation in 
order to be able to provide accurate information for the rest of the local community members. 
After consultation with the BPPTKG vulcanology research unit, the result of the visual 
observation is broadcast. Moreover, all interviewed community radio volunteers stated that 
they acted as a mediating group to deliver official disaster information from the authorities, 
particularly the BPPTKG vulcanology research unit, to the community members. These 
findings show that the community radio stations undoubtedly consider themselves as having 
the responsibility for building disaster capacity in responding to a Merapi eruption. 
 
5.2. The establishment of the Jalin Merapi network 
Being encouraged by their strong responsibility for local disaster management, all 
interviewed community radio volunteers claimed that they have developed effective 
mechanisms for community-based disaster communication for their own community. 
However, the community radio transmission coverage limits the community benefiting from 
their community–based disaster communication to those who are geographically located 
where their signals can be received. In the Indonesian context, Government Regulation No. 
51/2005 on Community Broadcasting Enforcement regulates that the broadcasting of a 
community radio station is allowed to cover areas within a radius of 2.5 kilometres from its 
transmitter by utilizing a maximum of 50 Watts ERP (Effective Radiated Power)22. In 
addition to the limited coverage, personal media preferences of community members reduce 
the exposure of a community radio station progressively. Although the broadcast of the 
community radio stations may travel more than 2.5 kilometres depending on the terrain 
                                                          
22
 As a comparison, the public-service radio station and the private radio station are allowed to reach areas in a 
radius of 12 to 30 kilometres from their transmitters by utilizing 2 to 63 kiloWatt ERP (Ministerial Decree of the 
Indonesian Minister of Transportation No.15/2003 on Masterplan of FM Radio Broadcast). 
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characteristics of its surroundings
23
, a volunteer of Gema Merapi FM strongly argued that one 
community radio station‘s broadcast is not sufficient to accommodate all community 
members who require disaster information and should be involved in disaster communication 
in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi (Ferdana, personal interview, 11 March 2014). If the local 
communities need to seek information from or share information with those outside the radio 
coverage, the community radio stations would be insufficient. 
In addition to the limited coverage, the community radio stations have had a mutual need for 
a coordinated and reliable community-generated information network as a solution to the 
delay in government information. Their awareness of the importance of a communication 
system that can assist them during a Mt. Merapi eruption was also determined by their spatial 
vulnerability to Mt. Merapi‘s hazards (eruption and lahar)24. Moreover, the interviewed radio 
volunteers explained that they have realized that being a single actor was inadequate to 
establish an effective disaster communication in responding to a Mt. Merapi eruption. It 
requires observations circling the whole mountain to gain a full understanding of what is 
really happening in the Merapi volcano. A circular response is also particularly required to 
address the official disaster response, which is performed separately by different local 
governments based on government administrative areas; meanwhile, hazards‘ occurrences do 
not recognize administrative borderlines.  
Responding to the limitation of the community radio stations and the mutual needs for 
reliable information and a connected circular response, Lintas Merapi FM in Deles hamlet, 
Siderejo village, Kemalang sub-district (at the south-western part of the Merapi volcano), K 
FM in Tegalsari hamlet, Dukun village, Dukun sub-district, Magelang district (at the north-
eastern part of the Merapi volcano), and MMC FM in Kuncen hamlet, Samiran village, Selo 
sub-district, Boyolali district (at the north-western part of the Merapi volcano) established the 
Jalin Merapi network as a community-based information network in 2006.  This was clearly 
described by one of the K FM volunteers below:  
We actually needed each other [...] we had a mutual need for disaster 
information and shared the same dreams with other radio stations in 
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 For example, K FM‘s broadcast can cover 7 – 8 villages (out of 372 villages in Magelang district) which 
consist of approximately 75 hamlets, meanwhile Gema Merapi FM‘s broadcast can travel three to five 
kilometres and only cover 8 hamlets (out of 1212 hamlets in Sleman district).   
24
 Lintas Merapi FM is located approximately 4 kilometres away at the south-western part from the Merapi 
summit, MMC FM is located approximately 6 kilometres away at the north-western part from the Merapi 




Boyolali, Klaten, and Sleman [...] we established the Jalin Merapi network 
as a medium to share and gather the information [...] Initially, we all had the 
problems of official information sharing…that needed to be shared with the 
community [...] It was almost impossible for the community to get any 
official information because it had to go through long bureaucracy steps [...] 
Now, if any of the radio stations get official information, it will be quickly 
shared and broadcasted. It is even faster from the internet (Asnawi, personal 
interview, 21 March 2014). 
 
The Jalin Merapi network has become a network at the grass-roots level by connecting the 
community radio stations as the pre–existing communication points in the local 
communication system in the Merapi volcano area. Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi 
FM, and Nasir, a former Combine staff member, told their stories: 
Jalin Merapi is a network connecting the community radio stations and 
friends. Our main purpose is to share accurate information about Mt. Merapi 
(Sukiman, personal interview, 6 May 2014). 
It was good to reinforce the community media, but it was not enough [...] 
There were a lot of things that could be solved if they were connected to 
each other [...] The community radios‘ members had known each other, but 
there was no bigger coordination [...] Jalin Merapi was a network. It did not 
interrupt because the communities had their own way [of information 
sharing] [...] Although, it did not mean that it [the internal information 
system] was sufficient [...] Actually, the Jalin Merapi network was in the 
middle. There were communities and community radio stations that worked 
within them.  The Jalin Merapi network was on the upper level of that, 
connecting the community radio stations surrounding Merapi (Nasir, 
personal interview, 17 March 2014). 
 
Soon after the establishment of the Jalin Merapi network, the community radio stations could 
not find the right ―formula‖ to connect all community radio stations in order to form a 
circular communication process. This was because of the various levels of communication 
capacity of the community radio stations and the limited supporting communication 
infrastructure. A volunteer of K FM gave the example that some radio volunteers had 
difficulties in accessing the Internet and mobile network because these were expensive in 
2006, (Haji, personal interview, 21 March 2014). Therefore, the community radio stations 
collaborated with the Combine Resource Institution (Combine) as the external agency that 
could assist them in resolving the difficulty with communication technology, particularly the 
internet-based media. A Combine staff member specifically explained: 
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The [disaster] communication and networks between the communities in 
Mt. Merapi have been established for a long time [...] The community radio 
stations become the focal points of the communities [...] We [Combine] 
support the community radio stations and optimize some of their functions 
with new technologies [...] For example, we developed a SMS Gateway that 
broadcasted the text messages of villagers on the internet [...] So, the public 
who are outside Merapi can also read information about Merapi [...] So, we 
connect the information from the [volunteers of] community radio stations 
to people outside Mt. Merapi with online media (Wijoyono, personal 
interview, 17 March 2014). 
Combine has played important roles in technology enforcement and assistance for the 
community radio stations regarding the establishment of the Jalin Merapi network. In 
addition to the SMS Gateway mentioned by Wijoyono above, Nasir described that Combine 
also assisted the community radio stations in creating Jalin Merapi‘s website and, later in the 
2010 eruption, Twitter accounts. When this study was conducted in 2014, the website and 
Twitter accounts of Jalin Merapi were managed by Combine and the community radio 
stations in such a collaborative scheme.  
Later, in the 2010 Merapi eruption, two other community radio stations, Gema Merapi FM in 
Pagerjurang hamlet, Kepuharjo village, Cangkringan sub-district, Sleman district (the south-
eastern part of the Merapi volcano) and Lahara FM in Jumoyo Lor hamlet, Jumoyo village, 
Salam sub-district, Magelang district (the north-western part of the Merapi volcano), joined 
the Jalin Merapi network. 
 
Figure 17. The community radio stations involved in the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 
Merapi eruption (Wijoyono, 2013). 
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Once the last two radio stations joined the Jalin Merapi network, together they connected all 
districts to form a circular response on the Merapi slopes. Therefore, the Jalin Merapi 
network  could form a circular compilation of information that represented all districts around 
the Merapi volcano. 
  
5.3. Community radio stations as a form of trustworthy community-based disaster 
communication.  
The reliability of radio stations in a disaster response is well supported in research, 
particularly regarding information broadcasting in a local context. However, their roles are 
somewhat restricted to its function as a form of communication channel (Birowo, 2006, 
Carpentier et al., 2007, Day, 2009, Fraser and Estrada, 2001) or a personalized 
communication link (Foy et al., 1992, Mohr, 1992, Moody, 2013, Valenzuela, 1992) that can 
remain ―alive‖ in an emergency situation. Unfortunately, the broadcasting ability of a 
community radio station often suddenly disappears right after a disaster occurs (Joyce, 2015). 
During the 2010 eruption, only two radio stations (Lintas Merapi FM and Lahara FM) were 
able to broadcast during the emergency situation. Lintas Merapi FM and its community 
members managed their own IDP camp and transported the radio equipment to the camp, 
where they continued their on-air broadcast. Unlike Lintas Merapi FM and Lahara FM, the 
other community radio stations had to be shut down because their radio volunteers had to 
evacuate and were not able to continue their radio broadcasts while evacuating. 
If the roles of community radio stations were limited to being a tool for disaster 
communication through broadcast they would be automatically ineffective at the time of their 
inactivity. However, according to the interviewed radio volunteers and community members, 
the engagement of the community radio stations was considered to be the key factor for 
trustworthiness and community participation in disaster communication through the Jalin 
Merapi network. The Jalin Merapi network meant that the community radio volunteers were 
still able to provide timely local information required by the evacuees and to engage their 
community members‘ involvement in the Jalin Merapi network. Despite some scholars 
arguing that sustainability has been the main strength of radio broadcasts in maintaining 
information availability during a disaster (Ewart and Dekker, 2013, Moody, 2013, Reynolds 
and Seeger, 2005), the trustworthiness and participation were not necessarily encouraged by 
sustainable radio broadcasts because, in fact, three out of five community radio stations that 
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participated in the Jalin Merapi network were unable to do live broadcast during the 2010 
Merapi eruption. 
An important observation, then, is that the roles of the community radio stations were not 
restricted to local information provision in disaster communication using radio technology, 
but they took advantage of the characteristics of community radio stations that have become 
embedded in the daily life of the Merapi people. The characteristics are specifically related to 
cultural engagement and the local social networks owned by its volunteers as local actors. 
Further, the engagement of the characteristics may develop community capacity to be able to 
participate in community-based disaster communication, in a familiar and trusted way for the 
affected community.  
5.3.1. Culture-embedded disaster communication as a means of trust encouragement 
The literature suggests that community radio stations have the potential to strengthen the 
internal identity of their community (Birowo, 2006, Carpentier et al., 2007, Day, 2009). This 
results from limited transmission power that limits the creation of programming to the local 
content (Lindsay, 1997). In general, all community radio stations in this case study broadcast 
local content in their on-air programs, about subjects such as the local economy, local culture, 
education, stockbreeding, agriculture, local tourism, local governance, the environmental 
conservation of the Mt. Merapi volcano, and any localized activities for community welfare. 
As part of the local community, the community radio stations strongly practise cultural 
identities and local content in their daily radio broadcasts, and these are recognized as one of 
the main characteristics of community radio stations (Day, 2009, Fraser and Estrada, 2001, 
Jankowski, 2002, Jurriëns, 2003, Kanayama, 2012, Lindsay, 1997, Moody, 2013, Valenzuela, 
1992, Foy et al., 1992, Mohr, 1992). In Indonesia, the practice of localised and cultural radio 
broadcasting was introduced by Mangkunegara VII, a princely ruler in Surakarta in the 
province of Central Java, in 1934. He established a radio station to broadcast a live 
performance of Gamelan music
25
 (Lindsay, 1997). The fact that a community radio station is 
a cultural medium cannot be considered independently of the Indonesian history of radio 
broadcasting, particularly when the government of the New Order made radio stations the 
repository of local cultural mediums (Sen, 2003). Further, an alignment of a community radio 
station with cultural content is regulated in the Government Regulation No. 51/2005, article 
                                                          
25
 Gamelan is one of the Javanese traditional music instruments.  
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18, clause 2, which states that a community radio station is obligated to broadcast local 
content in at least 80 percent of all programs. As community media, community radio stations 
aim at educating and empowering the community by broadcasting cultural, education, and art 
programs which represent national identities (The Broadcasting Act No.32/2002, clause 21, 
article 2b; The Government Regulation No. 51/2005, clause 19).  
Similarly, cultural characteristics have been embodied within the internal values of the 
community radio stations which participated in the Jalin Merapi network. The community 
radio volunteers interviewed for this research emphasized local content as their strength as 
community media. They particularly design their program content to empower the local 
traditional culture, in addition to the local economy, agriculture, local governance, local 
education and disaster management. For example, MMC FM has a regularly broadcast 
program of Javanese art performances: Kethoprak, Reog, Baduhi, Kobra Siwo, Jathilan, 
Rodat, and Topeng Ireng; K FM has regularly broadcast programmes of Wayangan (Javanese 
puppet theatre); and Lintas Merapi FM has a regular live programme of Karawitan (Javanese 
traditional music) performances played by the surrounding community members.  
Demonstrating their further commitment to cultural identities, the community radio stations 
frequently use the Javanese language26 in their programme content and taglines. For example, 
the tagline of Lintas Merapi FM is Nyajiwi Mrih Lestari Merapi in the Javanese language, 
which means ‗a unity for the sustainable Merapi‘. According to Lindsay (1997) and Kitley 
(2001), the Indonesian government previously required radio broadcasts to use Bahasa 
Indonesia as the national language to suppress regional and ethnic differences. However, the 
use of the local language is now legally permitted to support cultural programmes (the 
Government Regulation No. 51/2005 clause 21 article 2). This use has successfully 
established audiences‘ familiarity with the radio stations, as explained by a volunteer of K 
FM below: 
Actually, K FM means Key FM [...] A unifying key [and] a key of 
information [...] Our tagline was ―Key FM, it‘s your community 
channel‖…then we regretted using English [...] because the community 
apparently did not understand it [...] In 2007, we changed it to be ―Gawe 
Adem Lan Ayem‖ [to make it seem cool and relaxed]. It is in the local 
language [...] Although it may sound weird for the outsiders, it sounds 
familiar to the locals (Haji, personal interview, 21 March 2014). 
                                                          
26
 In a cultural context, Indonesia has more than 300 ethnic groups with more than 700 languages and dialects 
(Dougall et al., 2008; Troll et al., 2015).  
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Being constructed by cultural identities and local content, the community radio stations do 
not only broadcast their cultural program to entertain their listeners. They also have designed 
their cultural programs, which are broadcasted in the Javanese language, to combine cultural 
content with disaster content in order to fulfil their social responsibility in disaster 
management. For example, Gema Merapi FM combines culture and disaster risk reduction as 
its tagline: 
At first, our tagline was ―Berbudaya dan Tetap siaga‖ [―Be cultural and be 
alert‖], now we added ―Berdaya‖ [―empowered‖]. So, it becomes ―Be 
empowered, be cultural, and be alert‖. It represents our content of broadcast 
that focuses on culture and Merapi preparedness. The term of 
―empowerment‖ refers to our independence [...] We hope that our 
community radio station can empower the locals [...] particularly after they 
lost their livelihood during the 2010 Merapi eruption [...] So they can be 
empowered, be cultural and keep being alert for the Merapi hazard (Ferdana, 
personal interview, 11 March 2014). 
Another example is the radio-based disaster mitigation messages in a cultural format called 
Disaster Management Audio Material (DMAM), which has been developed by all involved 
community radio stations in the Jalin Merapi network. Lintas Merapi FM created Javanese 
comic chats, Javanese songs, and Wayangan (Javanese puppet theatre) about early warnings 
of Mt. Merapi eruptions.  
The particular culture-embedded approach is appropriate for the local communities living on 
the slopes of Mt. Merapi who have been strongly influenced by their Javanese culture in 
perceiving the volcanic risk and personifying Mr. Merapi in their daily life. Yet, it is 
important to acknowledge that degrees of cultural belief and risk perception vary in the local 
communities living on Mt. Merapi‘s slopes. Similarly to Donovan et al. (2012), I identified 
that risk perception and the degree of cultural belief are different within the local 
communities based on their geographical locations or their proximity to volcanic hazards. 
The local communities on the lower parts of Mt. Merapi‘s slopes, who are relatively distant 
from volcanic hazards, seem to have higher risk perceptions, in comparison to those living in 
the higher parts. Supadi, a community member who lives only four kilometres away from the 
Merapi summit, argued that the community members on the higher parts of Mt. Merapi‘s 
slopes have better disaster knowledge and are more willing to be involved in training for 
disaster management. He specifically stated: 
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We understand about the phreatic eruption [...] When it happened, the lower 
people were uncontrollable [...] They panicked and evacuated! We did not 
go anywhere but cleaned up the dirty roads [...] because of the volcanic ash 
[...] We have a better understanding about Merapi [...] when we had to 
evacuate, the evacuation barracks were full of the lower people [...] We 
realize that we need the knowledge (and) we can get it through training.  
Nonetheless, Lavigne et al. (2008) found that they are more affected by cultural beliefs than 
the communities who live on the lower part of Mt. Merapi‘s slopes. Sukiman, a volunteer of 
Lintas Merapi FM who lives four kilometres away from the Merapi summit, agreed that the 
Merapi people still need to keep harnessing their local ―senses‖ in observing the Merapi 
volcano, in order to complement the official information from the BPPTKG volcano research 
unit (personal interview, 6 May 2014). Consequently, the communities on the lower slopes of 
Mt. Merapi were more likely to evacuate than those on the higher slopes (Donovan et al., 
2012). Again, this supports the argument that the local cultural beliefs still have a dominant 
influence on the risk perception and disaster behaviors of the local communities, regardless of 
their scientific disaster knowledge. 
Referring to the significant influences of cultural beliefs in risk perception and evacuation 
decisions, the community radio volunteers interviewed strongly encouraged cultural 
engagement in their disaster information27. They emphasized the importance of recognizing 
communication behavior, and particularly the role of the local language as part of the 
communal identities in a local context, in disaster communication. Specifically, a volunteer 
of Lintas Merapi FM argued that the effectiveness of disaster-related messages is 
significantly influenced by the local culture and communication behavior (Sukiman, personal 
interview, 6 May 2014). In practice, the community radio volunteers provided their disaster 
information to the Jalin Merapi network in the Javanese language during the 2010 Merapi 
eruption. Consequently, the disaster information provided in the local language was 
considered to be able to facilitate familiarity, increase the level of understanding, and avoid 
misunderstanding by the affected communities; this was clearly explained by an interviewed 
community member: 
                                                          
27
 Defining culture is ‗almost unfeasibly difficult‘, because it involves all aspects of an individual‘s life (Crang, 
1998). Specifically, the socio-cultural factors in this thesis refer to the definition of Bankoff et al., (2015), p. 5 as 
the ‗beliefs, attitudes, feelings, experiences, values and narratives, and their associated behaviors, actions, and 
day-to-day routines‘ shared by the local communities living on the slopes of Mt. Merapi, with regard to the 
volcanic hazards of Mt. Merapi.  
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Communicate with us with our language [...] use our local media [...] in a 
very local way [...] Because of the usage of local language and local content, 
they can ―speak‖ to community members in such a way that can be easily 
understood by the community members (Wulandari, personal interview, 7 
July 2014).  
The argument that using the local language facilitates effective information sharing for the 
familiarity it creates mirrors the studies of Berque (1992) and Valenzuela (1992) that identify 
an engagement of local language as a key factor for mutual understanding because 
community members tend to identify themselves with it. Furthermore, information from the 
Jalin Merapi network was most likely to be accepted by the Merapi people, because it could 
―bridge‖ the information they needed in convenient ways based upon their daily 
communication behaviors. 
In addition to using the Javanese language, the community radio volunteers underlined the 
need to comprehend the local wisdom with scientific knowledge by applying a culturally 
rational approach; although this does not necessarily mean that the message design has to 
blindly take sides with cultural beliefs. Taking the evacuation instruction as an example, 
Mujianto, a volunteer of MMC FM, argued that local beliefs can be engaged in providing 
rational information about Mt. Merapi‘s hazards. He further explained that they composed the 
evacuation instructions based on the ―need‖ of Mt. Merapi for ―extra workspace‖ to improve 
its nature for the benefit of local communities. He specifically stated: 
It has been difficult to evacuate the villagers. We are in Selo [sub-district] 
located on the back side of Mt. Merapi. It‘s impossible if the Mt. Merapi 
spews out its material into Selo [...] [However], its nature is unpredictable. 
So, together with the other [volunteers of] community radio stations, we 
have been trying to build awareness of the nature of Mt. Merapi. We have to 
share our ―time‖ and ―space‖ with Mt. Merapi. When Mt. Merapi needs to 
use ―our shared space‖, we have to give it entirely to Mt. Merapi [...] So, we 
don‘t use the word ―evacuating‖, it‘s our awareness to voluntarily give our 
―time‖ and ―space‖ to Mt. Merapi, so it will be able to ―work‖ in its natural 
being (personal interview, 26 April 2014) 
This approach is in contrast to the way the local government designs their evacuation 
instructions based on scientific explanations of Mt. Merapi. However, the approach was more 
likely to successfully convince the affected community to evacuate because it fitted their 
cultural wisdom to live in harmony with nature and their geomythologies, perceiving that Mt. 
Merapi had power over their lives and should be treated respectfully (Triyoga, 2010). 
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Likewise, this approach is actually in line with scientific rationale as Mt. Merapi will erupt 
volcanic materials, which will fertilize the soil and provide the local communities with more 
material for mining.  
The tendency of a community to absorb a scientific explanation into their traditional culture 
can be observed in the case of Mbah Maridjan. After his death in the first eruption in 2010, 
there seemed to be a shift of trust within the Merapi communities towards the local 
government and vulcanology experts as the new ―gatekeepers‖ of Merapi Bachtiar (2014), 
particularly Surono as the Head of the Geology Agency during the 2010 eruption. Unlike 
Mbah Maridjan, Surono gave scientific explanations of the 2010 Merapi eruption by 
monitoring the Merapi observatory points and seismograph. Despite his scientific approach, 
the Merapi people gave the cultural appellation ―Mbah‖ to Surono, instead of ―Sir‖, the 
regular appellation for officials. This was an attempt to fit him into their cultural belief, as 
they normally entrusted the understanding of Merapi to the elders who are trusted as wise 
people. However, the shift has not necessarily applied to all Merapi people. When this study 
was conducted in 2014, many community members still complied with their cultural and 
religious informal leaders in making a decision to evacuate rather than the officials; this was 
clearly stated by an interviewed community member:  
The locals, particularly the elders have [...] a spiritual leader [...] his name is 
Mbah Gini [...] Many villagers believe that he can communicate with Mt. 
Merapi [...] How? I don‘t know. If he says that the villagers have to go 
down [evacuate], they go down. He‘s like Mbah Maridjan (Setiyoko, 
personal interview, 8 July 2014). 
Yet, the engagement of cultural rationality has been rarely applied by the authorities in 
official disaster communication (I have discussed how the local governments have heavily 
relied on the scientific principles in disaster management in Chapter Four). The most 
common argument about the unlikeliness of cultural rationality engagement in disaster 
management is because the inherent cultural knowledge may be unacknowledged or 
perceived as irrational or unnecessary by outsiders (Ropeik and Gray, 2002, Sandman, 1993, 
Bankoff et al., 2015). In fact, not all cultural beliefs owned by the Merapi people are 
unaligned with scientific rationality. For example, when the crops die because of volcanic 
ash, the Merapi people believe that it is the time when the Merapi kingdom borrows their 
crops for its party and it will return their crops abundantly in the next harvest time. Also, the 
Merapi people believe that they have to stay at home when Mt. Merapi releases volcanic ash, 
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because it is taboo to watch the spirits while they are working to transport their crops to the 
Merapi kingdom. This logic makes sense as when the volcanic ash mixes with soil, it will 
fertilise the soil. Also, avoiding the dangerous volcanic ash by hiding in the houses makes 
sense medically (Triyoga, 1991). Again, the Merapi people also believed that their houses 
have to face the road; the houses cannot face the Mt. Merapi, as it is considered to be 
disrespectful to Mt. Merapi and a surrender to giving the house as a ‗nest‘ for the spirit in the 
Merapi kingdom. This also makes sense as the position of the houses will make them easier 
to evacuate during an eruption (Triyoga, 1991, pp. 73, 123). In a similar fashion, Bankoff et 
al. (2015, p. 9), Lavigne et al. (2008) and Sandman (1993) describe that public perception 
based on ‗cultural rationality‘ makes perfect sense for those who experience it personally; in 
a similar way to ‗technical rationality‘, it also has the subjectivity of external reality. 
However, the distinction depends on which aspects of reality one perceives.  
Likewise, adopting the local geomyths in disaster communication can make disaster 
information more understandable for all levels of the local community, compared to the 
scientific explanation, because it can contextualise the knowledge in daily life. This can be 
exemplified by how the traditional knowledge in the local geomyths has been passed from 
generation to generation easily. According to Troll et al. (2015, p. 141), the non-scientific 
‗geological‘ imagery, such the cultural personification of Mt. Merapi, is more accessible to 
the local community because it can provide a clear concept of the relationship between the 
natural events of Mt. Merapi and their social life. Yet, my argument does not necessarily 
suggest negating the science rationality in disaster communication, but more to emphasize 
that disaster communication can more effectively reach the affected community when it is 
designed in a psychologically familiar approach for the affected community.  
Additionally, I argue that the engagement of culture is more likely to encourage trust within 
the affected community. Julianto, a community member, clearly stated, ‗the engagement of 
local wisdom was one of the determining factors in maintaining trust‘ (personal interview, 8 
July 2014). In practice, the Merapi people tend to feel that disaster information is trustworthy 
when it comes from someone who is ―part of us‖. This finding also has another implication in 
strengthening the argument that engaging the affected community as the local actors is 
important, because of their understanding of local perspectives (Day, 2009; Fraser & Estrada, 
2001; Moody, 2013).  
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Culturally-embedded disaster communication does not only potentially encourage trust 
within the affected community, but may further become a means of establishing trust in its 
authenticity in providing and sharing Merapi-based information among the wider audiences 
of the Jalin Merapi network. In his interview, Nasir, a former Combine staff member who 
was also located at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network after the eruption started, gave 
an example as below: 
My first tweet was derived from the Facebook status of a community radio 
volunteer. Sukiman [Lintas Merapi FM] always uses the Javanese language 
[on his Facebook status]. I copied and tweeted it. My second tweet was its 
translation [...] There were some tweets that mentioned that it was 
interesting because it was different and directly came from the locals in the 
Javanese language [...] They even recommended that Jalin Merapi published 
real information from the locals of Merapi (17 March 2014). 
The argument that the usage of the Javanese language on social media encourages trust 
mirrors the study of Crowe (2012) regarding the significant role of cultural identity in 
validating information on social media. However, it is also important to acknowledge that 
the process of translation, from the local language to another comprehensible language for 
the outsiders, requires extra time that may delay information sharing (Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative, 2011). 
In summary, culturally-embedded communication that is performed by the affected 
community potentially becomes an effective means of increasing the effectiveness of disaster 
information and establishing trust. This contrasts with previous studies on the negative effects 
of cultural beliefs on risk perception (Butt, 2014, Donovan, 2010, Donovan et al., 2012, 
Dove, 2008, Lavigne et al., 2008, Schlehe, 1996), and the lack of socio-cultural 
acknowledgment in crisis communication theories and practices (Fronz, 2012, Hewitt, 1983). 
The argument, however, supports the previous studies in regard to their arguments about the 
positive association between cultural values and trust (Guion et al., 2007, Romo‐Murphy et 
al., 2011, Veszteg et al., 2015, Uslaner, 1999, Widén-Wulff et al., 2008), as homophily 
(‗sharing the cultural values of your audience and showing that you share them‘) is one of the 
determining factors of public perception of an information source‘s credibility (Sandman, 
1993, p. 69). Moreover, culturally-embedded communication can positively facilitate a 
common understanding of collective goals, which further lead to grass-roots collective 
participation (IFRC, 2015, Murayama et al., 2013, Samadhi, 2014, Tang et al., 2012). On the 
other hand, neglecting cultural understanding may lead to high levels of distrust and low 
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levels of linking social capital; further, it prevents co-operation and the community members 
will remain unlikely to act on information accordingly (Fisher, 2013). 
The argument that culturally-embedded communication encourages effectiveness and trust in 
disaster communication is strengthening the previous argument about the importance of 
integrating socio-cultural knowledge in the official assessment of disaster management (in 
Chapter Four). Culturally-embedded communication, in the form of local language use and 
culturally-rational message design, can overcome the incompatibility between some cultural 
beliefs and a scientific approach that is often applied in formal disaster management. The 
approach can particularly translate scientifically technical disaster-related information in 
order to adapt it to public understanding (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009; Reynolds & Seeger, 
2005). Again, engaging local traditions in disaster communication can provide potential 
linguistic tools to ‗introduce a dialogue‘ and facilitate ‗a fruitful interaction‘ between the 
outsiders, who rely on scientific grounds, and the affected community, who rely on cultural 
beliefs (Troll et al., 2015, p. 138, 161). Similarly, Bankoff et al. (2015), Dove (2008), Mei et 
al. (2013), Shannon et al. (2014), Triyoga (1991), and the Sendai Framework of the United 
Nations (2015) agree that combining traditional values and scientifically rational responses 
can create useful hybrid forms of disaster management.  
 
5.3.2. Networks of local actors in community-based disaster communication 
In order to facilitate effectiveness in information sharing, and encourage trust and 
participation from the affected community, I argue that disaster communication needs to 
engage the local social networks, the ones with both strong ties and weak ties. This argument 
is built on the finding that Jalin Merapi was able to achieve the positive outcomes above by 
being a manifest practice from a community-based movement and a systematization of the 
existing local network of the involved community radio volunteers, as described by a 
community member: 
Jalin Merapi is an iceberg phenomenon [...] The initiative [of Jalin Merapi] 
cannot be separated from the community radio stations [...] It would be 
meaningless without the previous disaster experiences and the community-
based networks [...] In my opinion, Jalin Merapi was a descendant of the 
movement of community-based information networks. The main 
instruments were the community radio stations [...] The pre-existing 
network had been established, but they were not connected with each other 
168 
 
yet [...] Jalin Merapi connected them [...] We can‘t see Jalin Merapi as Jalin 
Merapi itself [...] Jalin Merapi will be nothing without the community radio 
stations [...] So, the pre-conditions of Jalin Merapi had been established over 
such a long time, not in a short time (Zakaria, personal interview, 27 June 
2014). 
Similarly, Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM, and Wijoyono, a Combine staff 
member, strongly emphasised: 
Jalin Merapi significantly required the community radio stations for their 
actors and networks. Otherwise, it would not have been able to engage the 
community members during the 2010 Merapi eruption […] I urge people 
not to trust ―Jalin Merapi‖, trust ―the actors of Jalin Merapi‖ instead [...] It is 
closely related with the roles of the community radio stations in the area 
surrounding Mt. Merapi [...] In the absence of the [volunteers of] 
community radio, I think people will not trust Jalin Merapi as much as they 
did [in the 2010 eruption] [...] Jalin Merapi is the community radio stations. 
The radio stations are the community members themselves (Sukiman, 
personal interview, 6 May 2014). 
 
Jalin Merapi is a medium established on the pre-existing community 
network. The pre-condition is the agreement of a mutual need [in the pre-
existing network]. It is followed by the medium (Wijoyono, personal 
interview, 17 March 2014). 
By engaging the community radio stations, Jalin Merapi became a network at the grass-roots 
level by connecting the existing communication points within the local communication 
system on the Merapi volcano. According to a former Combine staff member, Nasir, Jalin 
Merapi‘s system would not work if there were no existing networks that could be connected 
(Nasir, personal interview, 17 March 2014). Confirming Nasir, a volunteer of Jalin Merapi told 
the story of when they failed to apply the model of the Jalin Merapi network in a different 
disaster because of the absence of local social networks: 
We copied the model of Jalin Merapi into the flood of Jakarta in 2013, last 
year [...] We used the Twitter @kalamkata [...] It suffered from the absence 
of local verification [...] We had no one in the field [...] no one acted like the 
[volunteers of] community radio stations in Jalin Merapi [...] If we personify 
it as a soccer match, the volunteers of the community radio stations passed 
the ball, and the Twitter account became the striker. It didn‘t work that way 
[in the 2013 Jakarta flood] [...] There was no engagement of [volunteers of] 
community radio stations who were the locals and the existing actors of 
local disaster management at the community level [...] I was really 
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disappointed [...] But, the model of Jalin Merapi was applied successfully in 
the Mt. Kelud eruption [...] because we also engaged the community radio 
stations there (Negoro, personal interview, 23 April 2014). 
Dougall et al. (2008), Hilhorst and Serrano (2010), Richards (2010), and Shannon et al. 
(2014) agree that engaging local actors within ongoing and local relationships with mutual 
goals will result in more effective disaster communication and humanitarian activities, 
compared to those without any pre-existing relationship. Therefore, this particular section‘s 
focus is on the way the tie strength of the social network of the community radio volunteers 
influences information sharing and trust encouragement in disaster communication.  
5.3.2.1 The roles of strong ties in information sharing and trust encouragement.  
During a disaster response, humanitarian volunteers, who mostly come from unaffected 
communities, often face barriers in gaining instant access to disaster-affected evacuees 
(Borgatti and Halgin, 2011, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Murayama et al., 2013, 
IFRC, 2015), in order to gain information directly from them. They usually do not understand 
the local culture and local language, and do not have personal relationships with the evacuees 
in order to make an appropriate approach. Although recent disasters demonstrate that affected 
communities have increasingly utilized internet-based media, especially social media, to 
request specific assistance (Austin et al., 2012, Palen, 2008, BBC, 2012, Doan et al., 2012, 
Lindsay, 2011), this cannot necessarily be generalized to a community that is heavily 
influenced by local culture such the Merapi community. During the 2010 Merapi eruption, 
some of the interviewed community members stated their hesitation in sharing information 
about their needs with strangers, particularly on social media, and considered that it was 
culturally inappropriate (Purnomo, personal interview, 8 July 2014). Similarly, they also 
hesitated to request help from the local government because of the complicated bureaucracy 
(Adji, personal interview, 22 July 2014). Not only were they hesitant to talk about their 
personal disaster information, but the Merapi people also tended to avoid talking about the 
eruption they were facing. They culturally believe that it is taboo to talk about an eruption 
because the erupted volcanic material is regarded as a working spirit that gets angry if it is  
being talked about; any violation of the taboo will lead to death (Triyoga, 1991). Based on the 
finding that the affected community hesitated to share their information to strangers, I argue 
that the local traditional culture has a stronger influence on the affected community‘s effort to 
seek out resources (aid, in this case) from their network ties, regardless that the novel 
communication technologies offer ease of connection with someone outside their close social 
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network. The culturally-influenced hesitation of the Merapi people in sharing disaster 
information with strangers tends to widen the gap between the evacuees and outsiders; yet the 
outsiders are those who are more likely to be able to provide aid for the affected community 
when the supporting systems are extremely damaged. 
This thesis demonstrates that the strong ties embedded in the close personal relationships 
between the community radio volunteers, who are members of the affected communities, and 
the evacuees played a significant role in encouraging the evacuees to share their personal 
disaster information. Unlike the hesitation in sharing disaster information with strangers, 
some evacuees did not feel ashamed or hesitant in sharing their personal disaster information 
with the community radio volunteers, because of their personal familiarity with these 
volunteers based on common community membership and geographical proximity; this was 
clearly stated by Setiyoko, a community member, ‗because we know each other […] we share 
our information‘ (personal interview, 8 July 2014). Moreover, the community radio 
volunteers understood better how to approach the fragile evacuees culturally and 
linguistically in order to gather information and engage them in disaster communication. 
Another community member, Adji, agreed that it was more convenient to share their 
information in such a daily conversation with the community radio volunteers as unlike 
communicating with the local government, it did not require any formal administrative 
requirement. He also stated, ‗It was easy and quick, because we know them‘ (personal 
interview, 22 July 2014). The argument that the community radio volunteers, who were part 
of the affected community, with a strongly tied social network can facilitate information 
gathering within the affected community is similar to that of Opsahl et al. (2010), Putnam 
(1993, 2000), and Uslaner (1999) who also argued that strongly-tied individuals are effective 
in facilitating internal information diffusion. Similarly, Haythornthwaite (2005) and Romo‐
Murphy et al. (2011) agree that the values of interpersonal relationships between strongly-
tied individuals can encourage a willingness to collaborate in exchanging information.  
Not only can they bring effectiveness into the process of information gathering from the 
affected community, but a social network of strong ties can also bring effectiveness into the 
process of information sharing from the people outside the affected areas to the affected 
community. This argument is particularly significant in responding to the lack of direct 
communication with the affected community in official disaster communication, which was 
previously identified in Chapter Four. In the Jalin Merapi network, the involvement of the 
volunteers of community radio stations in the Jalin Merapi network could provide an 
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appropriate mechanism to deliver information directly to the affected community members 
by engaging information nodes that are internally recognized and considered to be reliable by 
the community members. Specifically, Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM, described 
that the community radio volunteers could identify who talks to whom, about what, via which 
media, and media accessibility on a regular basis (personal interview, 6 May 2014). The 
community radio volunteers also could identify the existing key influencers who play 
important roles in information sharing and can mobilize other community members. The 
ability of community radio volunteers to increase information through their networks mirrors 
the studies of Hindman and Coyle (1999) and Kanayama (2012). 
The effectiveness of engaging strongly-tied individuals in sharing information within the 
affected community was also acknowledged by a community member. He specifically stated: 
It‘s confusing if we don‘t know who is sharing information with us [...] 
Firstly, we have to know who they are [...] Those who share information 
have to be familiar with those with whom information is being shared [...] 
the community members and the community leaders [...] There should be a 
connection beforehand [...] a personal closeness (Julianto, personal 
interview, 8 July 2014). 
Instead of trying to reach all community members, the particular knowledge of local social 
networks can provide effectiveness by recognizing who can act as information nodes in 
representing collective information from the community members, and extending exposure of 
disaster information to the rest of the community members. This way was also acknowledged 
by Setiyoko, a community member, as a way that can facilitate effective and trustworthy 
information sharing within the community members. He specifically stated: 
We can identify someone as the representative of a hamlet [...] he will share 
the information to the rest of the community members [...] It may be very 
effective because it can speed up the information sharing. Who is the 
information source is also clear [...] because we know him [...] it is more 
trustworthy (personal interview, 8 July 2014).  
Similarly, Austin et al. (2012), Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2011),  Lavigne et al. (2008), 
Shannon et al. (2014), and Steelman et al. (2015) agree that the key influencers of an affected 
community have to be carefully identified and engaged in user-generated content sharing. 
Without the knowledge of ‗inside‘ contacts, outsiders might choose the ‗incorrect‘ 
information sources with inappropriate network ties (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011, p. 1169) and 
this certainly results in ineffective disaster communication.  
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In addition to the argument that strongly-tied local actors play important roles in internal 
information sharing within the affected community, I also argue that the consistent 
engagement of strongly-tied local networks can provide a perception of a guarantee of the 
validity of information that was being shared within the particular networks, which further 
leads to trust. The argument is supported by six out of the eleven interviewed audiences of 
Jalin Merapi, who argued that it was mostly the involvement of the local actors whose 
personal relationships/networks led to trust based on personal recognition. Further, the 
personal recognition provides clarity of information sources, so the information is considered 
trustworthy and reliable. A community member, Julianto, clearly stated, ‗based on our 
culture, we trust more in someone we know‘ (personal interview, 8 July 2014). Similarly, 
another interviewed community member stated, ‗People prefer someone whom they know 
personally as a trustworthy information source [...] because they are more accurate‘ 
(Wulandari, personal interview, 7 July 2014). In particular, another community member, 
Supadi, described his trust in the community radio stations:  
We trust the information shared by the community radio stations [...] it is as 
accurate as the official information shared by the village government [...] 
The difference between them lies in its speed [...] the one [the information 
shared by the community radio stations] is fast, the other one is slow [...] 
We trust the information shared by the community radio stations [...] it‘s 
accurate for sure (Supadi, personal interview, 22 July 2014). 
In his interview, Haji, a volunteer of K FM, expressed his agreement: 
I personally trusted our volunteers [...] I do not reckon the media, but I 
100% trust all information from them [...] If someone informed about a 
condition of a particular area in Merapi, all we needed to do was to chat 
with the community radio volunteers who lived in that area, and ask them 
about the information‘s accuracy. If they said that it was not true, I would 
not have shared it (personal interview, 21 March 2014). 
The argument that the involvement of strongly-tied individuals provides trust in disaster 
communication is similar to previous studies (Bouchillon, 2014, Opsahl et al., 2010, Putnam, 
1993, Sias and Wyers, 2001, Uslaner, 1999, Murayama et al., 2013, Fisher, 2013, 
Haythornthwaite, 2005, Putnam, 2000) that argue the positive association between strong ties 
and trust.  
Yet, although the strong ties may effectively encourage ―inside‖ information sharing, they 
seemed to be another barrier to sharing their information with outsiders. Some interviewees 
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seemed to show a tendency for ‗amoral familism‘ which demonstrates a high number of 
strong ties and a low number of weak ties (Widén-Wulff et al., 2008, pp. 351-352). They 
specifically perceived that the involvement of some outsiders did not assist them to gain 
accurate information about Mt. Merapi, but was more likely to create confusion. Supadi, a 
community member (personal information, 22 July 2014), clearly stated: ‗Those who are not 
locals, they mostly exaggerate the information. For instance, when someone asks A, they 
answer B‘. This also may lead to an egocentric network as raised by Fisher (2013) and 
Granovetter (1973). Consequently, the community members tend to restrain themselves from 
networking and communicating with people outside their own community and this may 
prevent the insiders‘ information from being shared with the outsiders, and the other way 
around. 
5.3.2.2.The roles of weak ties in information sharing and trust encouragement  
With regard to the possibility of an egocentric network, the community radio volunteers acted 
as information couriers by actively gathering information at the individual level in the IDP 
camps and shared it further with wider audiences through the Jalin Merapi network. During 
the 2010 eruption, most of the evacuees did not closely know the Jalin Merapi network. They 
mostly recognized the Jalin Merapi network was closely related to their community radio 
stations; this was clearly stated by an interviewed community member:  
When we experienced the 2010 eruption, Jalin Merapi helped us to get what 
we needed. The community radio station was the one that facilitated the 
process [...] We know that Jalin Merapi is closely related to our community 
radio station [...] Sukiman [Lintas Merapi FM] personally introduced us to 
Jalin Merapi (Supadi, personal interview, 22 July 2014). 
In practice, Jalin Merapi engaged internet-based media (e.g. social media, website, and audio 
streaming) to virtually share the information provided by the Merapi people with wider 
audiences, who were located beyond the broadcasting coverage of the involved community 
radio stations. Similarly, Birowo (2006), Fraser and Estrada (2001), and Hindman and Coyle 
(1999) agree that integrating community radio stations with the internet is one of the best 
ways to reach out to wider audiences whilst maintaining two-way communication.  
Based on the finding, I argue that weak ties can bridge information sharing between the 
affected community and the people outside the affected areas in disaster communication (see 
Figure 19). By engaging the internet-based media, particularly social media, Jalin Merapi 
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generated weak ties of social network by virtually extending the existing offline social 
networks of the affected community to the people outside the affected areas; this ability of 
social media has also been identified in previous studies (Schellong, 2007, Austin et al., 
2012, IFRC, 2015). Simultaneously, Jalin Merapi networked the ―dots‖ of otherwise 
disconnected information nodes consisting of the evacuees, potential donors, and authorities; 
this was clearly explained by Zakaria, a community member, as below: 
The technologies helped. But the most important thing was the network 
establishment. So, there were two things: [1] Twitter, SMS, email were the 
technologies. [2] Jalin Merapi was an initiative to establish the network 
among the donors, those who distribute the aid, and the beneficiaries. It 
made the process more effective and faster. Donors usually don‘t know the 
locations of the affected areas. [Thus], overloaded aid in a particular area 
becomes a common problem in many disasters. Jalin Merapi had the 
technologies and the network. In my opinion, the most important part of 
Jalin Merapi was the network. It made a new connection between the 
victims and those who want to help, with Jalin Merapi as a mediator. The 
information was distributed evenly and clearly. There was no buildup [of 
information] (personal interview, 27 June 2014). 
The argument about the weak ties established by social media fits the latent tie theory of 
Haythornthwaite (2005). The usage of the communication platforms (Twitter, in this case), 
which were previously not used by the community radio volunteers, can connect individuals 
who had been disconnected socially through latent social network ties. Further, the 
combination of online ‗technical connection‘ mediated by the social media and the ‗social 
interventions‘ of the Jalin Merapi network in providing and sharing information through Jalin 
Merapi‘s social media channels were most likely to develop the latent ties between the Jalin 
Merapi network and the people outside the affected areas into weak ties (Haythornthwaite, 
2005, p. 140). Furthermore, the generated weak ties bridged information from the affected 
















Figure 18. Tie strength in Jalin Merapi‘s disaster communication 
The argument that weak ties play important role in sharing information between different 
communities supports the previous studies (Fisher, 2013, Lin, 2001, Widén-Wulff et al., 2008, 
Granovetter, 1973, Valente and Fujimoto, 2010, Hansen, 1999) showing the important roles 
of weak ties in external information diffusion. Not only have they enabled the affected 
community to share their information with the outsiders, but weak ties also enable them to 
gain new information/ resources from those who are beyond an individual‘s close-community 
network (Lin, 2001, Johnson, 2007, Granovetter, 1973, Borgatti and Halgin, 2011, 
Montgomery, 1993). Furthermore, new information/resources can potentially play important 
roles in community and individual empowerment (Fisher, 2013), particularly in assisting them 
to be resilient in a disaster response. 
In addition to the benefit of weak ties in external information sharing, I argue that weak ties 
encourage trust indirectly for the people outside the affected areas. Not only have they 
extended the social network of the affected community, but the weak ties also indirectly 
extended trust that had been established by the strong ties of the Merapi people. In practice, 
trust embedded in the strong ties of Merapi people led to personal recommendations on Jalin 
Merapi‘s trustworthiness within their extended networks (the weak ties). This was clearly 
explained by Zakaria, a community member who acted as a donor during the 2010 Merapi 
eruption, as below: 
Whom I knew in Jalin Merapi‘s network mattered. I didn‘t need to verify. 
So, the network was the most important thing [...] I didn‘t notice who the 
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evacuees were anymore. I was confident that the information from Jalin 
Merapi was valid [...] because it was based on my friend‘s 
recommendation…even my friend‘s friend [...] Conversely, my friends 
didn‘t need to verify who Jalin Merapi was; the most important was my 
recommendation about Jalin Merapi [...] So, it was more a friendship 
network (personal interview, 27 June 2014). 
From the perspective of the people outside the affected areas, trust in the Jalin Merapi 
network was particularly related to the fact that it directly engaged the strongly-tied 
community radio volunteers, who were part of the affected community and able to provide 
information about the real conditions and needs of the evacuees. This also appeared to affect 
potential donors in deciding the reliability of the Jalin Merapi network in distributing their 
donations, as Jalin Merapi was able to deliver specific aid to the specific evacuee who 
requested it, not to representatives of the evacuees. The trust for aid distribution was 
described by one of Jalin Merapi donors as below:   
I preferred to give my donation to Jalin Merapi [...] rather than to the mutual 
donation account that was created by my company [...] Jalin Merapi could 
directly deliver my donation [to the evacuees]. My company could not give 
a quick response [...] [It] waited until a certain date [...] then chose another 
agency [to distribute the donations] [...] I did not know exactly when it was 
delivered [to the evacuees] (Ramawanti, personal interview, 24 July 2014) 
The argument that weak ties indirectly encourage trust mirrors the study of Bouchillon (2014) 
that weak ties do not have a direct effect on trust establishment, but are more likely to have an 
indirect or extended effect that was initiated by the strong ties of the affected community.  
Regardless of the positive outcomes of extended relationships and extended trust, I argue that 
the online social network of weak ties does not automatically provide a sustainable 
trustworthy disaster communication because of its foundation on an unstable latent network; 
the instability of weak ties also has been acknowledged by Bouchillon (2014) and Widén-
Wulff et al. (2008). In the case of Jalin Merapi, the social network of weak ties could vanish 
easily because it strongly depends on the social media used to bridge different communities 
and the shared interest in a temporary volcanic eruption. One of the administrators of Jalin 
Merapi‘s Twitter account, Wijoyono expressed concern regarding the difficulty in 
maintaining active interactions and active followers on @jalinmerapi. Its followers only show 
interest in the account when there is increasing activity on Mt. Merapi; otherwise, there is an 
information vacuum and the number of followers decreases (personal interview, 17 March 
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2014). Similarly, a community member, Setiawan raised the issue of information 
inconsistency in the Jalin Merapi network after the 2010 eruption. He stated:  
After the 2010 eruption, I rarely accessed their [the Jalin Merapi network] 
information [...] The last time, I accessed them was when the status of Mt. 
Merapi increased [in March 2014]. They are not the same as they used to be. 
I saw that their last update was in February 2013, if I am not mistaken. 
When the status of Mt. Merapi increased in 2014, they didn‘t update their 
website (personal interview, 5 June 2014). 
The argument about the easily vanishing weak ties of the Jalin Merapi network is supported 
by Borgatti and Halgin (2011) who argue that the network ties that are established based on 
interactions during temporary events, such as a volcano eruption, have shorter continuity over 
time in comparison to other social ties grounded on kinship or cognitive roles. Moreover, if 
the instrument or the interest in the event is no longer available, the engaged individuals will 
lose interest in maintaining continuing participation, and the ‗sense of community‘ is more 
likely to collapse (Bregman & Haythornthwaite, 2003; Haythornthwaite, 2005; Miller, 2011, 
pp. 193-194).  
In addition to the dependency on the connecting medium and the interest in a temporary 
event, Jalin Merapi‘s functions have been heavily dependent on the informal personal 
friendship owned by the key actors (the community radio volunteers in this case). 
Consequently, the Jalin Merapi network may be unlikely to survive when the key individuals 
move on or their friendships are broken up (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Shannon et al., 2014). 
Yatin, a head of a village, also raised the danger of dependence on informal relationships in 
disaster communication, as below: 
My coordination with my contact persons [in government agencies] is 
based on personal relationships. This is unreliable. If they are suddenly 
transferred to other positions, I will be left without information (focus 
group, 19 July 2014).  
Furthermore, turnover of actors may destroy the trust that has been built on the relationships 
with the particular individuals (IFRC, 2015). 
The Jalin Merapi network may not be able to guarantee continuity in the longer term 
compared to official disaster communication. The character of unsustainability has actually 
been recognized by various scholars as a weakness of an informal (Griffin et al., 1999, 
Shannon et al., 2014) and voluntary (IFRC, 2015) organisation such the Jalin Merapi network. 
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Therefore, similarly to my previous argument on the importance of community engagement in 
formal disaster management, I also argue that community-based disaster communication 
cannot simply ignore the existence of local governments to some extent. Incorporating a 
formal structure and arrangement may ensure the longevity of Jalin Merapi‘s system by 
providing a fixed structure that can be adopted by successors in the absence of the initial key 
actors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Shannon et al., 2014, Griffin et al., 1999). 
 
5.4.Community radio stations encourage community participation in disaster 
communication. 
In addition to culturally-embedded broadcasting and the social network owned by the 
community radio volunteers, the sense of belonging to the community radio stations has 
encouraged community participation in the Jalin Merapi network. The community ownership 
was clearly identified by a volunteer of Gema Merapi FM: 
This community radio station belongs to everyone in the Cangkringan 
sub-district […] everyone has equal rights […] There is no particular 
village that can claim its ownership although it is located in one 
particular village (Widiyantoro, personal interview, 11 March 2014).   
As discussed in the previous sub section, the community radio stations that participated in the 
Jalin Merapi network were initially established based on the community need to have their 
own media as a reliable information source. Thus, the community radio volunteers 
emphasized that community involvement is an important basis for survival. It was clearly 
described by one of K FM volunteers as below: 
The main purpose of a community radio station is to manage a radio station 
that is managed by the community itself so they can inform what they need 
to know. So, whatever the community wants to be informed of, the 
community radio station is the only hope (Haji, personal interview, 21 
March 2014). 
 
Additionally, the community involvement is an interpretation of being local through radio 
programming (Lindsay, 1997). This is supported by Fraser and Estrada (2001), Kanayama 
(2012), and Servaes (1999) who argue that community participation is the main objective of a 
community radio station for social improvement and is the central focus of community radio 
programs and the basis for the community radio station‘s survival. In other words, the 
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community radio stations cannot broadcast without the voluntary participation of the 
community they serve. They greatly depend on the community members who volunteer their 
time and expertise to manage the community radio stations. Therefore, Sukiman, a volunteer 
of Lintas Merapi FM stressed that establishing the community‘s sense of belonging and 
acceptance – through voluntary participation - are more important than establishing the 
physical community radio station itself (personal interview, 6 May 2014). Similarly, Fraser 
and Estrada (2001) agree that the real basis of a community radio station is social will, not 
technical equipment.   
Further, I will discuss how the participatory mechanisms of the community radio stations can 
lead to participation in disaster communication. To distinguish the forms of community 
participation in the community radio stations, I will classify them into the off-air and on-air 
forms. Firstly, there is off-air participation that takes the forms of personal contributions for 
radio equipment and personal funding for daily activities and studio requisites. This is 
particularly driven by the Broadcasting Act No. 32/2002 which regulates that a community 
radio station is a non-profit organisation and should apply a community-service approach to 
its communities. Furthermore, it is not allowed to carry any commercial advertising except 
public service announcements. As a result, the community itself has to voluntarily contribute 
to the establishment of the community radio station. This principle is supported by Fraser and 
Estrada (2001) who state that a community has to be fully responsible for the ownership, 
management, finance, editorial independence and credibility of its community radio station.    
The community radio stations have heavily relied on community members during their early 
establishment and for their daily broadcasting. The community members themselves 
participated by contributing radio equipment, as described by Asnawi, a volunteer of K FM: 
‗Someone gave away a computer [...] a fan [...] a radio mixer [...] music CDs [...] whatever 
they had [...] for this community radio station‘ (personal interview, 21 March 2014). 
Similarly, a volunteer of Gema Merapi FM added: 
We all manage this radio station. If something is broken, we fix it together. 
We don‘t put the responsibility on one particular person [...] We have a 
donation box for radio operationalization (Widiyantoro, personal interview, 
11 March 2014).  
 
The voluntary contribution was not limited to radio equipment and finance, the community 
members also provide spaces for the community radio stations. The studios of Lintas Merapi 
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FM, Lahara FM, and MMC FM are located in private residences; meanwhile, K FM and 
Gema Merapi FM are located in public buildings, which are the public school and the 
government multi-purpose room. In general, lack of financial support becomes the biggest 
problem in the management of community radio stations, which frequently leads to 
unfeasible equipment and high personnel turnover.  
Secondly, one form of on-air participation is when the community members provide 
information to the community radio stations. As community media, the main purposes of the 
community radio stations participating in the Jalin Merapi network are to provide valid local 
information that is needed by their surrounding communities, and to be a medium in which 
the community members can provide their information in their own ways. The interviewed 
community radio volunteers strongly emphasized the local capacity to be the information 
sources of Merapi information - instead of just being the audience - in disaster 
communication. This was triggered by the fact that the communities had to watch national 
television broadcast from Jakarta, which is approximately 560 km away from the Merapi 
volcano, when they required information about the Merapi volcano. Some community 
members even relied on the television news as the basis for their evacuation decisions. In his 
interview, Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM, found the habit of relying on the 
national television stations to gain information about Mt. Merapi ironic because the 
information they get from the national television stations is actually the information that 
comes from their own surroundings. He stated:  
We are the information sources (about Mt. Merapi). The journalists come 
here (to get our information)…we are the ones who get interviewed. Why do 
we wait for the news that is edited at Jakarta? Too long! (personal interview, 
6 May 2014). 
Thus, the community radio volunteers stressed that the Merapi people themselves have the 
capacity to fulfil the demand for reliable local information. The listeners of the community 
radio stations usually provide information to the radio stations through direct conversations 
with broadcasters when visiting the radio stations, or through SMS, phone calls, and 
communication radio for simplicity and low cost. Moreover, a volunteer of MMC FM added 
that the community radio stations also frequently invite community members to talk on air 
about their personal experiences of the previous Merapi eruptions (Mujianto, personal 
interview, 26 April 2014). Nowadays, the participation process is simplified by social media, 
as described by a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM below:  
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The community members are aware…because they need it [the information] 
[...] it [the participation] is not limited to information providing [...] they also 
seek the information [...] lately they use social media because it is easier [...] 
Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp…BBM [BlackBerry Messenger] [...] our 
communities have our own Whatsapp group (Sukiman, personal interview, 6 
May 2014). 
 
Yet, the participation level varies among the community members, mainly depending on their 
access to communication technologies in order to be able to participate. The challenge of 
information provision mostly emerged in the early stage of the community radio stations‘ 
establishment. Initially the community radio stations sent their reporters to directly gather 
information from the community members and subsequently broadcast the information in a 
one-way communication process. At that time, the difficulty of providing information was 
mostly because the community members could not afford the communication technologies. 
However, rather than passively waiting for the listeners to increase their economic ability to 
buy the technology, the community radio volunteers have also actively assisted their listeners 
so they can easily provide information to the community radio stations. For example,  Lintas 
Merapi FM arranged fund raising to provide mobile credit for the community members, so 
they could send SMS to the community radio stations in the 2006 eruption. Hence, in 
addition to the recognition of community participation as their foundation as community 
media, the community radio stations also aim to build community capacity in participation. 
The participatory mechanism also applies to radio management and the production of radio 
programs. The community radio stations which participate in the Jalin Merapi network 
develop their programs based on the communities‘ feedback. The interviewed community 
radio volunteers argued that their programs are dedicated to the community; hence, they have 
to be ―created‖ by the community members themselves. In particular, a volunteer of Lintas 
Merapi FM explained: 
A community radio station has to be conceptualized at the community 
level…dedicated to the community [...] The on-air broadcasting is not the 
most important thing, but a [community] radio [station] has to be the 
―symbol‖ of all activities of the community [...] A community radio station 
has to be established by the locals (Sukiman, personal interview, 6 May 
2014). 
In comparison to commercial radio stations,  a volunteer of K FM described that the 
community radio programs are usually more flexible and can be modified based on the 
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listeners‘ requests (Santosa, personal interview, 21 March 2014). The approach is known as 
the ‗patchwork quilt‘ as a community radio station always tries to combine the special 
interests of the public within its programs (Kidd, 1992, p. 177). Furthermore, in comparison 
to formal emergency systems that use warnings and announcements, flexibility becomes a 
strategic approach in responding to uncertainty in a disaster response (Romo‐Murphy et al., 
2011, Sellnow et al., 2002).   
As well as flexibility in the content of radio programs, the interviewed volunteers of 
community radio stations also emphasized the value of flexibility in programme schedules to 
respond to local needs. In practice, the community radio stations that participate in the Jalin 
Merapi network always adapt their broadcasting schedule to their listeners‘ daily livelihoods, 
including the time when people are coming home, relaxing, not needing visual entertainment, 
and ready for traditional music. The community radio stations, henceforth, start their 
broadcasting in the afternoon until midnight. The flexibility is particularly important because 
of the recurring change of livelihood within the Merapi communities. Further, the change is 
influenced by the time when the community members are in radio coverage. It was clearly 
explained by Haji, one of the K FM volunteers, as below:   
We are always improving our radio station in terms of contents and 
schedule. We evaluate that the community was changed after an 
eruption…The livelihood changes after an eruption has occurred [...] The 
fields are ruined, so the farmers cannot harvest anything and lose their 
capital [...] Then, they change their job to be labourers, construction 
workers, or sand miners [...] When they were farmers, they came home at 2 
pm [...] They are within our radio coverage [...] Meanwhile, a labourer 
comes home at 5 pm [...] They spend more time outside our coverage area 
[...] This changes our broadcasting schedule. We now mostly broadcast after 
dark [...] Television broadcasting also determines our schedule. At 
primetime, it will be useless to broadcast because people will be more 
interested in watching television. We broadcast when people start to take a 
rest and do not need visual entertainment (personal interview, 21 March 
2014).  
This finding supports Fraser and Estrada (2001) who also identified that a community radio 
station has to consider its listeners‘ needs, preference, and habits concerning program content, 
duration, and schedule. 
In addition to community engagement in the on-air programs, the community radio stations 
also encourage their community members to actively participate in their off-air programs. 
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The off-air programs are regarded as more effective for promoting radio stations and building 
steady relationships with the community members. Interestingly, the community radio 
broadcasters claimed that the on-air programs are not always the priority - simply facilitating 
any localised communities‘ activities is the priority. A volunteer of Gema Merapi FM even 
claimed that the off-air events are symbols of community activities and more beneficial to the 
communities (Widiyantoro, personal interview, 11 March 2014).  
In summary, based on the clear self-conception within the community radio stations 
participated in Jalin Merapi, the community radio stations‘ participatory mechanisms have 
successfully established a sense of community ownership and encouraged community trust in 
the community radio stations‘ alignment to genuinely voice the community interests. Yet, this 
does not necessarily mean that community members agree that the mechanisms are succesful 
in articulating community interest because that is much harder to establish and is outside this 
research scope. The way the affected community members participated in Jalin Merapi 
through the community radio stations will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Similarly, Seeger (2006) and Romo‐Murphy et al. (2011) agree that interactive participation 
between local communities and community radio stations will develop credibility and trust. 
Furthermore, the generated sense of ownership and trust go ‗beyond formalized partnership 
and participation mechanisms‘ (IFRC, 2015, p. 59). Despite the absence of formal regulations 
obligating community participation, the sense of community ownership established by the 
community radio stations can enhance a sense of community solidarity, which further 
facilitiates motivation to voluntarily participate in community-based disaster communication 
conducted by the community radio stations; in turn, the participatory mechanism in the 
communication process between them is more likely to continue in any stage of a disaster 
because of the sense of ownership. 
In fact, before the 2010 Merapi eruption, community radio stations were used for the stages 
of early warning, emergency response and recovery in some natural disasters in Indonesia, 
such the 2004 tsunami in Aceh (Swara Meulaboh FM, Suara Sinabang FM, Seha FM, Al 
Jumhur FM, and Samudera FM), the 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta (Pamor FM and 
Angkringan FM), and the flood in South Sulawesi (MBS FM and Champuss FM) (Birowo, 
2009, Romo‐Murphy et al., 2011, Tanesia, 2007). However, Tanesia (2007) argued that the 
community radio stations in those events heavily relied on articles from newspapers and the 
internet in broadcasting disaster information. This meant the information quoted was often far 
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too general and inappropriate for the affected communities, and there was limited space for 
the affected communities to provide information through Short Message Service (SMS).  
During the 2010 Merapi eruption, the community radio stations in the Jalin Merapi network 
faced a totally different situation. With the negative experience of inaccurate information 
from a national television station and the lack of trust in official disaster communication, the 
affected community, including the community radio volunteers, heavily relied on the other 
community members as information sources. Unlike the other community radio stations that 
limitedly engaged the community members in information providing, those involved in the 
Jalin Merapi network engaged the affected community in providing, sharing, and verifying 
community-based disaster information. How the affected community participated in Jalin 
Merapi will be discussed thoroughly in the following chapter. 
 
5.5.The mechanisms of the Jalin Merapi network for facilitating community 
participation in disaster communication: the people and the technologies.  
The initial mechanisms of disaster-response-communication of the Jalin Merapi network 
were established  to respond to the 2006 Merapi eruption. According to two community radio 
volunteers, Sukiman (personal interview, 6 May 2014) and Asnawi (personal interview, 21 
March 2014), the 2006 eruption became the starting point of community recognition of the 
important role of the community radio stations as an effective means of disaster 
communication. In the 2006 Merapi eruption, the community radio stations broadcasted local 
information required by their listeners, such as information about evacuees, Mt. Merapi‘s 
status, Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps, and missing family members. Specifically, 
Lintas Merapi FM coordinated 32 patrolling posts and simultaneously broadcast updated 
information about Merapi from each point. The Lintas Merapi FM also sought external 
donations for mobile credit to enable them to engage their listeners in providing their 
information to the radio stations through Short Message Service (SMS); so the information 
could be broadcast widely to the rest of the community members (Sukiman, personal 
interview, 6 May 2014). In a different way, K FM broadcast information from the evacuees 
by inviting them to their studios and asking them to share their information about their 
condition, visual observations of Mt. Merapi, the locations of IDP camps, and missing family 
members. A volunteer of K FM specifically stated: 
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The 2006 eruption was not too big [...] only the upper villages were 
evacuated [...] First, we collected donations with Combine‘s support [...] We 
invited the refugees to our studio to get the donations every night. We 
interviewed them about the condition of the refugees and the Merapi 
volcano. Then, we broadcasted it [...] We also broadcasted about someone 
who was lost during the evacuation process. He was finally found [...] We 
continuously broadcasted about the locations of evacuation barracks [...] We 
did that for 3-4 months [...] Afterward, people started to realize that 
community radio was effective as a means of local information [sharing] 
(Asnawi, personal interview, 21 March 2014). 
 
In the 2006 eruption, the Jalin Merapi network utilized a platform of media multiplexity 
consisting of seven different media: two-way radio, website, Yahoo Messenger, Shoutbox, 
live audio streaming of the broadcasts of the community radio stations, SMS gateway, land-
lined phone and mobile phone. At the time, the affected community mostly provided 
information about their conditions through the SMS gateway. For the most part, the 
information was related to complaints about the condition of the evacuation barracks and 
government disaster responses. 
5.5.1. The newly created Jalin Merapi network in the 2010 Merapi eruption 
Four years after the 2006 eruption, the platform of media multiplexity of the Jalin Merapi 
network was reactivated and recreated from 23 October 2010, two days after the status of Mt. 
Merapi was increased to Level III. At that time, the broadcasters of K FM created the first 
Facebook group account of the Jalin Merapi network; they have been managing the Facebook 
account ever since. Right after the first eruption on 26 October 2010, Combine created the 
first Twitter account in the name of the Jalin Merapi network, which was initially managed 
by some Combine staff members at Yogyakarta city (approximately 30 kilometres from Mt. 
Merapi). On the same day, the broadcasters of K FM established the first field post of Jalin 
Merapi at the home of one of the broadcasters in the Magelang district. Following the action, 
broadcasters from the other community radio stations established other field posts of the Jalin 
Merapi network in their own areas.  
Demand for information from and to the field posts of the Jalin Merapi network increased 
rapidly, and could not be covered only by the limited number of  broadcasters of the 
community radio stations. Hence, the Jalin Merapi network opened an online application for 
recruiting volunteers on its website by using Google Form. The application was open to 
186 
 
anyone who wanted to participate without any demographic restrictions, as described by two 
volunteers of the Jalin Merapi network:  
 
Jalin Merapi was open […] anyone was accepted […] although we were 
able to help for two or three days, Jalin Merapi still accepted us […] There 
were no time limitations [and] age restrictions […] I am in retirement, but 
they accepted me […] I found it very difficult to join other voluntary 
communities […] Where could I help? […] How could I help? It was 
unclear […] Jalin Merapi was more accessible (Widyarsi, personal 
interview, 27 May 2014). 
I joined another voluntary movement. It prioritized publication […] The 
mechanism for donations was too long […] They only gave the donations 
when there were journalists […] I didn‘t like it! They just wanted to show 
off […] Then, I joined Jalin Merapi […] I think it was the representative [of 
the affected community] […] We could help quickly and appropriately 
(Negoro, personal interview, 23 April 2014) 
As a result, 100 applicants submitted their applications in the first 30 minutes and there were 
approximately 2500 registered applicants in total. However, based on the requests for 
volunteers from the field posts, the Jalin Merapi network‘s 1000 volunteers in total were 
drawn from the community radio volunteers, the Combine staff members, the evacuees, and 
outsiders.  
The main purpose of the Jalin Merapi network was to provide accurate information about Mt. 
Merapi and the evacuees. However, the Jalin Merapi network eventually had to deal with aid 
distribution as an inevitable task to help the affected communities. Thus, the Jalin Merapi 
network divided its volunteers into two types: information volunteers and logistics volunteers, 
who were both distributed to one main post (Jalin Merapi - JM Induk) and nine field posts 
(JM1-JM9) (see Figure 19). None of the community radio volunteers were located at the main 
post; they acted as the Jalin Merapi volunteers at the field posts. The community radio stations 
closely collaborated with Combine during the 2010 eruption. The Combine staff members, 
including those interviewed in this research, participated in the Jalin Merapi network as the 





Figure 19. Distribution of the Jalin Merapi main post and field posts (Jalin Merapi, 2010) 
The information volunteers in the main post and the field posts had distinctive 
responsibilities. In general, information volunteers in the main post were responsible for 
monitoring, sharing, and responding to all information on the different media platforms, and 
coordinating mostly with the field volunteers regarding information verification. The 
information volunteers in the main post consisted of seven people who were coordinated by 
an information coordinator (see Figure 20). Having only seven people in the main post was 
clearly explained by Widyarsi, a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network, below: 
It was more effective to have a small team as the main coordination system 
for such a big job. The most important thing is that what happens in the 
small team has to be communicated to the rest of the bigger team (personal 
interview, 27 May 2014). 
The information volunteers at the field posts were mostly responsible for gathering and 
verifying information from the affected community, and updating information on the Google 
Docs and the Facebook accounts of the Jalin Merapi network. Each field post was 
coordinated by a field post coordinator, who simultaneously acted as the contact person for 
any outgoing information from the field post and the local verifier (see Figure 20). However, 
the task distribution was not strict because the information volunteers might have 
simultaneously acted as logistic distributors while gathering information at the Internally 
Displaced Person (IDP) camps. The flexibility was necessary so a field post could cover 
some IDP camps within a particular affected area. Dougall et al. (2008) agree that a flexibly 





Figure 20. The Jalin Merapi organisation during the 2010 Merapi eruption 
 
As a community-based network consisting of community radio stations relying heavily on  
community support, the Jalin Merapi network did not have a strong financial foundation 
during the 2010 eruption. Thus, similarly to the personal contribution to the community radio 
stations, voluntary participation also took the form of providing support and technical 
equipment to ensure continuous processes of community-based disaster communication in 
Jalin Merapi. For example, some affected community members voluntarily provided their 
homes to be Jalin Merapi field posts; the community radio stations provided radio equipment 
and local actors; the volunteers provided personal laptops and mobile phones; Combine 
provided a modem, internet connection and two-way radio equipment; and funding was 
partly voluntarily collected and supported by the donors.  
During the 2010 eruption there was a significant expansion in the number of people 
volunteering for Jalin Merapi, and the network platform was significantly expanded by using 
fourteen different media to share information in the 2010 eruption. They were: website, SMS 
Gateway (08180 438 9000), Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), audio streaming (for 
community radio‘s broadcasts and two-way radio), Facebook, Twitter, Blackberry Messenger 
(BBM), Yahoo Messenger (YM), e-mail, shoutbox, Google docs, mobile and land-lined 
phone (0274 411 123), and Google maps. Although the local community has been using 
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not involve any type of mass media in its media multiplexity. This was particularly because 
of the inaccurate news of a national television channel that led to distrust in television (see 
the introduction chapter). The platform of media multiplexity of the Jalin Merapi network 
will be discussed thoroughly in the next chapter.  
 
5.6.Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the second research question by explaining that community-based 
disaster communication can be regarded as trustworthy and can facilitate community 
participation when it engages the local cultural knowledge and the tie strength of the local 
social networks. Specifically, culturally-embedded disaster communication within the 
affected community is more likely to increase the effectiveness and trustworthiness of 
disaster information because it can ―bridge‖ the information in convenient ways based upon 
cultural communication behaviors. When culturally-embedded disaster communication is 
combined with internet-based media, the combination can facilitate outsiders‘ exposure to 
such communication and, simultaneously, encourage trust within the outsiders regarding the 
authenticity of disaster information as locally-based information from the affected 
community. Another significant argument that emerged from this study is that both strong 
ties and weak ties play important roles in a supportive relationship in community-based 
disaster communication, without necessarily competing with each other. The strong ties of 
the affected community are more likely to establish social capital, trust, and community 
participation and are more effective in encouraging the affected community to provide their 
―inside‖ information. Meanwhile, weak ties are more effective in disseminating the ―insiders‘ 
information‖ to a larger number of people across different communities (e.g. the unaffected 
community). By engaging online media, weak ties potentially have an indirect influence in 
encouraging trust, as they extend the offline social networks and trust owned by the affected 
community. In the next chapter, I will discuss community participation encouraged by the 
generated trustworthiness in community-based disaster communication, particularly in the 







Networked participatory community-based disaster communication 
 
As the first responders, an affected community usually has great eagerness to participate in  
disaster communication (Hindman and Coyle, 1999, IFRC, 2015). Moreover, the 
development of mobile and online communication technologies has made information 
sharing easier for the affected community, even during a disaster response (Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Nugroho, 2011). Understanding how an affected community 
uses communication technologies and participates in information sharing can enable a new 
approach to existing disaster management, based on a ‗many-to-many model‘ of disaster 
communication (IFRC, 2015, p. 181). Thus, using the example of how the affected 
community participated in Jalin Merapi (Jaringan Informasi Lingkar Merapi – Information 
Network of the Merapi Circle) during the 2010 Merapi eruption, this chapter explores how an 
affected community uses communication technologies and participates in community-based 
disaster communication. I will begin the chapter by discussing the platform of media 
multiplexity of the Jalin Merapi network, through which the affected community participated 
in disaster communication. Based on the definition of Haythornthwaite (2005), media 
multiplexity refers to the simultaneous usage of multiples means of communication by the 
volunteers of Jalin Merapi during the 2010 Merapi eruption. Then, I will discuss the 
participation of the affected community in the community-based disaster communication 
facilitated by the Jalin Merapi network. Referring to the studies of Palen (2008) and Palen et 
al. (2010) on forms of community participation in natural disasters, I will focus the discussion 
of community participation on how the affected communities provided, shared, and verified 
disaster information through the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 Merapi eruption. 
Specifically, community participation in information providing and sharing will be discussed 
in this chapter, and community participation in information verification will be discussed 






6.1. Media multiplexity in participatory disaster communication 
Jalin Merapi used technology to answer a classic question of disaster 
response; how to connect individuals providing support to individuals who 
need it […] The Jalin Merapi project represents one of the most important 
and under-recognized ways in which community use of technology in 
disasters is profoundly different to that of aid agencies and is facilitating the 
development of new systemic approaches (International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2015, p. 190). 
In this section, I will discuss the way media multiplexity was used by the volunteers of the 
Jalin Merapi network, including the volunteers of the community radio stations, in facilitating 
participation by the affected community in community-based disaster communication. In the 
discussion, some of the fourteen media used by the Jalin Merapi network such as the SMS 
Gateway, audio streaming, the Facebook groups and Twitter accounts, and Google Docs will 
be discussed more thoroughly than the others. This is based on the finding that these 
particular media were most discussed by the research participants. However, it does not 
necessarily indicate that the other media, like CCTV, BBM, YM, e-mail, Shoutbox, mobile 
phone, and land-line phones were not utilised effectively during the 2010 Merapi eruption. 
They seemed to be treated as supporting media and were used on a more regular basis than 
the ones I will focus on. In particular, BBM and YM were mainly utilised for coordination 
among the volunteers. Email, Shoutbox, mobile phones, and land-line phones were mainly 
utilised by the wider audiences outside the affected areas to ask the Jalin Merapi network 
about the Mt. Merapi eruption and the evacuees. In the stage of lahars, livestreaming of the 
CCTV feed was added into the media multiplexity of the Jalin Merapi network, as a response 
to the information demand for the traffic and road situation of areas through which lahars 
often flowed.  
During the 2010 eruption, the media multiplexity of the Jalin Merapi network had three main 
characteristics. It was based on existing communication behaviour, integrated the 
technologies already used by the community in a single platform, and it was adaptive in order 
to be able to effectively facilitate the community participation.  
6.1.1. The media multiplexity based on the existing communication behaviours 
As previously listed in Chapter Five, the Jalin Merapi network engaged fourteen media to 
comprise a platform of media multiplexity in the stage of response to the 2010 Merapi 
eruption. The media were selected based on the local communication behaviours of the 
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targeted audiences for whom the disaster communication was intended. This was clearly 
explained by Nasir, a former Combine staff member who was based at the main-post of the 
Jalin Merapi network, as below: 
There was nothing new in the technologies we used. They are ―old‖. They 
were not invented purposively for it [the 2010 eruption]. We intentionally 
chose the existing technologies based on the assumption that people had 
been familiar with them. We couldn‘t choose only one [media] because, in 
fact, people use each in their own ways. Maybe [it is] because of 
convenience, economy, using HT [Handy-Talkie/two-way radio] because 
they don‘t want to buy mobile credit, practicality. Anything! (personal 
interview, 17 March 2014). 
The number of different media used in the media multiplexity was reasonably consistent with 
the local media usage of the Merapi people. In practice, the villagers living on the slopes of 
Mt. Merapi have an established pattern of media selection for seeking and sharing reliable 
disaster information about Mt. Merapi within their personal networks via multiple channels. 
They tend to engage a number of media in their information workflow regarding Mt. Merapi. 
As explained by Haythornthwaite (2005) and Koku et al. (2001), the number of media used in 
communication may differ from one community to another, depending on the tie strength of 
the local network; a community with stronger ties uses more media to communicate with one 
another. As a community with strong ties, as previously discussed in Chapter Five, those 
living on the slopes of Mt. Merapi are most likely to use numerous different media in their 
communication behaviours. Thus, if the Jalin Merapi network aimed at facilitating the local 
existing media usage, the media multiplexity of the Jalin Merapi network needed to engage 
all media used by the local communities in their local disaster communication behaviour in 
the Mt. Merapi areas.   
Aiming at sharing the insiders‘ information within the affected community and with the 
general public, the Jalin Merapi network developed a media multiplexity reflecting the media 
selections of both targeted audiences. Specifically, the villagers living on the slopes of Mt. 
Merapi mainly use mobile phones (Short Message Service (SMS) and phone calls), two-way 
radio (Walkie-Talkie
28
/Push-to-talk radio and Citizen Band radio), and national television to 
seek and share information about Mt. Merapi in their daily life. Meanwhile, according to 
Nasir, the general public tend to use social media to get information about Mt. Merapi 
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(personal interview, 17 March 2014). The combination of the media usage of the Merapi 
people and the media usage of the general public in the media multiplexity was clearly 
explained by a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network:  
There were fourteen technologies used by Jalin Merapi in managing 
information […] The usage of those fourteen technologies was based on the 
characteristics, users, and functions of each of the technologies […] One 
technology has different users from the others […] their behaviours and 
needs. The users of Handy-talkie, for example. They have been well-known 
for their main function in monitoring Mt. Merapi. The pattern of 
communication has been well established. Unfortunately, their information 
is only shared among themselves. When Mt. Merapi erupted in 2010, the 
need of people outside the affected areas for the updated information about 
Mt. Merapi was huge. Jalin Merapi filled in the gap by sharing the audio 
information [shared by the users of two-way radio] through the audio-
streaming technology and social media (Dewi, personal interview, 26 March 
2014). 
Because it uses media the affected community was already familiar with, four community 
members out of the eleven interviewed argued that the Jalin Merapi network was able to fulfil 
their personal demand for information by facilitating the accessibility of locally-relevant 
information. It was particularly so because of the usage of two-way radio as one of the most 
used media in local disaster communication. However, the remaining seven interviewed 
community members argued that the network was not as effective as possible in reaching all 
affected community members because it did not include television, another medium that is 
widely-owned by the Merapi people. The reason for not including television in the media 
multiplexity was because of the misleading news that further led to distrust in the national 
television station during the 2010 eruption (as discussed in Chapter One).   
Therefore, based on the findings, I argue that it is important to select and use the media that a 
community already uses in daily communication behaviours and is familiar with in local 
disaster communication. Familiarity with an information source and the media used in 
disaster communication plays a significant role in promoting the effectiveness of disaster 
communication particularly in the context of a community-based information network. In 
their disaster communication, people tend to use familiar channels that are convenient for 
them, regardless of the actual effectiveness of the channel. This tendency can be observed in 
the usage of the two-way radio. Despite being arguably ineffective and untrustworthy, the 
number of two-way radio users is increasing within the local communities living on the 
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slopes of Merapi, which may be led by their familiarity with two-way radio as the channel of 
community-based disaster communication since the 1990s. 
This use of familiar media fits the Uses and Gratification Theory (Rubin, 1994) and the 
Channel Complementarity Theory regarding media selection. It also reflects previous studies 
(for example, the studies of Austin et al., 2012; Dutta-Bergman, 2004; Hollingshead et al., 
2007; Ruggiero, 2000; Steelman et al., 2015; Whitting and Williams, 2013) emphasising that 
individuals tend to select and use specific media with which they are familiar and are tied into 
their existing information flows, regardless of the perceived usefulness of the selected media. 
Nonetheless, being familiar with, or the convenience of particular media, if accompanied by 
trustworthy sources, may facilitate better access and effective usage when it is most needed in 
a disaster response (Steelman et al., 2015, Jaeger et al., 2007). Further, selecting media based 
on the existing communication behaviours of the affected community can facilitate 
community capacity to participate in disaster communication in a familiar and convenient 
way. 
The argument that it is important to engage multiple media based on the local media usage in 
the local communication behaviors of the affected community is different from the 
mainstream approach to disaster communication as below. This was clearly stated by Nasir, a 
former Combine staff member who was based at the main-post of the Jalin Merapi network: 
The most common and mainstream approach of information technology has 
been inventing a new special platform. Then, pushing people to use it. 
Maybe it is appropriate for a closed and structured model, meaning that it 
will be used by a certain institution or by trained officers. But, for the open 
public, it won‘t work and is ineffective (personal interview, 17 March 
2014). 
His argument mirrors the issue raised by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC) in its 2015 World Disaster Report. They identified the risk of 
assuming everyone uses the same communication technologies in the same way, and that 
humanitarian responses to a disaster often take the form of a sudden introduction of a new 
platform of communication technology as a novel solution in communicating with the 
affected community. However, during a disaster response, an affected community is unlikely 
to learn a new platform, which they have never dealt with, because they ‗are likely to be 
overwhelmed by the response itself‘ (p. 194).  
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Imposing a new platform of communication technology by overlooking the local pattern of 
disaster communication can render disaster information inaccesible, such as occurred in the 
official disaster communication of the Mt. Merapi eruption. As also discussed in Chapter 
Four, Setiyoko, a community member (personal interview, 8 July 2014) and Sukiman, a 
volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM (personal interview, 6 May 2014), separately stated that some 
official disaster information was still inaccessible because of the incompatibility of media 
usage between the authorities and the villagers living on the slopes of Mt. Merapi. Two other 
community members confirmed:  
Government officials should be prepared with all important information, and 
be willing to share it to the communities […] They have to be open-minded 
and have the skill to use various communication technologies based on the 
community‘s preferences, so they can become more accessible (Wulandari, 
personal interview, 7 July 2014). 
 
People don‘t know about the existence of the SMS gateway [of the BPPTKG 
vulcanology research unit]. What is that? Those who know are those who 
accessed the Facebook account [of the BPPTKG] and read that it has SMS 
Gateway, BBM, and Whats app group too […] Those who have the 
technologies to access social media. I don‘t! I am also not sure that the youth 
who have Twitter and Facebook also subscribe to it [the SMS gateway]. I am 
not sure about it (Julianto, personal interview, 8  July 2014). 
 
Moreover, ignoring or removing a particular medium from the existing information 
workflows requires the communities to instantly change their behaviours to re-establish their 
existing information flow, and this is likely to be very difficult during a disaster response.  A 
channel loss potentially has a negative effect on the tie strength (Miczo et al., 2011) and the 
behaviours of disaster communication (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). Specifically, 
Haythornthwaite (2005, p. 141) explains that the disengagement of former communication 
means can affect individuals‘ access to disaster information, in regards to ‗where and when 
information can be received, and who has immediate, at-home access to such information‘. It 
may also remove the existing interactions that previously had been maintained by the 
discontinued medium. Moreover, an affected community with strong ties, such as the local 
communities living in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi, will most likely resist using a new 
medium if they find it does not suit them (Haythornthwaite, 2005). Again, this strengthens 
the significance of engaging the media that the disaster-affected community is already using 
and is familiar with in disaster communication.  
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6.1.2. The integrated platform of media multiplexity 
In addition to the importance of establishing media multiplexity based on the existing 
communication behaviours of the targeted audience(s), the Jalin Merapi network also 
emphasised the importance of integrating media into an accessible platform. In practice, a 
Combine staff member who was based at the main-post of the Jalin Merapi network, 
Wijoyono explained that the fourteen media platforms were integrated on the website of the 
Jalin Merapi network, so that ‗the website of Jalin Merapi was a portal to a lot of media‘ 








Figure 21. The display of media multiplexity on Jalin Merapi‘s website (modified from Wijoyono (2013).  
The integrated media multiplexity of the Jalin Merapi network was aimed at accommodating 
different preferences of media usage within the targeted audiences and integrating the 
strength of each medium engaged in their community-based disaster communication during 
the 2010 Merapi eruption.  
Firstly, integrating the multiple media into a platform can connect different audiences who 
use different types of media in their disaster communication. As previously discussed, Jalin 
Merapi aimed at sharing the information of the affected community to the general public and 
vice-versa; they both used distinct media in their communication behaviours. By identifying 
and compiling the existing media used by both the targeted audiences into an integrated 
platform, the Jalin Merapi network could simultaneously gather and connect the users of 
different media. Moreover, as community members often seek and transfer reliable 
information through cross-channel clusters of media in order to leverage their collective 
capacities (BBC, 2012, Palen, 2008, Reagan, 1996), Jalin Merapi‘s platform could simplify 
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the processes of seeking information from multiple media and transferring information from 
one medium to another.  
The argument was explained by Nasir, a former Combine staff member who was based at the 
main-post of the Jalin Merapi network, and Dewi, a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network, as 
below: 
It was a real organic convergence. We observed what [media] people had 
been using, then we gathered them […] At that time, Twitter users were the 
middle-class and upper-middle-class people. They often asked ―What do 
you need? What can we help with? Where? Who can be contacted? […] 
Meanwhile, the needy ones ―shouted‖ their needs via SMS or Facebook […] 
By sharing their needs on Twitter, we could bring the needy ones to the 
people who wanted to help. If there was only one platform, people who used 
SMS could not ―meet‖ the Twitter users […] We did not want to change 
[or] lead people to choose one [medium]. We created an integrated terminal 
(Nasir, personal interview, 17 March 2014). 
One of the lessons learnt from Jalin Merapi is that a convergence of 
technologies and media is a must. We can‘t rely on one particular 
technology. Beside, a convergence of technologies is conditioned by a 
convergence of actors. Each actor or community has their own behavior and 
need for information (Dewi, personal interview, 26 March 2014). 
The discrepancy between media preferences within the targeted audiences can be exemplified 
by the preferences of the community radio volunteers and the Combine staff members, which 
represent the different media usages between the Merapi people and people outside the 
affected areas. At that time, the community radio volunteers were more familiar with 
Facebook than Twitter and considered Twitter to be too complicated. Hence, they preferred 
Facebook for information sharing during the 2010 Merapi eruption; this was clearly stated by 
a volunteer of K FM:  
Facebook was the easiest. The Facebook groups were initially closed to 
communicate with other community radio volunteers […] We provided and 
exchanged our information in that group. Every member could write and 
read [all the information] from the very beginning in such a consecutive plot 
(Haji, personal interview, 21 March 2014). 
On the other hand, the Combine staff members and most of the volunteers located at the main 
post of the Jalin Merapi network, who represented people outside the affected areas, preferred 
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Twitter because it was considered to facilitate rapid sharing of important information. 
Sundary, one of the volunteers located at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network, stated: 
Twitter is the most open social media to spread information […] It is faster 
[…] It can be followed by millions of people. Moreover, a live tweet is more 
reliable than Facebook […] Because of its limited 140 characters, people 
tend to only inform about important things […] On Facebook, there are too 
many features: chat, group, fan page, etc. On Twitter, we can monitor the 
track, especially by Chrip story (personal interview, 21 April 2014). 
In regard to the discrepancy, the Twitter accounts were used to share the most updated 
information to the wider audiences; meanwhile, the Facebook groups were used for internal 
coordination, discussion, and information verification. Despite the different purposes, all 
social media accounts of the Jalin Merapi network were displayed on the website of Jalin 
Merapi. Integrating the accounts of Twitter and Facebook of the Jalin Merapi network onto 
its website can gather both of the users of the distinct social media accounts. Moreover, the 
Twitter followers can easily access the information mentioned on the Facebook groups, and 
vice-versa.  
Secondly, integrating the engaged media into a platform is not solely based on the argument 
to connect different audiences who use different types of media in their disaster 
communication, but also as a response to the fact that each medium has its own weakness and 
strength in disaster communication. This argument is built on my finding that the research 
participants had different opinions on which media is the most suitable for community-based 
disaster communication, as they regarded each medium as having weaknesses in effectively 
fulfilling the information demand of the local communities. This finding is similar to the 
studies of Fronz (2012) and Palen et al. (2010) emphasizing that each communication channel 
has a different level of trustworthiness, exposure, affordability, and availability. What the 
interviewed community members thought about specific media in community-based disaster 
communication will be discussed here with a focus on SMS, two-way radio, and social 
media. 
Mobile phones are very common within the Merapi communities (Mei et al., 2013), and all 
interviewed community members liked to use SMS in their disaster communication. 
Wulandari, a community member, stated that SMS can ensure the trustworthiness of 
information because the sender is traceable, which means it can be verified in response and 
any misunderstood information can be clarified (personal interview, 7 July 2014). However, 
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the research participants also acknowledged the limitations of SMS during a disaster 
response. Adji, a community member (personal interview, 22 July 2014), and Yatin, a head 
of village (focus group, 19 July 2014), argued that SMS through a mobile phone is not very 
reliable because of its dependency on electricity and mobile networks. Adding another 
limitation of SMS, Setiyoko, a community member (personal interview, 8 July 20140, and 
Setyawan, a volunteer of Lahara FM (personal interview, 20 March 2014), described that the 
mobile network always collapses or jams during an eruption; so, sending a text message can 
be very slow. Similarly, another community member, Purnomo added that some areas 
surrounding Mt. Merapi have unstable mobile connectivity, so it is often difficult to send a 
text message (personal interview, 8 July 2014). The limitation of SMS technology can be 
observed through the number of text messages provided by the affected community into the 
SMS gateway of the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 eruption. According to Nasir from 
Jalin Merapi, there were only approximately 5,000 incoming text messages (personal 
interview, 17 March 2014), which was a very small number in comparison to the high 
number of mobile phone users in the area around Mt. Merapi
29
. Arguably, the small number 
of incoming messages may be determined by a lack of community awareness of the number 
of the SMS gateway for the Jalin Merapi network.  
Regarding the usage of two-way radio, in Chapter Four I discussed its use as an example of 
how bottom-up disaster communication can lead to overlapping information. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the local communities living on Mt. Merapi‘s slopes have 
stopped utilising two-way radio in their community-based disaster communication. Similarly 
to the debate over the effectiveness of SMS usage, the research participants had divergent 
perceptions of the effectiveness of two-way radio, as shown in the table below: 
Pro Contra 
 Two-way radio users provide reliable 
information because of their mechanism in 
reporting information on the spot. 
Additionally, they also refer to BPPTKG for 
information about Mt. Merapi. 
 Two-way radio users have close personal 
relationships (as being the part of the 
community) and have a long history as the 
most accessible ‗channels‘ who socialise 
information directly to the community 
members. 
 A large number of users, the involvement of 
people outside the affected areas, and lack of 
coordination between the two-way radio users 
create confusion over its overlapping 
information with an unclear information 
source. It eventually becomes an unreliable 
medium.  
 The frequency of two way radio becomes ‗too 
crowded‘. It is difficult to ask for urgent 
needs. 
 A two-way radio is more suitable for 
                                                          
29
 For example, there are 5,703 households with mobile phones in the Cangkringan sub-district of the Sleman 
district (BNPB, 2010); Cangkringan is one of 20 sub-districts that were affected by the 2010 Merapi eruption.  
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 Each frequency is owned by an 
organisation/community, so it offers clarity of 
information sources. 
 Its rapid information sharing and endurance, 
especially when mobile communication and 
electricity is shut down.  
 A two-way radio is considered to be a means 
of informal disaster communication to seek 
the official information from BPPTKG and 
local government.  
 The coordination among the BPBD, National 
Army, Police force and the authorities in all 
levels, is mostly performed by the means of 
two-way radio. 
coordination, not to gain reliable information.  
 Lack of knowledge of two-way radio‘s 
functions and communication skill within its 
users. Henceforth, they tend to modify the 
information or share any information they 
heard from other users without verification.  
 The users of two-way radio need to provide 
their information consistently, especially 
regarding the level of lahars.  
 The users of two-way radio are more likely to 
use unfamiliar and unofficial terminologies, 
compared to local daily language and the 
official standard of radio communication. 
Therefore, they need to adapt and make their 
terminologies uniform in order to be easily 
understood and considered officially valid 
 The usage of two-way radio has been 
increasingly insufficient because of its limited 
coverage in one-to-one points and is regarded 
as exclusive to certain people because it is an 
expensive device. 
 
Table 3. Pro and contra in regard to the effectiveness of two-way radio  
The divergent perceptions of the effectiveness of two radio is unlikely to be determined by 
individuals‘ ownership or usage of two-way radio because those against the effectiveness of 
two-way radio may still have owned or used that medium. The main criticism within the 
divergent perceptions relates to the inconsistency of information shared by the users of two-
way radio in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi, as previously discussed in Chapter Four. Each 
group of users is in their own unique subculture by using unique terminologies based on their 
individual understanding in interpreting and sharing information about Mt. Merapi. They are 
not organised into a community network like the Jalin Merapi network. The way Jalin Merapi 
networked the community radio stations circling the Merapi volcano simultaneously 
generated mutual standards of information sharing within the network to ensure the 
uniformity and reliability of information, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Consequently, without a network connecting all the groups of two-way radio users, there has 
been no mutual standard of reliable information shared via two-way radio in the area 
surrounding Mt. Merapi.  
Regardless of the debate, most of the interviewed community members agreed that two-way 
radio is still regarded as an effective channel for disaster communication and the most-owned 
technology for disaster communication by Merapi people. Wulandari, a community member, 
and Sukiman, a volunteer of Lintas Merapi FM, gave examples of the ownership of two-way 
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radios around Mt. Merapi: there is at least one two-way radio in every five houses in 
Sewukan village – Magelang (Wulandari, personal interview 7 July 2014), and approximately 
30 two-way radios in a village in Kemalang sub-district – Klaten (Sukiman, personal 
interview, 6 May 2014). Similarly, the officials identified that there are 20 groups of two-way 
radio users in Sleman district, and 27 groups in Magelang district.  
Another example is the technology of internet-based media, particularly social media. 
Although internet-based communication technologies have increasingly become a means to 
share insiders‘ information to the general public in the various recent disasters (Sutton et al., 
2008, Austin et al., 2012, Crowe, 2012), some community members interviewed stated that 
social media do not fit the daily media usage of the Merapi people because of the lack of 
internet literacy
30
. A community member, Julianto stated, ‗it [the usage of social media] was 
effective for people outside the affected areas […] not for the insiders‘ (personal interview, 8 
July 2014). In a separate interview, another community member stated the same argument: 
It [the usage of social media] was not appropriate for sharing information to 
the locals […] Our local livelihood is mostly related to physical field work, 
we do not always get connected to the computerised media […] But, it was 
appropriate for people outside the affected areas who wanted to donate […] 
Individual donators usually face difficulties in delivering their donations. 
Jalin Merapi shared [information] that this person needed that aid (personal 
interview, 5 June 2014). 
Also, another community member, Adji described that some of the Merapi people, especially 
the elders and the farmers, cannot afford internet technologies (personal interview, 22 July 
2014). Yet, the argument that social media is not the most effective tool in disaster 
communication in the area around Mt. Merapi is not simply due to limited ownership of 
internet technology. Those who have internet connections also agree that the internet is 
ineffective because of slow connection speeds.  
The inaccessibility and slow connectivity of internet technologies are not the only elements of 
internet illiteracy within the communities living on the slopes of Mt. Merapi. I identified the 
                                                          
30 Although Indonesia has the fourth largest Facebook subscriber base in the world with approximately 65 
million monthly active users (The Jakarta Post, 2014a) and the fifth biggest Twitter subscriber base in the world 
with 29 million users (The Jakarta Post, 2014b), these numbers are concentrated in the big cities. Again, 
although the number of Indonesian internet users reaches 88.1 million (Indonesian Internet Provider 
Association/Assosiasi Penyelenggara Internet Indonesia - APJII, 2014), the number only represents 17 internet 
users per 100 people (The World Bank, 2014), while 65.1% of total population has not used the internet in 
Indonesia (APJII, 2014). Most communities in remote areas, including some areas in the Merapi volcano, still 
have difficulties accessing mobile and internet connections due to a lack of supporting infrastructure. 
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sociological stereotypes of the careless young internet users and the uneducated community 
members reduced the likelihood that others would use the information shared on internet-
based media by those stereotyped groups. According to Julianto, a community member 
(personal interview, 8 July 2014), the Sleman officers, and the Magelang officers, most social 
media users in Mt. Merapi are the youth who tend to trust the information they gain from the 
social media without further verification. This leads to a fundamental bias about the 
inaccuracy of social media information because of the sociological stereotype of the young 
generation as careless people (Crowe, 2012). Additionally, some of the interviewed officials 
also considered most Merapi people to be incapable of efficiently and appropriately using 
internet-based media because of their low level of education, despite being able to afford the 
technologies. Consequently, accoding to Yatin, a head of a village, the incapability can lead to 
the possibility of inaccurate information sharing (focus group, 19 July 2014). Regardless of 
whether the stereotypes are accurate or not, this finding shows that stereotyping affects how 
individuals view the veracity of internet-shared information. In other words, media usage in 
disaster communication cannot only refer to the effectiveness of a particular medium 
regarding message exposure and accessibility, but also requires understanding of how the 
affected community regards the trustworthiness of the particular media. 
In addition to the benefit of accommodating different preferences of media usage by the 
targeted audiences, integrating the existing media into an accessible platform can solve the 
limitations of each medium by integrating its strengths. For example, those with limited 
access to internet technologies could provide information by means of SMS instead or seek 
information via two-way radio. To share SMS messages to the wider audience, all incoming 
text messages were automatically published on the website of Jalin Merapi in a form of 
running text. Again, the limited coverage of two-way radio, which only covers one-to-one 
point, and the limited coverage of a community radio broadcast, which only covers a certain 
small area, can be solved by online audio streaming on the website of the Jalin Merapi 
network. So, the one-to-one point conversation of the users of two-way radio and the radio 
broadcast can be simultaneously shared to the wider audience, regardless of their geographic 
locations. Hence, it is also important to recognise that relying on a single medium may not 
reach all community members, because a specific medium may only be accessible to a 
specific audience within a specific social network.  
Moreover, the finding of the integrated media multiplexity shows that the novelty of 
communication technology does not guarantee effectiveness or utilisation by the targeted 
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community. Being novel in disaster communication does not necessarily mean switching 
from the former offline means of communication (e.g., two-way radio and SMS) to the most 
advanced online media. Therefore, internet-based media need to be used deliberately 
without neglecting traditional media, but integrated in such a complementary way (Austin et 
al., 2012, Liu and Jin, 2010, Crowe, 2012). By combining the traditional channels of 
communication with internet-based communication technologies, it may be possible to 
combine exposure and familiarity in disaster communication. 
6.1.3. The adaptive structure of media multiplexity 
In addition to the value of being based on the existing communication behaviours of the 
targeted audience(s), I argue that an integrated platform of media multiplexity needs to have 
an adaptive structure to respond to the emerging changes in local media usage and the 
information demands of the targeted audiences. This argument is built on the finding about 
the adaptative changes in the media platform of the Jalin Merapi network. The adaptation can 
be exemplified by the increased number of media engaged in the media multiplexity, which 
can be clearly observed by comparing the initial version of the media multiplexity used in the 
2006 eruption to the version used in the 2010 eruption. The initial version brought together 
two-way radio, website, Yahoo Messenger (YM), Shoutbox, live audio streaming of the 
broadcasts of the community radio stations, SMS gateway, land-line phone and mobile phone 
(see Figure 22). Keeping up with the novelty of communication technologies used by the 
affected community and the general public, the media multiplexity of the Jalin Merapi 
network was expanded by adding other media (Twitter, Facebook, BBM, Google Docs, and 
CCTV) during the 2010 eruption. The addition also aimed at reaching the wider audiences 




Figure 22. The initial website of Jalin Merapi used in the 2006 Merapi eruption (Combine, 2007) 
(left) and the website of Jalin Merapi used in the 2010 Merapi eruption (2016) (right). 
 
Additionally, the adaptive structure of the media multiplexity of Jalin Merapi can be observed 
clearly through the proliferation of its social media accounts on both Facebook and Twitter. 
The first Facebook group was initially closed to the public and dedicated to internal 
coordination among the community radio volunteers. Later, it became publicly open, 
however it remained restricted because of the member limitation of a Facebook group-page, 
which was 250 members at  that time. As soon as the first group reached that number, the 
community radio volunteers created another Facebook group, and so forth. Sentosa, a 
volunteer of K FM, explained the process:  
It (the first Facebook group) was open and all volunteers could be its 
members […] It became public and anyone could access it […] Everyone 
could register his friends to be its members […] Even the aid organisations 
[…] Later, it was overloaded and reached the limitation of 250 members in 
two weeks […] We created the second group […] it grew more (personal 
interview, 21 March 2014). 
During the stage of disaster response to the 2010 eruption, from September 2010 to July 
2011, the Jalin Merapi network consecutively created and used four Facebook groups in total: 
Jalin Merapi, Jalin Merapi [Alternative], Jalin Merapi 3, and Jalin Merapi 4, and 1 Facebook 
Fan-page.  
The Facebook groups are different from each other in regard to their membership. Although 
the Jalin Merapi network did not determine the membership of each group, a previously 
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existing member tended to register his/her friend into the group he/she joined. As a result, 
each Facebook group invariably consisted of members of a certain friendship network. 
Further, the different types of membership led to different topics of discussion on the 
Facebook groups, as explained by a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network: 
Anyone could be a member [of the Facebook groups of the Jalin Merapi 
network]. However, the discussion‘s content was determined by the 
majority of its members […] For example, there was a Facebook group most 
of whose members were the NGOs [Non-Government Organisations] that 
helped the Jalin Merapi network. It didn‘t mean that all NGOs had to be its 
members, but it happened that most of them were the members of NGO by 
itself. There was a Facebook group most of whose members were 
community radio broadcasters; there was one where most of the members 
were volunteers [of the Jalin Merapi network] […] If the majority was from 
the NGO, they would have mostly discussed donations […] the volunteers 
would have discussed the demands […] So, we can imagine the diversity of 
the Facebook groups‘ content (Dewi, personal interview, 26 March 2014).  
Similarly to the Facebook groups, the Twitter account of Jalin Merapi also proliferated during 
the response stage of the 2010 Merapi eruption. A few days after the creation of the first 
Twitter account @jalinmerapi (as the main account to share information in Bahasa 
Indonesia), another Twitter account (@jalinmerapi_en) was created by the volunteers, who 
were located at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network, as an English translation of 
@jalinmerapi. The @jalinmerapi-en was dedicated to the international public who sought 
information about the 2010 eruption and did not understand the Indonesian language. The 
process of creating the @jalinmerapi_en account was explained by Nasir, a former Combine 
staff member who was based at the main-post of the Jalin Merapi network, as follows: 
There were some suggestions to create an English version from our 
followers. We tweeted that we had limited administrators. ―Is there anyone 
who can be a translator?‖ […] lots of them! There were approximately 100 
people who wanted to be the translators […] We created the account 
[@jalinmerapi_en] and entrusted its password to some followers. They only 
monitored @jalinmerapi, translated, and tweeted it […] They only copied 
and pasted [the information] […] they were located somewhere else, not in 
the main post [of the Jalin Merapi network] (personal interview, 17 March 
2014). 
Later, the volunteers located at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network created another 
Twitter account, @jalinmerapi_adm. It was dedicated to the general public who needed more 
detailed information than the 140 characters of a tweet, for internal coordination, and 
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functioned as a backup account when the @jalinmerapi was overloaded. Zulivan, a volunteer 
of Jalin Merapi, described:  
@jalinmerapi_adm was for internal coordination and functioned when the 
@jalinmerapi was overloaded […] When that happened, we could not 
tweet; meanwhile, there was a lot of important information (that had to be 
shared), so we used the @jalinmerapi_adm […] We also used it for a longer 
conversation [for the followers who requested more detailed information] 
[…] otherwise, it would have ―littered‖ the @jalinmerapi (personal 
interview, 17 March 2014). 
In total, during the 2010 Merapi eruption, the Jalin Merapi network created and used three 
Twitter accounts: @jalinmerapi, @jalinmerapi_en, and @jalinmerapi_adm. Unlike the 
additional Facebook groups that functioned as additional spaces for more members of those 
who sought information from the Jalin Merapi network, the additional Twitter accounts 
addressed distinctive types of disaster information as the situation developed.  
The finding that the media multiplexity of the Jalin Merapi network has an adaptive structure 
emphasises the value of flexibility in media usage in order to adapt to the rapidly increased 
need for information and the emergent needs for different types of disaster information 
during disaster response. In particular, flexibility is most likely to be provided by an informal 
community-based movement, such the Jalin Merapi network, compared to formal 
organisations. As discussed in Chapter Four, the bureaucratic and top-bottom structures of 
formal disaster communication performed by the local governments are unlikely to provide 
flexibility (Shannon et al., 2014). On the other hand, the informally loose and fluid friendship 
in the Jalin Merapi network can provide flexibility and creativity in responding to the changes 
they faced during the 2010 eruption. This finding strengthens my argument that the 
engagement of informal elements of a community into the formal structure of official disaster 
communication enables ‗creativity and flexibility to sit within a context of continuity and 
stability‘ (Griffin et al., 1999; Shannon et al., 2014, p. 649).  
 
6.2. Community participation in community-based disaster communication 
I have discussed the lack of an official mechanism to deliver specific types of official and 
locally-based information directly to the affected community in disaster communication in 
Chapter Five, which mirrors some studies that have acknowledged that particular issue in 
various disaster responses (Birowo, 2009, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Tanesia, 
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2007). Conversely, the absence of a direct channel of communication to the affected 
community creates a barrier for the affected community to communicate its disaster 
information including specific needs to the external stakeholders, particularly the authorities 
and potential donors. Consequently, the local governments and the donors tend to generalise 
the needs of disaster-affected evacuees. Those who want to help the affected community often 
do not acknowledge that the needs of one evacuee may be different from another and may 
change over time.  
The tendency to generalise the needs of disaster-affected community often results in 
inappropriate responses to the local conditions of disaster affected areas and the unique 
individual needs of the affected community. For example, tons of used clothes were wasted 
because the evacuees did not require them; this was clearly described by Julianto, a 
community member, Negoro, a volunteer of Jalin Merapi and Sundary, a volunteer of Jalin 
Merapi, as below: 
In a disaster response, the first thing people think to donate is clothing […] 
We don‘t need that! It is insulting […] Some donations were inappropriate 
such as torn underwear, broken toys […] It was so inappropriate! […] Well, 
some take the clothing donation, but lots always become a waste (Julianto, 
personal interview, 8 July 2014). 
Clothing donations were actually required right after the eruption […] but 
they came a week later […] the donors needed time to collect and deliver 
the donation […] The time difference was too long […] If the need was not 
responded to quickly, it would have been changed […] 80 tons of clothing 
donation became a waste (Negoro, personal interview, 23 April 2014). 
At that time, there was an overloaded clothing donation in Muntilan [a sub-
district in the Magelang district]. The evacuees didn‘t take the clothes. [The 
evacuees said,] ―Our homes were not on fire, we still have our clothes and 
we still can get them at our homes‖ (Sundary, personal interview, 21 April 
2014). 
A volunteer of Lahara FM, Setyawan, gave another example of inappropriate aid. He 
mentioned a donation of high-voltage generators that apparently were incompatible with the 
residential electrical equipment and nearly caused a fire (personal interview, 20 March 2014). 
Similarly, a district officer, Iman, stated that there were some evacuees who needed rice and 
received eggs instead (focus group, 19 July 2014). Not only the individual donors, but the 
local government also made the same mistake. According to Setiyoko, a community member, 
the local governments often distributed aid to the affected community indiscriminately 
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without investigation about personal needs, while some community members may require 
specific aid or more aid than the others (personal interview, 8 July 2014). In other words, the 
local governments often overlook the individual needs and focus more on mutual needs based 
on formal policies in disaster responses. Meanwhile, an effective disaster response is one 
performed based on the specific needs of the affected community (IFRC, 2015).  
In order to be able to share the specific disaster information about the affected community, 
the Jalin Merapi network closely engaged the evacuees, including the volunteers of the 
community radio stations to participate in its community-based disaster communication. In 
the case of the Jalin Merapi network, the affected community was eager to participate in the 
Jalin Merapi network because of the trust encouraged by the culture-embedded 
communication and the social network owned by the community radio volunteers, as 
discussed in Chapter Five. Again, by using the multiple media established in the local 
communication behaviours, the Jalin Merapi network provided a convenient means for the 
affected community to easily participate in providing, verifying, and sharing disaster 
information. In the next sub-sections, I discuss the community participation in providing and 
sharing information through the Jalin Merapi network in detail. 
6.2.1. Community participation in information providing 
In providing information about local disaster information, the Jalin Merapi network closely 
engaged the evacuees, including the volunteers of the community radio stations, as trusted 
information sources during the 2010 Merapi eruption. Similarly, Hindman and Coyle (1999) 
agree that community members are the first responders and simultaneously become crucial 
information sources in a disaster response. Particularly, the Jalin Merapi network encouraged 
and facilitated the participation of the affected community to provide their information about 
themselves and the area surrounding Mt. Merapi based on their personal experiences and 
visual and audio observations on what was happening in their surroundings to the Jalin 
Merapi network. The affected community, including the volunteers of the community radio 
stations, experienced the hazards themselves so they could provide accurate information 
about their surroundings. Negoro, a volunteer of Jalin Merapi agreed that the spatial 
proximity of the community radio volunteers to the Merapi hazards is an advantage for timely 
response in providing local information about Mt. Merapi whenever necessary, compared to 
the government offices which are situated far away from the Merapi summit (personal 
interview, 23 April 2014). 
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As previously mentioned in Chapter Five, the volunteers of the community radio stations set 
up field posts of the Jalin Merapi network in their surroundings in order to be able to 
continuously provide information about the affected community and the affected areas. In the 
field posts, Lintas Merapi FM and Lahara FM continued their on-air broadcast. A volunteer 
of Lahara FM described his broadcasting experience:  
Almost everyone listened to Lahara FM [...] [by the means of] handphone or 
radio [...] We continuously broadcasted information about the level of the 
lahar flood and its direction [...] When the lahar flood came, everyone had  
safely reached the shelter [...] Back then, the community radio station was 
extremely beneficial for the affected communities. The flood was huge and 
there were no victims [...] because of the information shared by Lahara FM 
[...] We were so grateful for the community radio station (Setyawan, 
personal interview, 20 March 2014).  
Although MMC FM could not be on-air during the 2010 Merapi eruption, Mujianto, a 
volunteer of MMC FM, described what he did in order to be able to share information needed 
by the evacuees. He specifically stated: 
There was a rumor that Selo was destroyed. It created anxiety within the 
evacuees [...] I stayed [...] at Jalin Merapi‘s field post [...] at Selo [...] I did 
not evacuate [...] there were only four of us [...] I provided information 
about our village [...] they [the evacuees] could contact me to ask about their 
houses [...] We also guarded the road to prevent theft (personal interview, 26 
April 2014). 
In addition to the volunteers of the community radio stations, the other affected community 
members also provided their information to the Jalin Merapi network.  
However, the participation levels in information provision varied among the affected 
community members, mainly depending on their access to communication technologies and 
the level of technology adoption during the 2010 Merapi eruption. At that time, most 
survivors utilized two-way radio (Walkie Talkie)
31
 and SMS to provide their information, 
particularly about their needs, to the Jalin Merapi network. For those who could not access or 
use the communication technologies, the Jalin Merapi network became an alternative and 
trusted channel through which the evacuees could provide information. In practice, the field 
volunteers of Jalin Merapi (the community radio volunteers and the newly-recruited ones) 
personally gathered information from the evacuees every morning and afternoon. They went 
                                                          
31
 The local communities living on the slopes of MT. Merapi refer to a two-way radio as a Handy Talkie. 
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to the IDP camps, particularly those that were less exposed and isolated, to gather 
information about the evacuees‘ demography (name, address), their current health condition, 
their daily needs, and the condition of the area surrounding Mt. Merapi. Sundary, a volunteer 
of Jalin Merapi, explained the process: 
Sometimes, the evacuees came to the field posts of Jalin Merapi […] But, 
mostly, we came to the evacuees every day […] every morning we recorded 
their condition and needs for a day […] we updated the information onto our 
database, afterwards. The aid came […] we distributed the aid in the 
afternoon […] [At the same time when the aid being distributed], the 
evacuees told us again what they needed […] We updated our database 
again (personal interview, 21 April 2014). 
The process of information gathering was challenging because of a lack of official data about 
the existing IDP camps (as previously discussed in Chapter Four). Additionally, the evacuees 
tended to move from one IDP camp to another; hence, the number of IDP camps most likely 
fluctuated. In this case, the involvement of the community radio volunteers (as the locals) was 
significant to identify the isolated areas that potentially became the unofficial IDP camps. In 
regard to this practice, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2011, p. 39) agrees that ‗to get 
information, you have to be on the ground. You have to walk around and ask people for it‘.  
The access to communication technologies and the level of technology adaption are not the 
only determining factors for the ability to provide information conveniently. I argue that the 
way the affected community was able to provide their information became a significant factor 
in participation. In the early stage of the 2010 eruption, the Jalin Merapi network initially 
tried to impose a strict format for information provision through SMS so the information 
could be automatically classified by the computerised system. Although the format may have 
been extremely useful for classifying incoming information, it did not work for the affected 
community, including the community radio volunteers. Dewi, a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi 
network, clearly explained the failure, as follows: 
W]e initially applied many codes in our SMS gateway […] type #, then *, 
then type the information and send it to Jalin Merapi‘s number […] Because 
we needed to archive it, so it would have been easier for classification […] 
The codes were socialised […] We printed the guidance of how to text 
messages on papers and stacked them at the post. It was easy! But 
apparently, our target audiences did not feel comfortable in using it […] 
When we applied the codes, no one used our SMS Gateway. It was blank! 
Even the volunteers felt that it was too complicated and they did not use it 
[…] Finally, we gave up the format (personal interview, 26 March 2014). 
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Introducing a new way to communicate in community-based disaster communication does not 
necessarily guarantee the participation of the affected community, regardless of whether the 
new way is regarded as an effective tool by the people outside the affected areas who are 
trying to help. Similarly to the previous observations about the usage of multiple media based 
on existing local media usage, this finding also stresses the importance of adapting 
technologies to the existing local communication behaviours of the affected community to 
assure community participation in disaster communication.   
As the result of the efforts of Jalin Merapi to facilitate community participation in 
information provision, the affected community members (including the community radio 
volunteers) were able to provide their specific information during the 2010 eruption. The 
information provided was about: the up to date condition of the Merapi volcano; hazards of 
Merapi (pyroclastic flows and  secondary hazards such as lahars); the refugees‘ condition, 
numbers, demography, locations and needs (demand); the affected residents; the locations of 
IDP camps; aid distribution; and the needs for additional volunteers during the 2010 eruption. 
The types of information were listed by Asnawi, a volunteer of K FM, as follows: 
Our aims were to provide information about the evacuees‘ condition [and] 
their locations because lots of people wanted to deliver their aid directly to 
the evacuees […] Besides, we also provided information about the 
evacuees‘ needs […] through Twitter, Facebook, Jalin Merapi‘s website, 
etc. […] We also provided information about our needs for volunteers in 
certain posts. We needed volunteers to deliver [the logistics], to record [the 
information], etc. (Asnawi, personal interview, 21 March 2014). 
In addition to the information listed above, the volunteers of the community radio stations, as 
members of the affected community, were able to provide knowledge about local hazards. 
This particular ability distinguishes Jalin Merapi‘s community-based network from other 
humanitarian organisations that do not directly engage with the disaster-affected community. 
Moreover, knowledge about local hazards is often unavailable in a disaster response. Hence, 
‗it is not uncommon, for example, for volunteers to rush to the scene of a disaster and 
actually impede the emergency response‘ (Reynolds and Seeger, 2005, p. 50). Therefore, the 
knowledge of local hazards is specifically valuable to protect untrained volunteers from 
outside the affected region from being the next victims, which is likely to happen in the 
disaster response stage. 
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During the 2010 eruption, the volunteers of the community radio stations assisted other new 
volunteers and donors in identifying the safe areas when they were gathering information or 
distributing aid to the refugees. The importance of the local knowledge was emphasized by a 
volunteer of K FM: 
Our community radio volunteers are really familiar with their surroundings 
[…] It is impossible if they do not know. I myself know the 153 hamlets in 
this sub-district very well […] If volunteers are lost, we can know their 
positions just by explaining the characteristics of the road, the surrounding 
buildings, or even the trees! […] In the 2010 eruption, our [community] 
radio volunteers helped to coordinate and escort Jalin Merapi volunteers, 
because we were the only ones who really knew our surroundings […] We 
had important roles when the volunteers had to record the evacuees or 
distribute logistics in the field. We recommended them the way […] We 
knew which rivers had been frequently flooded with lahars […] If they were 
lost, we guided them via two-way radio […] Otherwise, like what happened 
in Mt. Sinabung, a volunteer died because of the pyroclastic flow. It might 
have been because they did not consult with the locals first. The locals know 
exactly how many bridges, which one is the safe road, where the shortcut is 
[…] We know the risk if we choose a way […] The community radio 
volunteers know the information because we are the locals! (Asnawi, 
personal interview, 21 March 2014). 
Additionally, the members of an affected community also can provide warnings about 
possible threats based on their local beliefs. The community‘s culture and geomythologies of 
volcanic hazards are based on concrete memories and direct personal experiences of previous 
eruptions (Cashman and Giordano, 2008, Cronin and Cashman, 2008, Donovan, 2010, 
Fischer, 2000, Troll et al., 2015), so community members can provide a warning of any 
possible threat based on the patterns of previous eruptions (Troll et al., 2015). The finding 
supports Jaeger et al. (2007) who found that the community members may help to identify an 
emergency and may help others avoid it. Also, the finding strengthens my previous argument 
that the cultural knowledge of the affected community can play an important role in 
community-based disaster communication. However, it is important to acknowledge that 
there are limits to cultural knowledge in predicting natural hazards, as demonstrated by what 
happened to Mbah Maridjan, the spiritual gatekeeper of Mt. Merapi, in the 2010 eruption (as 
discussed in Chapter one). 
At the end of the process of providing information, the field volunteers of the Jalin Merapi 
network, including the volunteers of the community radio stations, delivered the useful 
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information provided by the evacuees to the volunteers located at the main post. They 
delivered the information by means of personal Twitter accounts by mentioning 
@jalinmerapi or direct messaging, personal Facebook accounts, the Jalin Merapi network‘s 
Facebook groups, Yahoo Messenger, email, two-way radio, and Google Docs. A volunteer of 
MMC FM, Mujiono, clearly described it:  
In the field post, I used my personal Twitter account and mentioned 
@jalinmerapi. We also used the Facebook group […] and SMS […] The 
information was shared further onto @jalinmerapi by the volunteers located 
at the main post [of the Jalin Merapi network] […] For example, ―The 
evacuees in Selo need blah blah blah, for further coordination please contact 
Muji at this number‖ (a personal interview, 26 April 2014).  
Unlike the most affected community members who preferred SMS, the volunteers preferred 
social media because it was considered more affordable. As an illustration, one of the 
Indonesian telecommunication operators charges 30 IDR (approximately 0.003 NZD) for 10 
KB of internet data (Telkomsel, 2015a) and 175 – 200 IDR (approximately 0.01 – 0.02 NZD) 
for 1 SMS (Telkomsel, 2015b). Besides, social media are more suitable to deal with low 
bandwidth and unreliable internet access (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011).  
6.2.2. Community participation in information sharing 
The useful local information, which was provided by the evacuees and the field volunteers, 
was shared back to the affected community and the general public by the Jalin Merapi 
network through the integrated platform of media multiplexity. Prior to the process of 
information sharing, the volunteers located at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network had 
to extract easily-classified structured information from unstructured incoming information 
from the multiple media. That process has become the biggest challenge in community-
based disaster communication (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011), because it often 
takes the form of endless organising over overloaded incoming information. Thus, the 
volunteers located at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network developed a mechanism to 
monitor the incoming media in order to be able to classify and share the useful provided 
information to the public, including the affected community. 
Initially, all of the seven volunteers located at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network 
monitored the incoming information on all used media at the same time. They regarded the 
mechanism as chaotic eventually because each medium had information coming at different 
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rates. According to one of the volunteers, the rapid information change of social media was 
the most challenging issue (Dewi, personal interview, 26 March 2014). Responding to that 
particular challenge, they amended their mechanism of information monitoring. One 
volunteer was responsible for monitoring incoming information on the Facebook group and 
answering phone calls, one volunteer was responsible for monitoring incoming information 
on two way radio and the SMS Gateway, three volunteers were responsible for monitoring 
incoming information and sharing information on the Twitter accounts, and two volunteers 
were responsible for compiling the useful incoming information onto the Google Docs 
database. The latest mechanism was more effective in monitoring the overload incoming 
information than the previous one. Dewi, a volunteer located at the main post of the Jalin 
Merapi network, explained the working flows:  
I monitored the @jalinmerapi account. I often asked Uma [another 
volunteer] about where the logistic aid should be distributed. She would 
have checked the database of the evacuees‘ needs on the website, or asked 
for the information on the chat room of the Facebook group, or asked the 
field volunteers via land-line phone. Vice versa, she would tell us [the 
volunteers who were monitoring the Twitter account] about the evacuees‘ 
need, which was delivered via the Facebook group. So, it could be publicly 
published. Saiful, who was monitoring the situation of the Merapi volcano 
[via two-way radio], also helped us in replying to questions from the Twitter 
followers and the Facebook members (personal interview, 26 March 2014).  
In order to be able to work effectively, the seven volunteers were strictly required to work in 
the same room in order to be able to exchange their information from the monitored media 
rapidly. This also means that the seven volunteers were reliant on face to face communication 
in filtering through the social media feeds.  
The task distribution among the volunteers, who were located at the main post of the Jalin 
Merapi network, is called ‗micro-tasking‘ which is regarded as effective for dividing large 
crowdsourcing processes into discrete tasks that only need a few minutes to complete each 
task (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 49). However, it requires a higher degree of 
auditing to ensure that no task is performed repetitively. Furthermore, the mechanism of 
micro-tasking in monitoring the information provided was also applied to the information 
sharing. I will further discuss the process of information sharing by referring to Hollingshead 
et al. (2007, p. 260) who defined ‗information sharing‘ as a ‗voluntary act of making 
information available to others…and includes plans about what information to share, how, 
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when, and to whom‘. Specifically, I will start the discussion of information sharing in the 
Jalin Merapi network with ‗what information to whom‘, followed by ‗how to share the 
information‘, and ‗when to share the information‘ accordingly.  
6.2.2.1. What information to whom 
In his interview, Nasir, a former Combine staff member who was based at the main-post of 
the Jalin Merapi network, defined information sharing in the Jalin Merapi network as a 
process of sharing the useful provided information (from the affected communities) to the 
general public (people outside the affected areas) and back to the affected communities 
through the media multiplexity (personal interview, 17 March 2014). This was supported by 
another Combine staff member who was based at the main-post of the Jalin Merapi network, 
Wijoyono, as he explained: 
The objectives was to provide accurate information about Mt. Merapi from 
the local people [...] We divided it into two sides. The local community with 
community media and people outside Mt. Merapi with online media [...] 
Both sides, all of them needed the information about Mt. Merapi [...] It was 
two-way communication. Not only from the locals to the people outside the 
affected areas. We also got some information from the vulcanologists, the 
meteorologist agency [...] we shared it to the community radio stations 
(personal interview, 17 March 2014).   
The information shared through the Jalin Merapi network was the information provided by 
the affected community to the field volunteers (including the community radio volunteers) in 
advance. In general, the information was about the updated condition of the Merapi volcano; 
hazards of Merapi (pyroclastic flows and its secondary hazards such as lahars); the refugees‘ 
condition, numbers, demography, locations and needs (demand); the affected residents; the 
locations of IDP camps; aid distribution; and the needs for additional volunteers during the 
2010 eruption. Setyawan, a volunteer of Lahara FM, explained: 
They (the evacuees) came to us and asked ―I need this. Do you have it?‖ 
[…] They also called [and] sent text messages […] We shared the 
information on social media. For example, they needed sanitary napkins. If 
we had them [at the field post], we gave them to them instantly. If not, we 
typed ―The villagers at this hamlet need sanitary napkins‖. We shared it on 
the Twitter account of Jalin Merapi (personal interview, 20 March 2014).  
With regard to the two different target audiences, the Jalin Merapi network shared the 
provided information differently based on the information demands of each audience type. 
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The discrepancy in information needs between an affected community and an unaffected 
community was clearly described by Zakaria, a community member, and Sundary, a 
volunteer of Jalin Merapi, as follows: 
If I were not a victim, I would have needed the information about how I 
could help […] If I were a victim, I would have needed the information 
about the safe and vulnerable areas, and the actions I should take (Zakaria, 
personal interview, 27 June 2014). 
The evacuees need the information related to their basic needs […] the 
people outside the affected areas who wanted to help often get confused 
over how and where to help. They also need to know whether their 
donations can be distributed soon (Sundary, personal interview, 21 April 
2014).  
Each audience has distinctive priorities of information demands. Ferrante (2010), Reynolds 
and Seeger (2005), and Sellnow et al. (2002) agree that disaster communication must be able 
to reduce uncertainty by providing timely, accurate, and helpful direct messages for the 
affected community. For those who are unaffected but worried, disaster communication must 
be able to reduce generalised anxiety and concern. In the following sub-sections I detail how 
Jalin Merapi shared distinct information to the general public outside the affected areas and 
back to the affected community.  
6.2.2.1.1. Sharing to the people outside the affected areas. 
The action of sharing information to the general public was mostly done by the seven 
volunteers located at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network. They mostly used the Twitter 
account @jalinmerapi because it was considered to be able to accommodate the demand for 
timely information.  
 
Figure 23. An example of Jalin Merapi‘s tweets  
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However, Twitter was not the only medium for sharing the provided information to the 
general audience. The wider audiences could directly read the running text of the SMS sent 
by the affected communities, listen to the audio streaming of two-way radio conversations, 
and access the Google Docs on Jalin Merapi‘s website.  
Basically, the information shared with the people outside the affected areas was the 
information provided by the affected community to the Jalin Merapi network, as explained by 
a Combine staff member who was based at the main-post of the Jalin Merapi network below: 
Information about Mt. Merapi has been mainly sourced from mass media. 
The characteristics of information will be different between [the 
information] shared by the community and that published by mass media. 
So, we made a bridge between the insider and the people outside the 
affected areas […] We collected the local information and published it 
online. So, people outside Mt. Merapi could know what was happening in 
Mt. Merapi from the view of the local people (Wijoyono, personal 
interview, 17 March 2014).   
Particularly, the information sharing focused on the needs of the evacuees; the volunteers 
located at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network classified that particular information as 
the ―Demands‖. It was particularly useful because without a trustworthy direct channel of 
communication with the affected community, individual donors had difficulty finding 
information about about the specific needs of the evacuees and the locations of the affected 
areas where the evacuees needed particular forms of aid during the 2010 eruption. Moreover, 
they hesitated to contact the local government because they were unsure whether the local 
government would have been willing to accept and distribute personal donations which were 
more likely to be quantitatively less than the institutional donations. 
The information about the needs of of the affected community (the demands) was compiled 
on the Google Doc of ―Demands of Merapi eruption-affected communities 2010‖ (Data 
kebutuhan Warga Terdampak Erupsi 2010) before being shared with the general public. 
Agustina, a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network, explained that the Google Doc became a 
continuously updated database for aid distribution to set priorities of demands and avoid 
overlapping aid (personal interview, 12 May 2014). It was a matrix template of compiled 
information about the detailed location of IDP camps, demands including detailed contact 
and its urgency, and demographic information (e.g. numbers of toddlers, children, the elderly, 




Figure 24. ―Demands of Merapi eruption-affected communities 2010‖ Google Doc  
Specifically, the information about demand compiled in the Google Doc was shared on the 
website of the Jalin Merapi network, so it could be accessible to the general public. As a data 
base, the general audiences could simply access the compiled information on the Google Doc 
and did not necessarily need to gather scattered information to get the most updated and 
detailed information. Moreover, according to a volunteer of Jalin Merapi, potential donors 
could easily decide what they could help with and where because the compiled information 
was already divided based on the sub-districts (the location) (Widyarsi, personal interview, 
27 May 2014). 
6.2.2.1.2. Sharing back to the affected community 
Unlike the information sharing with the general public that was mostly done by the 
volunteers located at the main Jalin Merapi post, information sharing back to the affected 
communities was mostly done by the field volunteers, particularly the volunteers from the 
community radio stations. Similarly to the role of the volunteers of the community radio 
stations in providing the evacuees‘ information to the Jalin Merapi network, the community 
radio volunteers also acted as message couriers to deliver information back to the evacuees, 
utilizing their personal social networks to share the information with their eruption-affected 
friends and families. Additionally, they engaged the community information nodes, the 
people considered to be reliable by other community members, as the initial points in 
forwarding information to the rest of the community members. The role of the community 
radio volunteers as information couriers in bridging information from the people outside the 
affected areas to the evacuees strengthens the argument about the importance of engaging 
local actors in disaster communication. 
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Moreover, I argue that the process of information sharing through Jalin Merapi demonstrates 
that it is important to engage local people who are physically present in the affected areas in 
disaster communication. By being in the affected areas, the community radio volunteers 
could engage in face-to-face communication with the evacuees, which made the process of 
information sharing back to the affected community more effective than using SMS or two-
way radio. The effectiveness of word-of-mouth communication through a face-to-face 
meeting was emphasized by some interviewed community members; they specifically 
considered that the particular traditional way of communication, known as Getuk Tular, is 
still the most effective method because information can be shared with someone they know 
immediately (Adji, 22 July 2014; Supadi, 22 July 2014). In a similar fashion, Wulandari, 
another community member, described that ‗many prefer seeking information at the 
Poskamling [the neighbourhood watch post]‘ through a face-to-face meeting. Not only at the 
community level, but a head of a village, Yatin also described that traditional communication 
built upon offline relationships is more resilient, because a disaster always disrupts the 
network systems of the communication technologies (focus group, 19 July 2014). Supporting 
the argument that face-to-face communication is important in disaster communication, Austin 
et al. (2012), Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2011), Ryan (2013), and Romo‐Murphy et al. 
(2011) found that person-to-person communication, particularly word of mouth through face-
to-face interaction, is the primary source of local disaster information right after a disaster 
strikes; additional sources of information such as local authorities, social media, and mass 
media tend to be used afterwards. More importantly, face-to-face communication provides 
‗the cronic monitoring of the gaze, bodily posture, and gesture‘, which can confirm the 
trustworthiness of information (Giddens, 1990, p. 99). 
During the 2010 Merapi eruption, the disaster information shared with the Merapi people 
mainly consisted of three types of information: official information about Mt. Merapi‘s status 
from Balai Penyelidikan dan Pengembangan Teknologi Kebencanaan Geologi (Center for 
Investigation and Technology Development of Geological Disasters – BPPTKG), community-
generated information about lahars from the two-way radio users, and information about aid 
supplies from donors. The types of shared information reflected the information needed and 
valued by the affected community. In particular, prioritising information about the hazards of 
eruption and lahars matched the previous studies of Mt. Merapi (Thouret et al., 2000, Voight 
et al., 2000, Dove, 2008, Surono et al., 2012, Triyoga, 1991) and the local knowledge that 
pyroclastic flows and lahars (cold lava flows) are the most dangerous hazards of Mt. Merapi. 
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Moreover, the affected community already considered the BPPTKG as the most reliable 
information source about the Mt. Merapi eruption and the users of two-way radio (regardless 
of the controversy about its information accuracy) as the most reliable information about 
lahars. Based on the finding, I argue that it is important to acknowledge the compatibility of 
the shared information with the needs of the affected community in sharing information to 
them and, at the same time, refer the shared information to an information source that is 
regarded as reliable and trustworthy by the affected community.  I detail the process of 
sharing of each type of information in the following discussions. 
Firstly, the Jalin Merapi network sought official information from the BPPTKG vulcanology 
research unit and shared the official information to the affected community accordingly. 
During the 2010 Merapi eruption, the volunteers located at the main post of Jalin Merapi 
actively requested official information from BPPTKG by means of SMS, phone calls, and its 
official website. They also consulted visual field observations on Mt. Merapi provided by the 
affected community with the BPPTKG. The responses of and data gained from the BPPTKG 
were shared back to the affected community through the volunteers of community radio 
stations. Throughout these processes, the Jalin Merapi network informally conveyed the 
official information to the affected communities. The aim to share official information to the 
affected community was acknowledged by Supadi, a community member, who stated, ‗The 
radio will coordinate with the BPPTKG. We just need to ask the [broadcasters of] radio 
station.‘ (personal interview, 27 April 2014).  
The finding that the Jalin Merapi network shared the official disaster information from the 
BPPTKG to the affected community strengthens my previous argument in Chapter Four that 
official disaster communication cannot be simply disregarded by the affected community, 
regardless of how much the trust in official channels has been undermined. Almost all the 
interviewed community radio volunteers and volunteers of Jalin Merapi claimed that they 
only referred to the information released by the BPPTKG volcanology research unit and 
disregarded the other government agencies. Widyarsi, a volunteer of Jalin Merapi, stated that 
the regional government could be a valuable information source for community-based 
disaster communication. She explained further that she gained useful disaster information 
from the website of the Sleman government (e.g. detailed information about distribution of 
the IDP camps in the Sleman districts, name lists of evacuees in a particular IDP camp, lists 
of missing persons, the lists of casualties, and evacuees‘ movements on specific dates). She 
specifically stated:   
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If someone asked about his/her missing family [members] […] I browsed 
the website of the Sleman Government […] it had (information about) who 
moved to where, who were in a particular post […] I think [the website of] 
Sleman [district] was good […] and updated […] It had the information 
about locations of all IDP camps in Sleman […] this village evacuated to 
which village […] It also had the information about death and re-evacuation 
[…] I could further recommend someone who asked for the information 
(personal interview, 27 May 2014). 
Although the local governments had useful information resources, the Jalin Merapi network 
did not seem to make the most of the official resources. Presumably, the community‘s 
perceived lack of trust in the official disaster communication, as discussed previously in 
Chapter Four, had influenced the way the volunteers of the Jalin Merrapi network, 
particularly the volunteers of the radio community stations, did not prioritise the official 
channels as their information sources during the 2010 eruption. This finding also strengthens 
the argument about the significance of the role of the community‘s perceived trust in disaster 
communication. Yet, despite the emphasis on community-based information networks, it is 
important to acknowledge that other stakeholders still have a valuable role. Principally, other 
involved stakeholders, including the government agencies, are still required in order to 
establish effective information sharing in disaster response.  
Secondly, the Jalin Merapi network shared information about lahars, which was mostly 
provided by the users of two-way radio, to the affected community. To gather information 
about lahars, these users often directly observed river banks and shared their observations 
with their internal networks including the community radio volunteers. Furthermore, the 
community radio volunteers shared the information generated by two-way radio users about 
lahars with the rest of the community members, both through the community information 
nodes and SMS. Moreover, the Jalin Merapi network relayed and streamed some frequencies 
of local two-way radio on the website of Jalin Merapi. The audio streaming successfully 
extended the one-to-one-point characteristic of two-way radio to be one-to-many point 
information sharing. This was not only useful for the affected community members who did 
not have direct access to two-way radio, but also for the general public outside the affected 
areas. The general public could also directly listen to the local conversations from the 
affected areas by the Merapi people themselves.  
Thirdly, the Jalin Merapi network shared information about available aid supplies, which 
were previously provided by donors, to the affected community. In practice, the Jalin Merapi 
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network connected the ―supplies‖ from the general public to the ―demands‖ of the affected 
community, even for the smallest and most uncommon; this was clearly explained by 
Widyarsi, a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network: 
At first, we were not sure about publishing demands for ―small‖ stuff […] 
We shared it anyway […] Surprisingly, people responded to it […] People 
sent us food […] funds […] used clothes […] groceries […] radio 
equipment […] vegetables […] pasture for livestock […] water pumps […] 
rain coats […] mobile credit for volunteers […] four-wheel [drive] cars for 
evacuation […] people offered lifts to deliver donations from Jakarta […] 
someone offered his house for temporary accommodation to some medical 
students who wanted to help the refugees […] and much more (personal 
interview, 27 May 2014). 
In the case of Jalin Merapi, the supplies were not solely related to funding and tangible 
donations; they also included information about health services, trauma healing, the distance 
between the evacuees and the Mt. Merapi summit, and available venues for temporary IDP 
camps.  
The information sharing about aid supplies started when the affected communities were 
instructed to re-evacuate for the third time, to 20 kilometres away from the Mt. Merapi 
summit. At that time, most evacuees did not know whether they needed to re-evacuate 
because they did not know the distance between their initial IDP camps and the Mt. Merapi 
summit. In responding to the absence of official information, the volunteers located at the 
main post of the Jalin Merapi network, who acted as the people outside the affected areas in 
comparison to the community radio volunteers, shared information about the distance 
between the evacuees and the Mt. Merapi summit. Nasir, a former Combine staff member 
who also participated as a volunteer of Jalin Merapi during the 2010 eruption, explained: 
When the safety zone was extended to 20 kilometres, lots of people asked 
[…] ―Do we have to re-evacuate or not?‖ We asked their locations […]We 
could not find the hamlets on Google Maps. So we bought a huge map and 
adhered it on the wall [at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network] […] 
We checked their locations [on the map], we checked their distance from the 
Mt. Merapi summit and the nearest river. In 10 minutes, we answered them 
(personal interview, 17 March 2014).   
Similarly to the distance-related confusion, there was also an absence of detailed information 
about where and how to re-evacuate. According to a community member, most of the 
affected community members asked, ‗where do we [re]evacuate?‘ (Gimar, personal 
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interview, 8 July 2014). Moreover, another community member, Setiyoko, added that the 
authorities were too slow in providing vehicles for re-evacuation; hence, people re-evacuated 
independently by their personal means of transportation and were organised by the informal 
leaders (personal interview, 8 July 2014). Subsequently, the Jalin Merapi network shared the 
information about the available venues for temporary IDP camps such as university halls, 
schools, sports stadiums, etc. to address their questions about where to re-evacuate and the 
information about available vehicles to transport the evacuees. 
The way the Jalin Merapi network treated information as a form of aid stands out from the 
focus of most humanitarian activities on tangible donations in helping the affected community 
in a disaster response. Providing numerous tangible donations frequently challenges 
community-based responses with limited resources, particularly those organised by the 
affected community themselves; the people outside the affected areas are the ones who are 
most likely to be able to provide the tangible donations needed by the affected community. 
Yet, the Jalin Merapi network showed that assisting an affected community does not 
necessarily require the ability to provide what the affected community needs; mediating 
between those who are able to provide the tangible aid and the affected community by sharing 
the information about the aid supplies can be very helpful. 
In summary, the way the Jalin Merapi network shared different information to different target 
audiences emphasises the importance of distinguishing shared information based on the 
specific demands of the affected community and the general public. I argue that this thesis 
may be able to take a position in the debate on crisis communication theories about whether 
identifying the unique vulnerability of different communities matters in deciding effective 
crisis communication strategies (Fronz, 2012). Taking the side of the scholars who consider it 
important to identify audiences based on their unique vulnerability, the thesis argues that 
disaster communication needs to distinguish information being shared to different targeted 
communities because each community has their unique information needs based on their 
unique vulnerability .  
6.2.2.2. How to share disaster information  
The Jalin Merapi network applied a cross-posting strategy to ensure that the shared 
information was accessible to all targeted communities (the general public and the affected 
communities). The main principle of the cross-posting strategy was to correlate information 
from one medium to the others. The information provided on one particular medium by the 
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affected community or the field volunteers, was shared further on the other media by the main 
volunteers. Conversely, the information provided on the other media by the affected 
community or the field volunteers, was used to respond to the information on that particular 
medium.  
For instance, the information on the Facebook groups was summarised into notes and 
published on the website of Jalin Merapi; later, the links of notes were shared on the 
Facebook and Twitter accounts. A volunteer of K FM, Santosa, explained: 
When information came from a field post, it was posted on one [Facebook 
group] and copied to other groups […] manually […] A conclusion of a 
conversation was ―converted‖ into a note, then shared […] We had certain 
community radio volunteers in each group as the controllers […] All valid 
information was shared with all groups, not being compiled on one 
particular group (personal interview, 21 March 2014). 
Again, the information from the two-way radio and the SMS gateway was shared on the 
Facebook and Twitter accounts. All incoming SMS was displayed as running texts on the 
website of Jalin Merapi, so they could be read publicly. The information from the Twitter 
account was shared on the Facebook groups, and vice-versa.  
However, the strategy of cross-posting created another challenge in translating the 
―language‖ of each medium to the others. For example, Twitter and Facebook have distinct 
information characteristics, where Twitter messages are limited to 140 characters, Facebook 
allowed longer and detailed messages (Potts et al., 2011, Karimi et al., 2013). Cross-posting a 
Facebook message onto Twitter requires the skill to modify a long and detailed message into 
140 characters without losing its key information. Similarly, skill is also required to translate 
the specific terms used by the users of two-way radio into daily language that can be 
understood by the people outside the affected areas. This challenge needs to be acknowledged 
as it may delay the process of information sharing despite the demand for timely information 
in a disaster response.  
The cross-posting strategy seems to have created a huge workload; nonetheless, it was 
effective to emphasise message prominence and increase message exposure. Similarly, 
Austin et al. (2012) and Dougall et al. (2008) agree that despite the redundancy, transmitting 
the same key messages across multiple platforms is effective in encouraging audiences to be 
more responsive to disaster information. Moreover, the strategy of cross-posting ensured that 
all useful provided information was accessible through various media in the media 
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multiplexity of Jalin Merapi. Hence, both the affected community and the people outside the 
affected areas could participate through their own media preferences. The cross-posting 
strategy fits Jaeger et al.‘s (2007) suggestion that a community-based response needs to be 
supported by multiple technologies that provide the same vital information in different 
formats that best fit the media. 
6.2.2.3. When to share information  
In addition to the distinctive information demands of both the affected community and the 
general public, the information demands shifted to adapt to the changes in the volcanic 
hazards. I summarise the statements of the research participants in Table 4 below to describe 
the distinctive demands of the affected community and the general public from time to time 






Before an eruption The most updated status and recent 
condition of Mt. Merapi. 
The most updated status and recent 
condition of Mt. Merapi. 
Right after an 
eruption 
The most updated status of Mt. 
Merapi; casualties; evacuees‘ 
condition; affected areas; possibility of 
following eruptions as the 
consideration for the next action of 
evacuation (necessary or not, where 
and how). 
Information about certain areas 
where their families and friends live. 
During the eruptions 
and evacuation 
process 
Affected/vulnerable area; damages; 
casualties; evacuees; evacuation 
routes; locations of IDP camps; 
emergency bags; transportation means 
and fuel for evacuation; demands for 
food, clothes, and blankets. 
Affected/vulnerable area; evacuees‘ 
condition; mechanism of donation 
(Supply); aid distribution; 
mechanism of voluntary 
participation; locations of those who 
needed help. 
After the eruptions Aid distribution; evacuees‘ needs; 
missing persons; physical and 
psychological recovery; demand for 
food ingredients, clothes, blankets, and 
activities; condition of livelihood, 
farms, livestock; time when they can 
feed their livestock; time when they 
can go home for their daily activities. 
 
After the eruption, the information of 
Merapi status was not mostly required. 
The refugees gained the information of 
Missing persons; mechanism of 
donations (Supply); aid distribution; 
how they can voluntarily participate 






After the eruption, the information 
of Merapi status was mostly not 
required. The unaffected could get 
                                                          
32
 I classified the information about the information demands gained from the local government officers, the 
community members, and the community radio volunteers into the category of the types of information 
demands of the Merapi people, as the affected communities.  
33
 I classified the information about the information demands gained from the Combine staff members and the 
Jalin Merapi volunteers into the category of the types of information demands of general public, as the 
unaffected communities.  
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the most updated status of Merapi, 
from the closest posts to their IDP 
camps.  
the updates from the mass media. 
Lahars stage Lahars flows and their level; traffic 
updates and road blockages; logistic 
aid (Demand) for food ingredients and 
water pumps. 
Traffic conditions and updates on 
roads that might have been blocked 
by lahars. 
Table 4. Information demands of the affected communities and the general public in the Jalin Merapi network 
Unlike the other natural disasters that mostly have one certain hazard to be dealt with, a 
volcanic eruption, such the Mt. Merapi eruption, can involve developing and changing 
hazards in the response period. An eruption of Mt. Merapi typically has two main hazards 
such as the pyroclastic flows and lahars that threaten lives in in the area around the mountain 
(Thouret et al., 2000, Voight et al., 2000, Dove, 2008, Surono et al., 2012, Triyoga, 1991). 
After an eruption resulting in pyroclastic flows and a bursting out of volcanic material, the 
erupted material build up can cause lahars. If an eruption happens during a rainy season, the 
volcanic material is often turned into a mudflow, as happened in the 2010 eruption (see the 
Introduction for the subsequent events of the 2010 eruption). During the 2010 eruption, the 
changing hazards in turn required changing information needs for the affected community 
and this strongly influences the type of shared information in disaster communication 
accordingly. In other words, the types of information shared in the Jalin Merapi network were 
not constant and depended on the demands for information of their target audiences. In a 
similar fashion, Moody (2013) also identified changes in information demands during the 
disaster response to Hurricane Katrina in 2006.  
Based on the findings, I argue that it is important to acknowledge the changing information 
demands in different time frames during a disaster response. The argument is particularly 
important due to the lack of acknowledgement in other studies that information needs change 
during a disaster stage, particularly in the response period. Most existing studies of disaster 
communication do not identify different hazards during a response period, and often 
distinguish information demands in disaster communication only based on the crisis type and 
the disaster stages. For example, most studies have acknowledged that the public need for 
information in the stage of disaster preparedness is different from their need in the stage of 
disaster response; also, the public need for information when responding to an earthquake is 
different from their need when responding to a tsunami (for example, the studies of Reynolds 
and Seeger, 2005 and Seeger et al., 2003). Yet, the changing demands for distinct disaster 
information during a single disaster stage, particularly the disaster response, have been less 
explored. Therefore, I argue that acknowledging the change of information demand by the 
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target audience in a particular time frame is necessary to determine the type of disaster 
information to be shared in disaster communication. This builds on the previous argument 
that flexibility is required in disaster communication; it is not limited to the flexibility of 
media usage, but includes message design in order to adapt to the information demand of the 
target audience in a particular time frame.  
 
6.3. Conclusion 
During the 2010 eruption, the Jalin Merapi network was recognised for its ability to provide 
local information from the affected community, particularly information about specific types 
and quantities of aid required by individuals in the areas around Mt. Merapi, to the general 
public. At the same time, the Jalin Merapi network was able to provide information from 
outside the affected area, particularly information about available aid, from the general public 
to the affected community. In order to be able to do so, the Jalin Merapi network closely 
engaged the participation of the affected community, used an integrated platform of media 
multiplexity based on local communication behaviours, and benefited from the personal 
social networks owned by the community radio volunteers. Specifically, the community radio 
volunteers bridged the information provided by the affected community to the outside, and 
shared outside information back to the affected community by harnessing their offline pre-
existing networks and media with which the affected community was already familiar. 
Simultaneously, the Jalin Merapi network shared the information of the affected to the 










I summarise the community participation in providing and sharing information within the 











               : information providing  
 : information sharing 
 
Figure 25. Information providing and sharing in the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 Merapi 
eruption. 
Addressing the third research question regarding community participation in disaster 
communication, this chapter has explained that the mechanisms of community participation 
in providing and sharing local disaster information through Jalin Merapi represent a 
networked approach, which is significantly different from the command-and-control 
approach used by the authorities in formal disaster communication. Community participation 
in providing and sharing information was built on existing media multiplexity and existing 
local social networks. By combining those two, Jalin Merapi was able to facilitate detailed 
information about the affected community, which is often only exchanged within their 
personal networks locally, to people and organisations outside the affected area, who may be 
able to respond to the information effectively through many-to-many communication forms. 
The Jalin Merapi network also benefited from the trustworthiness that was embedded in the 
personal networks of the engaged community radio volunteers. In other words, the Jalin 
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friend-to-friend network model and with familiar media. At the same time, the Jalin Merapi 
network scaled up their participation enormously by engaging internet-based media.   
This research does not suggest that the exact platform of communication technologies used 
by the Jalin Merapi network is transferable to other affected communities, because each 
community has particular local media preferences that may differ from one community to the 
other. More importantly, I emphasise the value of community participation that is rooted in 
existing local social networks and unique local communication behaviours in disaster 
communication. Using appropriate communication technologies can empower local social 
networks to effectively promote resident-to-resident assistance and foster a coordinated 
emergency response throughout a community (Jaeger et al., 2007). In turn, community 



















Information verification for trustworthiness 
 
Along with that toolkit, and the standards and processes that inform how we 
use the tools, there is also the critical element of crowdsourcing: bringing the 
public into the process and working with them to ensure we all have better 
information when it matters most  (Silverman & Tsubaki, 2014, pp. 11-12) 
Community-based disaster communication is often perceived as untrustworthy because of a 
combination of excess information, myriad information sources, and a lack of aggregation 
and validation mechanisms (Gao et al., 2011, Austin et al., 2012, Crowe, 2012, Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). Because of the perception that community-generated disaster 
information is unorganized and unverified, Chapter Four argued that the authorities tend to 
perceive community-generated information as unreliable based on their institutional logic of 
information verification. This has led to a lack of trust and community engagement in disaster 
communication by the authorities. Despite this institutional mistrust, community-generated 
disaster information, particularly facilitated by social media, has grown considerably in the 
aftermath of recent disasters. Attempting to make the best use of community-generated 
information in disaster response, some volunteer tech communities have developed and used 
internet-based communication technologies such Ushahidi and the OpenStreetmap to collect 
and classify the overloaded crowdsourcing into easily-identified information for the general 
public. However, verifiying the considerable quantity of  crowdsourced information is still 
the biggest challenge.    
Experts have increasingly used advanced computing to verify information posted on social 
media (Silverman and Tsubaki, 2014), and this has shown both ‗promises and pitfalls‘ 
recently (Meier, 2014, p. 78). This process seems to focus on verifying the community-
generated information shared on social media and overlooks the information provided 
through other more traditional media such as SMS and two-way radio, as the advanced 
verification tools cannot be automatically applied to verify community-generated information 
through those older media. Therefore, this chapter addresses the challenge of developing a 
verification mechanism for community-generated disaster information that can be applied to 
multiple media in disaster communication. Specifically, this chapter starts with a discussion 
of how the Jalin Merapi network verified the information provided by the affected 
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community during the 2010 Merapi eruption. This chapter also presents a discussion of the 
protocols of information sharing applied by the Jalin Merapi network to maintain the validity 
of its information. The discussion is followed by an explanation of how the community-based 
verification mechanisms of the Jalin Merapi network contrast with the verification 
mechanisms of the local governments in the regions around Mt. Merapi. This chapter ends 
with a discussion of the compatibility of the community-based verification mechanisms of the 
Jalin Merapi network with individuals‘ perspectives on verified disaster information, which 
evidently encouraged trust from the affected community and the general public in the Jalin 
Merapi network during the 2010 Merapi eruption. 
 
7.1. Community participation in information verification 
Although the information shared through the Jalin Merapi network was provided directly by 
the Merapi people, who are often considered to be the reliable ―insider‖ information sources 
because they personally experienced the eruption, verification was still necessary to guarantee 
validity, because of the possibility that an affected community would exaggerate information 
under an extreme stress situation (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011). Therefore, the Jalin 
Merapi network implemented two verification mechanisms, which were public and internal 
verification. I will discuss how each mechanism was implemented by Jalin Merapi‘s 
volunteers and the community radio volunteers in order to verify the information provided to 
the Jalin Merapi network during the 2010 Merapi eruption. 
Firstly, the Jalin Merapi network closely engaged the participation of the affected community 
as information verifiers in its mechanism of public verification. In his interview, a volunteer 
of Gema Merapi FM  explained that the affected community was involved as ‗significant 
others‘ to ensure the accuracy of the information shared by the Jalin Merapi network 
(Ferdana, personal interview, 11 March 2014). The survivors voluntarily clarified any 
inaccurate information they saw on or heard from the Jalin Merapi network. The voluntary 
verifiers were often those who lived at or near the location associated with the information 
and able to quickly investigate the facts. The community‘s ability to verify information was 
facilitated by the openness of the information of the Jalin Merapi network; Wijoyono, a 
Combine staff member who also participated as a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network, 
explained,  ‗We were using open data. All information had a contact person […] So people 
can verify the information by themselves‘ (personal interview, 17 March 2014). Regarding 
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the argument that the affected community can verify information shared in disaster 
communication, Crowe (2012, p. 129) labels the particular process of information verification 
as ‗social validation‘ and the ‗self-correction mechanism of collective wisdom‘. 
In addition to the voluntary verification performed by the affected community, the general 
public, particularly donors, also performed voluntary verification on the information about 
aid distribution and demand. Referring to the information shared by the Jalin Merapi 
network, some donors personally distributed their aid to the evacuees and simultaneously 
checked whether the person-in-need associated with particular pieces of information actually 
required the aid. There were some cases during the 2010 Merapi eruption when people were 
proven to have provided false information, particularly about logistic needs. Two volunteers 
of the Jalin Merapi network, Nasir and Zulivan, gave examples of information verification by 
donors: 
At that time, Magelang had a blackout for two weeks. The demand for 
generators was really high […] There was someone who initiated donations 
of generators […]He tweeted ‗there is a fraud over generators in Krinjing [a 
village in Magelang district]. I didn‘t directly re-tweet it because it was 
suspect information. I asked his contact number […] to ask further […] 
about the chronology […] He told me that his team surveyed the village 
where someone requested generators via Jalin Merapi. They were convinced 
that he really needed them. When they delivered the generators the next day, 
they incidentally found out that there was a pile of logistic aid and 
generators at the back of the house […] I re-tweeted the information about 
the fraud […] So, the donors also shared that kind of information [the 
information about fraud the donors revealed] […] they have a similar 
interest (Nasir, personal interview, 17 March 2014). 
The verification also came from the crowd of Twitter or Facebook. For 
example, someone said that they needed hay. Then, someone else responded 
that he/she had hay and had gone there. But, the donor found out that the 
person was lying. They did not need the hay. They just wanted to sell it, 
maybe. So, the donor tweeted it (Zulivan, personal interview, 17 March 
2014).  
Secondly, the Jalin Merapi network involved its volunteers (again, including the community 
radio volunteers) as internal information verifiers. Two volunteers of the Jalin Merapi 
network, Wijoyono and Nasir, explained the internal information verification, as follows: 
For our verification system, our key persons were the community radio 
people in the field […] We could confirm any information with them and 
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the volunteers in the posts. The information was not only about [Mt 
Merapi‘s] condition, but also about demand and donations. In the office [the 
main post of Jalin Merapi], we had a team for verification purposes […] 
made calls for donation verification. Of course, we could not verify one by 
one but we had a team for that purpose [verification] (Wijoyono, personal 
interview, 17 March 2014).   
The volunteers of the nearest field post of Jalin Merapi [including the 
volunteers of the community radio stations] were the verifiers. ―There is 
someone who said that they need ABCD, this is his number, this is his 
location, please check‖ […] They reported the result of the verification […] 
The other verifier was Ibu Wid […] She was one of the volunteers [located 
at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network] […] She called the 
information sources […] She could identify whether the person was lying or 
not, even from the way he was talking. If she wasn‘t sure, she asked the field 
volunteers to check it on the spot […] She was right many times (Nasir, 
personal interview, 17 March 2014). 
The role of community radio stations in information verification has been barely discussed in 
previous studies on them, however the community radio volunteers (as parts of the affected 
community) have an important practical role as information verifiers in a disaster response. In 
the case of the Jalin Merapi network, they acted as the field focal points with access to the 
real situation on the ground. In practice, the community radio volunteers extended the 
verifiers networks with their personal networks on the ground, so the process of information 
verification could encompass all areas surrounding Mt. Merapi. As locals, Haji, a volunteer 
of K FM, explained that the community radio volunteers knew exactly what was happening 
in their surroundings and had personal relationships to fill in the ―blank spots‖ of information 
sources. He further stated that the community radio volunteers could check the information 
accuracy with someone they knew who lived in the area associated with the information, 
based on the trust in their personal relationships (personal interview, 21 March 2014). As a 
result, another volunteer of K FM explained that the community radio volunteers became the 
contact persons on the website of Jalin Merapi, so the wider audience members could call 
them to ask about their families or to verify information (Pandu, personal interview, 21 
March 2014). 
For internal verification of information, the volunteers used the Facebook accounts of Jalin 
Merapi as channels for internal coordination, discussion, and verification. In practice, a 
volunteer of K FM explained that the field volunteers or the community radio volunteers 
created a group chat for each field post on the Facebook groups in advance, so every member 
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could write and read all information consecutively (Santosa, personal interview, 21 March 
2014). Any uncertain information, which was previously provided by the evacuees, would 
have been shared on the Facebook groups by chatting or wall-posting. The information in 
question was mostly about the false demands for aid or the rumours of another sequence of 
Merapi eruptions. In responding to that information, the volunteers or the community radio 
volunteers, who were located at the nearest field post, would check the information‘s 
accuracy directly with an affected community member at the relevant location. This 
verification mechanism was described by Haji, a volunteer of K FM, as below: 
All community radio volunteers were online [on the Facebook groups] […] 
they could read the chats […] They would have verified inaccurate 
information […] We personally trusted our volunteers […] I do not reckon 
the media, but I 100% trust all information from them [volunteers] […] If 
someone informed about a condition of a particular area in Mt. Merapi, all 
we needed to do was chat with the community radio volunteers who lived in 
that area, and ask them about the information‘s accuracy. If they said that it 
was not true, I would have shared it […] We used that mechanism to verify 
local information. For information of evacuees, we asked the volunteers of 
Jalin Merapi to directly verify it at the IDP camps (personal interview, 21 
March 2014). 
Again, similarly to the processes of providing and sharing information, the verification 
mechanism of the Jalin Merapi network was built on the social networks of community radio 
volunteers, which established trust and extended the verifier networks. In a conventional 
disaster response, the authorities often overlook the local social network, as one of the 
important social aspects of the affected community, particularly regarding information 
verification.  
In addition to the verification process by the volunteers of the community radio stations on 
the ground, the Jalin Merapi network assigned one volunteer located in the main post to 
information verification, as described by Nasir above. The volunteer, Widyarsi, verified 
information by making phone calls to the affected community members providing 
information and cross-media verification. In her interview, she explained: 
I called them […] They said, ―yes, mam. We need that. If you have time, 
you can come here‖ […] through direct conversation, I could tell if they 
were lying (Widyarsi, 27 May 2014). 
235 
 
Although a direct conversation with the information source seems to be old-fashioned 
compared to the advanced computing technologies, it is an important verification tool to track 
the details of information down and determine the reliability of the information source (De 
Rosa, 2014, Law and Bannock, 2014). Asking direct questions will often prompt an 
individual‘s confession if s/he has given false information (Wardle, 2014).  
In addition to a direct conversation with the person providing the information, Widyarsi also 
explained the cross-media verification process. She took an exampe of verifying information 
by cross-checking the information on the Facebook and the Google Docs:  
One time, I had just finished inputting data onto the Google Docs when I read 
information on the Facebook. It was posted by a person claiming to be a 
volunteer of Merapi […] It was the same name in different information I just 
inputted [on the Google Docs] […] I re-checked the name and the contact 
number […] Confirmed! It was the same person […] He stated that he was a 
field volunteer in a particular location. He demanded priority of aid 
distribution […] I called the coordinator of the field post in that particular 
location. ―No, mam. We don‘t have that name here. Don‘t respond to him‘ 
[…] We deleted his name on the list [of the Google Docs]  […] When he 
found it out, he cursed at me through SMS […]He was not located at Mt. 
Merapi, not one of the evacuees […] He gave his number so he could get the 
aid for himself […] I monitor all information on Facebook and Google Docs. 
I cross-checked each of them […] I am an auditor, so I am used to it.     
Suppporting the effectiveness of cross-media verification, Meier (2014) agrees that this 
particular strategy can triagulate information across media to ensure the reliability of 
information.   
Not only to verify the accuracy of the information provided by the affected community, the 
mechanisms of public and internal verification were also applied to address and clarify any 
misleading rumours and news that might have led to community panic. According to the 
interviewees involved in the Jalin Merapi network, Jalin Merapi challenged any misleading 
rumour or news by verifying the news with the community radio volunteers or the field 
volunteers in the news associated area. If the news was proven inaccurate, they would share 
the verification through the media multiplexity of Jalin Merapi. This was clearly explained by 
Sundary, a volunteer of Jalin Merapi: 
At that time, there were so many message broadcasts shared on BBM 
[BlackBerry Messenger] stating that Mt. Merapi would erupt again at a 
particular time […] Jalin Merapi directly checked whether the information 
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was accurate or not to the field volunteers and the volunteers of community 
radio stations. We always reminded [the audiences] not to trust random 
information sources, [and that] the real condition is blah blah blah […] We 
did that kind of clarification a lot, even to the national media […]In the end, 
Jalin Merapi became a place where you could find information clarification 
(personal interview, 21 April 2014). 
Dougall et al. (2008) agree that scanning and clarifying inaccurate news are necessary in 
disaster communication because of the slow response of the government and the tendency 
towards exaggerated news in the mass media. Moreover, any misleading news will lead to 
increased outrage, which leads further to more news coverage, to more outrage, and on and on 
in an upward spiral (Sandman, 1993). Similarly, all interviewed community members agreed 
that the national television stations often did not broadcast substantive news but 
exaggerations, which frightened the affected communities during the 2010 Merapi eruption. 
Therefore, the finding supports the argument that corrective action over misleading 
information is important in disaster communication. 
7.1.1. Information arrangement of the Jalin Merapi network to maintain validity and 
accountability 
Not simply verifying the information provided by the affcted community, the Jalin Merapi 
network also applied some protocols to ensure the validity of the information shared through 
its platforms. In practice, the Jalin Merapi network set some unofficial arrangements in 
sharing their information with their target audiences during the 2010 eruption. All shared 
information had to note the time when the information was being shared, the contact number 
of the person who was responsible for the information being shared, and the location 
associated with the shared information. By mentioning a specific time, in particular, the Jalin 
Merapi network attempted to keep its information up-to-date, so its audiences did not share 
and respond to out-of-date information. This was clearly explained by Zulivan, a volunteer of 
the Jalin Merapi network, as follows: 
At first, we did not consider that our tweet might have been re-tweeted in a 
couple of hours, a couple of days […] even a week later […] For example, if 
we tweeted that Merapi had just erupted, people might have thought that it 
was still erupting when someone re-tweeted it a week later […] So, we 
always put [the exact time] the hour and minute in front of our tweet […] in 
24 hours format […] It aimed to keep the data accurate and could be quickly 
responded to […] People could know when the tweet was published […] so 
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they would not have responded to expired information (personal interview, 
17 March 2014). 
The information about a contact person showed who was responsible for the accountability of 
the information shared. If the information was provided by a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi 
network, the coordinator of the field post of Jalin Merapi, who was located in the associated 
area, would have acted as the contact person. Finally, the shared information had to include 
the detailed location of the information: the district area followed by the sub-district area. If 
the information was provided by a volunteer located at a field post of Jalin Merapi, the 
information should have included the name of the particular post. This particular information 
of the location was significantly useful for information verification as ‗geodata is verifiable 
because its accuracy can be ascertained by walking to the place and checking the data by eye‘ 
(Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, p. 42; Wardle, 2014).  
Although the research participants did not consider the references of time-frame, contact 
person, and location as one of the verification mechanisms of the Jalin Merapi network, that 
particular information is actually fundamental for the verification process. Numerous experts 
in the Verification handbook (2014) point out the significance of investigating information in 
reference to the source, the date, and the location in making decisions on the validation of the 
information in various emergency situations; highly-validated information has a credible 
source and is published on the event-associated date and in the event-associated location. 
When the Jalin Merapi network deliberately included the references, they corroborated the 
validity of the shared information as coming from the affected community in the area 
surrounding Mt. Merapi during the event of the 2010 Merapi eruption. More importantly, the 
references were most likely to encourage the perception that the information was verified for 
the information receivers.  
To strengthen understanding that the information it carried was verified, the  Jalin Merapi 
network also emphasised the accountability of their network, particularly to the general 
public. As outlined in Chapter Five, the Jalin Merapi network coordinated with aid 
distribution, in addition to their main focus on community-disaster communication. To 
maintain their accountability, the Jalin Merapi network used a Google Doc to record 
incoming aid and aid distribution as well as a Google Doc of Demands that acted as the 
database of information about the needs of the evacuees (detailed in Chapter Six). The report 
of incoming aid was publicly published on Jalin Merapi‘s website as ―Data Penyaluran 
Bantuan via Jalin Merapi‖ (Data of aid distribution via Jalin Merapi). It was a matrix 
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template of compiled information about the details of aid (types and date received) as the 
―Supplies‖, the details of the donors (name, address, and phone number), and the details of 
aid distribution (date, location, and the beneficiary‘s name). Thus, donors could directly 
check whether their donations had been well received by the evacuees. 
Not only useful for the donors, the report was also used by the field volunteers as a database 
of aid supplies. As the report had information about incoming and outgoing aid, it 
automatically had information about the available aid, and what had been distributed at the 
main post or the field posts of the Jalin Merapi network. Subsequently, the field volunteers 
could seek available aid that matched any unfulfilled need of the evacuees in their 
surroundings. 
 
7.2. Publish and then verify before it is too late.  
In addition to engaging the participation of the affected community as information verifiers 
and the internal arrangement to maintain information validity, the Jalin Merapi network also 
addressed the need for rapid decision making in responding to the needs of the evacuees in the 
2010 eruption. According to Nasir, a former Combine staff member who was based at the 
main-post of the Jalin Merapi network, the process of verifying community-based disaster 
information in the area around Mt. Merapi had heavily relied on the official hierarchical 
process of the local government. Ironically, the hierarchical process to ensure the accuracy of 
information had frequently led to invalidity because of the long time span of the verification 
process (personal interview, 17 March 2014). 
In practice, to be regarded as verified in official disaster response, community-generated 
disaster information has to be supported by an official. Thus, information from a community 
member has to be delivered to the low-level of local government in advance, so it can be 
verified officially by the authorities. Nurwiyono, a head of a sub-district explained the proses 
of official verification: if information comes from a community member at the hamlet levels, 
s/he needs to deliver the information to a head of a hamlet or a head of a village in advance. 
The head of a hamlet or village will verify the information before delivering it further to the 
head of a district. Then, the head of a sub-district will deliver it to the BPBD regional disaster 
management agency. Finally, the BPBD will deliver the information to the other government 
agencies and coordinate with them for further response (focus group, 19 June 2015). This 
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reflects the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative‘s finding (2011) which identified that the formal 
humanitarian community still relies on a hierarchical process for collecting and analysing 
disaster information. 
As a result, by the time information is officially verified and published, the verified 
information does not represent the real situation; so it becomes invalid. Specifically, Nasir 
from Jalin Merapi stated: 
The validity of data depends on the situation relatively. Information about 
building reconstruction may be valid for a week or a month. But, the data of 
emergency needs is only valid for minutes or even seconds, isn‘t it? [...] A 
verification method that can keep up with the change of the real situation is 
the only choice! [...] If we verified more slowly than the speed of data 
changes, it was still not valid. For example, the number of refugees in 
barrack A was 1000 at 12 pm; it could be 5000 or 500 at 5 pm because they 
might have moved in or moved out. If the number of 1000 was published at 
5 pm [...] It was not valid anymore [...] In principle, it had been validated, 
but it did not represent the real situation [...] This still generally happens up 
until now. They [the local government] collect the data today and publish it 
tomorrow morning. It is not real time [...] It is methodologically valid, but it 
is not valid in reality (personal interview, 17 March 2014). 
The inability of the formal verification process to deal with the fast pace of information 
movement in emergency situations also has been acknowledged in the studies of the Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative (2011), and Silverman and Tsubaki (2014). This inability often 
prevents rapid decision-making in a disaster response. Yet, many organisations, including the 
local governments, continue to enforce their ‗standards and practices for handling 
crowdsourced information‘ (Silverman & Tsubaki, 2014, p. 10). 
Therefore, according to Nasir, the Jalin Merapi network strongly argued for a mechanism of a 
real-time verification that can keep pace with the speed of situation changes during an 
eruption (personal interview, 17 March 2014). In practice, the Jalin Merapi network applied a 
default principle that all information about the needs of the evacuees was assumed to be 
accurate until it had been verified as inaccurate; the information was automatically published 
and compiled on Google Docs before being verified during the 2010 Merapi eruption. In 
contrast, all information about Mt. Merapi, which could potentially create public panic, was 
assumed to be inaccurate until it had been verified otherwise. The default principle of 
information treatment was clearly explained by Wijoyono, a Combine staff member who was 
also a volunteer at the main post of the Jalin Merapi network, as follows: 
240 
 
Information about demands for logistics, blood, or medicines was 
automatically treated as accurate until it was proven otherwise after 
verification. Importantly, it went online first. We realised that it had 
weaknesses, but we took the risk to keep up with the speed of change in  the 
situation. So, we didn‘t filter [the information] by selecting the sources [of 
the information] purposively. The assumption was everything was important 
[…] On the contrary, for information about a situation that potentially 
created public panic, we treated it as inaccurate until it was verified […] For 
example, someone reported that there was a hot-ash cloud [a pyroclastic 
flow] […] we didn‘t re-tweet it before we checked it directly with our 
friends [the community radio volunteers] in the field (personal interview, 17 
March 2014). 
In addition to keeping up with the fast pace of change, publishing unverified information 
about the needs of the evacuees was regarded as a form of open data required for public 
verification. Nasir from Jalin Merapi argued, ‗Open data was the condition. It means that the 
data can be accessed by everyone‘ (personal interview, 17 March 2014). By publishing the 
information, the audiences of the Jalin Merapi network, both the affected community and the 
people outside the affected areas, could participate in verifying the information. If the shared 
information was verified as accurate, the result of verification complemented the earlier data. 
Otherwise, the previously shared information was revised and updated on the Twitter 
accounts and the Google Docs of Jalin Merapi. 
Yet, the efforts of the Jalin Merapi network to provide speed was not necessarily flawless. 
The information shared through the Jalin Merapi network was not necessarily accurate, 
despite being directly sourced from the affected community. Taking examples of the 
donations of generators and hay as told by Nasir and Zulivan above, the verification process 
of the Jalin Merapi network was still vulnerable to fraud when someone attempted to get more 
aid than s/he actually required. It was particularly so because verification of information was 
performed when the requested aid had been available and delivered to the beneficiary by the 
field-post volunteers or the donor. In responding to the flaw, Nasir argued that it was solved 
by ―public punishment‖ for the fraud. He specifically stated: 
We assumed that the information about the needs [of the evacuees] was 
accurate until it was verified otherwise […] If they ]the ones who provided 
the information] really needed it, our response was not too late. If the 
information was inaccurate, it could be revised and there was always a 
punishment […] to be scolded publicly […] to be blacklisted virally […] I 
re-tweeted the information about the fraud […] no one contacted them after 
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the tweet about the fraud; no one responded when they asked for more aid 
[…] So, it was layered verification (personal interview, 17 March 2014). 
 
Because of the same vulnerabilities, the concept of sharing unverified disaster 
communication to increase the speed of information was strongly debated by the officials 
who participated in this study. They argued that they only share verified information in their 
official disaster communication. One of the officials, Sunyoto, specifically argued: 
At the government level, the information selection is compulsory […] The 
official information sharing is restricted to the verified information. It has 
been frequently coordinated, so inaccurate information will not ever be 
shared (focus group, 19 June 2014). 
Although the information may have been verified by Jalin Merapi‘s audiences, either the 
affected community or the donors, it is still not likely to be regarded as verified by the 
officials. In both focus groups, the officials defined verified information as that which has 
been verified scientifically with a valid methodology by an authorized agency or the experts. 
This is similar to their perception of risk that also heavily relies on the scientific paradigm in 
Chapter Four.  
The particular official definition of verified information has been regarded as the main 
determinant of the difficulty of integrating community-based disaster communication, such as 
Jalin Merapi, with official disaster communication. Going back to the Jalin Merapi network, 
Nasir from Jalin Merapi explained that the incompatibility of verification between the Jalin 
Merapi community-based network and the local government was because both parties 
perceived verified information differently (personal interview, 17 March 2014). His 
explanation was supported by two other Combine staff members who were volunteers of the 
Jalin Merapi network: 
That‘s the challenge. Until now, those who work in disaster management 
perceive verified information […] as that which is valid methodologically 
[…] or valid according to a certain institution. A NGO or a government 
agency […] It doesn‘t matter whether it [the data] represents the reality or 
not […] They [the NGO and the government agency] are not the only ones 
who own disaster data (Widarto, personal interview, 17 March 2014). 
The governments don‘t trust a publicly open verification system […]They 
prefer a system that is verified by a team in the government itself 




In contrast to the local government agencies who strongly relied on scientific and authorized 
verification, the Jalin Merapi network emphasised that information verification can also be 
done by the public, particularly the affected community members, who are personally 
experiencing the information-associated event. Yet, according to Wijoyono, a Combine staff 
member who was also a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network, the local government had 
doubted the data collection system and the public verification of the Jalin Merapi network 
during the 2010 Merapi eruption (personal interview, 17 March 2014). The doubt on public 
verification is actually common in disaster communication; there are always criticisms to 
argue whether the crowdsourcing data is properly collected, or whether samples are unlikely 
to be representative, or may have self-selection bias (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 
2011). 
I summarize the differences between the verification mechanism of Jalin Merapi and the 
verification mechanism of the local government in a table below: 
Jalin Merapi Government 
Information publication should be performed in 
real time. 
Information publication should be performed 
after verification. 
Valid information means that the information 
represents the real situation in real time. 
Valid information means that the information is 
methodologically accurate.  
Information about the needs of survivors is valid 
until it is proven inaccurate. 
Valid disaster information is the official version 
from the authorities.  
Information verification can be conducted by the 
local communities as the first responders. 
Information verification can be conducted only 
by an authorized agency. 
Table 5. A comparison between the Jalin Merapi network‘s and the local government‘s information 
verification.  
 
7.3. Individual perspective of the community-based verification mechanisms of the Jalin 
Merapi network. 
Notwithstanding the strong misgivings of the officials, the attempt of the Jalin Merapi 
network to keep up with the rapid changes in a disaster situation made it possible to 
immediately respond to those who really needed help. The verification mechanisms of the 
Jalin Merapi network were considered to successfully fast forward the process of information 
verification by the local government in a disaster response; this was clearly stated by Zakaria, 
a community member, as follows: 
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In the formal procedure of aid distribution, an official has to personally 
verify to the IDP camps to ensure the evacuees really need the aid. 
Consequently, the official aid frequently comes late when it is not needed 
anymore. Jalin Merapi could fast-forward the process in the 2010 eruption 
[…] Jalin Merapi could fill in the gap without interrupting the conventional 
way performed by the government institutions (personal interview, 27 June 
2014). 
Moreover, by the audiences of the Jalin Merapi network, the information shared through the 
Jalin Merapi network was perceived as trustworthy for the speed of its timely updated 
‗insider‘ information, its verification by the affected community themselves, its open and 
accessible data, and its rapid aid distribution. Two interviewed community members 
described that those particular characteristics had become the determinants of their trust in the 
Jalin Merapi network. They specifically stated:  
In disaster response and disaster recovery, we need different types of 
information. Consequently, the way we trust information is strongly 
influenced by that. In a disaster response, we need rapid information from 
our social network (Zakaria, personal interview, 27 June 2014). 
At that time, I needed information […] It was very difficult to get the most 
updated […] I found that Jalin Merapi was the most updated […] even the 
[news of] TV was not real-time. Well, maybe sometimes it was. But, Jalin 
Merapi was more real-time […] the most updated [and] intensive […] None 
was faster than Jalin Merapi at that time […] Those who provided the 
information to Jalin Merapi, they were really there [in the area surrounding 
Mt. Merapi] (Ramawanti, personal interview, 24 Jul 2014). 
Interestingly, although the community-generated disaster information shared by the Jalin 
Merapi network was unlikely to be engaged in the formal disaster response at the institutional 
level, the information was treated differently by the officials at the individual level. According 
to Wijoyono, a Combine staff member who was also a volunteer of the Jalin Merapi network, 
the authorities often used the information shared in the Jalin Merapi network for individual 
purposes, not for institutional purposes (personal interview, 17 March 2014). Supporting 
Wijoyono, Susetya, a Magelang district officer, stated that he personally accessed the 
information shared in the Jalin Merapi network because it could provide information that was 
unavailable on the government agencies‘ websites, especially the data about evacuees. 
However, he argued that the information shared through the Jalin Merapi network was partial 
and not comprehensive enough for the government‘s interest. Specifically, he stated: 
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From my experiences during the 2010 eruption, I accessed Jalin Merapi 
frequently […] Its features were far more communicative [and] fitted our 
needs […] compared to the official website of Magelang district […] the 
magelang.go.id published by the Agency of Communication and 
Informatics […] I wish its features could be more accessible to those who 
need it. For example, Jalin Merapi was far more communicative. Honestly! 
Jalin Merapi had information we could hear directly [the audio-streaming] 
[…] the data of the needs [of the evacuees]. Although, it was still partial, 
still not comprehensive. But, at least, it [the Jalin Merapi network] was a 
progressive initiative from the community. It showed creativity in content 
management, which somehow has to be produced by the Agency of 
Communication and Informatics as well (focus group, 19 July 2014). 
This shows that the community-based verification mechanisms applied by the Jalin Merapi 
network were more appropriate for individuals and an informal community movement than 
formal organisations, as described by a volunteer of Jalin Merapi below: 
A community-based information network should not be performed by a big 
organization, since it will make its movement become slower. It may lose its 
community-based orientation, because it will focus more on accountability. 
In order to maintain its accountability, it may create a particular bureaucracy 
that involves a lot of forms. Meanwhile, what makes Jalin Merapi different 
is its speed, for not being bureaucratic, and its basis of trust (Widyarsi, 
personal interview, 27 May 2014). 
Unlike the local government members who define information validity based on their 
institutional logic and scientific approach to maintain their public responsibilities, individuals 
rely more on trustworthiness, speed, and the compatibility of the information with individual 
needs. In other words, although people may not verify the information themselves, they tend 
to automatically consider that information is trustworthy when they know that the information 










Integrating the argument in this chapter that the affected community can play important roles 
in information verifying on the ground with the argument in the previous chapter that the 
other important role of the affected community is providing and sharing local-relevant 
disaster communication through media multiplexity, I summarise the three processes of 
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Figure 26. Information providing, sharing, and verification in the Jalin Merapi network during the 
2010 Merapi eruption. 
To maintain the validity of the information shared in its platform of media multiplexity, the 
Jalin Merapi network closely engaged the participation of the affected community, including 
the volunteers of the community radio stations. This chapter also addresses the third research 
question by focusing on community participation in verifying information provided by other 
affected community members. The affected community members had access to the real 
situation on the ground. So, they were able to quickly verify whether the information was 
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radio stations played an important role in extending the verifiers‘ network on the ground with 
their personal social networks. So, the verifiers‘ network encompassed all areas surrounding 
Mt. Merapi. In practice, the volunteers of Jalin Merapi used Facebook groups, direct phone-
calls to the people who provided information, and cross-media strategies to verify the 
information provided by the affected community. As well as focusing on verifying 
information from the affected community, Jalin Merapi also maintained the validity of its 
information by including references to the time when the information was being shared, the 
contact number of the person who was responsible for the information being shared, and the 
location associated with the shared information. Also, the Jalin Merapi network published a 
regularly-updated report of incoming aid and aid distribution to maintain its accountability. 
The verification mechanism of the Jalin Merapi network attempted to address the inability of 
the official verification mechanisms to keep up with the fast pace of changes on the ground 
during the 2010 eruption. In practice, Jalin Merapi applied a default principle that information 
about the needs of the evacuees was published and verified afterwards. Meanwhile, 
information about Mt. Merapi‘s hazards had to be verified before being published.   
However, the community-based verification mechanisms of Jalin Merapi are unlikely to be 
adopted by the organisations with formal procedures for disaster response, such as the local 
governments, because they do not fit the institutional logic of accountability that demands a 
more explicit methodology. This is particularly because of the discrepancy in the definition of 
verified information between the local governments and the Jalin Merapi community-based 
network. The local governments have defined verified information as that which has been 
verified scientifically with a valid methodology by an authorized agency or the experts. On 
the other hand, the affected community also has an idea about what information validity 
means, which apparently is different from the definition adopted by the government. The 
community-based verification mechanism is more likely to fit the community‘s idea of 
information validity than the institutional logic of information validity. At the individual 
level, the mechanism of community-based verification is regarded as faster than the official 
verification mechanism and able to immediately respond to those who really need help. In 
particular, the community-based verification mechanism is faster in providing locally-relevant 
information, is more compatible with individual needs during a disaster response, and 
emphasises data openness. In the case of the Jalin Merapi network, those particular 
characteristics have led to trust in disaster communication.  
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This thesis does not necessarily suggest adopting community-based verification mechanisms 
for official disaster communication processes. Unlike Jalin Merapi‘s community-based 
informal movement, the local governments have to face penalties both from the law and the 
public if they share faulty information. Moreover, the local government is responsible for all 
lives in their territories; thus, one simple mistake may impact a lot of lives, with potentially 
fatal consequences. However, I argue that engaging the affected community as active 
information verifiers is worth combining with official disaster communication, especially 
because of the ability to encourage trust in disaster communication as shown in this case study 




























By specifically investigating the case study of Jalin Merapi during the 2010 Merapi eruption, 
this thesis provides an in-depth understanding of trustworthy and participatory community-
based disaster communication in responding to a disaster. The thesis used the methods of in-
depth interviews and focus group interviews in gathering data and the constructivist grounded 
theory in analysing data. The data analysis constructed a framework for understanding 
trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication. Therefore, this final 
chapter summarises the research arguments by referring to the research questions about the 
community perspective on trustworthy and community-engaging official disaster 
communication, whether community capital encourages trustworthiness and collective 
participation, and the processes of community participation in a networked disaster 
communication. The chapter will discuss the contributions of this thesis to theoretical and 
practical knowledge, reflect on some limitations of the research and offer suggestions for 
future research.  
 
8.1. What do the members of the affected community regard as trustworthy and 
community-engaging official disaster communication in responding to the Mt. Merapi 
eruption? 
On the part of the affected community, this research identified that official behaviour by local 
authorities in the Merapi region of Indonesia has a strong influence on the trustworthiness of 
their disaster communication. Trust in official disaster communication is not a 
straightforward result of formal message design and using the most up to date media. 
Specifically, the interviewed local communities living on the Mt. Merapi slopes mistrust the 
official disaster communication for three main reasons.  
Firstly, the interviewed community members distrusted the officials because they perceived 
that officials were secretive about disaster information. This perception was perpetuated by 
the community‘s experiences of having received delayed, critically-close-to-emergency 
information, or no official information at all, during disaster responses since the 1994 Merapi 
eruption. Secondly, the interviewed community members perceived that officials were not 
fully committed to the local communities‘ safety during a disaster response, as the 
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government agencies tended to share only information that was useful for the authorities 
rather than for the affected community. This understanding is based on the differences 
between the community‘s cultural needs, and the local governments‘ focus on hazard-related 
scientific logic and economic-political national interests, in appraising the risk of the volcanic 
hazards of Mt. Merapi. Thirdly, interviewed community members mistrusted the officials 
because of the lack of interactivity in official disaster communication, which indicated that 
local governments do not value community feedback. The local governments have adopted 
the unidirectional, top-down and bureaucratic communication model in both their 
conventional ―offline‖ and online disaster communication.  
The findings demonstrate that many of the affected community around Mt Merapi regards 
official disaster communication as trustworthy and community-engaging when the local 
governments provide (1) prompt and accessible information reflecting complete official 
disaster information, (2) recognition of the community‘s local knowledge and concerns, and 
(3) community engagement through interactivity. When the affected community regards the 
local government as being unable to provide those, it can lose confidence in the government‘s 
actions and so lose trust in the accuracy or usefulness of information provided by the 
government, regardless of the local community‘s urgent need for information in responding 
to a disaster. 
On the part of the local government, the informational delay and inaccessibility, which have 
made the local governments appear secretive, results from two main conditions: the 
information silos within the cluster design and sectoral bureaucracy adopted by the local 
governments, and the absence of a direct mechanism for the officials to communicate with 
the affected community in a timely manner. Specifically, each government agency manages 
information based on its main functions, which further forms information silos in the official 
disaster communication. Consequently, when a community member does not know which 
information silo belongs to which agencies, they will not know where to look for the 
appropriate information during a disaster response. Similarly on the part of the authorities, 
the information silos prevent a timely response to the critical need for information from 
communities. Moreover, the authorities tend to generalize their message design and the 
audience of their disaster information. The generalizations are often inappropriate for 
responding to the individual demands for specific types of official and locally-based 
information from the authorities. As a result, again, the official disaster communication may 
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become inaccessible and slow in sharing information to the community living on the slopes 
of Mt. Merapi, which most likely further reduces perceptions of trust. 
Similarly to the local community‘s mistrust in official information, many of those responsible 
for information in local governments have regarded community-based disaster 
communication in this research as untrustworthy, unreliable and unverified; although the 
local governments have acknowledged the community‘s capacity for voluntary collective 
actions and providing local disaster information. In particular, the local governments have 
regarded the local communities living on the Mt. Merapi slopes as risk averse and likely to 
panic, and too easily led by their cultural understanding of Mt. Merapi rather than science. As 
a result, the local governments have consciously only engaged the affected community to a 
limited extent in their official disaster communication, and this lack of community 
engagement has in turn reduced community trust in the official disaster communication. 
The perspectives of both the affected community and the local governments bring us further 
to the conclusion that reciprocal trust is influenced heavily by the behaviours of disaster 
communication of each party. In official disaster communication, the governments‘ 
behaviours in providing promptness, accessibility, interactivity, community engagement, and 
perceiving risk affect the degree of trust of the affected community. Subsequently, the level 
of the community‘s trust in the official disaster communication affects the community‘s 
behaviours in their community-based disaster communication. When the community distrusts 
the local governments, they are unlikely to cooperate with the local government and maintain 
their confidence in it during a disaster response; additionally, this lack of confidence can lead 
to an excessive risk perception. On the part of the local governments, the community‘s 
reluctance to cooperate and excessive risk perception have been considered to prevent the 
community responding to a disaster effectively, which leads further to a lack of trust in the 
community-based disaster communication. Furthermore, when the authorities do not trust the 
affected community as an equally capable partner, they are unlikely to engage with it. Again, 
from the perspective of the affected community, a lack of community engagement can 
increase the level of distrust in the official disaster communication. 
Therefore, in order to encourage trust in official disaster communication, this thesis provides 
three fundamental suggestions. Firstly, it is important to develop more transparent and 
immediate official information sharing by using accessible communication technology, in 
order to facilitate the community‘s real-time access to official disaster information. Secondly, 
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the local governments need to give the local communities more recognition for their own 
ways of knowing and understanding Mt. Merapi. This can be done by combining the 
scientific risk assessment applied by the authorities with the socio-cultural knowledge of the 
local community that influences individual interpretation of disaster information. Thirdly, it is 
important to engage the affected community as information couriers in official disaster 
communication. This research shows that engaging the affected community with more 
prompt information can encourage trust and, furthermore, community willingness to 
corporate with government agencies in official disaster communication.  
 
8.2. How can community-based disaster communication be regarded as trustworthy and 
facilitate community participation in a disaster response? 
When referring to the reciprocal trust between the affected community and the local 
government, identifying the trustworthy aspects of community communication may be useful 
to decrease the government‘s doubt in community-based disaster communication, and, 
subsequently, increase the affected community‘s degree of trust in the local governments. 
This thesis describes the social capital engaged by the Jalin Merapi network that successfully 
encouraged trust in the community-generated information shared by the network in the 2010 
Merapi eruption. Particularly, the engaged social capital takes the forms of culturally-
embedded disaster communication and the tie strength of the local social network, built by 
the volunteers of the community radio stations who are already embedded in the local 
communities and trusted by the locals. 
8.2.1. How can culturally-embedded communication encourage trust and collective 
participation in community-based disaster communication? 
Through the case of the Jalin Merapi network, this thesis argues that culturally-embedded 
disaster communication performed by the affected community effectively increases the level 
of understanding and trustworthiness of the community-generated disaster information. 
Particularly, the culturally-embedded disaster communication in this research uses local 
language and engages psychologically familiar cultural knowledge in disaster 
communication. When the disaster information is delivered in the local language used by the 
affected community, it increases the level of understanding, reduces misunderstandings, and 
encourages community trust because of the familiarity it has created. Disaster information in 
the local language is also regarded as trustworthy by the people outside the affected areas for 
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its authenticity as locally-based information coming from the affected community. In addition 
to using local language, adopting the local cultural geomyths in disaster communication 
makes disaster information more understandable than a scientific explanation, for all levels of 
the local community, because it can contextualise the knowledge with their daily life.  
The particular argument that cultural engagement encourages trust supports previous research 
that argues that cultural values have a positive association with trust (Guion et al., 2007, 
Romo‐Murphy et al., 2011, Veszteg et al., 2015, Uslaner, 1999, Widén-Wulff et al., 2008). 
The argument also counterbalances previous research  that identifies the negative effects of 
the local cultural beliefs on the risk perception of the local communities living on the Mt. 
Merapi slopes (Butt, 2014, Donovan, 2010, Donovan et al., 2012, Dove, 2008, Lavigne et al., 
2008, Schlehe, 1996). 
8.2.2. How can the tie strength of local networks encourage trust and collective 
participation in community-based disaster communication?  
Through the case of the Jalin Merapi network this thesis argues that strongly-tied individuals 
(the volunteers of community radio stations, in this case) played important roles in 
distributing information among the members of the affected community and encouraging 
trust in disaster communication. In particular, strongly-tied individuals who share common 
community membership and have personal relationships with disaster victims, have the 
knowledge of the local language and culture required to access useful information about 
fragile disaster victims, so a disaster response can be designed appropriately for their specific 
needs. Without this kind of information, outside humanitarian aid workers often have to 
struggle for access to fragile disaster victims. As well as gathering local information from the 
affected community, the strongly-tied individuals are useful for sharing information into the 
affected community because of their personal social network and their knowledge of who 
talks to whom, about what, via which media, as well as local media accessibility in the 
affected community, and the reliable local information nodes who play important roles in 
information sharing on a regular basis. The argument that strong ties effectively facilitate 
information sharing within the affected community mirrors the research of Opsahl et al. 
(2010), Putnam (1993, 2000), and Uslaner (1999) that supports the effectiveness of strongly-
tied social networks in facilitating internal information diffusion. 
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Moreover, when community members receive information from their friends or people with 
whom they have close relationships, the information is most likely to be considered to be 
trustworthy and reliable by the community members. Engaging strongly-tied individuals can 
clarify which information sources are perceived as guaranteeing information validity and, 
further, encouraging trustworthiness. The argument that strongly-tied social networks 
encourage trust supports the previous research (Bouchillon, 2014, Opsahl et al., 2010, 
Putnam, 1993, Sias and Wyers, 2001, Uslaner, 1999, Murayama et al., 2013, Fisher, 2013, 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011, Haythornthwaite, 2005, Putnam, 2000) about the close 
relationship between trust and a strongly-tied social network.  
Slightly differently from the strong-ties, the weakly-tied individuals played important roles in 
external information sharing from the affected community to those outside the affected areas, 
and vice-versa, and indirect trust encouragement in disaster communication. The weakly-tied 
individuals in the Jalin Merapi network enabled the affected community to share information 
with the outsiders and gain new information from them. The argument mirrors the previous 
studies (Fisher, 2013, Lin, 2001, Widén-Wulff et al., 2008, Granovetter, 1973, Valente and 
Fujimoto, 2010, Hansen, 1999, Borgatti and Halgin, 2011, Johnson, 2007) about the abilities 
of weak ties to bridge information between different social networks and to provide access to 
new information from those beyond an individual‘s close-community network.  
Moreover, engaging weakly-tied individuals has an indirect effect on trust encouragement 
compared to the direct effect of the strongly-tied individuals. Specifically, the weakly-tied 
individuals extended the trust initiated by the strong ties of the Merapi people with personal 
recommendations on Jalin Merapi‘s trustworthiness within the extended networks. This 
argument mirrors the study by Granovetter (1973), Fisher (2013), and Haythornthwaite 
(2005) regarding the positive association between trust and weak ties. However, together with 
Bouchillon (2014) and Widén-Wulff et al. (2008), this research shows that the trust 
encouraged by weak ties is thin and unsustained. The interactions and trust among the 
weakly-tied individuals can easily vanish because of their dependency on temporarily shared 
interest, the medium used to connect with other group members, and the key actors. In the 
Jalin Merapi network, the weakly-tied individuals‘ interactions were encouraged by their 
shared interest in the temporary event of the 2010 eruption and facilitated by social media. 
When the facilitating social media or the hazardous eruption of Mt. Merapi is no longer 
available, the weakly-tied individuals will lose their interest in maintaining continuous 
interaction; this argument is similar to the studies regarding the collapse of a sense of 
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community in a social network that consists of weak ties in online community 
(Haythornthwaite, 2005, Miller, 2011). Moreover, the indirect trust embodied in weak ties is 
unlikely to survive a key actor turnover, which in this case would be the volunteers of the 
community radio stations. 
 
8.3. How does the affected community participate in community-based disaster 
communication through media multiplexity? 
The trust encouraged by the culturally-embedded communication and the tie strength of local 
social networks leads further to individual willingness to participate and collaborate with 
others in a collective action of community-based disaster communication. To the general 
public, the Jalin Merapi network was well–known for collective participation by the affected 
community in providing, sharing, and verifying very specific local information, which made it 
became trustworthy community-based disaster communication accordingly. In order to be 
able to do so, I identified that the Jalin Merapi network engaged an integrated media 
multiplexity rooted in the local communication behaviours and existing local social networks 
of the affected community members. By combining those two, the affected community could 
participate in disaster communication conveniently in trustworthy familiar friend-to-friend 
networks. 
8.3.1. Media multiplexity in participatory disaster communication 
To enable the affected community to participate conveniently, I argue that the multiple media 
used in disaster communication needs to be based on the existing local communication 
behaviours, integrated in a platform, and flexible. During the 2010 Merapi eruption, the Jalin 
Merapi network used multiple media that were selected based on the specific patterns of 
media usage tied into the existing information flows and the way local people communicated 
with each other in local disaster communication about Mt. Merapi. Specifically, people may 
use different media from another, in accordance with the Uses and Gratification Theory 
(Rubin, 1994) and Channel Complementarity Theory regarding individual media selection. 
Thus, a particular medium may have different levels of exposure and accessibility between 
different individuals. Closely engaging the individuals‘ patterns of media usage may promote 
community participation in disaster communication because they can easily seek or share 
information conveniently through the media that they feel most comfortable with and can use 
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most easily. This research shows that familiarity with the media used in disaster 
communication plays a significant role in promoting community participation.  
In addition to building on existing local communication behaviours, this research shows the 
importance of compiling the simultaneously engaged media into an accessible platform. This 
can simplify the processes of seeking information in multiple media and transferring 
information from one medium to another when an individual often uses multiple media in 
seeking and sharing disaster communication (BBC, 2012, Palen, 2008, Reagan, 1996). The 
compilation is also useful for connecting different individuals, even different community 
groups, with different media preferences in their disaster communication. Moreover, I argue 
that the compilation of the multiple media is useful for overcoming the limitations of each 
engaged medium by utilising the strength of the other media. Comparing offline with online 
media, the affected community around Mt. Merapi is more familiar with offline means of 
communication, such as two-way radio and face-to-face communication, which facilitates 
communication, but is less available to the general public. Hence, combining the familiar 
traditional channels of communication with the internet-based communication technologies 
provide exposure to broader audiences and familiarity in disaster communication. 
Moreover, I argue that flexible media multiplexity can be effective for adapting to the 
uncertainties of a disaster, which may lead further to changes of media usage and information 
demands of the affected community. In this research, flexibility is exemplified by the change 
in the number of media engaged in the media multiplexity, as the number can be increased or 
decreased based on the changes in the information demands of the target audience. 
Supporting Shannon et al. (2014), flexibility in disaster communication, in general, is more 
likely to be provided by an informal community-based network consisting of fluid friendships 
than the official bureaucratic and bottom-up structure.  
8.3.2. Community participation in community-based disaster communication 
In this research, community participation is classified into three main forms: providing 
information, sharing information, and verifying information (Palen et al., 2010, Palen, 2008). 
Firstly, the affected community members are the first responders who have experienced the 
disaster themselves. Thus, they can provide specific disaster information about the condition 
of the affected areas, the possibility of upcoming hazards, the condition, numbers, 
demography, locations and specific needs of the survivors, aid distribution, and the 
requirement for volunteers based on personal experiences and visual and audio observation of 
256 
 
the surroundings. Additionally, they can provide warnings about potential local hazardous 
threats based on their knowledge of what happens daily in their own environment where the 
disaster occurred, and their cultural beliefs. Facilitating community participation in providing 
local information, those with better access to communication technologies can play an 
important role as trusted information couriers in mediating between those with limited access 
to communication technologies and the outsiders. The role of information couriers is more 
effective if it is played by affected community members themselves rather than humanitarian 
volunteers who are outside the local social networks. I argue that the fragile affected 
community finds it more culturally and linguistically convenient to entrust their personal 
disaster information to familiar faces. This argument is also analogous to the findings of 
Mohr (1992) and Perez-Lugo (2004) who emphasized the significance of social networks in 
connecting isolated individuals to the outsiders in a natural disaster response. 
Secondly, this research argues the importance of distinguishing information shared based on 
the specific demands of the affected community and the demands of the general public (as the 
worried well). During the 2010 Merapi eruption, the Jalin Merapi network divided its target 
audiences into the general public (those outside the affected community) and the affected 
community. Based on the distinctive priorities of information demands between those two, 
the Jalin Merapi network shared information about the needs of the evacuees to the general 
public, and information about Mt. Merapi‘s status from the BPPTKG, lahars from the two-
way radio users, and aid supplies from donors to the affected community.  
In practice, Jalin Merapi applied a cross-posting strategy to share information through 
multiple media. By posting the same vital information from one medium in(on)to other 
media, the cross-posting strategy increases message prominence and message exposure to the 
target audiences who are using different media at the same time. This finding is similar to the 
studies of Austin et al. (2012), Dougall et al. (2008), and Jaeger et al. (2007) that suggest the 
redundancy of transmitting the same key messages across multiple platforms is effective for 
encouraging audiences to be more responsive to disaster information. In posting community-
generated information across different media, I argue that compiling the detailed information 
in a continuously-updated and accessible database can be extremely useful for setting 
information priorities and simplifying the process of information seeking of the target 
audiences. Further, the updated and compiled information can speed up the response because 
it eliminates the need to spend time gathering scattered information.  
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In addition to the cross-posting strategy, the Jalin Merapi network engaged the volunteers of 
the community radio stations as couriers for information sharing to the affected community. 
As parts of the affected community themselves, these information couriers could use their 
personal social network for sharing information with their disaster-affected friends and 
families, as well as their knowledge of local information nodes who could act as the initial 
points for forwarding information to other community members. In this research, the local 
information couriers were effective for overcoming the absence of direct mechanisms of 
delivering official disaster communication to the affected community and connecting the 
available supplies of aid from outsiders to the specific demands of the affected community, 
even the smallest or the uncommon ones. 
Thirdly, in addition to identifying the roles of the affected community in providing and 
sharing disaster information, this research also argues the important role of the affected 
community in verifying information on the ground. The case of the Jalin Merapi network 
showed that the affected community voluntarily participated in verifiying the accuracy of the 
information associated with their surroundings. Not just directly investigating the situation on 
ground, community members used their trusted personal networks to ask people living in less 
accessible areas for information. In other words, they extended the verifier networks by using 
their personal networks to fill in the ‗blank spots‘ of information verifiers; so, the process of 
information verification could encompass all of the affected area.  
In verifying information, the Jalin Merapi network did not just depend on the affected 
community, it also applied internal verification mechanisms by using its Facebook groups, 
direct phone-calls to the people providing information, and a cross-media strategy. Moreover, 
in order to maintain the validity and accountability of information, Jalin Merapi included the 
references to the time when the information was being shared to ensure the novelty of the 
information, the contact number of the person who was responsible for the information being 
shared, and the location associated with the shared information. Likewise, the Jalin Merapi 
network published a continuously-updated and accessible report about supplies of aid (e.g. 
types of available aid, donors) and aid distribution (e.g. date of distribution, location(s) of 
distribution, beneficiary). Including references to time, information source, and location, and 
publishing the aid report demonstrates accountability and, further, increases the 
trustworthiness of a community-based network such as Jalin Merapi. 
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As well as verifying information accuracy, this research also emphasises the need for real-
time verification that can keep pace with the speed the situation changes during a disaster 
response. The difficulty in keeping up with the fast pace of changes has become a limitation 
of the bureaucratic process of official information verification. In this research, the Jalin 
Merapi network managed this by publishing information about the needs of the survivors 
before the information was verified, revising it later if it was verified as inaccurate. In 
contrast, the information about Mt. Merapi‘s hazards had to be verified before being 
published. As a result, this research shows, the particular mechanism indeed can be faster than 
the official verification mechanism and respond to those who really needed help immediately. 
Yet, the mechanism is still vulnerable to fraud. Thus, it is unlikely to be adopted by the local 
governments in their official disaster communication because it does not fit with the 
institutional logic of accountability. 
The publication of unverified information about the needs of the survivors was not the only 
controversy between the Jalin Merapi network and the local governments. This research 
identified that publicly-verified information is not necessarily accepted as verified by the local 
governments. The main argument for not accepting it is that the local governments‘ definition 
of valid information is verification by a valid scientific methodology, experts, or the 
authorities. Although a piece of information has been verified by a community member, the 
information is unlikely to be accepted as valid information by the local governments if it is 
not authorised by an official or scientifically verified by the experts. On the other hand, the 
public verification fits the community‘s definition of valid and trustworthy information. 
Consequently, although it is controversial at the government level, this research presents the 
value of combining the mechanisms of community-based information sharing and verification 
engaging the affected community, such the ones used by the Jalin Merapi network, into the 
official disaster communication. This is because of their abilities to share local-related 
information, which is needed by the affected community and has been absent in the official 
disaster communication, and to encourage trust at the individual level. 
Similarly to many studies using grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006, Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
Glaser, 1978, Hansen, 2009, Miller and Salkind, 2002), the conceptual relationships between 
the findings of this thesis are presented in the systematic diagram/ model below. The 
argument behind the modelling/diagramming is to provide a visual representation of the 
abstract and complex connections among the social capital of an affected community, trust, 
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Figure 27. Framework of trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication.  
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8.4. Thesis contributions to theory building and practical knowledge 
Adopting the methodology of grounded theory, this thesis aims to develop concepts of 
trustworthy and participatory community-based disaster communication that can be applied 
more widely and beyond the literature. Aligning with previous research such as those of 
Bankoff et al. (2015) and Troll et al. (2015), this thesis emphasises that disaster 
communication needs to start moving from the supply-driven approach based on the priorities 
of outsiders to the demand-driven approach based on the priorities of the affected community 
in order to ensure trustworthiness and effectiveness. Particularly, this thesis frames the 
demand-driven approach by directly involving the local actors, the affected community, to 
gain more accurate understanding of the insider perspective. Moreover, engaging the local 
actors, and simultaneously engaging their social capital, enables the affected community to 
perform their own community-based disaster communication in a way that is suitable to their 
local context. In practice, this thesis answers the global calls of the United Nations in the 
Sendai Framework (2015) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies in its World Disaster Report (2015) for a people-centered approach by 
engaging the participation of local actors to establish efficient and accountable humanitarian 
responses. 
This thesis is also significant in responding to the lack of attention by existing research to 
how disaster communication is considered trustworthy by the affected community, and how it 
can increase collective participation. The failure of most research into disaster 
communication to recognize the way an affected community regards trustworthiness based on 
their perspectives of a hazard has also been raised by some scholars such Ferrante (2010), 
Reinhardt (2015), and Steelman et al. (2015). Responding to the lack of attention paid to the 
affected community, this thesis contributes a detailed perspective on an affected community 
into the existing research on disaster communication. Moreover, this thesis provides the 
community perspective from a developing country, which has been less explored and less 
well-documented in existing research about disaster communication. 
For the affected community, one of the qualities of disaster communication that is considered 
able to encourage trust is that it engages the community‘s communication capacity. Yet, 
engaging community members in disaster communication often ends up with the debate 
about whether the information provided by the community members is trustworthy or not. 
Together with Johnson (2007) and Steelman et al. (2015), this thesis takes a position on the 
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debate by arguing that community-based disaster communication can be regarded as 
trustworthy by an affected community when it engages the local socio-cultural knowledge 
and the tie strength of the local social networks.  Expanding on the others‘ research, the thesis 
can contribute details about the socio-cultural aspects of an affected community that can 
encourage trust at the individual level and facilitate collective participation in disaster 
communication at the community level, namely culturally-embedded communication. More 
specifically, the argument that culturally-embedded communication encourages trust can 
contribute to the significance of engaging culture into the existing research on crisis 
communication; as Fronz (2012) and Hewitt (1983) have acknowledged that the existing 
theories of crisis communication have treated socio-cultural factors as less significant than 
other communication factors. Moreover, this thesis has shown that the existing strongly-tied 
social network and trust (and distrust) among disaster-affected community members, and 
their local cultural knowledge are not disrupted in the same way as the mass-mediated and 
institutionalised structures can be affected by an extreme disaster such the 2010 Merapi 
eruption. Instead, they are strengthened by being used intensively during a disaster response. 
As well as contributing to theoretical knowledge, this thesis also has the same practical 
implications for designing trustworthy disaster communication. The understanding of how an 
affected community perceives trustworthiness in this thesis can be useful for emergency 
managers designing their disaster communication to fit community perceptions and ensure 
the community‘s trust accordingly. Moreover, the argument that culturally-embedded 
communication encourages trust can be useful for bridging the historically existing gap 
between the community-based informal approach and an organisational formal approach in 
disaster communication. Integrating socio-cultural knowledge in official assessment can 
overcome the incompatibility between some cultural beliefs adopted by an affected 
community and the scientific approach adopted by the experts and the authorities. This 
integration also can be another way to translate the scientifically technical disaster-related 
information of the experts into language that can be easily understood by the lay public such 
as the affected community. When experts (including the authorities) and the affected 
community reach the same level of understanding, dialogues and fruitful interactions between 
both parties are most likely to happen. In other words, this thesis can be a valuable empirical 
example for emergency managers to understand the appropriate efforts of disaster 
communication in disaster-prone areas that are very much affected by the local culture, such 
as the 2010 Merapi eruption in Indonesia.  
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Additionally, understanding how a specific social tie influences disaster communication is 
useful for designing a conducive and trustworthy ―environment‖ for disaster communication 
to facilitate collective participation and effective information sharing within a specific target 
audience, such as the affected community or the general public. This benefits emergency 
managers in designing their disaster communication, and also benefits the affected 
community members. Individuals can have the ability to choose a specific local social 
network or a combination of strong and weak ties, which can provide the trustworthy 
information they require, and avoid information overload and exposure to irrelevant 
information. The ability increases the capacity of the affected community for effective 
disaster communication and, further, an effective disaster response. 
Not only useful for designing trustworthy disaster communication, this thesis also has the 
same practical implication in designing participatory disaster communication. Specifically, 
the understanding of media multiplexity in this thesis can contribute knowledge to emergency 
managers regarding selecting and using media that can make the process of participation 
more convenient for the affected community. The argument that media usage needs to be 
based on the existing local communication behaviours of the affected community is 
particularly important in responding to the recent tendency to suddenly introduce a new 
platform of communication technology as a novel solution in communicating with the 
affected community every time a disaster occurs. Imposing a new platform of communication 
technology by overlooking the local pattern of disaster communication can harm the 
accessibility of disaster information. It changes how the information can be accessed, and by 
whom (Haythornthwaite, 2005). It also means forcing the communities to instantly change 
their formerly-established communication behaviours, which is extremely difficult to do 
during an emergency situation. The argument to avoid being too focused on the latest tech 
solutions also conveys the importance of community relations within the media themselves. 
Having a solid relationship with the community may provide knowledge about types of 
information needed by the community and trustworthy local information sources. The 
knowledge, further, can assist the media to design and deliver their messages in an 
appropriate way for the community.   
This thesis also contributes a reminder of the roles of the traditional means of 
communication, which still exist and are still used by the local communities, to the research 
and the practice of disaster communication. This reminder is necessary for responding to the 
increasingly-popular focus of existing research on disaster communication (e.g. Crowe, 2011; 
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Palen and Liu, 2007; and Sutton et al., 2008) and humanitarian activities using the internet-
based media as the most novel and in-trend communication technologies, so that the old-
fashioned means of communication are often left behind in disaster communication. Some 
traditional means of communication, indeed, may be inferior to the internet-based media in 
relation to the ability to rapidly share disaster information from one point to multi-points. 
However, this research shows that the old-fashioned means of communication embody the 
familiar and existing communication capacity of the community. As familiarity leads to 
effectiveness and trustworthiness, combining the traditional means of communication and the 
novel internet-based media can contribute effectiveness and trustworthiness into disaster 
communication dedicated to the affected community and also to the general public. 
Particularly for Indonesia, this thesis highlights the importance of setting up disaster 
community-based information network in disaster-vulnerable areas and integrating 
community-based information system with the official disaster information system. These 
ideas can be applied by involving multiple parties in disaster communication such as the 
disaster-affected community members, local community media, and the local authorities. Yet, 
it is important to acknowledge that involving multiple parties may risk having multiple 
overlapping information sources. Responding to that risk, the local authorities can play an 
important role as an ―umbrella‖ networking the involved parties as the Jalin Merapi network 
did in networking the community radio stations surrounding Mt. Merapi, in order to ensure 
the reliability of information. Moreover, the formal structure of Indonesian disaster 
management has made it possible to design a disaster response based on specific local needs. 
Yet, with 300 ethnic groups and more than 700 languages and dialects, Indonesia needs to 
design its disaster communication in a more culturally-humanistic and less institutionalised 
manner in order to fit the specific local culture of the disaster-affected community. 
Furthermore, rather than only relying on established expertise, the local authorities need to 
acknowledge the importance of community relations in their daily practices by building 
―friendships‘ between the authorities and community on a day-to-day basis. ―Friendship‖ can 
encourage trust between those parties, which can be significantly useful in maintaining trust 
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Appendix A: Interview guidelines, information sheet, and interview schedule for the 
semi-structure in-depth interviews. 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
For Combine Resource Institution (CRI) 
 
1. What were CRI‘s roles in the development of Jalin Merapi (JM) Networks? Nowadays? 
2. What are the aims of the development of JM? 
3. What were the challenges in JM‘s development? 
4. Who have involved in JM? In what role? 
5. Why were community radio stations and social media selected in the first time? 
(compared to other media) 
6. How was the selection process of the community radio stations to be involved in JM? 
7. How did the local communities accept the JM? Why? Especially related to their 
communication (media preference, infrastructure, literacy rate) and cultural behaviors 
(language, beliefs, etc)?  
8. What are the supporting systems (fund, infrastructure) for JM?  
9. What were the efforts to build JM as a trusted information source?  
10. Is JM sufficient to fulfill communities‘ needs of rapid and reliable information? Why?  
11. How was JM compared with official information management?  
12. Does the local government support the JM? 
13. How can JM contribute and be integrated in official disaster management? 
 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
For Community Radio Stations 
 
1. What are the characteristics (content, audience, etc) of your radio station? 
2. How do you define your radio‘s responsibility to the community regarding to Merapi 
eruption? 
3. Before the development of JM, how did you disseminate information of previous Merapi 
eruption? 
4. How and why did your radio get involved in the development of JM? 
5. Who is responsible on the operational JM in your radio? 
6. How were the roles of your radio station as a stimulus or mediator for community 
participation in JM social media accounts? 
7. Who or what were the sources that provided the information for JM? 
8. How was the information verified? 
9. What kind of information that was mentioned before and after the 2010 Merapi eruption? 
The aims? 
10. How was the information shared to the communities? In what channel? 
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11. Was a specific JM social media account used for a particular information or particular 
audience? 
12. How was the mechanism to respond the communities‘ feedback of the information that 
was mentioned in JM? 
13. How was the mechanism to compile all the information from multiple JM social media 
accounts? 
14. Was it also integrated with official source(s) and other sources? If yes, how? 
15. Did Javanese culture and beliefs have influences on the whole information sharing 
process? How? 
16. What kinds of interference that could disrupt the process of information sharing? 
(bureaucracy? Internet connection? Else?) How? What was the solution? 
 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
For Volunteers 
 
1. How did you know about JM? 
2. Why, when and how you decided to participate in JM as a volunteer? 
3. What was your participation in JM? 
4. What kind of skills and facilities that you needed to participate in JM? 
5. What was the challenge to participate in JM? In what order? How did you cope with? 
6. Did your culture (Javanese) and beliefs have influence on your participation? 
7. Before the development of JM, did you participate in previous Merapi eruption? If yes, 
why and how? 
8. How did you get reliable information of Merapi eruption before the development of JM? 
9. How did you use information from JM before and after the 2010 Merapi eruption? 
10. As a volunteer and a part of local communities, what kind of information did you need 
most? Why? 
11. What kind of information did you provide and share in JM? 
12. Did JM become effective means to fulfill your information need? Why? (Regarding to 
media preference, accessibility, literacy, etc.). 
13. Did you trust JM? Why? 
14. How did you verify the information from JM as it motivated you to help the refugee or 
give donation? (this question will be addressed to someone who is outside the local 
communities) 
15. How do you compare JM, other media (television, newspaper, etc.), and official 
source(s) regarding to their trustworthiness and effectiveness? Why?  
16. Who was in charge to coordinate the volunteers in JM? How? 
17. Did you coordinate with other volunteers, community radio and/or government agencies 
in term of information sharing? If yes, how? 
18. Did you find the practicality of JM Networks in evacuation and aid activities among 





SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
For Audience 
 
1. How did you get reliable information about Merapi before and after the 2010 eruption? 
2. As a part of the local community, what kind of information did you need most? Why? 
3. How did you know about JM? 
4. Did you trust JM? Why? 
5. How did you use information from JM? 
6. Did you share the information that you gained from JM? How? 
7. How did you verify the information from JM when it asked you to help refugees or give 
donations? 
8. What do you think about the compatibility between Jalin Merapi‘s media selection 
(Social media and community radio) and your media preference? 
9. Did JM become an effective means to fulfill your information needs? Why? (Regarding 
media preference, accessibility, literacy, etc.). 
10. How do you compare JM, other media (television, newspaper, etc.), and official 
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Community-based Information Framework in Indonesian Natural Disaster Response 
Information Sheet for Interviewees 
 
I am a PhD candidate in University of Canterbury – New Zealand and also an official of Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (LIPI). I am working on research about how local communities seek, provide, 
verify, and share information mediated by Jalin Merapi networks in responding to the 2010 Merapi 
eruption. Regarding to this research, I am asking for your willingness to participate in an interview. 
 
Your involvement in this research will be as an informant to answer questions in a face to face 
interview for about 45-60 minutes. The questions will be related to your knowledge and participation 
experiences in information sharing mediated by Jalin Merapi in the 2010 Merapi eruption. The 
interview will be recorded. The transcript of the recording will be sent to you to be reviewed and you 
may amend your transcript. The full report or summary of research findings will also be sent to all 
interviewees who are interested in receiving a copy. A token of appreciation will be availabe to 
recompense interviewees‘ time.  
 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any stage without penalty. If you 
withdraw, I will remove information you have provided from the thesis before it is completed at the 
University of Canterbury 
 
You also may choose whether you want your identity to be confidential or not. If you do not want to 
be confidential, your identity will be published. However, if you want to be confidential, you may be 
assured of the complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation. Your identity will not be 
made public without your prior consent. To ensure confidentiality, all participants‘ identities will be 
identified as numbers. All information will be kept confidential to the researcher in locked and secure 
room, stored in password protected computer and will be destroyed after ten years. The results of this 
research will be published and presented in conferences. The thesis that results from this research is a 
public document and it will be publicly available through the UC library. 
 
The research is being carried out as a requirement for PhD degree by Dwie Irmawaty Gultom under 
the supervision of Dr Zita Joyce, who can be contacted at zita.joyce@canterbury.ac.nz. She will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the research. This research has 
been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, and 
participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you are asked to complete the consent form. Your 
participation will be highly appreciated. 
 
 






No Interviewee's name Group Location Age Date 
1 
Adriani dwi kartika 
zulivan JM Volunteer Yogyakarta 31 17 March 2014 
2 Akhmad nasir Combine Yogyakarta 38 17 March 2014 
3 Ambar sari dewi JM Volunteer Yogyakarta 38 25 March 2014 
4 Amron risdianto JM Volunteer Yogyakarta 35 18-Apr-14 
5 Andi verdana Community radio Sleman 23 11 March 2014 
6 Andry setiawan JM audience Klaten 32 5 June 2014 
7 Arie nur pujiantoro JM audience Klaten 32 5 June 2014 
8 Berton panjaitan Government Jakarta   03-Sep-14 
9 Diah triasih agustina JM Volunteer Balikpapan 33 27 May 2014 
10 Dini Government Jakarta   27 March 2014 
11 Eko budi setyawan Community radio Magelang 47 20 March 2014 
12 Elanto wijoyono Combine Yogyakarta 31 17 March 2014 
13 Floribertha widyarsi JM Volunteer Yogyakarta 60 27 May 2014 
14 Gimar JM audience Magelang 47 8 June 2014 
15 Gunawan julianto JM audience Magelang 44 8 June 2014 
16 Kurniawan widiyantoro Community radio Sleman 24 11 March 2014 
17 Letsu vella sundary JM Volunteer Yogyakarta 22 21-Apr-14 
18 Mart widarto Combine Yogyakarta 32 17 March 2014 
19 Muhammad amrun Combine Yogyakarta 32 18-Apr-14 
20 Muhammad sodiq asnawi Community radio Magelang 40 21 March 2014 
21 Mujianto Community radio Boyolali   26-Apr-14 
22 Nursanti retno ramawanti JM audience Sleman 37 24 July 2014 
23 Pandu Community radio Magelang 23 21 March 2014 
24 Putro setyo negoro JM Volunteer Yogyakarta 25 23-Apr-14 
25 Rajab santosa Community radio Magelang 31 21 March 2014 
26 Ratna wulandari JM audience Magelang 40 7 July 2014 
27 Sarjino adji JM audience Klaten 36 22 July 2014 
28 Setiyoko JM audience Magelang 26 8 June 2014 
29 Son haji Community radio Magelang 35 21 March 2014 
30 Sukiman Community radio Klaten 44 6 May 2014 
31 Supadi JM audience Klaten 37 22 July 2014 
32 Suryo purnomo JM audience Magelang 29 8 June 2014 
33 Totok hartanto Combine Yogyakarta 30 12 March 2014 
34 Wahyu kurniawan JM Volunteer Yogyakarta 27 18-Apr-14 
35 Yando zakaria JM audience Sleman 55 26 June 2014 
36 
Focus group (7 
participants) Government Magelang   19 June 2014 
37 
Focus group (7 






Appendix B: Focus group guidelines, information sheet, and invitation letters for the 
focus group interviews. 
FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS 
1. How does the official disaster information flow between the government agencies in 
responding to Mt. Merapi eruption? Is there any legislative foundation? 
2. How does the government decide which information that has to be prioritized to be 
disseminated to the public? 
3. What is the supporting data required in the official disaster communication? Is there any 
agency who act as an accesible bank data for the public? 
4. What is the media selection used in information dissemination, both between government 
agencies, and between the government agencies and the public? Why? 
5. What is the roles of community radio stations dan the users of two-way radio in the 
official disaster communication? Are they treated as information sources or as 
information sources to deliver official information to the public? 
6. How is the usage of internet-based media in the official disaster communication? 
7. How does the government coordinate with and engage the local communities in the 
formal disaster response, particularly in disaster communication and decision-making? 
8. How does the local government percieve the trustworthiness and the accuracy of 
community-based disaster communication? 
9. How do you compare the information network of the government, mass media and 
community-based information network, regarding its efectiveness, accessibility, 
trustworthiness, and accuracy?  
10. How is the consideration of the official disaster information-disclosure for the public, 
regarding the information type, the time, and the media selection?  
11. How can community contribute in the process of decision making in formal disaster 
management? 
12. What are the challenges in integrating the mechanism of community-based information 
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Community-based Information Framework in Indonesian Natural Disaster Response 
Information Sheet for Focus Group Participants 
 
I am a PhD candidate in University of Canterbury – New Zealand and also an official of Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (LIPI). I am working on research about how local communities seek, provide, 
verify, and share information mediated by Jalin Merapi networks in responding to the 2010 Merapi 
eruption. Regarding this research, I am asking for your willingness to participate in a focus group. 
 
Your involvement in this research will be as a participant to answer and discuss questions in a focus 
group for up to 2 hours. The questions will be related to your knowledge and experiences in 
information sharing mediated by Jalin Merapi in the 2010 Merapi eruption. The discussion will focus 
on how community-based information can contribute to and be integrated into authorized responses in 
responding to a disaster. The focus group will be video recorded. The transcript of the recording will 
be sent to you to be reviewed and you may amend your transcript. The full report or summary of 
research findings will also be sent to all participants who are interested in receiving a copy. A token of 
appreciation will be availabe to recompense participants‘ time. 
 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any stage without penalty. If you 
withdraw, I will remove information you have provided from the thesis before it is completed at the 
University of Canterbury. 
 
You also may choose whether you want your identity to be confidential or not. If you do not want to 
be confidential, your identity will be published. However, if you want to be confidential, you may be 
assured of the complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation. Your identity will not be 
made public without your prior consent. To ensure confidentiality, all participants‘ identities will be 
identified as numbers. All information will be kept confidential to the researcher in locked and secure 
room, stored in password protected computer and will be destroyed after ten years. The result of this 
research will be published and presented in conferences. The thesis that results from this research is a 
public document and it will be publicly available through the UC library. 
 
The research is being carried out as a requirement for PhD degree by Dwie Irmawaty Gultom under 
the supervision of Dr Zita Joyce, who can be contacted at zita.joyce@canterbury.ac.nz. She will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the research. This research has 
been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, and 
participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 




If you agree to participate in this study, you are asked to complete the consent form. Your 
participation will be highly appreciated. 
 




Appendix C: Consent form for the research participants.   
 
Department of Media and Communication 
Telephone: +642108456842 (New Zealand), +628122732002 (Indonesia) 
Email: dwie.gultom@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Community-based Information Framework in Indonesian Natural Disaster Response 
Consent Form for Confidential Participants 
 
I have been given a full explanation of this research and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
 
I understand that participation is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw at any time without 
penalty. If I withdraw, information I have provided will be removed from the thesis before it is 
completed at the University of Canterbury. 
 
I understand that any information or opinion I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher and 
that any published or reported results will not publish my identity or my institution. I understand that 
the thesis that results from this research is a public document and will be publicly available through 
the UC Library. 
 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in a locked and secure room, stored in 
password protected computer and will be destroyed after ten years. 
 
I understand the there is no risk associated with taking part in this research. 
 
I understand that I will receive the transcript of the recording and I am able to amend it.  
 
I understand that if I am interested to have a copy of full report or summary of the research findings, I 
can ask the researcher to sent it to me.  
 
I understand that I can contact the researcher (Dwie Irmawaty Gultom at 
dwie.gultom@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or supervisor (Dr Zita Joyce at zita.joyce@canterbury.ac.nz) for 
futher information. If I have any complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 













Department of Media and Communication 
Telephone: +642108456842 (New Zealand), +628122732002 (Indonesia) 
Email: dwie.gultom@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Community-based Information Framework in Indonesian Natural Disaster Response 
Consent Form for Non Confidential Participants 
 
I have been given a full explanation of this research and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
 
I understand that participation is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw at any time without 
penalty. If I withdraw, information I have provided will be removed from the thesis before it is 
completed at the University of Canterbury. 
 
I understand that any information or opinion I provide will not be kept confidential and that any 
published or reported results will publish my identity or my institution. I understand that the thesis 
that results from this research is a public document and will be publicly available through the UC 
Library. 
 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in a locked and secure room, stored in 
password protected computer and will be destroyed after ten years. 
 
I understand the there is no risk associated with taking part in this research. 
 
I understand that I will receive the transcript of the recording and I am able to amend it.  
 
I understand that if I am interested to have a copy of full report or summary of the research findings, I 
can ask the researcher to sent it to me.  
 
I understand that I can contact the researcher (Dwie Irmawaty Gultom at 
dwie.gultom@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or supervisor (Dr Zita Joyce at zita.joyce@canterbury.ac.nz) for 
futher information. If I have any complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 








Appendix D: The approval of Human Ethics Committee and the research permits of the 
Indonesian government. 
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